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SUMMARIES OF CASE LAW RELATED TO ARTICLE 10 ECHR (BY DIRK
VOORHOOF)
Selection of 100 judgments (1979-July 2011) of
the European Court of Human Rights 
on Freedom of Expression, Media and Journalists
(www.echr.coe.int – HUDOC)
Nrs. 1-90 selected and summarised by Dirk VOOR-
HOOF
Nr. 91-100 selected and summarised by Dirk
VOORHOOF and Ronan Ó FATHAIGH
Article 10 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expres-
sion. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public author-
ity  and regardless of frontiers. This article shall
not prevent States from requiring  the licensing
of broadcasting, television or cinema enterpris-
es.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries
with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are neces-
sary  in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the pro-
tection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information re-
ceived in confidence, or for maintaining the au-
thority and impartiality of the judiciary."
1.- Sunday Times (n° 1) v. the United Kingdom,
26 April 1979 (contempt of court, presumption
of innocence, trial by newspaper, injunction or-
der, prior restraint)
The first case in which the Court had to take a de-
cision on the merits in respect of freedom of ex-
pression and information in the context of jour-
nalistic reporting by the press was in the
Sunday Times (n° 1) case. In this judgment the
Court emphasised that freedom of expression
constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society. Subject to paragraph 2 of Ar-
ticle 10, it is applicable not only to information
or ideas that are favourably received or re-
garded as inoffensive or as a matter of indif-
ference, but also to those that offend, shock or
disturb the State or any sector of the popula-
tion. This freedom is subject to the exceptions set
out in Article 10 § 2, which must, however, be in-
terpreted narrowly. The Court held that there
had been a violation of Article 10 by reason of an
injunction restraining the publication in the Sun-
day Times of an article concerning a drug and the
litigation linked to its use (thalidomide case).
The injunction, based on the English law on con-
tempt of court, was not found to be "necessary in
a democratic society".
The Court held that the courtroom being a fo-
rum for the settlements of disputes did not mean
"that there can be no prior discussion of disputes
elsewhere, be it in specialised journals, in the gen-
eral press or amongst the public at large". It is
recognised that the courts cannot operate in a
vacuum and that the press must be in the pos-
sibility to report about the administration of
justice, which serves the interests of the com-
munity at large and requires the co-operation
of an enlightened public. It is emphasised that
the media have not only the task of imparting
such information and ideas: the public has also a
right to receive them. The Court observed that
the thalidomide disaster was a matter of undis-
puted public concern and that the public had
the right to be properly informed. The Court
concluded that the interference complained of by
the Sunday Times did indeed not correspond to a
social need sufficiently pressing to outweigh the
public interest in freedom of expression within
the meaning of the Convention. The restraint im-
posed on the Sunday Times was not necessary in
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a democratic society for maintaining the author-
ity of the judiciary. Accordingly there has been a
violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
(See also Worm v. Austria, 29 August 1997 and Du Roy
and Malaurie v. France, 3 October 2000. Compare with
Tourancheau and July v. France, 24 November 2005)
2.- Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986 (defamation
of a politician, value judgment)
In 1975 the applicant journalist was fined for
criminal defamation of Bruno Kreisky, the Chan-
cellor of Austria at that time. Lingens had pub-
lished two articles in the Vienna magazine Profil
in which he had criticised Kreisky for having pro-
tected former members of the SS for political rea-
sons and for his accommodating attitude to-
wards former Nazis in Austrian politics. These
articles were published in the context of a pos-
telection political controversy. Lingens was con-
victed because he had used certain very negative
expressions criticising Mr. Kreisky, such as "bas-
est opportunism", "immoral" and "undigni-
fied". According to the European Court Lingens'
conviction by the Austrian judicial authorities
was a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The
Court reiterated the crucial importance of free-
dom of political debate and press freedom in
a democratic society: "Whilst the press must
not overstep the bounds set, inter alia, for the
protection of the reputation of others, it is never-
theless incumbent on it to impart information
and ideas on political issues just as on those in
other areas of public interest. Not only does the
press have the task of imparting such informa-
tion and ideas: the public also has a right to re-
ceive them".
The Court continues: "Freedom of the press fur-
thermore affords the public one of the best
means of discovering and forming an opinion of
the ideas and attitudes of political leaders. The
limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wid-
er as regards a politician as such than as regards a
private individual. Unlike the latter, the former
inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to
close scrutiny of his every word and deed by jour-
nalists and the public at large, and he must con-
sequently display a greater degree of tolerance".
In the Court's view, the facts on which Lingens
founded his negative value judgments visàvis
Kreisky were undisputed, as was also the jour-
nalist's good faith. According to the Court, the
requirement of the Austrian Criminal Code that
the journalist had to prove the truth of his state-
ments, was impossible of fulfilment and in-
fringed the freedom of opinion itself, which is a
fundamental part of the right secured by Article
10. The existence of facts can be demonstrated,
whereas the truth of value judgments is not
susceptible of proof.
(See also Castells v. Spain, 23 April 1992).
3.- Oberschlick (n° 1) v. Austria, 23 May 1991
(defamation of politician, provocation)
The applicant is an Austrian journalist, residing
in Vienna. In the periodical Forum he published
the full text of a criminal complaint which he and
other persons had laid against an Austrian politi-
cian, Mr. Graber-Meyer. In an election campaign,
this politician had made certain discriminatory
or even racist statements concerning migrant
workers and family allowances. Oberschlick ex-
pressed the opinion that the statements of Grab-
er-Meyer corresponded to the philosophy and the
aims of National Socialism. The politician there-
upon instituted a private prosecution for defa-
mation. Oberschlick was convicted and fined and
the seizure of the relevant issue of Forum was or-
dered.
According to the European Court, the task of
the media is to impart information and ideas
on political issues and on other matters of
general interest. It is underlined that the free-
dom of political debate is at the very core of the
concept of a democratic society, which prevails
throughout the Convention. The Court notes
that a politician must display a greater degree
of tolerance with regard to criticism, especial-
ly when he himself makes public statements
that are susceptible of criticism: "A politician is
certainly entitled to have his reputation protect-
ed, even when he is not acting in his private ca-
pacity, but the requirements of that protection
have to be weighed against the interest of open
discussion of political issues". The Court is of the
opinion that "the insertion of the text of the said
information in Forum contributed to a public de-
bate on a political question of general impor-
tance. In particular, the issue of different treat-
ment of nationals and foreigners in the social
field has given rise to considerable discussion not
only in Austria but also in other member States
of the Council of Europe. Mr. Oberschlick's crit-
icism (..) sought to draw the public's attention in
a provocative manner to a proposal made by a
politician which was likely to shock the people. A
politician who expresses himself in such terms
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exposes himself to a strong reaction on the part
of journalists and the public". The Court reached
the conclusion that the conviction of Ober-
schlick by the Austrian courts was to be consid-
ered as a breach of Article 10 of the European
Convention.
4.- Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June
1992 (criticising the police, burden of proof, ru-
mours, intention)
Thorgeir Thorgeirson is the author of two arti-
cles published in the Reykjavik daily newspaper
Morgunblaoio. In these articles Thorgeirson com-
mented on alleged police brutality by the metro-
politan police. He was convicted for defamation.
According to the European Court of Human
Rights, this conviction and sentence for defama-
tion was a violation of Article 10 of the Conven-
tion. The Court once more referred to the
"preeminent role of the press in a State governed
by the rule of law" and to the vital role of the
press as a "public watchdog". The Court empha-
sised that Article 10 gives protection to freedom
of expression in the context of political discus-
sion, as well as on discussion of other matters of
public concern. Although the applicant was es-
sentially reporting what was being said by
others about police brutality, this was consid-
ered as a sufficient basis by the Court to re-
port about brutalities by unspecified mem-
bers of the Reykjavik police. In as far as the
applicant was required to establish the truth
of his statements, he was, in the Court's opin-
ion, faced with an unreasonable, if not impos-
sible task.
The Court also was of the opinion that the criti-
cal articles published by the applicant were not
aimed to damage the reputation of the Reykjavik
police: it was Thorgeirson's intention to urge the
Minister of Justice to set up an independent and
impartial body to investigate complaints of po-
lice brutality. The Court admitted that the arti-
cles were "framed in particularly strong terms",
but regarding their purpose and intention, the
Court was of the opinion that the language used
could not be estimated as excessive. Finally, the
Court considered that the conviction and sen-
tence were capable of discouraging open discus-
sion of matters of public concern.
5.- Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994 (in-
citement to racism, intention, interview)
The Jersild judgment concerns the case of a Dan-
ish journalist who was sentenced to a fine for
having aided and abetted the dissemination of
racist remarks made by extremist youths in a tel-
evision programme he produced. As a starting
point, the Court emphasises its particular con-
sciousness of the vital importance of combat-
ing racial discrimination in all its forms and
manifestations. The European Court also un-
derlines the importance of the role of the press as
well as the importance of the audiovisual media
in a democratic society. The Court considers that
"news reporting based on interviews, whether ed-
ited or not, constitutes one of the most impor-
tant means whereby the press is able to play its
vital role as public watchdog". At the same time
the Court noticed that in considering the duties
and responsibilities of a journalist, the potential
impact of the medium concerned is an important
factor and that it is commonly acknowledged
that the audiovisual media have often a much
more immediate and powerful effect than the
print media. According to the Court "the audio-
visual media have means of conveying through
images meanings which the print media are not
able to impart".
The Court is of the opinion that the punishment
of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination
of racist statements made by another person in
an interview would seriously hamper the contri-
bution of the press to discussion of matters of
public interest and should be envisaged unless
there are particularly strong reasons for doing so.
A significant feature of the case is that the appli-
cant did not make the objectionable statements
himself, but that he assisted in their dissemina-
tion in his capacity of television journalist re-
sponsible for a news programme. Furthermore,
the item was broadcast as a part of a serious Dan-
ish news programme and was intended for a well-
informed audience. The Court also underlines
that the methods of objective and balanced re-
porting may vary considerably and that it "is not
for the Court, nor for the national courts for that
matter, to substitute their own views for those of
the press as to what technique of reporting
should be adopted by journalists". The Court fi-
nally recalls that Article 10 "protects not only the
substance of the ideas and information ex-
pressed, but also the form in which they are con-
veyed". After a thorough examination of the con-
tent of the program the Court comes to the
opinion that the purpose of the applicant TV-
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journalist in compiling the broadcast in question
was not racist.
Taking into account and balancing all these ele-
ments of the case, the Court reaches the conclu-
sion that the conviction of the journalist by the
Danish courts is to be considered as a violation of
Article 10 ECHR.
6.- Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 27 March
1996 (protection of journalistic sources, unless
overriding requirement in the public interest)
In 1990 William Goodwin, a trainee-journalist
working for the financial magazine The Engineer
was found guilty by the House of Lords of con-
tempt of court because he refused to disclose the
identity of a person who previously supplied him
with financial information derived from a confi-
dential corporate plan of a private company. The
disclosure order was estimated to be in conform-
ity with Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act
of 1981, as the disclosure was held to be necessary
in the interest of justice. The European Court
however is of the opinion that the impugned dis-
closure order is in breach of Article 10 of the Con-
vention. The Court firmly underlines the princi-
ple that "protection of journalistic sources is
one of the basic conditions for press freedom"
and that "without such protection, sources may
be deterred from assisting the press in informing
the public on matters of public interest". The
Court emphasises that without protection of a
journalist's sources "the vital public-watchdog
role of the press may be undermined and the abil-
ity of the press to provide accurate and reliable in-
formation may be adversely affected". The Court
considers that a disclosure order cannot be com-
patible with Article 10 of the Convention unless
it is justified by an overriding requirement in
the public interest. As the Court pointed out:
"In sum, limitations on the confidentiality of
journalistic sources call for the most careful scru-
tiny by the Court". The European Court in casu is
of the opinion that the interests of the private
company in eliminating, by proceedings against
the source, the (residual) threat of damage
through dissemination of the confidential infor-
mation, are not sufficient to outweigh the vital
public interest in the protection of the applicant
journalist's source.
(See also Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, 25 Feb-
ruary 2003 and Ernst and others v. Belgium, 15 July
2003).
7.- De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 24 February
1997 (criticising judges, burden of proof, protec-
tion of sources)
In Belgium, two journalists of the weekly maga-
zine Humo were convicted by a civil court for
abuse of freedom of the press and for having ex-
ceeded the limits of acceptable criticism by in-
sulting and defaming four members of the judici-
ary. In several articles, De Haes en Gijsels had
accused three judges and an Advocate-General of
marked bias and cowardice. The two journalists
especially expressed the opinion that the judges
hadn't been impartial in their handling of a case
on the custody and sexual abuse of children (case
of Mr. X).
The Court however is of the opinion that the con-
viction of the two journalists because of their ac-
cusations of bias and lack of independence
against the judges and the Advocate-general, is a
breach of Article 10 of the Convention.
The Court considers that "the articles contain a
mass of detailed information about the circum-
stances in which the decisions and the custody of
Mr. X's children were taken. That information
was based on thorough research into the alle-
gations against Mr. X and the opinions of several
experts who were said to have advised the appli-
cants to disclose them in the interests of the chil-
dren (...)". Hence the journalists "cannot be ac-
cused of having failed their professional
obligations by publishing what they had learned
about the case. It is incumbent of the press to im-
part information and ideas of public interest".
Even the revelation by the journalists of the polit-
ical sympathies of the judges in itself was not to
be seen as defamatory. As the Court notes: "the
facts which they believed they were in a position
to allege concerning those persons' political sym-
pathies could be regarded as potentially lending
credibility to the idea that those sympathies were
not irrelevant to the decisions in question".
The Court also decides: "Looked at against the
background of the case, the accusations in ques-
tion amount to an opinion, whose truth, by defi-
nition, is not susceptible of proof. Such an opin-
ion may, however, be excessive, in particular in
the absence of any factual basis, but it was not so
in this instance (..) Although Mr. De Haes' and
Mr. Gijsels' comments were without doubt se-
verely critical, they nevertheless appear propor-
tionate to the stir and indignation caused by the
matters alleged in their articles. As to the journal-
ists' polemical and even aggressive tone, which
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the Court should not be taken to approve, it must
be remembered that Article 10 protects not only
the substance of the ideas and information ex-
pressed but also the form in which they are con-
veyed. (...) Journalistic freedom also covers
possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration,
or even provocation".
8.- Oberschlick (n° 2) v. Austria, 1 July 1997
(criticising a politician as an "idiot" is protected
political speech)
In 1990 a speech of the leader of the Austrian
Freedom Party (FPÖ), Mr. Haider, was repro-
duced in the periodical Forum. In that speech
Haider glorified the role of the "generation of
soldiers" who had taken part in the Second
World War, including those who had, according
to Haider, fought for peace and freedom in the
German Army. The speech was commented by
Oberschlick who qualified Haider as an "idiot"
or a "nazi" ("Trottel" statt "Nazi"). Haider
brought an action for defamation and insult
against Oberschlick, who was found guilty by the
Austrian courts under Article 115 of the Criminal
Code (insult/"Schimpfwort").
The European Court however disagreed with this
conviction. In the Court's view, "the applicant's
article, and in particular the word Trottel, may
certainly be considered polemical, but they did
not on that account constitute a gratuitous per-
sonal attack as Oberschlick provided an objec-
tively understandable explanation for them de-
rived from Mr. Haider's speech, which in itself
was provocative. As such they were part of the
political discussion provoked by Mr. Haider's
speech and amount to an opinion, whose
truth is not susceptible of proof. Such an opin-
ion may, however, be excessive, in particular in
the absence of any factual basis, but in the light of
the above considerations, that was not so in this
instance". The Court concluded that the necessi-
ty of the interference with the exercise of Ober-
schlick's freedom of expression has not been
shown. There has therefore been a breach of Arti-
cle 10 of the Convention.
(See also Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal, 28 Septem-
ber 2000 and Andreas Wabl v. Austria, 21 March 2000,
"nazi-journalism")
9.- Fressoz and Roire v. France, 21 January
1999 (the right of journalists to receive and pub-
lish confidential documents)
In its first judgment after the reorganisation of
the European Court of Human Rights according
to the 11th Protocol (November 1998), the Court
decided strongly in favour of the protection of
journalists and emphasised once again the im-
portance of the freedom of the press and its vital
role in a democratic society. 
The applicants both were convicted in France for
the publication of an article in the satirical news-
paper Le Canard Enchaîné. The article and the doc-
uments it contained showed that the Peugeot
managing director, Mr. Calvet, had received large
pay increases while at the same time the manage-
ment refused the demands of the workers of Peu-
geot to a pay rise. Mr. Fressoz, the publication di-
rector of the magazine at that time and Mr. Roire,
the journalist who wrote the article, were convict-
ed for receiving and publishing photocopies that
had been obtained through a breach of duty of
confidentiality by an unidentified tax official.
They both claimed that these convictions violat-
ed their freedom of expression as protected by Ar-
ticle 10 of the European Convention.
The Court at the one hand emphasises that jour-
nalists in principle cannot be released from
their duty to obey the ordinary criminal law
on the basis that Article 10 affords them pro-
tection of freedom of expression. However, in
particular circumstances the interest of the
public to be informed and the vital role of the
press can justify the publication of documents
that fall under an obligation of professional
secrecy. Taking into consideration the fact that
the article contributed to a public debate on a
matter of general interest, that the information
on the salary of Mr. Calvet as head of a major in-
dustrial company did not concern his private life
and that this information already had been
known to a large number of people, the Court is
of the opinion that there was no overriding re-
quirement for the information to be protected as
confidential. As a matter fact the conviction was
based on the publication of documents of which
the divulgation was prohibited, but the informa-
tion itself they contained was not confidential.
The Court emphasises that in essence Article 10
of the Convention "leaves it for journalists to
decide whether or not it is necessary to repro-
duce such documents to ensure credibility. Its
protects journalists' rights to divulge informa-
tion on issues of general interest provided that
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they are acting in good faith and on an accurate
factual basis and provide "reliable and precise"
information in accordance with the ethics of
journalism". In the Court's view the publication
of the tax assessments were relevant not only to
the subject matter but also to the credibility of
the information supplied, while at the same time
the journalist had acted in accordance with the
standards governing his profession of a journal-
ist. The final and unanimous conclusion of the
Court, sitting in Grand Chamber, is that there
was no reasonable relationship of proportionali-
ty between the legitimate aim pursued by the
journalist's conviction and the means deployed
to achieve that aim, given the interest a democrat-
ic society has in ensuring and preserving freedom
of the press. The Court decided that there has
been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
10.- Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway, 20
May 1999 (defamatory allegations based on
(still confidential) official document) 
In 1992 the Newspaper Company Bladet Tromsø
and its editor, Pal Stensaas, were convicted by a
Norway district court for defamation. The news-
paper had published several articles on seal hunt-
ing as well as an official - but secret - report that
referred to a series of violations of the seal hunt-
ing regulations (Lindberg report). The article and
the report more specifically made allegations
against five crew members of the seal hunting
vessel M/S Harmoni who were held responsible
for illegal methods of killing seals. Although the
names of the concerned persons were deleted, the
crewmembers of the M/S Harmoni brought defa-
mation proceedings against the newspaper and
its editor. The district court was of the opinion
that some of the contested statements in the arti-
cle and the report as a matter of fact were "null
and void" and the newspaper and its editor were
ordered to pay damages to the plaintiffs.
The Court came to the conclusion that the con-
viction by the Norwegian district court was in
breach of Article 10 of the European Convention.
The Court took account of the overall back-
ground against which the statements in question
had been made, notably the controversial that
seal hunting represented at the time in Norway
and the public interest in these matters. The
Court also underlined that the manner of report-
ing in question should not be considered solely
by reference to the disputed articles but in the
wider context of the newspaper's coverage of the
seal hunting issue. According to the Court "the
impugned articles were part of an ongoing debate
of evident concern to the local, national and in-
ternational public, in which the views of a wide
selection of interested actors were reported". The
Court however underlined that Article 10 of the
Convention does not guarantee an unrestricted
freedom of expression even with respect to media
coverage of matters of public concern, as the crew
members can rely on their right to protection of
their honour and reputation or their right to be
presumed innocent of any criminal offence until
proven guilty. According to the Court some alle-
gations in the newspaper's articles were relatively
serious, but the potential adverse effect of the im-
pugned statements on each individual seal hunt-
er's reputation or rights was significantly attenu-
ated by several factors. In particular, the Court
was of the opinion that "the criticism was not an
attack against all the crew members or any specif-
ic crew member". On the other hand the Court
emphasised that the press should normally be
entitled, when contributing to public debate
on matters of legitimate concern, to rely on
the contents of official reports without having
to undertake independent research, because
otherwise, the "vital public-watchdog role" of
the press might be undermined. The Court
reached the following conclusion: "Having re-
gard to the various factors limiting the likely
harm to the individual seal hunter's reputation
and to the situation as it presented itself to Bladet
Tromsø at the relevant time, the Court considers
that the paper could reasonably rely on the offi-
cial Lindberg report, without being required to
carry out its own research into the accuracy of the
facts reported. It sees no reason to doubt that the
newspaper acted in good faith in this respect". 
It is to be mentioned that 4 judges of 17 dissented
with the majority. In the dissenting opinions, an-
nexed to the judgment, it is argued why the arti-
cles are to be considered as defamatory towards
private individuals. According to the minority
judges the Court has not given sufficient weight
to the reputation of the seal hunters. The minor-
ity opinion also disagrees with the publication of
the secret report and the fact that the newspapers
took the allegations formulated in the report for
granted: "How could it have been "reasonable" to
rely on this report when the newspaper was fully
aware that the Ministry had ordered that the re-
port not be made public immediately because it
had contained possibly libellous comments con-
cerning private individuals?". In an unusually
sharp conclusion, the minority judges are of the
opinion that the Court sends the wrong signal to
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the press in Europe and that the judgment un-
dermines respect for the ethical principles which
the media voluntarily adhere to. Their final con-
clusion is: "Article 10 may protect the right for
the press to exaggerate and provoke but not to
trample over the reputation of private individu-
als".
However, let there be no misunderstanding: the
judgment of 20 May 1999 in the case of Bladet
Tromsø versus Norway has far reaching implica-
tions for the interpretation of the balancing of
journalistic freedom and the protection of the
rights or reputation of others. It is obvious that a
clear majority of the Court argues in favour of the
public watchdog-function of the media and the
critical reporting on matters of public concern.
And although this freedom is not totally unre-
stricted, according to the actual jurisprudence of
the Court, the freedom with respect to press cov-
erage of matters of serious public concern is ex-
tremely wide.
11.- Sürek v. Turkey and other cases v. Turkey,
8 July 1999 (incitement to violence and hatred,
criticising the government, separatist propagan-
da, interviews with representants of terrorist or-
ganisations, the publisher's responsibility)
On 8 July 1999 the European Court of Human
Rights delivered judgment in thirteen cases
against Turkey involving Article 10 of the Con-
vention. In eleven of the thirteen cases the Court
held that there has been a violation of the free-
dom of expression. All cases concern different
criminal convictions of the applicants because of
separatist propaganda against the Turkish na-
tion and the territorial integrity of the State (art.
159 and 312 of the Criminal Code) or propagan-
da against the indivisibility of the State contrary
to the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1991 (Act nr.
3712 of 12 April 1991). 
In the case of Arslan v. Turkey the applicant was
sentenced, as he was the author of a book under
the title "History in mourning, 33 bullets". The
book described the Turkish nation as barbarous
and that the Kurds were the victims of a constant
oppression, if not genocide.
The case of Polat v. Turkey concerns the publica-
tion of a book entitled "We made each dawn a
Spring Festival". The book evocated some histor-
ical episodes that marked the Kurdish rebel
movements in Turkey and also described the ill
treatment of prisoners in the Diyarbakir Prison.
Baskaya and Okçuoglu applied before the Euro-
pean Court as they have been convicted as the au-
thor and the publisher of a book entitled "West-
ernisation, Modernisation, Development –
Collapse of a Paradigm. An Introduction to the
Critique of the Official Ideology". In the book it
was mentioned that part of Turkish territory in
fact belongs to "Kurdistan" and that the Turkish
State is an oppressor in political, cultural and ide-
ological terms. All copies of the book were seized.
Baskaya was sentenced to imprisonment of 20
months and was dismissed from his post as a uni-
versity professor.
Karatas v. Turkey concerns the author of an an-
thology of poems under the title "The song of a
rebellion – Dersim". Karatas was convicted be-
cause some of the poems referred to a particular
region of Turkey as "Kurdistan" and glorified the
Kurd's fight for national independence.
In the case Erdogdu and Ince v. Turkey the editor
of the monthly review Democratic Opposition, Mr.
Erdogdu, was sentenced because of the publica-
tion of an interview with a sociologist, Mr. Ince.
The interview focused on the Kurdish struggle
for independence and on the role of the PKK and
the Turkish army.
In the case Ceylan v. Turkey the applicant, a
former president of the petroleum workers' un-
ion, was convicted because of an article published
in a weekly newspaper. The article under the title
"The time has come for the workers to speak out
– tomorrow will be to late", dealt with the Kurd-
ish question in Turkey.
Okçuoglu v. Turkey concerns the conviction of a
lawyer for holding a speech concerning the Kurd-
ish question and for having his text published in
the review Democrat. The article was entitled "The
past and present of the Kurdish problem".
Gerger v. Turkey concerns the case of a journalist
who was sentenced to 20 months' imprisonment
for having drafted a message that was read out in
public at a memorial ceremony and was consid-
ered as to contain pro-Kurdish separatist propa-
ganda.
Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey concerns a publish-
er and an editor-in-chief both held responsible
for the publication of an article in a weekly review
which contained an interview with a leader of the
PKK.
In four other different cases Mr. Sürek is the ap-
plicant. As a publisher, he was convicted for sev-
eral articles published in the weekly review Hab-
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erde Yorumda Gerçek, all dealing with the Kurdish
problem and some of them containing references
to Kurdistan as an independent region and the
PKK as a liberation movement. Mr. Sürek was
found guilty of disseminating propaganda
against the indivisibility of the Turkish State.
The case Sürek n° 1 concerns the publication of
two letters which had been submitted by readers
and in which the military actions in South-east
Turkey were vehemently condemned and the au-
thorities were accused of brutal repression of the
Kurdish people. In the case of Sürek n° 2 an arti-
cle was published in which the identity was re-
vealed of officials mandated to fight terrorism
and suggesting misconduct on their part having
ordered to open fire on the local population of
Sirnak. According to the authorities the disclo-
sure of the names of these persons rendered them
terrorist targets and had put their lives at danger
from terrorist attack. Sürek n° 3 concerns the
publication of a news commentary presenting
the activities of PKK in a positive perspective,
while Sürek n° 4 inter alia concerns the publica-
tion of an interview with a representative of the
National Liberation Front of Kurdistan, the po-
litical wing of PKK.
In all cases the European Court reiterates the fun-
damental principles underlying its former judg-
ments relating to Article 10, according to which
freedom of expression constitutes one of the es-
sential foundations of a democratic society. The
Court emphasises once again that Article 10 of
the Convention also protects information and
ideas that "offend, shock or disturb" and recalls
that there is little scope under Article 10 of the
Convention for restrictions on political speech
or on debate on questions of public interest.
At the same time, the limits of permissible criti-
cism are wider with regard to the government
than in relation to a private citizen: in a demo-
cratic society the actions or omissions of the gov-
ernment must be subject to the close scrutiny of
public opinion. According to the Court, the dom-
inant position which the government occupies
makes it necessary for it to display restraint in re-
sorting to criminal proceedings, particularly
where other means are available for replying to
the unjustified attacks and criticisms of its adver-
saries. It is incumbent on the press to impart in-
formation and ideas on political issues, including
divisive ones and the public has also a right to re-
ceive such information and ideas. On the other
hand, the Court recognises the competence of
state authorities as to take measures to guarantee
public order and hence to interfere with freedom
of expression in cases of incitement to violence
against individuals, public officials or a sector of
the population. It is also underlined that the du-
ties and responsibilities which accompany the ex-
ercise of the right of freedom of expression by
media professionals assume special significance
in situations of conflict and tension and that par-
ticular caution is called when publication is given
to the views of representatives or organisations
which resort to violence against the State. Such
interviews hold the risk that the media become a
vehicle for the dissemination of hate speech and
the promotion of violence.
After a thorough examination of the wording
and the content of the litigious publications and
after considering the context of the political and
the security situation in South-east Turkey, the
Court in eleven cases comes to the conclusion
that the conviction and sentencing of the appli-
cants was not necessary in a democratic society.
Accordingly there has been a violation of Article
10 of the Convention. In all of these cases the
Court was of the opinion that the impugned ar-
ticles, news reporting, books or speeches
could not be said to incite to violence. In most
cases, the Court is also struck by the severity of
the sanctions imposed (20 month's imprison-
ment, substantial fines, and seizures of books…):
in that connection the nature and severity of the
penalties are also factors which lead to the con-
clusion of disproportionality of the interferences.
Specifically in the Sürek n° 2 case the Court un-
derlined that the contested interference related
to journalistic reporting of statements made by
certain politicians to the press concerning their
visit to an area in Turkey where tensions had oc-
curred. Furthermore, as the information in issue,
identifying specific police officers with serious
misconduct, was also reported in other newspa-
pers, there was no real need to prosecute the pub-
lication of this information anymore. The Court
in this case considered that the conviction and
sentence of Mr. Sürek were capable of discourag-
ing the contribution of the press to open discus-
sion on matters of public concern.
In most of the cases the Court also has found a
violation of Article 6 of the Convention. The
applicants had been denied the right to have
their cases heard before an independent and
impartial tribunal as the National Security
Court, in which one of the bench of three judges
was a military judge, had tried them.
In the case of Sürek n° 1 and Sürek n° 3 the
Court found no violation of Article 10 of the
Convention. The Court is of the opinion that
the impugned letters and the news commen-
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tary must be seen as capable of inciting to fur-
ther violence in the region. Hence the convic-
tion of Sürek could be regarded as answering a
"pressing social need". The Court is of the opin-
ion that what is in issue in these two cases is "hate
speech and the glorification of violence" and "in-
citement to violence".
The two judgments that found no violation of
Article 10 are also important from another point
of view. It is to be underlined that Sürek was con-
victed while he was the owner/publisher of the
weekly review in which the letters of the readers
and the news commentary were published.
Although he didn't write the articles personally
and even as he had only a commercial and not an
editorial relationship with the review, this could
not exonerate him from criminal liability. Sürek
was the owner and "as such he had the power to
shape the editorial direction of the review". The
Court held that for that reason Sürek "was vicar-
iously subject to the "duties and responsibili-
ties" which the review's editorial and journalistic
staff undertake in the collection and dissemina-
tion of information to the public and which
assume an even greater importance in situations
of conflict and tension". 
12.- Dalban v. Romania, 28 September 1999
(critical reporting on fraud and corruption by
politician and business man)
In the case of Dalban v. Romania the Grand
Chamber of the Court unanimously reached the
conclusion that there has been a violation of the
freedom of expression by the Romanian authori-
ties. The case concerns an application by Mr.
Ionel Dalban who was a journalist and ran a local
weekly magazine, the Cronica Romascana. In 1994
Dalban was convicted for criminal libel because
of some articles that exposed a series of frauds al-
legedly committed by a senator (R.T.) and the
chief executive (G.S.) of a State-owned agricultur-
al company, Fastrom/State Farm. Dalban died on
13 March 1998. His widow continued the pro-
ceedings in Strasbourg in the applicant's stead.
In the meantime, on 2 March 1999 the Romanian
Supreme Court quashed the conviction of Dal-
ban and acquitted the applicant of the charge of
libelling G.S. The proceedings in the case on the
charge relating to Senator R.T. were discontinued
due to Mr. Dalban's death. 
In its judgment of 28 September 1999 the Euro-
pean Court is of the opinion that the applicant's
conviction constituted an "interference by public
authority" with his right to freedom of expres-
sion, without the interference was necessary in a
democratic society. The Court underlines that
the articles in issue concerned a matter of public
interest and that the press has to fulfil an essen-
tial function in a democratic society. According
to the Court there is no proof that the descrip-
tion of events given in the articles was totally
untrue. It is also emphasised that Dalban did
not write about aspects of private life about
senator R.T., but about his behaviour and atti-
tudes in his capacity as an elected representa-
tive of the people. The European Court cannot
agree with the Romanian courts that the fact that
there hasn't been a court case against R.T. or G.S.
was sufficient to establish that the information
contained in Dalban's articles was false. The
Court reached the conclusion that the appli-
cant's conviction of a criminal offence and the
sentencing to imprisonment amounted to a dis-
proportionate interference with the exercise of
his freedom of expression as a journalist. 
(See also Constantinescu v. Romania, 27 June 2000 and
Busuioc v. Moldova, 21 December 2004)
13.- News Verlags GmbH & CoKG v. Austria, 11
January 2000 (the publication of photographs of
a suspect without his consent, defamation, pre-
sumption of innocence)
This case concerns an injunction order by the Vi-
enna Court of Appeal prohibiting the magazine
News to publish photographs of a person (B.) in
the context of its court reporting. B. was suspect-
ed to be responsible for a letter-bomb campaign
in 1993. According to the Court the prohibition
to publish such photos in connection with re-
ports on the criminal proceedings is to be con-
sidered as interference in the applicant's free-
dom of expression and information. The
Court agrees that the interference was prescribed
by Austrian law and pursued a legitimate aim as
the injunction had the aim of protecting the rep-
utation or rights of B. as well as the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary. The Court decided
however that the injunction order was dispropor-
tionate and hence violated article 10 of the Con-
vention.
The Court recalled that "it is not for the Court, or
for the national courts for that matter, to substi-
tute their own views for those of the press as to
what technique of reporting should be adopted
by journalists". Furthermore the media have not
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only the right, but even the duty according to the
Court to impart - in a manner consistent with its
obligations and responsibilities – information
and ideas on all matters of public concern, in-
cluding the reporting and commenting on court
proceedings. The Court emphasised that the
criminal case on the letter bombs at the time was
a news item of major public concern and that B.
was arrested as the main suspect. Although the
injunction order did in no way restrict the appli-
cant company's right to publish comments on
the criminal proceedings against B, it is under-
lined however that it restricted the applicant
company's choice as to the presentation of its re-
port, while it was undisputed that other media
were free to continue to publish B's picture
throughout the criminal proceedings against
him. An absolute prohibition to publish pic-
tures of B. in the press reports of the magazine
News is considered by the Court as a dispro-
portionate measure. As the Court underlines:
"The absolute prohibition of the publication of
B's picture went further than was necessary to
protect B. against defamation or against viola-
tions of the presumption of innocence". It fol-
lowed from these considerations by the Court
that the interference with the applicant compa-
ny's right to freedom of expression was not "nec-
essary in a democratic society" and accordingly
violated Article 10 of the Convention.
(See also Krone Verlag & Co v. Austria, 26 February
2002 and Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft v.
Austria, 13 November 2003).
14.- Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 29 February 2000
(freedom of expression of civil servant, employee,
criticising the management/employer, horizon-
tal effect)
In this case the Court reached the conclusion
that the dismissal of an employee of the public
broadcasting organisation TVE was to be consid-
ered as a violation of the freedom of expression.
In 1993 Fuentes Bobo co-authored an article in
the newspaper Diario criticising certain manage-
ment's action within the Spanish public broad-
casting organisation. Later in two radio pro-
grammes Fuentes Bobo made critical remarks
about some TVE-managers. These remarks led to
disciplinary proceedings that ended with the ap-
plicant's dismissal in 1994. 
In its judgment of 29 February 2000 the Court
was of the opinion that the dismissal of the appli-
cant due to certain offensive statements was to be
considered as interference by the Spanish author-
ities in the applicant's freedom of expression.
The Court pointed out that Article 10 of the
Convention is also applicable in relations be-
tween employer and employee and that the
State has positive obligations in certain cases
to protect the right of freedom of expression
against interference by private persons. Al-
though the interference was prescribed by law
and was legitimate in order to protect the rep-
utation or rights of others, the Court could
not agree that the severe penalty imposed on
the applicant met a “pressing social need”.
The Court underlined that the criticism by the
applicant had been formulated in the context of
a labour dispute within TVE and was to be situat-
ed in a public discussion on the failings of public
broadcasting in Spain at the material time. The
Court also took into consideration that the of-
fensive remarks attributed to the applicant ap-
peared more or less to have been provoked during
lively and spontaneous radio-shows in which he
participated. As no other legal action was under-
taken against the applicant because of the "offen-
sive" statements and because of the very severe
character of the disciplinary sanction the Court
finally came to the conclusion that the dismissal
of Fuentes Bobo was to be considered as a viola-
tion of Article 10 of the Convention.
(See also De Diego Nafria v. Spain, 14 March 2002).
15.- Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, 16 March 2000
(freedom of the press, duty of authorities to pro-
tect journalists against violent attacks, positive
obligation)
In the case of Özgür Gündem v. Turkey the Europe-
an Court once more held that there has been a vi-
olation of Article 10 of the Convention by the
Turkish authorities. Özgür Gündem was a daily
newspaper published in Istanbul in the period
1992-1994, reflecting Turkish Kurdish opinion.
After a campaign that involved killings, disap-
pearances, injuries, prosecutions, seizures and
confiscation, the newspaper ceased publication.
The applicants submitted that the State authori-
ties had failed to provide protection of the news-
paper and complained of the convictions of its re-
porting on the Kurdish issue that was estimated
as constituting separatist propaganda and pro-
voking racial and regional hatred. 
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In respect of the allegations of attacks on the
newspaper and its journalists, the Court was of
the opinion that the Turkish authorities
should have better protected Özgür Gündem.
The Court considered that although the essential
object of many provisions of the Convention is to
protect the individual against arbitrary interfer-
ence by public authorities, there may be positive
obligations inherent in an effective respect of the
rights concerned. The Court stated that genuine,
effective exercise of the freedom of expression
"does not depend merely on the State's duty not
to interfere, but may require positive measures of
protection, even in the sphere of relations be-
tween individuals". In the case of Özgür Gündem
the Turkish authorities have not only failed in
their positive obligation to protect the freedom
of expression of the applicants. 
According to the Court the search operations,
prosecutions and convictions for the reporting
on the Kurdish problem and for criticising the
government policy violated Article 10 as well. The
Court underlined that the authorities of a dem-
ocratic State must tolerate criticism, even if it
may be regarded provocative or insulting. The
judgment also emphasised that the public enjoys
the right to be informed of different perspectives
on the situation in south-east Turkey, irrespec-
tive of how unpalatable those perspectives appear
to the authorities. An important element was
also that the reporting by Özgür Gündem was not
to be considered as advocating or inciting to
the use of violence. The Court held unanimous-
ly that there has been a breach of Article 10 of the
Convention.
16.- Thoma v. Luxembourg, 29 March 2001
(criticising civil servants, burden of proof, quota-
tion from a newspaper)
Marc Thoma, a radio journalist working for RTL
(Luxembourg radio and television), alleged that a civ-
il conviction because of a defamatory statement
in a radio programme violated his right to free-
dom of expression. In that radio programme he
reported on alleged fraud mechanisms in the
field of reforestation work. These allegations
were based on an article published in the newspa-
per Tageblatt. On request of 63 Forestry Commis-
sion officials the journalist was convicted by the
Luxembourg's courts because of defamatory
statements.
The European Court of Human Rights held
unanimously that there has been a violation of
Article 10 of the Convention. The Court remind-
ed its general principles, emphasising the impor-
tant role of the press in a democratic society. Al-
though the European Court recognised that
some of the applicant's remarks were very serious
and that the officials of the Water and Forestry
Commission were indirectly identifiable, it noted
at the same time that the issue raised in the radio
programme had been widely debated in the Lux-
embourg media and concerned a problem of
public interest. Particularly the fact that Thoma
had based his defamatory remarks on an article
published by a fellow journalist, was a decisive el-
ement in this case. The European Court reiterat-
ed that punishing a journalist for assisting in the
dissemination of statements made by another
person would seriously hamper the contribution
of the press to discussion of matters of public in-
terest and should not be envisaged unless there
were particularly strong reasons for doing so. The
Luxembourg court had decided that a journalist
who merely quoted from an article that had al-
ready been published would only escape liability
if he formally distanced himself from that article.
The European Court however is of the opin-
ion that such a requirement for journalists to
distance themselves systematically and for-
mally from the content of a quotation that
might defame or harm a third party was not
reconcilable with the press's role of providing
information on current events, opinions and
ideas. The Court noted that the applicant had
taken the precaution of mentioning that he was
quoting from a press article and that he had un-
derlined that this article contained some
"strongly worded" allegations. The Court also
took into consideration the fact that the journal-
ist had interviewed a third party, a woodlands
owner, whether he thought that the allegations
of fraud in the sector of reforestation were true.
Under these circumstances the Court was not
sufficiently convinced that the conviction of the
applicant was necessary in a democratic society
to protect the reputation and the rights of others.
(See also Radio France v. France, 30 March 2004)
17.- Feldek v. Slovakia, 12 July 2001 (Criticising
a politician because of his "fascist past")
In this judgment the European Court of Human
Rights has decided, by five votes to two, that
there has been a violation of Article 10 because of
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the conviction of a publicist who had sharply
criticised the Slovak Minister of Culture and Ed-
ucation. It was the second time in only a short pe-
riod that the Strasbourg Court has found a
breach of the freedom of expression in Slovakia
(ECtHR 19 April 2001, Appl. 32686/96, Marônek
v. Slovakia).
In 1995 after the publication of a statement in
several newspapers referring to the "fascist past"
of the Minister of Culture and Education of the
Slovak Republic, the author of this statement,
Mr. Feldek was convicted by the Supreme Court.
The Court applied the Articles 11 and 13 of the
Slovak Civil Code, giving protection against un-
justified infringement of one's personal rights,
civil and human dignity. The statement indeed
was considered as having a defamatory character
and Feldek was ordered to endure the publica-
tion of the final judgment in five newspapers.
In its judgment of 12 July 2001 the European
Court of Human Rights recalls that there is little
scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for
restrictions on political speech or on debate on
questions of public interest and that the limits of
acceptable criticism are wider as regards a politi-
cian as such than as regards a private individual.
Emphasising the promotion of free political
debate as a very important feature in a demo-
cratic society the Court underlined that allow-
ing broad restrictions on political speech in
individual cases would undoubtedly affect re-
spect for the freedom of expression in general.
In the Feldek case, the Court is satisfied that the
value judgment referring to the "fascist past" of
the Slovak Minister of Culture was based on in-
formation which was already known to the wider
public. The Strasbourg Court refuses to sub-
scribe to a restrictive definition of the term "fas-
cist past", as such a reference can also mean that
a person participated in a fascist organisation, as
a member, even if it was not coupled with specific
activities propagating fascist ideals. The Human
Rights Court reaches the conclusion that the Slo-
vakian courts did not convincingly establish any
pressing social need for putting the protection of
the personal right of a public figure above the ap-
plicant's right to freedom of expression and the
general interest of promoting this freedom when
issues of public interest are concerned. As the in-
terference complained of by Feldek was not nec-
essary in a democratic society, the Court found
that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention.
(See also Hrico v. Slovakia, 20 July 2004)
18.- Ekin v. France, 17 July 2001 (prohibition of
distribution of a book, discrimination, freedom
of expression regardless of frontiers)
In a judgment of 17 July 2001 the European
Court of Human Rights has analysed Section 14
of the French Act on the Freedom of the Press
from the scope of Article 10 and 14 of the Euro-
pean Convention. This provision empowers the
Minister of the Interior to impose a ban on the
circulation or distribution of foreign publica-
tions. The Court noted that Section 14 of the law
of 1881 did not state the circumstances in which
the power could be used. In particular, there was
no definition of the concept of "foreign origin"
and no indication of the grounds on which a
publication could be banned. With regard to the
banning in 1987 of the book "Euskadi at war"
published by the Basque cultural organisation
Ekin, the Court was of the opinion that the appli-
cant had not been in the possibility to rely on an
effective judicial review to prevent abuse of Sec-
tion 14 of the French Press Act. According to the
Court this provision appeared also to be in direct
conflict with the actual wording of Article 10 § 1
of the Convention, which provides that the rights
recognised in that Article subsist "regardless of
frontiers". According to the Court a system of
control on publications merely based on their
foreign origin is indeed to be considered as a
kind of discrimination. Finally the Court held
that the content of the book did not justify so se-
rious an interference with the applicant's free-
dom of expression as that constituted by the ban
imposed by the French Minister of the Interior.
Besides the violation of Article 10 of the Conven-
tion, the Court also noted that the total length of
the proceedings, more than nine years, could not
be considered "reasonable", although the issue of
the litigation was of particular importance (viola-
tion of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention).
19.- E.K. v. Turkey, 7 February 2002 (advocacy
of human rights' protection, criticising the gov-
ernment, separatist propaganda)
In 1994 E.K., the secretary of the Istanbul section
of the Human-Rights Association, was convicted
in two separate judgments by the State Security
Court finding that she had expressed support for
the activities by the PKK and that she had under-
mined territorial integrity and unity of the Turk-
ish Nation. The first conviction was related to an
article by E.K. published in the Istanbul daily
newspaper Özgür Gündem under the title "The
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world owes a debt to the Kurdish people". The ar-
ticle contained the text of a lecture by E.K. on a
conference held in the Belgian Parliament. The
article criticised the repressive approach of the
Turkish policy in Kurdistan and the violation of
human rights by the Turkish army. The second
case concerned an article in a book that was edit-
ed by E.K. The article described the situation in
Turkish prisons. The State Security Court sen-
tenced E.K. to two years' and six months' impris-
onment and convicted her to substantial fines.
The applicant complained that her conviction in
relation to the publication of the book constitut-
ed a violation of Article 7 (no punishment with-
out law) and that both convictions infringed Ar-
ticle 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 6 (fair
trial) of the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
The Court unanimously declared the conviction
in relation to the publication of the book as an
infringement of Article 7 of the Convention, as
indeed according to Turkish law prison sentences
could be imposed only on editors of periodicals,
newspapers and magazines and not books. The
Court also unanimously declared that both con-
victions were a breach of Article 10 of the Con-
vention. The conviction in relation to the publi-
cation of the book applied a law, which was no
longer applicable at the time of the conviction by
the State Security Court. Hence this interference
by the Turkish public authorities was considered
not to be prescribed by law. In more general and
principle terms the Court also found a breach of
Article 10, as the Court emphasised once more
the importance of freedom of expression, the role
of the press in a genuine democracy and the right
of the public to be properly informed. According
to the Court the impugned article published in
Özgür Gündem indeed sharply criticised the
Turkish authorities, but it did not contain any
incitement to violence, hostility or hatred be-
tween citizens. The conviction of the applicant
as editor of the book was neither to be considered
as "necessary in a democratic society". The Court
emphasised that the impugned article was rather
to be considered as a profound protest referring
to a difficult political situation, and not as an in-
citement to an armed struggle.
(See also Emire Eren Keskin v. Turkey, 22 November
2005 and Erbakan v. Turkey, 6 July 2006)
20.- Gaweda v. Poland, 14 March 2002 (regis-
tration of periodical, not "prescribed by law",
ambiguous and unclear criteria)
In 1993 and 1994, Mr. Gaweda was refused the
registration of two periodicals by the Polish au-
thorities. The first periodical was titled "The So-
cial and Political Monthly – A European Moral Tribu-
nal", while the second request concerned the
registration of a periodical under the title "Ger-
many – a Thousand year old Enemy of Poland". Both
requests for registration were dismissed by the
Polish courts, considering that the name of a pe-
riodical should be relevant to its content in appli-
cation of the 1984 Press Act and the Ordinance of
the Minister of Justice on the registration of peri-
odicals. With regard to the first periodical the
Polish courts were of the opinion that the name
proposed implied that a European institution
was supporting or publishing the magazine,
which was untrue and misleading. With regard to
the second title the courts considered that the ti-
tle was in conflict with reality as well, in that it
unduly concentrated on negative aspects of
Polish-German relations, thus giving an unbal-
anced picture of the facts.
In a judgment of 14 March 2002 the European
Court of Human Rights reached the conclusion
that both refusals to register the title of a period-
ical magazine were violating the applicant's free-
dom of expression as guaranteed by the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights. The
European Court does not consider the obliga-
tion to register a title of a newspaper or a mag-
azine as such as a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention. But as the refusal of the registra-
tion amounted to an interference with the appli-
cant's right of expression, this refusal must be in
accordance with Article 10 § 2 of the Convention,
which means in the first place that this interfer-
ence in the freedom of expression of the appli-
cant must be "prescribed by law". Referring to
Article 20 of the Press Act and Article 5 of the Or-
dinance on the registration of periodicals, the
Court is of the opinion that the applicable law
was not formulated with sufficient precision,
as the terms used in the Law and in the Ordi-
nance are ambiguous and lack the clarity that
one would expect in a legal provision of this
nature. According to the Court the legal provi-
sions rather suggest that registration can be re-
fused where the request for registration did not
conform to the technical details specified in Arti-
cle 20 of the Press Act. The refusal of a registra-
tion because of the alleged misleading title is to
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be considered as "inappropriate from the stand-
point of freedom of the press". The European
Court also observed that in the present case the
domestic courts have imposed a kind of prior re-
straint on a printed media in a manner which en-
tailed a ban on a publication of entire periodicals
on the basis of their titles. Such an interference
would at least require a legislative provision
which clearly authorised the courts to do so. Ac-
cording to the European Court the interpreta-
tion given by the Polish courts to Article 5 of the
Ordinance introduced new criteria, which could
not be foreseen on the basis of the text specifying
situations in which the registration of a title can
be refused. Therefore the Court was of the opin-
ion that the manner in which the interference in
the applicant's exercise of his freedom of expres-
sion was not "prescribed by law" within the
meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. Ac-
cordingly, the Court unanimously concluded
that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention.
21.- Nikula v. Finland, 21 March 2002 (defama-
tion, freedom of expression of lawyer, criticising
the public prosecutor)
In 1996 Anne Nikula, a lawyer living in Helsinki,
lodged an application against Finland alleging
that her freedom of expression had been violated
on account of her having been convicted of defa-
mation for having criticised, in her capacity as de-
fence counsel, the public prosecutor. In a memo-
rial that the applicant read out before the court
in a pending case, the public prosecutor, Mr. T.
had been criticised because of "role manipula-
tion and unlawful presentation of evidence". Af-
ter a private prosecution initiated by Mr. T.,
Nikula was convicted of public defamation com-
mitted without better knowledge. After judg-
ment by the Supreme Court the criminal convic-
tion was confirmed while the sanction was
restricted to pay damages and costs.
In its judgment of 21 March 2002 the Court reit-
erates that the special status of lawyers gives
them a central position in the administration
of justice as intermediaries between the public
and the court. Regard being had to the key
role of lawyers in this field, it is legitimate to
expect them to maintain public confidence in
the administration of justice. The Court refers
however also to the possibility that an interfer-
ence with the counsel's freedom of expression in
the course of a trial could also raise an issue un-
der Article 6 of the Convention with regard to the
right of an accused client to receive a fair trial. Ac-
cording to the Court the equality of arms princi-
ple and more generally the fair trial principle mil-
itates in favour of a free and even forceful
argument between the parties, although this
should not lead to an unlimited freedom of ex-
pression of a defence counsel. In evaluating the
legitimate character of the applicant's conviction
the Court, referring to the Interights Amicus Curiae
report, reiterates the distinction between the role
of the prosecutor as the opponent of the accused,
and that of the judge. This should provide an in-
creased protection for statements whereby an ac-
cused criticises a prosecutor, as opposed to ver-
bally attacking the judge or the court as a whole.
The Court also noted that the applicant's sub-
missions were confined to the courtroom, as op-
posed to criticism against a judge or prosecutor
voiced in the media. According to the Court "it is
only in exceptional cases that restriction - even by
way of a lenient criminal sanction - of defence
counsel's freedom of expression can be accepted
as necessary in a democratic society ". The Court
held, by five votes to two, that there has been a vi-
olation of Article 10 of the Convention.
(See also Steur v. Netherlands, 28 October 2003; Kypri-
anou v. Cyprus, 27 January 2004 and (Grand Cham-
ber) 15 December 2005; Veraart t. The Netherlands, 30
November 2006).
22.- Three cases v. Austria, 26 February 2002
(defamation, political speech, value judgments
and fair comment)
In three judgments of 26 February 2002, all
against Austria, the Court has found a breach of
Article 10 of the European Convention. The first
case (Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v.
Austria) concerns the publication in the periodi-
cal "TATblatt" of a leaflet referring to the "racist
agitation" by the Austrian Freedom Party FPÖ.
The text criticised the racist policy proposals of
the FPÖ and was followed by a list of address and
telephone numbers of FPÖ members and offices
with an invitation to the readers of "TATblatt" to
call the FPÖ politicians and tell them what they
think of them and their policy. The Austrian
courts, after civil proceedings initiated by FPÖ
leader Jörg Haider, were of the opinion that the
statement concerning the racial agitation was to
be considered as an insult and went beyond the
limits of acceptable criticism by reproaching the
plaintiff with a criminal offence. An injunction
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not to repeat the statement was granted against
the publisher of the magazine. The European
Court however in its judgment of 26 February
2002 is of the opinion that the statement is to be
situated in the context of a political debate and
contributed to a discussion on subject-matters of
general interest such as immigration and the le-
gal status of aliens in Austria. The Court did not
accept the qualification of the statement on "rac-
ist agitation" as an untrue statement of fact and
considered the comment as a value judgment, the
truth of which is not susceptible of proof. In sum,
the Court unanimously concluded that it could
not find sufficient reasons to prevent the pub-
lisher from repeating the critical statement in
question. For that reasons the Court held that
there has been a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention.
In a second case (Dichand and others v. Austria) the
Austrian courts had ordered to retract and not re-
peat some critical statements published in the
Neue Kronen Zeitung. These statements criticised
firmly the strategies and interest of a politician-
lawyer, Mr. Graff, defending another media
group. Again the European Courts dissented
with the Austrian courts: according to the Euro-
pean Court the impugned statements were value
judgments that had an adequate factual basis
and represented a fair comment on issues of
general public interest. The Court accepted the
criticism against Mr. Graff, as a politician who
was in a situation where his business and politi-
cal activities overlapped. It is recognised by the
Court that the statement contained harsh criti-
cism in strong polemical language. However, the
Court remembered on it's standard jurispru-
dence that Article 10 also protects information
and ideas that offend, shock or disturb. Unani-
mously the Court came to the conclusion that
the interference by the Austrian authorities vio-
lated Article 10 of the Convention.
In the third case (Krone verlag GMBH & CO. KG v.
Austria) the European Court of Human Rights
found that the Austrian courts failed to take into
account the essential function the press full fills
in a democratic society and its duty to impart in-
formation and ideas on matters of public inter-
est. The case concerned the publication of an ar-
ticle, accompanied by photographs of a
politician who allegedly had received unlawful
salaries. A permanent injunction order was grant-
ed by an Austrian court prohibiting the applicant
company to publish the politician's picture in
connection with the article in question or similar
articles. According to the Strasbourg Court there
was no valid reason why the newspaper should
have been prevented from publishing the picture,
especially as the photographs did not disclose
any details of the private life of the politician
concerned. The Court also referred to the fact
that the picture of the politician as a member of
the Austrian Parliament was included on the
Austrian Parliament's internet site. The interfer-
ence with the newspaper's right to freedom of ex-
pression was therefore not necessary in a demo-
cratic society. Accordingly, the Court
unanimously held that there has been a violation
of Article 10 of the Convention.
(See also Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft mbH
v. Austria, 13 November 2003)
23.- Mc Vicar v. the United Kingdom, 7 May
2002 (defamation, burden of proof, "circum-
stantial evidence" is not a reliable basis for the li-
tigious allegations)
In September 1995 an article was published in
the magazine Spiked in which the journalist John
McVicar suggested that the athlete Linford
Christie used banned performance-enhancing
drugs. Mr. Christie brought an action in the High
Court for defamation against McVicar. During
the greater part of the proceedings McVicar rep-
resented himself, as he could not afford to pay le-
gal fees because legal aid was not available for def-
amation actions. His defence was that the
allegations made in the article were true in sub-
stance and in fact. The trial judge however re-
fused to admit the evidence of two witnesses
McVicar wished to rely on. The judge found that
allowing both witnesses would have been unfair
to Mr. Christie, without giving Mr. Christie time
to call counter-evidence and because Mr. Christie
would only be confronted with details about his
alleged drug-taking until the witness took the
stand. In 1998 the jury found that the article con-
tained defamatory allegations and found that
McVicar had not proved that the article was sub-
stantially true. McVicar was ordered to pay costs
and was made subject to an injunction prevent-
ing him from repeating the allegations.
McVicar lodged an application with the Europe-
an Court alleging that the inability of a defend-
ant to a libel action to claim legal aid constituted
a violation of Article 6 § 1 (fair trial) and 10 (free-
dom of expression and information) of the Con-
vention. He also submitted that the exclusion of
witness evidence at a trial, as well as the burden of
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proof which he faced in pleading a defence of jus-
tification, the order for costs and the injunction
restricting future publication further violated Ar-
ticle 10 of the Convention.
The European Court is of the opinion that
McVicar was not prevented from presenting his
defence to the defamation action effectively in
the High Court, nor were the proceedings unfair
by reason of his ineligibility for legal aid. The
Court inter alia noted that the applicant was a
well-educated and experienced journalist who
would have been capable of formulating a cogent
argument before the Court. Therefore, there had
been no violation of Article 6 or Article 10 of the
Convention.
As for the exclusion of evidence, the order to pay
the costs in relation to the defamation proceed-
ings and the injunction measure, the Court held
that there was no violation of Article 10 either.
The Court considered that the potential conse-
quences of the allegations made in the article
for an individual who had achieved fame and
fortune purely as a result of his athletic
achievements were very grave. The Court also
emphasised that the offending article in itself
made no mention of any authoritative basis
for the drug-taking allegation. For that reasons
the Court held unanimously that there has been
no violation of Article 10 of the Convention ei-
ther.
(See also Constantinescu v. Romania, 27 June 2000;
Wierzbicki v. Poland, 18 June 2002, Lešnìk v. Slovenia,
11 March 2003; Chauvy and others v. France, 29 June
2004 and Stângu and Scutelnicu v. Romania, 31 Janu-
ary 2006)
24.- Colombani (Le Monde) v. France, 25 June
2002 (insult, matter of public interest, official
document, no privilege for head of foreign state
with regard protection of reputation)
This case concerns the conviction of the publish-
ing director and a journalist of the newspaper Le
Monde. Both had been convicted by the Court of
Appeal of Paris in 1997 because of defamation of
the King of Morocco, Hassan II.
In its issue of 3 November 1995 the newspaper Le
Monde published a confidential version of a re-
port by the Geopolitical Drugs Observatory
(OGD) on drug production and trafficking in
Morocco. The report had been compiled at the re-
quest of the Commission of the European Com-
munities. The article that was headed "A confi-
dential report casts doubt on King Hassan's II
entourage", questioned the avowed determina-
tion of the Moroccan authorities, and principally
the King, to combat the increase in drug-traffick-
ing on Moroccan soil. On request of the Moroc-
can King criminal proceedings were brought
against the newspaper Le Monde. Mr. Colombani,
the publishing director, and Mr. Incyan, the jour-
nalist who wrote the article, were convicted by the
Paris Court of Appeal in application of section 36
of the Law of 29 July 1881 for insulting a foreign
head of state. According to the Court the journal-
ist had failed to check the allegations and the ar-
ticle was considered to have been inspired with
malicious intent. 
The European Court however does not agree with
these findings, emphasizing in the first place that
when contributing to a public debate on is-
sues that raised legitimate concerns the press
had in principle to be able to rely on official
reports without being required to carry out its
own separate investigations. The Strasbourg
Court also referred to other French case law in-
clining to recognise that the offence under sec-
tion 36 of the Law of 29 July 1881 infringed free-
dom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of
the Convention. Recent French jurisprudence it-
self appeared to accept that this incrimination
and its application was not necessary in a demo-
cratic society, particularly since heads of state or
ordinary citizens against whom insulting re-
marks had been made or whose honour or repu-
tation had been damaged had a sufficient crimi-
nal remedy in the form of a prosecution for
defamation. The special status for heads of
states that derogated from the general law could
not be reconciled with modern practice and polit-
ical conceptions. In the Court's view, such a priv-
ilege went beyond what was necessary in a
democratic society. The Court consequently
found that, because of the special nature of the
protection afforded by the relevant provision of
the Law of the Freedom of the Press of 1881, the
offence of insulting foreign heads of state was li-
able to infringe freedom of expression without
meeting a "pressing social need". For that rea-
sons the Court held unanimously that there has
been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
(See also Gutiérrez Suárez v. Spain, 1 June 2010)
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25.- Wilson & National Union of Journalist
(and others) v. the United Kingdom, 2 July 2002
(collective bargaining, union membership, fi-
nancial incentives and freedom of association)
In a judgment of 2 July 2002 the European Court
of Human Rights has found a violation by the
United Kingdom on the freedom of assembly and
association (article 11 of the European Conven-
tion). The case concerns the use of financial in-
centives to induce employees to surrender the
right to union representation for collective bar-
gaining. The case is especially interesting for the
media sector, as this case was brought before the
Court of Human Rights jointly by David Wilson,
a journalist working for the Daily Mail and by the
National Union of Journalists (NUJ). Other ap-
plications by members of the National Union of
Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers later were
joined to this initial application by Wilson and
the NUJ.
The case goes back to 1989 when the Associated
Newspapers Limited gave notice that it intended
to de-recognise the NUJ and terminate all aspects
of collective bargaining and that personal con-
tracts were to be introduced with a 4,5% pay in-
crease for journalists who signed and accepted
the de-recognition. Wilson applied to domestic
courts complaining that the requirement to sign
the personal contract and lose union rights, or
accept a lower pay rise, were illegal. After the
House of Lords held that the collective bargain-
ing over employment terms and conditions was
not a defining characteristic of union member-
ship, Wilson and NUJ lodged applications in
Strasbourg, alleging that the law of the United
Kingdom, by allowing the employer to de-recog-
nise trade unions, failed to ensure their right to
protect their interest trough trade union and to
freedom of expression contrary to Articles 11 and
10, also in conjunction with Article 14 of the
Convention (non-discrimination).
With regard to Article 11 the Court is of the opin-
ion that the absence in the United Kingdom law
of an obligation on employers to enter to collec-
tive bargaining gave no rise, in itself, to a viola-
tion of Article 11 of the Convention. However,
the Court found that permitting employers to
use financial incentives to induce employees
to surrender important union rights amount-
ed to a violation of Article 11. The Court re-
ferred to the fact that this aspect of domestic law
has been the subject of criticism by the Social
Charter's Committee of Independent Experts
and the International Labour Organisation's
Committee of Freedom of Association. Accord-
ing to the Court, it is the role of the State to en-
sure that trade union members were not pre-
vented or restrained from using their union to
represent them in attempts to regulate their
relations with their employers. The Court con-
cluded that the United Kingdom had failed in its
positive obligation to secure the enjoyment or
the rights under Article 11 of the Convention.
As the Court did not consider that any separate
issue arose under Article 10 that had not already
been dealt with in the context of Article 11 of the
Convention, the Court held that it was not neces-
sary to examine the complaint from the perspec-
tive of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court
also found that it was unnecessary to consider
the complaint raised under article 14 of the Con-
vention.
26.- Stambuk v. Germany, 17 October 2002
("commercial speech", freedom of expression of
doctor, advertising or interview, disciplinary
sanction)
In a judgment of 17 October 2002 the European
Court came to the conclusion that a disciplinary
punishment of a doctor for disregarding the ban
on advertising by giving an interview in the press,
was to be considered as a breach of Article 10 of
the Convention. In 1995, the applicant, an oph-
thalmologist, was imposed a fine by a district
Disciplinary Court for Medical Practitioners. An
article in a newspaper, with an interview and a
photograph of Mr. Stambuk was considered as
disregarding the ban on advertising for medical
practitioners. The interview in which Mr. Stam-
buk explained the successful treatment with a
new laser technique that he applied, was seen as a
kind of self-promotion, in breach of the Rules of
Professional Conduct of the Medical Practition-
ers' Council. According to section 25(2) of this
Code a medical practitioner should not allow for
picture-stories to be published in respect of pro-
fessional activities, which had an advertising
character, indicated the name and showed a pho-
tograph. According to section 27 the cooperation
of a medical practitioner in informative publica-
tions in the press was only permissible if these
publications were limited to objective informa-
tion, without the practitioner was presented in
the form of an advertisement. The Disciplinary
Appeals Court confirmed the sanction, taking
into regard that Mr. Stambuk had not only toler-
ated than an article was published which would
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go beyond objective information on a particular
operation technique, but had deliberately acted
so as to give prominence to his own person.
The European Court of Human Rights recognis-
es that restrictions on advertising by medical
practitioners in the exercise of their liberal pro-
fession have a legitimate aim in protecting the
rights of others or to protect health. The ques-
tion however if in casu a disciplinary punishment
was necessary in a democratic society, is answered
negative by the European Court. The Court re-
calls that, for the citizen, advertising is a means of
discovering the characteristics of services and
goods offered to him. The Court recognises that
owing to the special circumstances of particular
business activities and professions, advertising or
commercial speech may be restricted. The Court
also accepts that the general professional obli-
gation of medical practitioners to care of the
health of each individual and of the commu-
nity as a whole may indeed explain restric-
tions on their conduct, including rules of
their public communication or participation
in public communications on professional is-
sues. These rules of conduct in relation to the
press is to be balanced however against the legiti-
mate interest of the public in information and
are limited to preserve the well-functioning of the
profession as a whole. They should not be inter-
preted as putting an excessive burden on medi-
cal practitioners to control the content of
press publications, taking also into regard the
essential function fulfilled by the press in a dem-
ocratic society by imparting information and ide-
as on all matters of public interest. According to
the Court, the article with the interview and a
photo with Mr. Stambuk on the whole presented
a balanced explanation of the specific operation
technique, inevitably referring to the applicant's
own experience. The article may well have had
the effect of giving publicity to Mr. Stambuk
and his practice, but, having regard to the
principal content of the article, this effect
proved to be a secondary nature. According to
the European Court the interference complained
of by Mr. Stambuk did not achieve a fair balance
between the interests at stake, namely the protec-
tion of health and the interests of other medical
practitioners and Mr. Stambuk's right to free-
dom of expression and the vital role of the press.
In sum, there has been a breach of Article 10 of
the Convention.
27.- Demuth v. Switzerland, 5 November 2002
(refusal to grant a broadcasting licence, margin
of appreciation, broadcasting policy)
In 1997 Mr. Demuth complained before the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights that the decision
of the Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) refusing
to grant CAR TV AG a broadcasting licence for
cable TV, ran counter to Article 10 of the Conven-
tion (freedom of expression). He considered that
the refusal was arbitrary and discriminatory. In a
decision of 16 June 1996 the Federal Council had
decided that there was no right, either under
Swiss law or Article 10 of the European Conven-
tion, to obtain a broadcasting licence. With refer-
ence to the instructions for radio and television
listed in Section 3 § 1 and Section 11 § 1 (a) of the
Radio and Television Act (Bundesgezetz über Radio
und Fernsehen, RTA), the Federal Council was of
the opinion that the orientation of the program
of CAR TV AG was not able to offer the required
valuable orientation to comply with the general
instructions for radio and television, as the pro-
gram focused mainly on entertainment and re-
ports about automobile.
In its judgment of 5 November 2002 the Europe-
an Court confirms its former case law that the re-
fusal to grant a broadcasting licence is to be con-
sidered as an interference with the exercise of the
freedom of expression, namely the right to im-
part information and ideas under Article 10 § 1
of the Convention. The question is if such an in-
terference is legitimate. According to the third
sentence of Article 10 § 1 the member states are
permitted to regulate by means of a licensing sys-
tem the way in which broadcasting is organised
in their territories, particularly in its technical as-
pects. It remains however to be determined
whether the manner in which the licensing sys-
tem is applied satisfies the relevant conditions of
paragraph 2 of Article 10. The Court is of the
opinion that the relevant provisions of the licens-
ing system of the RTA were capable of contribut-
ing to the quality and balance of programs.
This is considered a sufficient legitimate aim, al-
beit not directly corresponding to any of the aims
set out in Article 10 § 2. The Court also refers to
the particular political and cultural structure
in Switzerland, that necessitate the applica-
tion of sensitive political criteria such as cul-
tural and linguistic pluralism and a balanced
federal policy. The Court sees no reason to
doubt the validity of these considerations, which
are of considerable importance for a federal
State. Such factors, encouraging in particular
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pluralism in broadcasting may legitimately be
taken into account when authorising radio and
television broadcasts. The Court comes to the
conclusion that the Swiss Federal Council's deci-
sion, guided by the policy that television pro-
grams shall to a certain extent also serve public
service, did not go beyond the margin of appreci-
ation left to national authorities in such matters.
The Court also observes that the refusal to grant
the requested licence was not categorical and did
not exclude a broadcasting licence once and for
all. Although the Court explicitly recognizes that
opinions may differ as to whether the Federal
Council's decision was appropriate and whether
the broadcasts should have been authorised in
the form in which the request was presented, the
Court reaches the conclusion that the restriction
of the applicant's freedom of expression was nec-
essary in a democratic society. The Court espe-
cially takes note of the Government's assurance
that a licence would indeed be granted to CAR
TV AG if it included cultural elements in its pro-
gram. The Court considered it unnecessary to ex-
amine the Government's further ground of justi-
fication, contested by the applicant, for refusing
the licence, namely that there were only a limited
number of frequencies available on cable televi-
sion. By 6 votes to 1, the Court reaches the con-
clusion that there has been no violation of Arti-
cle 10 of the Convention. 
28.- A. v. the United Kingdom, 17 December
2002 (freedom of speech by member of parlia-
ment, privilege, privacy, forum for political de-
bate)
Although the case of A. v. United Kingdom is not
an Article 10 case, the judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights of 17 December 2002 is
to be considered as an important confirmation of
the principle of freedom of speech and political
debate. The case concerns the question whether
the statements of an MP in the House of Com-
mons were protected by the parliamentary privi-
lege under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689.
During a parliamentary debate on housing policy
in 1996, a member of Parliament made offending
and derogatory remarks about the behaviour of
A. and her children. The MP called the family of
A. "neighbours form hell", a phrase which was
also quoted in the newspapers. Following the
MP's speech and the hostile wordings in the press
A. received hate-mail addressed at her and she
was also stopped in the street and abused by of-
fending language. A. was re-housed by the hous-
ing association as a matter of urgency and her
children were obliged to change school. A com-
plaining letter to the MP that was forwarded to
the Office of the Parliamentary Speaker and a let-
ter to the then Prime Minister, Mr. John Major,
stayed without effect. A. was informed about the
absolute character of the parliamentary privilege.
In Strasbourg the applicant complained that the
absolute nature of the privilege which protected
the MP's statements about her in Parliament es-
pecially violated her right of access to court un-
der Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Europe-
an Court of Human Rights recognises the
legitimate aim of protecting free speech in Par-
liament and maintaining the separation of
powers between the legislature and the judici-
ary. The Court emphasized that in a democracy,
Parliament or such comparable bodies are the es-
sential fora for a political debate. The Court is of
the opinion that the absolute immunity enjoyed
by MPs is designed to protect the interests of Par-
liament as a whole as opposed to those of individ-
ual MPs: "In all the circumstances of this case,
the application of a rule of absolute Parliamenta-
ry immunity cannot be said to exceed the margin
of appreciation allowed to States in limiting an
individual's right of access to court". The Court
emphasized however that no immunity attaches
to statements outside Parliament, nor does
any immunity attach to an MP's press state-
ments, even if their contents repeat the state-
ments during the parliamentary debate itself.
The Court agrees with the applicant's submis-
sions to the effect that the allegations made
about her in the MP's speech were extremely seri-
ous and clearly unnecessary in the context of a
debate about municipal housing policy. The
MP's repeated reference to the applicant's name
and address was particularly regrettable. The
Court considers that the unfortunate conse-
quences of the MP's comments for the lives of the
applicant and her children were entirely foreseea-
ble. However, these factors cannot alter the
Court's conclusion as to the proportionality of
the parliamentary immunity at issue. There has,
accordingly, been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention as regards the parliamentary im-
munity enjoyed by the MP. The absence of legal
aid for defamation proceedings in the United
Kingdom was neither estimated as a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant
was considered to have had sufficient possibili-
ties to bring defamation proceedings in respect
of the unprivileged press releases.
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The Court also took into consideration the do-
mestic law of the eight States to have made a
third-party intervention. Each of these laws make
provision for such an immunity, although the
precise detail of the immunities concerned varies.
The Court believes that the rule of parliamentary
immunity, which is consistent with and reflects
generally recognised rules within the signatory
States, the Council of Europe and the European
Union, cannot in principle be regarded as impos-
ing a disproportionate restriction on the right of
access to court as embodied in Article 6 § 1. The
Court found neither a violation of Article 8 (right
to respect for private and family life), Article 13
(right to an effective remedy) nor Article 14 (pro-
hibition of discrimination).
(See also Jerusalem v. Austria, 27 February 2001;  Cor-
dova no. 1 and no. 2 v. Italy, 30 January 2003 and De
Jorio v. Italy, 3 June 2004. Compare with : G.C.I.L and
Cofferati v. Italy, 24 February 2009 and G.C.I.L and
Cofferati (no. 2) v. Italy, 6 April 2010 )
29.- Peck v. the United Kingdom, 28 January
2003 (release and broadcasting of footage of
CCTV system infringes right of privacy, self-reg-
ulation and co regulation without sanctions is no
effective legal remedy)
In the case of Peck v. the United Kingdom the ap-
plicant complained about the disclosure to the
media of a closed circuit television (CCTV) foot-
age, which resulted in images of himself being
published and broadcasted widely. The CCTV's
Council had released images to the media with
the aim of promoting the effectiveness of the
CCTV system in the detection and the prevention
of crime. Extracts of the footage inter alia were in-
cluded in an Anglia Television news programme
and in the BBC program "Crime Beat". The
masking was considered inadequate by the ITC
(Independent Television Commission) and the
BSC (Broadcasting Standards Commission) as
neighbours, colleagues, friends and family who
saw the programmes recognised the applicant.
The judicial authorities in the United Kingdom
at the other hand did not consider that the dis-
closure of the CCTV material was a breach or the
applicant's right of privacy under Article 8 of the
European Convention.
The European Court of Human Rights however
is of the opinion that the disclosure of the images
to the media resulted in a breach of Article 8 of
the Convention. The Court emphasises that the
applicant was in a public street but that he was
not there for the purposes of participating in any
public event, neither that he was a public figure.
The image of the applicant was showed in the me-
dia, including the audio-visual media of which is
"commonly acknowledged that the audio-visual
media have often a much more immediate and
powerful effect than the print media". As a result,
the Court considers that the unforeseen disclo-
sure by the CCTV's Council of the relevant
footage constituted a serious interference
with the applicant's right to respect for his
private life. The Court also came to the conclu-
sion that the disclosure was not "necessary in a
democratic society". Although the Court recog-
nises that the CCTV system plays an important
role in detecting and preventing crime and that
this role is rendered more effective and successful
trough advertising the CCTV system and its ben-
efits, the CCTV's Council had other options
available to allow to achieve these objectives. The
Council could have taken steps to obtain the ap-
plicant's prior consent to disclosure, whether the
Council itself could have masked the images be-
fore making them available to the media, wheth-
er the Council could have taken the utmost care
in ensuring that the media to which the disclo-
sure was made, masked the images. The Court
notes that the Council did not explore the first
and second option and considers that the steps
taken in respect of the third option were inade-
quate. The Court is of the opinion that the
Council should have demanded written un-
dertakings of the media to mask the images,
which requirement would have emphasised
the need to maintain confidentiality. As such,
the disclosure constituted a disproportionate
and therefore unjustified interference with the
private life and a violation of Article 8 of the Con-
vention.
With regard the applicant's complaint that he
had no effective domestic remedy to have his
right of privacy protected in the United King-
dom, it is interesting to underline that the Euro-
pean Court is of the opinion that the power of
the BSC and the ITC is not sufficient to consider
the procedures before these bodies as an effective
remedy, as they cannot make a pecuniary com-
pensation available to an aggrieved individual
who may have been injured by an infringement of
the relevant broadcasting regulation. Neither did
the Court accept the Government's argument
that any acknowledgment of the need to have a
remedy would undermine the important con-
flicting rights of the press guaranteed by Article
10 of the Convention, as the media could have
mwb-3164-european.media.law.book  Page 22  Wednesday, August 17, 2011  2:33 PM
European Media Law
23
achieved their objectives by properly masking
of the applicant's identity. Accordingly there
has also been a violation of Article 13 of the Con-
vention.
(See also Van Hannover v. Germany, 24 June 2004, on
the relation between right to privacy and freedom of ex-
pression. See also Sciacca v. Italy, 11 January 2005;
Gourguénidze v. Georgia, 17 October 2006; Petrina v.
Romania, 14 October 2008; Reklos and Davourlis v.
Greece, 15 January 2009; Standard Verlag GmbH (no.
2) v. Austria, 4 June 2009 and Petrenco v. Moldova 30
March 2010)
30.- Perna v. Italy, 6 May 2003 – Grand Cham-
ber (defamation of public prosecutor, burden of
proof, lack of evidence)
In a judgment of 6 May 2003 the Grand Chamber
of the European Court of Human Rights has
overruled the judgment of 25 July 2001 of the
Second Section in the case of Perna v. Italy. While
the Strasbourg Court in 2001 came to the conclu-
sion that the conviction of the Italian journalist
Giancarlo Perna violated Article 10 of the Con-
vention, the Grand Chamber now reached the
conclusion that the conviction for defamation
was in accordance with the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.
The case goes back to an article published in the
newspaper Il Giornale in which Perna sharply crit-
icised the communist militancy of a judicial of-
ficer, Mr. G. Caselli, at that time the public pros-
ecutor in Palermo. The article raised in substance
two separate issues. Firstly, Perna questioned Ca-
selli's independence and impartiality because of
his political militancy as a member of the Com-
munist Party. And secondly, Caselli was accused
of a strategy of gaining control of the public pros-
ecutors' office and of the manipulative use of a
pentito against Mr. Andreotti (former Italian
prime minister). After a complaint by Caselli, Per-
na was convicted for defamation in application
of Articles 595 and 61 § 10 of the Criminal Code
and Section 13 of the Italian Press Act. Trough
out the defamation proceedings before the do-
mestic courts, the journalist was refused to admit
the evidence he sought to adduce. In 1999 Perna
alleged a violation of Article 6 and Article 10 of
the European Convention.
The refusal to prove the truth of his statements
before the Italian Courts was not considered by
the Strasbourg Court as a breach of Article 6 § 1
and 3 (d) of the Convention which guarantees
everyone charged with a criminal offence the
right to examine or have examined witnesses on
his behalf. The Court in its judgment of 25 July
2001 was of the opinion that there were no indi-
cations that the evidence concerned could have
contributed any new information whatsoever to
the proceedings. The Grand Chamber has now
confirmed this decision, emphasizing that it was
not established that the request of Perna to pro-
duce evidence would have been helpful in prov-
ing that the specific conduct imputed to Caselli
had actually occurred.
With regard to Article 10 of the Convention, the
Second Section of the European Court in its
judgment of 25 July 2001 has argued that the
criticism directed at Caselli had a factual basis
which was not disputed, namely Caselli's politi-
cal militancy as a member of the Communist Par-
ty (PCI). The Court agreed that the terms chosen
by Perna and the use of the symbolic image of the
"oath of obedience" to the Communist Party was
hard-hitting, but it also emphasized that journal-
istic freedom covers possible recourse to a degree
of exaggeration or even provocation. According
to the Court the conviction of Perna was a viola-
tion of Article 10 of the Convention as the pun-
ishment of a journalist for such kind of criticism
on a member of the judiciary was considered not
to be necessary in a democratic society. With re-
gard however to Perna's speculative allegations
about the alleged strategy of gaining control
over the public prosecutor's offices in a
number of cities and esp. the (ab)use of the pen-
tito Buscetta in order to prosecute Mr. Andreotti,
the Court came to the conclusion that the convic-
tion of Perna was not in breach with Article 10 of
the Convention. 
The Grand Chamber in its judgment of 6 May
2003 however has finally come to the conclusion
that the conviction of Perna was not violating Ar-
ticle 10 at all. The Court focuses on the article's
overall content and its very essence of which the
unambiguous message was that Caselli had
knowingly committed an abuse of authority, no-
tably connected with the indictment of Mr. An-
dreotti, in furtherance of the alleged PCI strategy
of gaining control of public prosecutor's offices
in Italy. The Court is of the opinion that at no
time Perna did try to prove that the specific con-
duct imputed to Caselli had actually occurred
and that in his defence he argued, on the contra-
ry, that he had expressed critical judgments
which there was not need to prove. According to
the Grand Chamber of the Court, the interfer-
ence in Perna's freedom of expression could
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therefore be regarded as necessary in a democrat-
ic society to protect the reputation of others
within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Con-
vention.
(See also Rizos and Daskas v. Greece, 27 May 2004)
31.- Murphy v. Ireland, 10 July 2003 (prohibi-
tion of religious advertising on Irish broadcast-
ing)
In a judgment of 10 July 2003 the European
Court of Human Rights has unanimously held
that the applicant's exclusion of broadcasting an
advertisement announcing a religious event was
considered to be prescribed by law, had a legiti-
mate goal and was necessary in a democratic soci-
ety. The decision by the Irish Radio and Televi-
sion Commission (IRTC) to stop the radio
broadcast of the advertisement was taken in ap-
plication of Section 10(3) of the Irish Radio and
Television Act, which stipulates that no adver-
tisement shall be broadcasted which is directed
towards any religious or political end. The Court
accepted that the impugned provision sought to
ensure respect for the religious doctrines and
beliefs of others so that the aims of the prohi-
bition were the protection of public order and
safety together with the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. Recognising
that a wide margin of appreciation is available to
the member states when regulating freedom of
expression in the sphere of religion, referring to
the fact that religion has been a divisive issue and
that religious advertising might be considered of-
fensive and open to the interpretation of prose-
lytism in Ireland, the Court was of the opinion
that the prohibition of broadcasting the adver-
tisement was not an irrelevant nor a dispropor-
tionate restriction on the applicant's freedom of
expression. While there is not a clear consensus,
nor a uniform conception of the legislative
regulation of the broadcasting of religious ad-
vertising in Europe, reference is made to the ex-
istence in other countries of similar prohibitions
on the broadcasting of religious advertising, as
well as to Article 12 of the EC-Directive 89/552 of
3 October 1989 according to which television ad-
vertising shall not prejudice respect of human
dignity nor be offensive to religious or political
beliefs. The Court also emphasized that the pro-
hibition concerned only the audio-visual media,
having a more immediate, invasive and powerful
impact, including on the passive recipient and
also the fact that advertising time is purchased
and that this would lean in favour of unbalanced
usage by religious groups with larger resources
and advertising. For the Court it is important
that the applicant, a pastor attached to the Irish
Faith Centre, a bible based Christian ministry in
Dublin, kept to be free to advertise in any of the
print media or to participate as any other citizen
in programmes on religious matters and to have
services of his church broadcast in the audio-vis-
ual media. The Court indeed accepts that a to-
tal ban on religious advertising on radio and
television is a proportionate measure: even a
limited freedom to advertise would benefit a
dominant religion more than those religions
with significantly less adherents and resources.
This would jar with the objective of promoting
neutrality in broadcasting, and in particular, of
ensuring a "level playing field" for all religions in
the medium considered to have the most power-
ful impact". The Courts reached the conclusion
that the interference in the applicant's freedom
of expression was not violating Article 10 of the
Convention.
(See also VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzer-
land, 28 June 2001, "political advertising")
32.- Karkin v. Turkey, 23 September 2003, Kiz-
ilyaprak v. Turkey, 2 October 2003 and Zarako-
lu (nos. 1-3) v. Turkey 2 October 2003
(incitement to separatism, no incitement to vio-
lence, freedom of political speech, friendly settle-
ment)
The case of Karkin v. Turkey concerns the convic-
tion of the secretary of a union organisation who
has been sentenced by the National Security
Board in 1997 to one year's imprisonment for
making a speech inciting the people to hatred
and hostility creating discrimination based on
membership of a social class and race, a criminal
conviction in application of Article 312 of the
Turkish Criminal Code. Although the Court
clearly takes into account the sensitivity of the se-
curity situation in south-east Turkey and the
need of the authorities to be alert to acts capable
of fuelling additional violence in the region, the
Court cannot agree that the conviction and pun-
ishment of Karkin was to be considered necessary
in a democratic society. The Court is of the opin-
ion that the applicant's speech was “political in
nature” and was expressed during a peaceful
gathering, far away from the conflict zone. As
this circumstances significantly limited the po-
tential impact of the comments on "national se-
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curity", "public order" or "territorial integrity"
and as the penalties imposed on the applicant
were severe, the Court unanimously concluded
that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention.
In the case of Kizilyaprak v. Turkey the European
Court of Human Rights is of the opinion that the
national authorities had not taken sufficient ac-
count of the public's right to be informed form
different perspectives on the situation in south-
east Turkey. The conviction of Kizilyaprak con-
cerned the publication of a book entitled "How
we fought against the Kurdish people! A soldier's
memoirs". In this book a Turkish soldier de-
scribed what he experienced during his military
service in south-east Turkey. As the content of
the book was considered as disseminating sepa-
ratist propaganda and incitement to hatred
based on ethnical and regional differences (Arti-
cle 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and Arti-
cle 312 of the Criminal Code), the owner of the
publishing house, Zeynel Abidin Kizilyaprak, was
sentenced to six month's imprisonment by the
National Security Court in 1993. In a crucial con-
sideration the Strasbourg Court is of the opinion
that although some passages in the book painted
an extremely negative picture of the Turkish
State and the army and reflected a very hostile
tone, the content of the book did not consti-
tute an incitement to violence, armed resist-
ance or an uprising. Referring also to the severi-
ty of the conviction, the Court unanimously
concluded that the Turkish authorities have vio-
lated Article 10 of the Convention.
In three other cases an agreement was reached be-
tween the applicant's widower, Mr. Zarakolu and
the Turkish Government. All three cases concern
the seizures of several books because of separatist
propaganda. The Court in its judgements of 2
October 2003 took notice of the Friendly settle-
ments, referring to the declaration from the
Turkish Government in which it is recognised
that the (former) Court's rulings against Turkey
in cases involving prosecutions under the provi-
sions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act relating
to freedom of expression, and also the facts un-
derlying of the presents cases, "show that Turk-
ish law and practice urgently need to be brought
into line with the Convention's requirements un-
der Article 10 of the Convention". In all three cas-
es the Court took note of the agreement reached
between the parties. The Court expresses its satis-
faction that the settlement is based on the respect
of human rights as defined in the Convention
and its Protocols. The cases are ordered to be
struck out of the list.
33.- Müslüm Gündüz v. Turkey, 4 December
2003 (incitement of the people to hatred and hos-
tility on the basis of religion, no incitement to vi-
olence, no “hate speech”, freedom of religious
speech)
In the case of Müslüm Gündüz v. Turkey, the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights has evaluated the
necessity of a criminal conviction because of in-
citing the people to hatred and hostility. The ap-
plicant, in his capacity as the leader of an Islamic
sect, during a TV-debate broadcasted by HBB
channel, has demonstrated a profound dissatis-
faction with contemporary, democratic and secu-
lar institutions in Turkey by describing them as
"impious". During the programme he also open-
ly called for the introduction of the sharia. Due to
these statements Müslüm Gündüz was found
guilty by the state security court of incitement to
hatred and hostility on the basis of a distinction
founded on religion. He was sentenced to two
years' imprisonment.
In its judgment of 4 December 2003 the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights comes to the conclu-
sion that this interference by the Turkish author-
ities with the applicant's right of freedom of
expression violated Article 10 of the Convention.
Although the applicant's conviction was pre-
scribed by Turkish Criminal Law and had the
protection of morals and the rights of others as
well as the prevention of disorder or crime as le-
gitimate goals, the Court was not convinced that
the punishment of Müslüm Gündüz was to be
considered as necessary in a democratic society.
The Court observed that the applicant was invit-
ed to participate in the programme to present the
sect and its nonconformist views, including the
notion that democratic values were incompatible
with its conception of Islam. This topic was the
subject of widespread debate in the Turkish me-
dia and concerned an issue of general interest.
The Court once more emphasised that Article 10
of the Convention also protects information and
ideas that shock, offend and disturb. At the same
time however there can be no doubt that ex-
pressions propagating, inciting or justifying
hatred based on intolerance, including reli-
gious intolerance, do not enjoy the protection
of Article 10. In the Court's view, the comments
and statements of Müslüm Gündüz expressed
during the lively television debate could not
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be regarded as a call to violence or as “hate
speech” based on religious intolerance. The
Court underlined that merely defending the
sharia, without calling for the use of violence
to establish it, cannot be regarded as “hate
speech”. Notwithstanding the margin of appre-
ciation accorded to the national authorities, the
Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of
Article 10 there were insufficient arguments to
justify the interference in the applicant's right to
freedom of expression. By six votes to one the
Court came to the conclusion that there had been
a violation of Article 10. The Turkish Judge, M.
Türmen, dissented with the majority of the
Court. He is of the opinion that the statements of
Müslüm Gündüz contained "hate speech" and
were offending for the majority of the Turkish
people who have chosen to live in a secular socie-
ty.
(See also Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, 29 June 2004 and 10
November 2005 (Grand Chamber), restrictions on free-
dom of religion from the scope of Article 9 Convention –
headscarf as form of religious expression; Erbakan v.
Turkey, 5 July 2006. See other cases against Turkey)
34.- Amihalachioiae v. Moldova, 20 April 2004
(freedom of expression of lawyer, public debate,
conviction because of lack of respect for Constitu-
tional Court, press interview)
The applicant, a lawyer and President of the Un-
ion of Lawyers in Moldova was imposed an ad-
ministrative fine for being disrespectful towards
the (judges of the) Constitutional Court. In an in-
terview which was published in a journal, the ap-
plicant criticised firmly a decision of the Consti-
tutional Court declaring unconstitutional the
statutory provisions requiring lawyers to be
member of the Union of Lawyers of Moldova,
such a condition being a violation of the freedom
of association according to the Constitutional
Court. Amihalachioaie was penalised for stating
that, as a result of the decision by the Moldovan
Constitutional Court "complete chaos would
reign in the legal profession" and that the ques-
tion therefore arose as whether the Constitution-
al Court was constitutional. The Constitutional
Court also penalised the applicant for asserting
that its judges "probably did not consider the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights to be an authori-
ty".
The European Court of Human Rights noted
that although the Moldovan legislation did not
define with absolute precision the actions
that had been penalised, on account of his pro-
fessional training and experience the applicant
could reasonably have foreseen that his remarks
were capable of being caught by Article 82 (e) of
the Code of Constitutional Procedure, penalising
the lack of respectfulness towards the Constitu-
tional Court. The Court also accepted that the in-
terference pursued a legitimate aim, which was to
maintain the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary. The Court however was of the opinion
that the interference in the applicant's freedom
of expression was not necessary in a democratic
society: Amihalachioaie's statements concerned
a matter of general interest which was the sub-
ject of a fierce controversy among lawyers and the
decision of the Constitutional Court could put
an end to the organisation of lawyers into a single
structure, the Union of Lawyers, of which the ap-
plicant was the president. The statements of the
applicant, even if they contained a certain lack of
consideration towards the Constitutional Court,
could not be regarded as serious or insulting
towards the judges of the Court. Furthermore,
since the applicant had subsequently denied part
of the statements attributed to him by the press
the European Court was of the opinion that Ami-
halachioaie could not be considered responsi-
ble for everything that had been published in
the interview. Since the applicant had not ex-
ceeded the limits of criticism permissible under
Article 10 of the Convention, the interference
complained of by Amihalachioaie was regarded
as a violation of the freedom of expression.
(See also Schöpfer v. Switzerland, 20 May 1998 and
Wille v. Liechtenstein, 28 October 1999)
35.- Plon (Société) v. France, 18 May 2004
(medical secret, injunction prohibiting distribu-
tion of a book, final order maintaining the prohi-
bition of the distribution of a book)
In this case about the book of Dr. Gubler "Le
Grand Secret" (a book about the former president
Mitterrand and how his cancer had been diag-
nosed and medically treated) the central question
is whether the prohibition of the distribution of
the book was to be considered as necessary in a
democratic society in order to protect the de-
ceased president's honour, his reputation and
the intimacy of his private life. Many items of in-
formation revealed in the book were also legally
confidential and hence were capable of infring-
ing the rights of others.
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As to whether the interference by the French
courts ordering the prohibition of the distribu-
tion of the book of Dr. Gubler on request of Mit-
terrand's widow and children, met a pressing so-
cial need, the Court is of the opinion that the
publication of the book had taken place in the
context of a general-interest debate. This de-
bate had already been going on for some time in
France and was about the right of the public to be
informed about serious illnesses of the president
and his aptitude to hold this office, being aware
that he was seriously ill.
The European Court considered the interim ban
on the distribution of "Le Grand Secret" few days
after Mitterrand death and until the relevant
courts had ruled on its compatibility with medi-
cal confidentiality and the rights of others as nec-
essary in a democratic society for the protec-
tion of the rights of the President Mitterrand and
his heirs and successors.
The ruling however, more than nine months after
Mitterrand's death, to keep the ban on the book
is considered as a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention. Moreover, at the time when the
French court ruled on the merits of the case
40,000 copies of the book had already been sold,
the book had been published on the internet and
it had been the subject of much comment in the
media. Accordingly, preserving medical confi-
dentiality could no longer constitute a pre-
ponderant imperative. The Court consequently
considered that when de French court gave judg-
ment there was no longer a pressing social need
justifying the continuation in force of the ban on
distribution of "Le Grand Secret". While the
Court found no violation on account of the in-
junction prohibiting distribution of the book
issued as an interim measure by the urgent ap-
plications judge (summary proceedings), the Euro-
pean Court comes to the conclusion of a viola-
tion of Article 10 of the Convention on account
of the order maintaining that prohibition in
force made by the civil court which ruled on
the merits.
(See also Observer and Guardian v. the United King-
dom and Sunday Times n° 2 v. the United Kingdom, 26
November 1991)
36.-Vides Aizsardzības Klubs (VAK) v. Latvia,
27 May 2004 (freedom of expression of NGO,
public debate, environment protection, criticism
of public figure, NGO role as watchdog, factual
allegations, value judgment, burden of proof)
The applicant, an NGO based in Riga activating
for environment protection, was convicted for
publishing defamatory allegations about a may-
or who, according to VAK, had signed illegal doc-
uments, decisions and certificates and had wil-
fully omitted to comply with the instruction of
the relevant authorities to halt illegal building
works. VAK was sued in court and in a judgment
of 23 August 1999 was ordered to publish an of-
ficial apology and pay damages to the mayor for
publishing these defamatory statements in a res-
olution that was also published in a regional
newspaper.
In a judgment of 27 May 2004 the Court empha-
sised that the main issue of the resolution of VAK
had been to draw the public authorities' atten-
tion to a sensitive issue of public interest, namely
the malfunctions in an important sector man-
aged by the local authorities. As an NGO special-
ised in the relevant area, VAK had thus exercised
its role of "watchdog" under the Environmental
Protection Act. According to the European Court
that kind of participation by an NGO in pub-
lic debate contributes to the transparency of
public authorities' activities and is essential
in a democratic society. The European Court is
of the opinion that VAK succeeded to establish
sufficiently the truth of its factual allegations
against the mayor. Given the limits on permissi-
ble criticism of a public figure, and taking into
account the Latvian mayor's powers with regard
to environmental protection, the criticism of the
mayor for the policy of an entire local authority
could not be regarded as an abuse of the freedom
of expression. In a democratic society public au-
thorities are to be exposed to permanent scruti-
ny by citizens and everyone has to be able to
draw the public's attention to situations that
they consider unlawful. Describing the mayor's
conduct as “illegal” is considered by the Euro-
pean Court as expressing a personal legal
opinion amounting to a value judgment of
which the accuracy cannot be required to be
proven. For all these reasons and despite the dis-
cretion afforded to the national authorities, the
Court held that there had not been a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the re-
strictions imposed on the applicant organisa-
tion's freedom of expression and the legitimate
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aim pursued. Unanimously the Court found a vi-
olation of Article 10 of the Convention.
(See also Karhuvaara and Iltalethi v. Finland, 16 No-
vember 2004 and Selistö v. Finland, 16 November
2004)
37.- Von Hannover v. Germany, 24 June 2004
(freedom of expression by "entertainment
press", privacy, public figure, publication of pho-
tographs, paparazzi) 
The European Court of Human Rights in a judg-
ment of 24 June 2004 has come to the conclusion
that Germany has not awarded a sufficient level
of protection to the right of privacy of Princess
Caroline von Hannover. On several occasions
Caroline von Hannover, the daughter of Prince
Rainier III of Monaco, applied to the German
courts for an injunction preventing any further
publication of a series of photographs which had
appeared in the German magazines Bunte, Freizeit
Revue and Neue Post. As Caroline von Hannover
was to be considered undeniably as a contempo-
rary public figure “par excellence”, the Ger-
man courts were of the opinion that she had to
tolerate the publication of the photographs, ex-
cept those in which she appeared with her chil-
dren or with a friend in a secluded place in a res-
taurant. Other photos however showing Caroline
van Hannover on horseback, shopping, cycling or
skiing were to be considered as falling under the
right of the press to inform the public on
events and public persons in contemporary
society, just like a series of photographs showing
the Princess in the Monte Carlo Beach Club. 
In its judgment of 24 June the Strasbourg Court
agreed with Caroline von Hannover that the deci-
sions of the German courts infringed her right to
respect for her private life as guaranteed by Ar-
ticle 8 of the Convention. The Court recognizes
that "the protection of private life has to be bal-
anced against the freedom of expression guaran-
teed by Article 10 of the Convention", emphasiz-
ing at the same time that "the present case does
not concern the dissemination of "ideas", but of
images containing very personal or even intimate
"information" about an individual. Further-
more, photos appearing in the tabloid press
are often taken in a climate of continual har-
assment which induces in the person con-
cerned a very strong sense of intrusion into
their private life or even of persecution". In
such circumstances priority has to be given to re-
spect of the right of privacy. As a matter of fact "a
fundamental distinction needs to be made be-
tween reporting facts – even controversial ones –
capable of contributing to a debate in a demo-
cratic society relating to politicians in the exercise
of their functions, for example, and reporting de-
tails of the private life of an individual who,
moreover, as in this case, does not exercise official
functions. While in the former case the press ex-
ercises its vital role of "watchdog" in a democracy
by contributing to "imparting information and
ideas on matters of public interest", it does not so
in the latter case". According to the Court the
sole purpose of the publication of the photos was
to satisfy the curiosity of a particular reader-
ship regarding the details of the applicant's
private life. In these conditions freedom of ex-
pression calls for a narrower interpretation. The
Court also stated that "increased vigilance in
protecting private life is necessary to contend
with new communication technologies which
make it possible to store and reproduce personal
data. This also applies to the systematic taking of
specific photos and their dissemination to a
broad section of the public". In the Court's view,
merely classifying the applicant as a figure of
contemporary society “par excellence”, does not
suffice to justify an intrusion into her private life.
The Court therefore considers that the criteria on
which the domestic courts based their decisions
were not sufficient to ensure the effective protec-
tion of the applicant's private life and she should,
in the circumstances of the case, have had a "le-
gitimate expectation" of protection of her pri-
vate life. Unanimously, the Court reaches the
conclusion that the German courts did not strike
a fair balance between the competing rights and
that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention.
(See also White v. Sweden, 19 September 2006 and
Standard Verlag (n° 2) v. Austria, 4 June 2009)
38.- Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, 17
December 2004 – Grand Chamber (defamation
of police man, burden of proof, lack of evidence,
ethics of journalism)
In Strasbourg, two journalists of Danish Nation-
al television (Danmarks Radio) complained about
their conviction for defamation of a Chief Super-
intendent. The journalists, Pedersen and Baads-
gaard, had produced two programmes about a
murder trial in which they had criticised the po-
lice's handling of the investigation. At the end of
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the programmes, the question was raised if it was
the chief superintendent who had decided that a
report should not be included in the case or who
concealed a witness's statement from the de-
fence, the judges and the jury. Both journalists
were charged with defamation and convicted and
sentenced to DKK 400 (53 EUR) and ordered to
pay DKK 100.000 (13.400 EUR). The domestic
courts came to the conclusion that the journal-
ists lacked a sufficient factual basis for the allega-
tion that the named chief superintendent had de-
liberately suppressed a vital piece of evidence in
the murder case. In a Chamber judgment of 19
June 2003, the Court held by four votes to three,
that there had been no violation of Article 10. On
3 December 2003 the panel of the Grand Cham-
ber accepted a request by the applicants for the
case to be referred to the Grand Chamber. The
Danish Union of Journalists was given leave to
submit written comments.
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights in its judgment of 17 December
2004 has also come to the conclusion, by nine
votes to eight (!), that there had been no viola-
tion of Article 10. The Court emphasizes that
the accusation against the named chief superin-
tendent was an allegation of fact susceptible of
proof, while the applicants never endeav-
oured to provide any justification for their al-
legation, and its veracity had never been prov-
en. The applicants also relied on just one witness.
The allegation of deliberate interference with evi-
dence, made at peak viewing time on a national
TV station, was very serious for the named Chief
Superintendent and would have entailed crimi-
nal prosecution had it been true. The offence al-
leged was punishable with up to nine years' im-
prisonment. It inevitably not only prejudiced
public confidence in him, but also disregarded
his right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty according to law. In the Courts' view, the
finding of a procedural failure in the conduct of
the investigation in the murder case as such
could not provide a sufficient factual basis for
the applicants' accusation that the chief superin-
tendent had actively tampered with evidence. The
Courts reached the conclusion that the interfer-
ence in the applicants' freedom of expression was
not violating Article 10 of the Convention, as the
conviction was necessary for the protection of the
reputation and the rights of others. Eight of the
17 judges of the Grand Chamber Court dis-
sented, emphasizing the vital role of the press
as public watchdog in imparting information
of serious public concern and referring to the
fact that the applicants had conducted a large-
scale search for witnesses when preparing
their programmes and that they had a suffi-
cient factual basis to believe that a report did
not contain the full statement of an important
witness. According to the minority a chief super-
intendent of police must accept that his act and
omissions in an important case should be sub-
jected to close and indeed rigorous scrutiny.
39.- Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania, 17 De-
cember 2004 – Grand Chamber (defamation and
insult of judge, privacy, burden of proof, lack of
evidence, ethics of journalism, (dis)proportional-
ity of sanctions)
Constantin Cumpănă and Radu Mazăre are both
professional journalists who have been convicted
in Romania of insult and defamation. In April
1994 they published an article in the Telegraf
newspaper questioning the legality of a contract
in which the Constanţa City Council had author-
ised a commercial company, Vinalex, to perform
the service of towing away illegally parked vehi-
cles. The article, which appeared under the head-
line "Former Deputy Mayor D.M. and serving
judge R.M. responsible for series of offences in
Vinalex scam", was accompanied by a cartoon
showing the judge, Mrs R.M., on the former dep-
uty mayor's arm, carrying a bag marked "Vinalex"
containing banknotes. Mrs R.M., who had signed
the contract with Vinalex on behalf of the city
council while employed by the council as a legal
expert, brought proceedings against Cumpănă
and Mazăre. She submitted that the cartoon had
led readers to believe that she had had intimate
relations with the former deputy mayor, despite
the fact that they were both married. In 1995
both journalists were convicted of insult and def-
amation and sentenced to seven months' impris-
onment. They were also disqualified from exer-
cising certain civil rights and prohibited from
working as journalists for one year. In addition,
they were ordered to pay Mrs R.M. a specified
sum for non-pecuniary damage. In November
1996 the applicants were granted a presidential
pardon releasing them from their custodial sen-
tence.
In a Chamber judgment of 10 June 2003 the
Strasbourg Court held by five votes to two that
there had been no violation of Article 10 of the
Convention, emphasizing that the article and the
cartoon were indeed damaging the authority,
reputation and private life of judge R.M., over-
stepping the bounds of acceptable criticism. The
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Grand Chamber of the European Court in its
judgment of 17 December 2004 has now unani-
mously come to the conclusion that there has
been a violation of Article 10. As the allegations
and insinuations in the article did not have a suf-
ficient factual basis, the Court is of the opinion
that the Romanian authorities were entitled to
consider it necessary to restrict the exercise of the
applicants' right to freedom of expression and
that their conviction for insult and defamation
had accordingly met a "pressing social need".
However, the Court observes that the sanctions
imposed on the applicants have been very se-
vere and disproportionate. In regulating the ex-
ercise of freedom of expression in order to ensure
adequate protection by law of individuals' repu-
tations, States should avoid taking measures
that might deter the media from fulfilling
their role of alerting the public to apparent or
suspected misuse of public power. The impo-
sition of a prison sentence for a press offence
is compatible with journalists’ freedom of ex-
pression only in exceptional circumstances,
notably where other fundamental rights had
been seriously impaired, as, for example, in
the case of hate speech or incitement to vio-
lence. In a classic case of defamation, such as the
present case, imposing a prison sentence inevi-
tably has a chilling effect. Also the order dis-
qualifying the applicants from exercising certain
civil rights is to be considered particularly inap-
propriate and is not justified by the nature of the
offences for which both journalists have been
held criminally liable. The order prohibiting the
applicants from working as journalists for one
year is considered as a preventive measure of gen-
eral scope contravening the principle that the
press must be able to perform the role of a
public watchdog in a democratic society. The
Court comes to the conclusion that, although
the interference with both journalists' right to
freedom of expression might have been justified
as such, the criminal sanction and the accompa-
nying prohibitions imposed on them by the Ro-
manian courts have been manifestly dispropor-
tionate in their nature and severity to the
legitimate aim pursued. The Court therefore
holds that there has been a violation of Article 10
the Convention.
(See also Hrico v. Slovakia, 20 July 2004 and Sabou en
Pîrcălab v. Romania, 28 September 2004)
40.- Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, 15
February 2005 (defamation/libel, leaflets, anti-
McDonald's campaign, fair trial, denial of legal
aid for defendants in libel case, public debate on
activities of powerful commercial entities, chill-
ing effect, disproportionate character of award of
damages).
The European Court of Human Rights in a judg-
ment of 15 February 2005 has come unanimous-
ly to the conclusion that the United Kingdom has
violated Article 6 (fair trial) and Article 10 (freedom
of expression) of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights in a libel case opposing McDonald's
Corporation against two United Kingdom na-
tionals, Helen Steel and David Morris, who had
distributed leaflets as part of an anti-McDon-
ald's campaign. In 1986 a six-page leaflet enti-
tled "What's wrong with McDonald's?" was dis-
tributed by Steel and Morris and in 1990 Mc
Donald's issued a writ against them claiming
damages for libel. The trial took place before a
judge sitting alone from June 1994 until Decem-
ber 1996, it was the longest trial in English legal
history. On appeal the judgment of the trial
judge was upheld in substance, the damages
awarded were reduced by the Court of Appeal to
a total of GBP 76,000. Leave to appeal to the
House of Lords was refused. Throughout the trial
and appeal proceedings Steel and Morris were
refused legal aid: they represented themselves
only with some help from volunteer lawyers. Steel
and Morris applied to the European Court com-
plaining that the proceedings were unfair princi-
pally because they were denied legal aid, although
they where unwaged and dependant on income
support. They applicants also argued that the
outcome of the proceedings constituted a dispro-
portionate interference with their freedom of ex-
pression. With regard the first complaint under
Article 6 § 1 the Court is of the opinion that the
denial of legal aid to the applicants had de-
prived them of the opportunity to present their
case effectively before the Court and contributed
to an unacceptable inequality of arms with Mc-
Donald's, who in this complex case, lasting 313
court days and involving 40,000 pages of docu-
mentary, had been represented by leading and
junior counsel, experienced in defamation law
and by two solicitors and other assistants. With
regard the second complaint, the Court reaches
the conclusion that there has been a violation of
Article 10 of the Convention. Although it is not
in principle incompatible with Article 10 to place
on a defendant in libel proceedings the onus of
proving to the civil standard the truth of defam-
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atory statements, it is considered essential by the
Court that when a legal remedy is offered to a
large multinational company to defend itself
against defamatory allegations, also the coun-
tervailing interest in free expression and open
debate must be guaranteed by providing pro-
cedural fairness and equality of arms to the
defendants in such a case. The Court also em-
phasizes the general interest in promoting the
free circulation of information and ideas
about the activities of powerful commercial
entities, as well as the potential "chilling" effect
on others an award of damages for defamation in
this context may have. Moreover, according to
the Strasbourg Court, the award of damages was
disproportionate to the legitimate aim served in
order to protect the right and reputation of Mc-
Donalds, as the sum of GPP 76,000 was not in a
reasonable relation of proportionality to the
injury to reputation suffered. Given the lack of
procedural fairness and the disproportionate
award of damages, the Court found that there
has been a violation of Article 10 in this case,
which in the media has been labelled as the "Mc-
Libel"-case. The United Kingdom is ordered to
pay 35,000 Euro to the applicants in respect of
non-pecuniary damages and 47,311 Euro in re-
spect of costs and expenses related to the Stras-
bourg proceedings.
41.- Independent News and Media v. Ireland, 16
June 2005 (defamation of politician, amount of
damages, proportionality)
The European Court of Human Rights in this
case is of the opinion that a conviction to pay an
award of damages of 381.000 euros because of
defamatory statements in a press article criticiz-
ing a politician, is not to be considered as a viola-
tion of Article 10 of the European Convention of
Human Rights. In 1997 a High Court jury in Ire-
land found an article published in the Sunday In-
dependent robustly criticizing a national politi-
cian, Mr. de Rossa, to be defamatory and awarded
Mr. de Rossa 300.000 Irish pounds (381.000 eu-
ros) in damages. The award, which was upheld by
the Supreme Court, was three times the highest
libel award previously approved in Ireland. The li-
tigious article referred to some activities of a
criminal nature of the political party of Mr. de
Rossa and criticised his former privileged rela-
tions with the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union. According to
the article, de Rossas political friends in the Sovi-
et Union "were no better than gangsters (..). They were
anti-Semitic". In upholding the award of damages,
the Supreme Court took into account a number
of factors, including the gravity of the libel, the
effect on Mr. de Rossa as leader of a political par-
ty and on his negotiations to form a government
at the time of publication, the extent of the pub-
lication, the conduct of the first applicant news-
paper and the consequent necessity for Mr. de
Rossa to endure three long and difficult trials.
Having assessed these factors, it concluded that
the jury would have been justified in going to the
top of the bracket and awarding as damages the
largest sum that could fairly be regarded as com-
pensation. While IR£300,000 was a substantial
sum, it noted that the libel was serious and grave,
involving an imputation that Mr. de Rossa was
involved in or tolerated serious crime and person-
ally supported anti-Semitism and violent Com-
munist oppression. Bearing in mind that a fun-
damental principle of the law of compensatory
damages is that the award must always be rea-
sonable and fair and bear a due correspond-
ence with the injury suffered and not be dis-
proportionate thereto, the Supreme Court was
not satisfied that the jury award went beyond
what a reasonable jury applying the law to all the
relevant considerations could reasonably have
awarded and considered it "not disproportionate to
the injury suffered by Mr. de Rossa". The press
groups publishing the Sunday Independent lodged
an application before the Strasbourg Court, com-
plaining that the exceptional damages' award
and the absence of adequate safeguards against
disproportionate awards violated their rights un-
der Article 10 of the Convention (freedom of ex-
pression). The application was also supported by
some other Irish media groups and by the Nation-
al Union of Journalists (NUJ).
Taking its judgment of 13 July 1995 in the case of
Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom as a point
of departure, the Court is of the opinion that the
present jury award was sufficiently unusual as to
require a review by the Court of the adequacy and
effectiveness of the domestic safeguards against
disproportionate awards. According to the Court
unpredictably large damages´ awards in libel cas-
es are considered capable of having a chilling ef-
fect on the press and therefore require the most
careful scrutiny. The Strasbourg Court however,
referring to the judgment of the Irish Supreme
Court upholding and legitimising the award of
damages, comes to the conclusion, by 6 votes to
1, that there has been no violation of the right of
freedom of expression in this case: "Having regard
to the particular circumstances of the present case, nota-
bly the measure of appellate control, and the margin of
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appreciation accorded to a State in this context, the
Court does not find that it has been demonstrated that
there were ineffective or inadequate safeguards against a
disproportionate award of the jury in the present case".
In his dissenting opinion judge Cabral Barreto
of Portugal argues that the amount of damages
which the publishing group of the Sunday Inde-
pendent was ordered to pay was so high "that the
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
interference and the legitimate aim pursued was not ob-
served". The 6 judges of the majority however
came to the conclusion that there has not been a
violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
42.- Grinberg v. Russia, 21 July 2005 (defama-
tion of politician, value judgments, limits of ac-
ceptable criticism)
The European Court in a judgment of 21 July
2005 has come to the conclusion that the Rus-
sian authorities overstepped the margin of appre-
ciation afforded to member states by convicting a
Russian citizen because of a defamatory state-
ment in a press article criticizing a politician. It is
the first judgment in which the European Court
finds a violation of the freedom of expression by
the Russian authorities since the Russian federa-
tion became member of the Council of Europe
and the European Convention on Human Rights
in 1996. The Strasbourg Court once again em-
phasizes the distinction that is to be made be-
tween statements of fact and value judgments.
The Court considers it unacceptable that the
Russian law on defamation, as it stood in the ma-
terial time, made no distinction between these
two different notions, referring uniformly to
statements and assuming that any statement was
amenable to proof in civil proceedings. The case
goes back to an article in the Guberniya newspa-
per written by Isaak Pavlovich Grinberg in 2002.
The article criticised the elected Governor of the
Ulyanovsk Region, the former General V.A. Sha-
manov for "waging war" against the independent
press and journalists. The article also referred to
the support by Mr. Shamanov for a colonel who
had killed a 18-year-ol Chechen girl, considering
that Mr. Shamanov had "no shame and no scru-
ples". On 14 November 2002 the Leninskiy Dis-
trict Court of Ulyanovsk found that the assertion
that Mr. Shamanov had no shame and no scru-
ples impaired his honour, dignity and profession-
al reputation and that Mr. Grinberg had not
proved the truthfulness of this statement. On 24
December 2002 the judgment was confirmed by
the Regional Court, while the Supreme Court on
22 August 2003 dismissed Mr. Grinberg's appli-
cation for the institution of supervisory-review
proceedings.
Grinberg's complaint under Article 10 of the
Convention about a violation of his right to im-
part information and ideas turned out to be suc-
cessful however before the European Court in
Strasbourg. The Court refers to its well-estab-
lished case law on the freedom of expression as
one of the essential foundation of a democratic
society, on the essential function of the press to
play its vital role of "public watchdog", on the
fact that there is little scope under Article 10 § 2
for restrictions on political speech and especially
on the distinction that is to made in defamation
cases between statements of fact and value judg-
ments, emphasizing that while the existence of
facts can be demonstrated, the truth of value
judgments is not susceptible of proof. The re-
quirement to prove the truth of a value judgment
is impossible to fulfil and infringes freedom of
opinion itself. The Strasbourg Court considers
that the contested comment was a clear example
of a value judgment that represented Mr.Grin-
berg's subjective appraisal of the moral dimen-
sion of Mr. Shamanov's behaviour who in his
eyes only kept one promise after being elected as
Governor, and that was waging war against the
independent press and journalists. The Court
takes into account that the contested press article
concerned an issue of public interest, that of free-
dom of the media in the Ulyanovsk region and
that it criticised an elected, professional poli-
tician in respect to whom the limits of accept-
able criticism are wider than in case of a pri-
vate individual. The facts which gave rise to the
criticism were not contested and Mr. Grinberg
had after all expressed his views in an inoffensive
manner. Neither did Mr. Grinberg's statements
affect Mr. Shamanov's political career or his pro-
fessional life. For these reasons the Strasbourg
Court unanimously came to the conclusion that
the domestic courts did not convincingly estab-
lish any pressing social need for putting the pro-
tection of the politician's personality rights
above the applicant's right to freedom of expres-
sion and the general interest in promoting this
freedom where issues of public interest are con-
cerned. Accordingly there has been a violation of
Article 10 of the Convention.
(See also Sokolowski v. Poland, 29 March 2005,
Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, 29 March 2005;
Salov v. Ukraine, 6 September 2005; Karman v. Russia,
14 December 2006)
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42.- I.A. v. Turkey, 13 September 2005 (abusive
attack on one's religion, offending attack on
matters regarded as sacred by Muslims)
In this case the European Court of Human
Rights has come to the conclusion that the Turk-
ish authorities did not violate the freedom of ex-
pression by convicting a book publisher for pub-
lishing insults against "God, the Religion, the
Prophet and the Holy Book". The managing di-
rector of the Berfin publishing house in France
was sentenced to two year's imprisonment,
which was later commuted to a fine. The Europe-
an Court is of the opinion that this interference
in the applicant's right to freedom of expression
had been prescribed by law (art. 175 §§ 3 and 4
Criminal Code) and had pursued the legitimate
aims of preventing disorder and protecting
morals and the rights of others. The issue for
the Court was to determine whether the convic-
tion of the publisher had been necessary in a
democratic society. This involved the balancing
of the applicant's right to impart his ideas on re-
ligious theory to the public, on the one hand, and
the right of others to respect for their freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, on the other
hand. The Court reiterates that religious people
have to tolerate and accept the denial by others of
their religious beliefs and even the propagation
by others of doctrines hostile to their faith. A dis-
tinction is to be made however between “pro-
vocative” opinions and abusive attacks on
one's religion. According to the Court, one part
of the book contained indeed an abusive attack
on the Prophet of Islam, whereas it is asserted
that some of the statements and words of the
Prophet were "inspired in a surge of exultation,
in Aisha's arms… God's messenger broke his fast
trough sexual intercourse, after dinner an before
prayer". In the book it is stated that "Mohammed
did not forbid sexual intercourse with a dead per-
son or a living animal". The Court accepts that
believers could legitimately feel that these passag-
es of the book constituted an unwarranted and
offensive attack on them. Hence, the conviction
of the publisher was a measure that was intended
to provide protection against offensive attacks
on matters regarded as sacred by Muslims. As the
book was not seized and the publisher had only
to pay an insignificant fine, the Court comes, by
four votes to three, to the conclusion that the
Turkish authorities did not violate the freedom
of expression. According to the three dissenting
opinions (of the French, Portuguese and Czech
judge) the majority of the Court followed its tra-
ditional case law on blasphemy leaving a wide
margin of appreciation to the member states. Ac-
cording to the three dissenters the Court should
reconsider its jurisprudence in the case of Otto-
Preminger-Institut v. Austria and Wingrove v.
UK, as this approach gave too much support to
conformist speech and to the "pensée unique",
implying a cold and frightening approach of free-
dom of expression. The majority of the Court
however (the Turkish, Georgian, Hungarian and
San Marino judge) argued why the conviction of
the book publisher met a pressing social need
protecting the rights of others. Accordingly there
has been no violation of Article 10 of the Con-
vention.
43.- Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-Verlags
GmbH v. Austria, 27 October 2005 (defamation
of politician, value judgments, factual basis, dis-
proportionate sanction)
The European Court of Human Rights in a judg-
ment of 27 October 2005 has come to the conclu-
sion that the Austrian authorities violated the
freedom of expression by convicting Wirtschafts-
Trend Zeitschriften-Verlags GmbH, a limited liability
company based in Vienna which owns and pub-
lishes the weekly magazine Profil. In November
1998 Profil published a book review written by a
Member of the European Parliament and mem-
ber of the Austrian Freedom Party. The article
criticised the author of the book for his treat-
ment of Jörg Haider, the former leader of the Aus-
trian Freedom Party (FPÖ), in that he pardoned
"his belittlement of the concentration camps as
'punishment camps'" ("Dessen Verharmlosung der
Konzentrationslager als 'Straflager'"). Mr Haider
filed successfully a compensation claim against
Profil as the Wiener Neustadt Regional Court or-
dered the applicant company to pay 3,633 euros
in compensation to Mr Haider. It also ordered
the forfeiture of that particular issue of the mag-
azine and instructed the company to publish its
judgment. In its reasoning the court said that Mr
Haider's words had been taken out of context
and that the article gave the impression that he
had played down the extent of crimes committed
in concentration camps when using the term
punishment camps, and that he had thereby in-
fringed the National Socialism Prohibition Act.
In its judgment of 27 October 2005 the European
Court reiterates that the limits of acceptable crit-
icism are wider as regards a politician than as re-
gards a private individual. The Court is of the
opinion that Haider is a leading politician who
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has been known for years for his ambiguous
statements about the National Socialist Re-
gime and the Second World War and has, thus,
exposed himself to fierce criticism inside Austria,
but also at the European level. In the Court's view
Haider must therefore display a particularly
high degree of tolerance in this context. In es-
sence, the Strasbourg Court is not convinced by
the domestic courts' argument that the state-
ment of belittling the concentration camps im-
plied a reproach that Mr Haider had played down
the extent of the Nazi crimes and came therefore
close to a reproach of criminal behaviour under
the Prohibition Act. The Court finds this conclu-
sion somewhat far-fetched, as the standards for
assessing someone's political opinions are quite
different from the standards for assessing an ac-
cused person's responsibility under criminal law.
According to the Court, the use of the term "pun-
ishment camp", which implies that persons are
detained there for having committed punishable
offences, may reasonably be criticised as a belit-
tlement of the concentration camps all the more
so if that term was applied by someone whose
ambiguity towards the Nazi era is well-known.
The undisputed fact that Mr Haider had used the
term punishment camp instead of concentration
camp was a sufficient factual basis for the ap-
plicant's statement, which was therefore not ex-
cessive in the circumstances. In conclusion, the
Court finds that the reasons adduced by the do-
mestic courts were not relevant and sufficient to
justify the interference. Moreover, the Court
notes that the applicant was not only ordered to
pay compensation to Mr Haider and to publish
the judgment finding it guilty of defamation, but
that the courts also ordered the forfeiture of the
issue of Profil which is a severe and intrusive
measure. Thus, the interference was not propor-
tionate either. Therefore, the Court unanimously
came to the conclusion that the interference
complained of was not "necessary in a democrat-
ic society" within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of
the Convention. Accordingly there has been a vi-
olation of Article 10 of the Convention.
(See also Urbino Rodrigues v. Portugal, 29 November
2005)
44.- Tourancheau and July v. France, 24 Novem-
ber 2005 (pre-trial publicity, secret of criminal
investigation, court reporting, prejudicial effect
on jury)
On 28 October 1996 the national daily newspa-
per Libération, published an article by Patricia
Tourancheau entitled "Adolescent love ends in
stabbing". The article focussed on a murder case.
The criminal investigation was still pending
when the article was published and two suspects,
a young man, B. and his girlfriend, A., had been
placed under investigation. Each accused the oth-
er of the crime, but the young man had been re-
leased while his girlfriend was in pretrial deten-
tion. The article in Libération reproduced extracts
from statements made by A. to the police and the
investigating judge, and comments from B. con-
tained in the case file or noted down during the
interview he had given to Tourancheau. On the
basis of section 38 of the Freedom of the Press
Act of 29 July 1881, criminal proceedings were
brought against Tourancheau and against de ed-
itor of Libération, Serge July. Section 38 of the
Press Act 1881 prohibits the publication of any
document of the criminal proceedings ("actes de
procedures criminelle ou correctionelle") until the day
of the hearing in court. Both the journalist and
the editor were found guilty as charged at first in-
stance and were each ordered to pay a fine of
10,000 French francs (FRF), about 1,525 euros
(EUR). Their conviction was upheld on appeal, al-
though payment of the fine was suspended. In a
judgment of 22 June 1999 the Court of Cassation
dismissed an appeal by the applicants. In the
meantime, on 10 June 1998, A. had been sen-
tenced to eight years' imprisonment for murder
and B. had received a five-year prison sentence for
failure to assist a person in danger.
In a judgment of 24 November 2005 the Stras-
bourg Court has come to the conclusion that the
conviction of Tourancheau and July was not to be
considered as a violation of Art. 10 of the Con-
vention. The Court noted that section 38 of the
1881 Freedom of the Press Act defined the scope
of the legal prohibition clearly and precisely, in
terms of both content and duration, as it was de-
signed to prohibit publication of any docu-
ment relating to proceedings concerning seri-
ous crimes or other major offences until the
day of the hearing. The fact that proceedings
were not brought systematically on the basis of
section 38 of the 1881 Act, the matter being left
to the discretion of the public prosecutor's of-
fice, did not entitle the applicants to assume that
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they were in no danger of being prosecuted, since
they were as professional journalists familiar
with the law. They had therefore been in a rea-
sonable position to foresee that publication of
extracts from the case file in the article might
render them liable to prosecution. The interfer-
ence in question could be regarded as being "pre-
scribed by law" and to be considered to protect
"the reputation and rights of others" and to
maintain "the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary".
In the Court's view, the reasons given by the
French courts to justify the interference with the
applicants' right to freedom of expression had
been "relevant and sufficient" for the purposes of
Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The courts had
stressed the damaging consequences of publica-
tion of the article for the protection of the repu-
tation and rights of A. and B. and for their right
to be presumed innocent, and also for the au-
thority and impartiality of the judiciary, ow-
ing to the possible impact of the article on the
members of a lay jury. The Court took the view
that the applicants' interest in imparting infor-
mation concerning the progress of criminal pro-
ceedings and the guilt of the suspects while the
judicial investigation was still ongoing, and the
interest of the public in receiving such informa-
tion, were not sufficient to prevail over the con-
siderations referred to by the courts. The Court
further considered that the penalties imposed on
the applicants were not disproportionate to the
legitimate aims pursued by the authorities. In
those circumstances, the Court held that the ap-
plicants' conviction had amounted to an inter-
ference with their right to freedom of expression
which had been "necessary in a democratic socie-
ty" in order to protect the reputation and rights
of others and to maintain the authority and im-
partiality of the judiciary. It therefore held that
there had been no violation of Article 10. In this
case the Cypriot, Bulgarian, Croatian and Greek
judge formed the smallest possible majority judg-
es (4/3 decision). 
The judges Costa, Tulkens and Lorenzen (France,
Belgium and Denmark) expressed a joint dissent-
ing opinion, in which they substantially argued
why the conviction of the applicants is to be con-
sidered as a violation of the freedom of expres-
sion. Neither do they assume the breach of pre-
sumption of innocence, nor the possible impact
on the lay judges of the jury as sufficiently perti-
nent arguments in order to legitimise the infer-
ence in the applicant's freedom of expression and
the right of the public to be informed about mat-
ters of public interest. According to the joint dis-
senting opinion journalists must be able to freely
report and comment on the functioning of the
criminal justice system, as a basic principle en-
shrined in the Recommendation of the Com-
mittee of Ministers 2003 (13) on the provision
of information trough the media in relation to
criminal proceedings.
45.- Case of Giniewski v. France, 31 January
2006 (defamation of Christian community)
In 1994 the newspaper Le quotidien de
Paris published an article with the headline "The
obscurity of error", concerning the encyclical
"The splendour of truth" (Veritatis Splendor) is-
sued by Pope John Paul II. The article was written
by Paul Giniewski, a journalist, sociologist and
historian and contained a critical analysis of the
particular doctrine developed by the Catholic
Church and its possible links with the origins of
the Holocaust. A criminal complaint was lodged
against the applicant, the newspaper and its pub-
lishing director, alleging that they had pub-
lished racially defamatory statements against
the Christian community. The defendants were
found guilty of defamation at first instance but
were acquitted on appeal. Ruling exclusively on
the civil claim lodged by the "General Alliance
against Racism and for Respect for the French
and Christian Identity" (Alliance générale contre le
racisme et pour le respect de l'identité française et chréti-
enne – AGRIF), the Orléans Court of Appeal held
that Giniewski was to pay damages to the AGRIF
and that its ruling was to be published at his ex-
pense in a national newspaper. The Orléans
Court of Appeal considered the litigious article as
defamatory toward a group of persons be-
cause of their belonging to a religion. The ap-
plicant appealed to the Court of Cassation but
without success.
In a judgment of 31 January 2006 the European
Court of Human Rights is of the opinion that the
article in question had contributed to discussion
of the various possible reasons behind the exter-
mination of Jews in Europe, a question of indis-
putable public interest in a democratic socie-
ty. In such matters restrictions on freedom of
expression are to be strictly construed. Although
the issue raised in the present case concerned a
doctrine upheld by the Catholic Church, and
hence a religious matter, an analysis of the article
in question showed that it did not contain at-
tacks on religious beliefs as such, but a view
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which the applicant had wished to express as a
journalist and historian. In that connection,
the Court considered it essential in a democratic
society that a debate on the causes of acts of par-
ticular gravity amounting to crimes against hu-
manity should be able to take place freely. The ar-
ticle in question had, moreover, not been
"gratuitously offensive" or insulting and had
not incited disrespect or hatred. Nor had it cast
doubt in any way on clearly established historical
facts. In this perspective, the facts were different
from those in I.A. v. Turkey (ECtHR 13 Septem-
ber 2005, offensive attack on the Prophet of Is-
lam) and those in R. Garaudy v. France (ECtHR
24 June 2003, decision on admissibility, nr.
65831/01). The Court considered that the rea-
sons given by the French courts could not be re-
garded as sufficient to justify the interference
with the applicant's right to freedom of expres-
sion. Specifically with regard to the order to pub-
lish a notice of the ruling in a national newspaper
at the expenses of the applicant, the Court con-
siders that while the publication of such a notice
did not in principle appear to constitute an exces-
sive restriction on freedom of expression, the fact
that it mentioned the criminal offence of defa-
mation undoubtedly had a deterrent effect. The
sanction thus imposed appeared disproportion-
ate in view of the importance and interest of the
debate in which the applicant had legitimately
sought to take part. The Court therefore held
that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention.
(See also Albert-Engelmann-Gesellschaft mbH v. Aus-
tria, 19 January 2006; Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey, 2 May
2006 and Klein v. Slovakia, 31 October 2006. See also
Paturel v. France, 22 December 2005)
46.- Case of Özgür Radyo v. Turkey, 30 March
2006 (suspension of radio licence) 
In 1998 and 1999 the Istanbul radio station
Özgür Radyo was given three warnings and its li-
cence was twice suspended by the Turkish broad-
casting regulatory authority (Radyo Televizyon Üst
Kurulu, RTÜK). The first suspension was for a pe-
riod of 90 days, the second suspension period
lasted 365 days. Some of the programmes of
Özgür Radyo had touched on various themes such
as corruption, the methods used by the security
forces to tackle terrorism and possible links be-
tween the State and the Mafia. The radio station
was sanctioned by RTÜK because a programme
was considered defamatory and other pro-
grammes had incited the people to engage in
violence, terrorism or ethnic discrimination,
had stirred up hatred or offended the inde-
pendence, the national unity or the territorial
integrity of the Turkish State. The radio station
applied to the administrative courts for an order
setting aside each of the penalties, but its applica-
tions were dismissed.
In its complaint to the European Court of Hu-
man Rights Özgür Radyo argued primarily that
the penalties that had been imposed by the
RTÜK entailed a violation of Article 10 of the Eu-
ropean Convention (freedom of expression). As
there was no discussion that the sanctions (both
the warnings and the suspension of the licence)
were prescribed by law (Art. 4 and 33 of the
Broadcasting Act no 3984 of 12 April 1991) and
pursued a legitimate aim listed in Article 10 § 2,
the decisive issue before the Court was whether
the interference with the applicants' right to free-
dom of expression had been "necessary in a dem-
ocratic society". In assessing the situation, the
Court said it would have particular regard to the
words that had been used in the programmes
and to the context in which they were broadcast,
including the background to the case and in
particular the problems linked to the preven-
tion of terrorism. The Court emphasizes that
the programmes covered very serious issues of
general interest that had been widely debated in
the media and that the dissemination of informa-
tion on those themes was entirely consistent with
the media's “watchdog” role in a democratic
society. The Court also notes that the informa-
tion concerned had already been provided to the
public. Some of the programmes had only orally
reproduced, without comment, newspaper arti-
cles that had already been published and for
which no one had been prosecuted. Moreover,
Özgür Radyo had been careful to explain that it
was citing newspaper articles and to identify the
sources. The Court also observes that although
certain particularly acerbic parts of the pro-
grammes had made them to some degree hos-
tile in tone, they had not encouraged the use
of violence, armed resistance or insurrection
and did not constitute hate speech. The Court
strongly underlines that this is an essential factor
to be taken into consideration. Finally the Court
refers to the severity of the penalties that had
been imposed on the applicant company, espe-
cially in terms of the suspension of the licence,
first for a period of 90 days and in a second deci-
sion for a period of one year, the latter being the
maximum penalty prescribed in Art. 33 of the
Turkish Broadcasting Act no 3984. Taking into
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regard all these elements of the case, the Stras-
bourg Court considers the penalties dispropor-
tionate to the aims pursued and, therefore, not
"necessary in a democratic society". Consequent-
ly, the Court holds unanimously that there has
been a violation of Article 10.
47.- Case of Dammann v. Switzerland, 25 April
2006 (protection of confidential or secret infor-
mation, the media's watchdog-function)
In its judgment of 25 April 2006 the Court unan-
imously held that the Swiss authorities have vio-
lated Article 10 of the Convention by convicting
a journalist, Viktor Dammann, for inciting an
administrative assistant of the public prose-
cutor's office to disclose an official secret. The
assistant, on demand of the journalist, had for-
warded data relating to criminal records of sus-
pects in a spectacular robbery. By punishing the
journalist a step had been taken prior to publica-
tion and such a sentence would be likely to deter
journalists from contributing to public discus-
sion of issues affecting the life of the community
and was thus liable to hamper the press in its role
as provider of information and watchdog. Fur-
thermore, no damage had been done to the
rights of the persons concerned, as the jour-
nalist had himself decided not to publish the
data in question. In these circumstances, the
Court considered that Dammann's conviction
had not been reasonably proportionate to the
pursuit of the legitimate aim in question, having
regard to the interest of a democratic society in
ensuring and maintaining the freedom of the
press.
(See also Weber v. Zwitserland, 22 May 1990; Observer
and Guardian v. United Kingdom, 26 November 1991;
Sunday Times (nr. 2) v. United Kingdom, 29 November
1991; Vereniging Weekblad 'Bluf!' v. the Netherlands, 9
February 1995; Fressoz and Roire v. France, 21 Janu-
ary 1999; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway, 20
May 1999; Colombani v. France, 25 June 2002; Plon
(Société) v. France, 18 May 2004 and Radio Twist v.
Slovakia, 19 December 2006)
48.- Case of Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey, 2 May 2006
(criticism of a religion without abusive attack,
protection of pluralism)
In 1992 Erdoğan Aydin Tatlav, a journalist living
in Istanbul, published a five volume book under
the title Islamiyet Gerçeği (The Reality of Islam). In
the first volume of the book he criticised Islam
as a religion legitimising social injuries portray-
ing them as "God's will". Following a complaint
at the occasion of the fifth edition of the book in
1996, the journalist was prosecuted for publish-
ing a work designed to defile one of the religions
(art. 175 Crim. Code). He was sentenced to one
year's imprisonment, which was converted into a
fine. 
Before the European Court of Human Rights
Tatlav complained that this conviction had been
in breach of Article 10 of the Convention, refer-
ring to the right of freedom of expression "with-
out interference by public authority". Essentially,
the Court evaluated whether the interference in
the applicant's right could be legitimised for the
protection of the morals and the rights of others
as "necessary in a democratic society". The Court
is of the opinion that certain passages of the
book contained strong criticism of religion in a
social-political context, but that these passages
had no insulting tone and neither contained
an abusive attack against Muslims or against
sacred symbols of Muslim religion (see I.A. v.
Turkey, 13 September 2005). The Court did not
exclude that Muslims could nonetheless feel of-
fended by the caustic commentary on their reli-
gion, but this was not considered a sufficient rea-
son to legitimise the criminal conviction of the
author of the book. The Court also took account
of the fact that although the book had first been
published in 1992, no proceedings had been in-
stituted until 1996, when the fifth edition was
published. It was only following a complaint by
an individual that proceedings had been institut-
ed against the journalist. With regard the punish-
ment imposed on Tatlav, the Court is of the opin-
ion that a criminal conviction involving,
moreover, the risk of a custodial sentence, could
have the effect of discouraging authors and
editors from publishing opinions about reli-
gion that were not conformist and could im-
pede the protection of pluralism, which is in-
dispensable for the healthy development of a
democratic society. Taking into regard all these
elements of the case, the Strasbourg Court con-
siders the interference by the Turkish authorities
disproportionate to the aims pursued. Conse-
quently, the Court holds unanimously that there
has been a violation of Article 10 of the Conven-
tion 
(See also Giniewski v. France, 31 January 2006).
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49.- Case of White v. Sweden, 19 September 2006
(right of privacy, suspected person, picture, pre-
sumption of innocence, reporting on issue of ma-
jor public interest)
In 1996, the two main evening newspapers in
Sweden, Expressen and Aftonbladet, published a se-
ries of articles in which various criminal offences
were ascribed to Anthony White, a British citizen
residing in Mozambique. The articles also in-
cluded an assertion that Mr. White had mur-
dered Olof Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister,
in 1986. Mr White was a well-known figure whose
alleged illegal activities had already been the fo-
cus of media attention. The newspapers also re-
ported statements of individuals who rejected
the allegations made against Mr White. In inter-
view published in Expressen, Mr White denied any
involvement in the alleged offences. Mr White
brought a private prosecution against the editors
of the newspapers for defamation under the Free-
dom of Press Act and the Swedish Criminal Code.
The District Court of Stockholm acquitted the
editors and found that it was justifiable to pub-
lish the statements and pictures, given that there
was considerable public interest in the allega-
tions. It further considered that the newspapers
had a reasonable basis for the assertions and that
they had performed the checks that were called
for in the given circumstances, taking into regard
the constraints of a fast news service. The Court
of Appeal upheld the District Court's decision.
Mr White complained before the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg that the
Swedish courts had failed to provide due protec-
tion for his name and reputation. He relied on Ar-
ticle 8 (right to respect for private and family life).
The European Court found that a fair balance
has to be struck between the competing inter-
ests, being the freedom of expression (Article
10) and the right to respect for privacy (Article
8), also taking into account that under Article 6
§ 2 of the Convention individuals have a right to
be presumed innocent of any criminal offence
until proven guilty in accordance to the law. The
Court first notes that as such the information
published in both newspapers constituted defa-
mation to the applicant. The statements clearly
tarnished his reputation and disregarded his
right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty as it appeared that Mr. White had not been
convicted of any of the offences ascribed by him.
However in the series of articles, the newspapers
had endeavoured to present an account of the
various allegations made which was as balanced
as possible and the journalists had acted in
good faith. Moreover, the unsolved murder of
the former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme
and the ongoing criminal investigations were
matters of serious public interest and concern.
The Strasbourg Court considered that the do-
mestic courts made a thorough examination of
the case and balanced the opposing interests in-
volved in conformity with Convention standards.
The European Court found that the Swedish
courts were justified in finding that the public
interest in publishing the information in
question outweighed Mr White's right to the
protection of his reputation. Consequently,
there had been no failure on the part of the Swed-
ish State to afford adequate protection of the ap-
plicant's rights. For these reasons, the Court con-
sidered that there had been no violation of Article
8 (Compare with Gourguenidze v. Georgia, 17
October 2006; Leempoel and S.A. Ciné Revue v.
Belgium, 9 November 2007 and Österreichischer
Rundfunk v. Austria, 7 December 2006).
50.- Case of Klein v. Slovakia, 31 October 2006
(defamation, satire, public debate)
In March 1997 the weekly magazine Domino Efekt
published an article written by Martin Klein, a
journalist and film critic. In this article Klein crit-
icised Archbishop Ján Sokol for his televised pro-
posal to have the distribution of the film "The
People v. Larry Flint" withdrawn as well as the
poster publicising it. The article contained slang
terms and innuendos with oblique vulgar and
sexual connotations, allusions to the Archbish-
op's alleged cooperation with the secret police of
the former communist regime and an invitation
to the members of the Catholic Church to leave
their church.
On complaints filed by two associations, crimi-
nal proceedings were brought against Klein. The
journalist was convicted of the offence of pub-
lic defamation of a group of inhabitants of the
republic for their belief and he was sentenced
to a fine of 375 euros, in application of Article
198 of the Slovakian Criminal Code. The Region-
al Court of Košice considered the article in ques-
tion as vulgar, ridiculing and offending and
hence not enjoying protection under Article 10 of
the European Convention. It concluded that by
the content of the article Klein had violated the
rights, guaranteed by the Constitution, of a
group of adherents to the Christian faith.
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Contrary to the domestic courts' findings, the
European Court of Human Rights is not per-
suaded that the applicant had discredited and
disparaged a sector of the population on ac-
count of their Catholic faith. The applicant's
strongly-worded pejorative opinion related exclu-
sively to the Archbishop, a high representative of
the Catholic Church in Slovakia. The fact that
some members of the Catholic Church could
have been offended by the applicant's criticism of
the Archbishop and by his statement that he did
not understand why decent Catholics did not
leave that Church cannot affect that position.
The Court accepts the applicant's argument that
the article neither unduly interfered with the
right of believers to express and exercise their
religion, nor denigrated the content of their
religious faith. Given that the article exclusively
criticised the person of the Archbishop, the appli-
cant's conviction of the criminal offence of defa-
mation of other person's belief was in itself inap-
propriate in the particular circumstances of the
case. For those reasons, and despite the vulgar
tone of the article, the Court found that it
could not be concluded that by publishing the
article the applicant interfered with the right
to freedom of religion of others in a manner
justifying the sanction imposed on him. The
interference with his right to freedom of expres-
sion therefore neither corresponded to a pressing
social need, nor was it proportionate to the legit-
imate aim pursued. The Court held unanimously
that the interference with the applicant's right to
freedom of expression was not "necessary in a
democratic society" and that there had been a vi-
olation of Article 10 of the European Conven-
tion.
(See also Mamère v. France, 7 November 2006 and Ver-
lagsgruppe News (1+2) v. Austria, 14 December 2006
and Dabrowski v. Poland, 19 December 2006. Com-
pare with Kobenter and Standard Verlags GmbH v.
Austria, 2 November 2006)
51.- Case of Mamère v. France, 7 November
2006 (defamation, public debate, television de-
bat, militant expression, sarcastic but within lim-
its of acceptable provocation)
On 11 October 2000 the Paris Criminal Court
found Mr. Noël Mamère, a leading member of the
ecologist party Les Verts and member of parlia-
ment, guilty for public defamation of the direc-
tor of the Central Service for Protection against Ionis-
ing Radiation (SCPRI), Mr. Pellerin. Mr. Mamère
was ordered to pay a fine of 10,000 francs, about
1,525 euros. The Paris Court of Appeal upheld
the conviction considering that Mr. Mamère's
comments during a television programme
were defamatory as they had damaged Mr. Peller-
in's "honour and reputation" by accusing him of
repeatedly having "knowingly supplied, in his ca-
pacity as a specialist on radioactivity issues, erro-
neous or simply untrue information about such
a serious problem as the Chernobyl disaster,
which was of potential consequence for the
health of the French population". The Court
found that Mr. Mamère had not acted in good
faith, as he had not adopted a moderate tone in
insisting forcefully and peremptorily that Mr.
Pellerin had repeatedly sought to lie and to dis-
tort the truth about the consequences of the
Chernobyl nuclear accident, spring 1986. Mr.
Mamère had also attributed
"pejorative characteristics" by using the adjective
"sinister" and by saying that he suffered from
"the Asterix complex". In May 2006 following a
complaint by certain individuals suffering from
thyroid cancer, the Commission for Research and In-
dependent Information on Radioactivity (CRIIRAD)
and the French Association of Thyroid Disease Suffer-
ers (AFMT), have recognised that the official serv-
ices at the time had lied and had underestimated
the contamination of soil, air and foodstuffs fol-
lowing the Chernobyl disaster.
The Strasbourg Court in its judgment of 7 No-
vember 2006 observes that the conviction of Mr.
Mamère for aiding and abetting public defama-
tion of a civil servant had constituted an interfer-
ence with his right to freedom of expression that
had been prescribed by the Freedom of the Press
Act of 29 July 1881 and had pursued one of the le-
gitimate aims listed in Article 10 § 2, namely the
protection of the reputation of others. The
Court however considers the interference as not
necessary in a democratic society, as the case ob-
viously was one in which Article 10 required a
high level of protection of the right to freedom of
expression. The Court underlines that the appli-
cant's comments concerned topics of general
concern, namely protection of the environ-
ment and of public health. Mr. Mamère also has
been speaking in his capacity as an elected repre-
sentative committed to ecological issues, so that
his comments were to be regarded as political or
“militant” expression. The Court reiterates that
those who have been prosecuted on account of
their comments on a matter of general concern
should have the opportunity to absolve them-
selves of liability by establishing that they have
acted in good faith and, in the case of factual al-
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legations, by proving that they were true. In
the applicant's case the comments in question
were value judgments as well as factual allega-
tions, so that the applicant should have been of-
fered both those opportunities. As regards the
factual allegations, since the acts criticised by the
applicant had occurred more than ten years pre-
viously, the 1881 Freedom of the Press Act barred
him from proving that his comments were true.
While in general the Court could see the logic of
such a time bar, it considered that where histori-
cal or scientific events were concerned, it might
on the contrary be expected that over the course
of time the debate would be enriched by new in-
formation that could improve people's under-
standing of reality. Furthermore, the Court is
not persuaded by the French Court's reasoning
concerning Mr. Mamère's lack of good faith and
the insulting character of some of his statements.
According to the European Court, Mr. Mamère's
comments can be considered sarcastic but they
remained within the limits of acceptable exag-
geration or provocation. Furthermore, the
question of Mr. Pellerin's personal and "institu-
tional" liability was an integral part of the debate
on a matter of general concern: as director of the
SCPRI he had had access to the measures being
taken and had on several occasions made use of
the media to inform the public of the level of con-
tamination, or rather, one might say, the lack of
it, within the territory of France. In those circum-
stances, and having regard to the extreme im-
portance of the public debate in which the
comments in issue had been made, Mr. Mamère's
conviction for defamation could not be said to
have been proportionate and hence "necessary in
a democratic society". The Court therefore holds
that there has been a violation of Article 10.
52.- Case of Leempoel and SA Ciné Télé Revue v.
Belgium, 9 November 2006 (court order, with-
drawal from sale and ban on distribution of issue
of weekly magazine, privacy, confidentiality,
criticizing a judge, (no) contribution to public
debate, art. 53 ECHR)
In a judgment of 9 November 2006 the Stras-
bourg Court found no violation of the freedom
of expression in a case concerning the withdrawal
from sale and ban on distribution of an issue of
the Belgian weekly magazine Ciné Télé Revue. On
30 January 1997 the magazine published an arti-
cle containing extracts from the preparatory file
and personal notes which an investigating judge,
D., had handed to a parliamentary commission
of inquiry. The article was advertised on the front
cover of the magazine by the headline, superim-
posed on a photograph of the judge. The disclo-
sures received substantial press coverage, as the
issue was related to the "Dutroux-case" and how
the police and the judiciary had handled the in-
vestigations with regard the disappearance, kid-
napping, sexual abuse and murdering of several
children.
On an application by investigating judge D., the
urgent-applications judge in Brussels ordered
the magazine editor and its publisher to take all
necessary steps to remove every copy of the mag-
azine from sales outlets and prohibited the sub-
sequent distributing of any copy featuring the
same cover and the same article, holding that the
documents that had been published were subject
to the rules on confidentiality of parliamen-
tary inquiries and that their publication
appeared to have breached the right to due proc-
ess and also the judge's right to respect for her
private life. 
In an application before the Strasbourg Court of
Human Rights, the applicants complained that
the ruling against them infringed Article 10 of
the Convention and they maintained that
Article 25 of the Belgian Constitution, which for-
bids censorship of the press, afforded a greater
degree of protection than Article 10 of the Con-
vention and that its application should accord-
ingly have been safeguarded by Article 53 of the
Convention (the Conventions rights and
freedoms being "minimum rules").
The Court noted that although the offending
article was related to a subject of public inter-
est, its content could not be considered as
serving the public interest. Moreover, the par-
liamentary commission's hearings had already
received a major media exposure, also live on
television. The Court found that the article in
question contained criticism that was especially
directed against the judge's character and that it
contained in particular a copy of strictly confi-
dential correspondence which could not be re-
garded as contributing in any way to a debate of
general interest to society. The use of the file
handed over to the commission of inquiry and
the comments made in the article had revealed
the very essence of the "system of defence" that
the judge had allegedly adopted or could have
adopted before the commission. The Court is of
the opinion that the adoption of such a "system
of defence" belonged to the "inner circle" of a
person's private life and that the confidentiality
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of such personal information had to be guaran-
teed and protected against any intrusion. As the
Court found that the article in question and its
distribution could not be regarded as having
contributed to any debate of general interest
to society it considered that the grounds given by
the Belgian courts to justify the ban of the distri-
bution of the litigious issue of the magazine were
relevant and sufficient and that the interference
with the applicants' right to freedom of expres-
sion was proportionate to the aim pursued. The
Court considered that such interference could be
seen as "necessary in a democratic society" and
did not amount to a violation of Article 10.
With regard the alleged neglect of application of
Article 53, the Court referred back to its finding
that the interference in question had been "pre-
scribed by law" and further observed that the
decision to withdraw the magazine from cir-
culation did not constitute a pre-publication
measure but, having been taken under the
urgent-applications procedure, sought to limit
the extent of damage already caused. As such an
interference was not considered by the Belgian
Court of Cassation as a form of censorship, the
European Court did not consider it necessary to
examine separately the complaint under Article
53 based on an alleged breach of Article 25 of the
Belgian Constitution.
53.- Case of Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Aus-
tria, 7 December 2006 (prohibition to show pic-
ture on television, ORF as “victim”, politician
convicted for crime with a clear political rele-
vance, injunction in broad terms)
This case concerns a reaction in respect of a news
item on the Austrian public television channel,
ORF (Österreichischer Rundfunk). In a news pro-
gram on ORF in 1999, a picture was shown of a
person, Mr. S, who a few weeks before had been
released on parole. Mr. S. had been convicted to
eight years' imprisonment in 1995 because he
was found to be a leading member of a neo-
Nazi organisation. On request of Mr. S. the Aus-
trian courts prohibited ORF from showing Mr.
S.'s picture in connection with any report stating
that he had been convicted under the National
Socialist Prohibition Act (Verbotsgezetz, Prohibi-
tion Act) once the sentence had been executed or
once he had been released on parole. The courts
found that the publication of the picture of Mr.
S. in that context had violated his legitimate in-
terests within the meaning of both Section 78 of
the Copyright Act and Section 7a of the Media
Act ('right of one's image').
The ORF complained in Strasbourg that the Aus-
trian courts' decisions violated its right to free-
dom of expression as provided in Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. Al-
though being a public broadcasting organisa-
tion, the Court is of the opinion that ORF is not
to be qualified as a governmental organisa-
tion and hence is in a position to claim to be a
'victim' of an interference by the Austrian au-
thorities in its right of freedom of expression,
within the meaning of the articles 34 and 35 of
the Convention. The Court is of the opinion that
the ORF is not resorting under government con-
trol, inter alia referring to the guarantee of edito-
rial and journalistic independence of the ORF
and its institutional autonomy as a provider of a
public service. With regard the question whether
the prohibition to show Mr. S's. picture relating
to his conviction under the Prohibition Act, the
Court takes into account several elements: the
Court refers to the position of the ORF as a pub-
lic broadcaster with an obligation for cover any
major news item in the field of politics, to the po-
sition of Mr. S. as a well-known member of the
neo-Nazi scene in Austria and to the nature and
subject matter of the news report, being a news
item concerning an issue of public interest.
The Court furthermore underlines the circum-
stance that the injunction granted by the domes-
tic courts was phrased in very broad terms and
that the news item on ORF referred to persons re-
cently released on parole after having been con-
victed for crime with a clear political rele-
vance. Taking into account all these elements the
Strasbourg Court finds that the reasons adduced
by the Austrian courts to legitimate the injunc-
tion were not relevant and sufficient to justify the
interference in the freedom of expression of ORF.
There has accordingly been a violation of Article
10.
(See also Radio France a.o. v. France, 30 March 2004)
54.- Case of Radio Twist v. Slovakia, 19 Decem-
ber 2006 (Radio station, illegally obtained tele-
phone conversation between two politicians,
protection of privacy, relevance, injunction in
broad terms)
In this case the applicant, Radio Twist, is a radio
broadcasting company that was convicted for
broadcasting in a news programme the recording
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of a telephone conversation between the State
Secretary at the Ministry of Justice and the Dep-
uty Prime Minister. The recording was accompa-
nied by a commentary, clarifying that the record-
ed dialogue related to a politically influenced
power struggle in June 1996 between two groups
which had an interest in the privatisation of a
major national insurance provider. Mr. D., the
Secretary at the Ministry of Justice subsequently
filed a civil action against Radio Twist for protec-
tion of his personal integrity. He argued that
Radio Twist had broadcast the telephone conver-
sation despite the fact that it had been obtained
in an illegal manner. Radio Twist was ordered by
the Slovakian courts to offer Mr. D. a written
apology and to broadcast that apology within 15
days. The broadcasting company was also or-
dered to pay compensation for damage of a non-
pecuniary nature, as the Slovakian courts consid-
ered the dignity and reputation of Mr. D. as a
public official tarnished. Especially the broad-
casting of the illegally tapped conversation was
considered as an unjustified interference in the
personal rights of Mr. D., as the protection of pri-
vacy also extends to telephone conversations of
public officials.
The Strasbourg Court however disagrees with
these findings by the Slovakian Courts. Referring
to the general principles that the European Court
of Human Rights has developed in its case law re-
garding freedom of expression in political mat-
ters, regarding the essential function of the press
in a democratic society and regarding the limits
of acceptable criticism of politicians, the Court
emphasizes that the context and content of the
recorded conversation was clearly political
and that the recording and commentary con-
tained no aspects of any private-life dimen-
sion of the politicians concerned. Furthermore
the Court refers to the fact that the news report-
ing by Radio Twist did not contain untrue of dis-
torted information and that the reputation of
Mr. D. seemed not to have been tarnished by
the impugned broadcast, as he was shortly later
elected as a judge of the Constitutional Court.
The Court points out that Radio Twist was sanc-
tioned mainly for the mere fact of having broad-
cast information which someone else had ob-
tained illegally and had forwarded to the radio
station. The Court is however not convinced
that the mere fact that the recording had been
obtained by a third person contrary to the law
could deprive the broadcasting company
which broadcast it of the protection of Article
10 of the Convention. The Court also notes that
at no stage it was alleged that the broadcasting
company or its employees or agents were in any
way liable for the recording or that its journalists
transgressed the criminal law when obtaining or
broadcasting it. The Court observes that there is
no indication that the journalists of Radio
Twist acted in bad faith or that they pursued
any objective other than reporting on matters
which they felt obliged to make available to
the public. For these reasons the Court comes to
the conclusion that by broadcasting the tele-
phone conversation in question, Radio Twist did
not interfere with the reputation and rights of
Mr. D. in a manner that could justify the sanction
imposed on it. Hence the interference with its
rights to impart information did not correspond
to a pressing social need. The interference being
not necessary in a democratic society amounted
to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
55.- Case of Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v.
Austria, 25 January 2007 (satire, caricature,
painting, sexual context, debasement, injunc-
tion)
In this case the Strasbourg Court considered the
conviction of an association of artists a violation
of the freedom of expression guaranteed by Arti-
cle 10 of the Convention. The association, Verein-
igung Bildender Künstler Wiener Secession, had or-
ganised in 1998 an exhibition entitled "The
century of artistic freedom". One painting enti-
tled "Apocalypse", made by the Austrian painter
Otto Mühl, was a collage of 34 public figures,
who all where portrayed naked and involved in
sexual activities. Among those portrayed was Mr.
Meischberger, a former general secretary of the
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and at the time a
member of the National Assembly. Mr. Meisch-
berger was shown gripping the ejaculating penis
of Mr. Jörg Haider (FPÖ) while at the same time
being touched by two other FPÖ politicians and
ejaculating on Mother Teresa.
The painting raised a lot of controversy and was
ultimately vandalised by a visitor to the exhibi-
tion, who covered the part which showed
Mr. Meischberger, among others, with red paint.
Mr. Meischberger brought proceedings under
Section 78 of the Austrian Copyright Act against
the association, seeking an injunction prohibit-
ing it from exhibiting and publishing the paint-
ing and requesting compensation. He argued
that the painting debased him and his political
activities. After the Vienna Commercial Court
(Handelsgericht) dismissed Mr. Meischberger's ac-
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tion, the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandes-
gericht) found that the painting constituted in-
deed a debasement of Mr. Meischberger's
public standing and issued an injunction
against the association prohibiting it from
displaying the painting at exhibitions and or-
dering it to pay EUR 1,450 in compensation and
costs to Mr. Meischberger. The judgment was
confirmed by the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerich-
tshof), considering that the Court of Appeal right-
ly had motivated why in this case the personal
rights of Mr. Meischberger as protected by Article
78 of the Copyright Act prevailed over the artistic
freedom protected by Article 17a of the Basic Law
(Staatsgrundgesetz), because a picture of Mr. Meis-
chberger has been used in a degrading and insult-
ing manner.
The European Court of Human Rights could not
agree with the findings by the Vienna Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court, as it considered
the painting, seen in its context, as protected
under the right of freedom of expression. The
Court noted first of all that the painting, in its
original state, depicted Mr. Meischberger in a
somewhat outrageous manner, but that the fig-
ures of the painting were caricatures and the
painting satirical. According to the Court, satire
is to be considered a form of artistic expression
and social comment which, by exaggerating and
distorting reality, is intentionally provocative.
The Court is of the opinion that the painting
did not concern Mr. Meischberger's private
life, but his public standing as a politician. The
scene in which he was portrayed could be under-
stood to constitute some sort of counter-attack
against the Austrian Freedom Party, whose mem-
bers had strongly criticised the painter's work.
The Court also observes that, even before Mr.
Meischberger brought proceedings, the part of
the painting showing his body was completely
covered by red paint. From that time onwards, Mr
Meischberger's portrayal – even assuming that he
was still recognisable – was certainly diminished,
if not totally eclipsed, by the portrayal of all the
other, mostly more prominent, people who were
still completely visible. The Court lastly noted
that the Austrian courts' injunction was not
limited either in time or in space. It therefore
left the association of artists, which directed one
of the best-known Austrian galleries specialising
in contemporary art, with no possibility of exhib-
iting the painting, irrespective of whether Mr.
Meischberger was known, or was still known, at
the place and time of a potential exhibition in the
future. The Court concluded that the Austrian
courts' injunction was disproportionate to the
aim pursued and therefore not necessary in a
democratic society, in violation of Article 10.
With this approach the majority of the Court re-
jected the firm arguments developed in the dis-
senting opinions by the Cypriot, the Norwegian
and the Luxemburg judge, who considered the
painting "senseless", containing "disgusted im-
ages", with "repulsive sexual poses, some even in-
volving violence", being manifestly "insulting"
and "undermining the reputation or dignity of
others". The dissenters emphasized that freedom
of expression cannot be unlimited, especially
when it interferes excessively with the right of
others. The excessive nature of the portrayal re-
sulted from its attack on the dignity of others, a
concept that prevails throughout the European
Convention on Human Rights. One of the dis-
senting opinions also emphasized that "nobody
can rely on the fact that he is an artist or that a
work is a painting in order to escape liability for
insulting others". The majority of the Court
however, without recognising an 'exception artis',
underlined that the pictures were painted in an
unrealistic and exaggerated matter which
amounted to a caricature of the persons con-
cerned using satirical elements.
This controversial case has produced a controver-
sial judgment. By four votes to three the Court
came to the conclusion that there has been a vio-
lation of Article 10 of the Convention. The judg-
ment is an important moral and legal support
however for artists and cartoonists producing sa-
tirical works, satire in the wording of the Court
being "a form of artistic expression and social
commentary and, by its inherent features of
exaggeration and distortion of reality, natu-
rally aims to provoke and agitate". According-
ly any interference with an artist's right to such
expression must be examined with particular
care, as the Court demonstrated in its judgment
of 25 January 2007.
56.- Case of Tønsbergs Blad and Haukom v. Nor-
way, 1 March 2007 (defamation, public figure,
issue of public interest, ethics of journalism, costs,
compensation for damages)
In 2000 Tønsbergs Blad published an article about
a list drafted by the Municipal Council of Tjøme
identifying property owners suspected of failing
to respect the permanent residence requirement
applying to certain properties, in breach of local
regulations. The article referred to a well-known
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singer and a well-known business man (Mr. Ry-
gh) stating that they might be "forced to sell their
properties at Tjøme". The article included a small
photo of Mr. Rygh with the caption: "it must be
due to a misunderstanding, says Tom Vidar Ry-
gh". Few weeks later, after being informed that
the Rygh family's property had been removed
from the list, the newspaper published an addi-
tional article which noted that Mr. Vidar Rygh
and the singer had "got off" of the list. The news-
paper criticized that there were "major loop-
holes" in the system, in that the regulations did
not apply to houses which had been built by the
owners. In a further article, entitled "Tønsbergs
Blad clarifies", the paper stated that the proper-
ties belonging to the singer and the Rygh family
had been removed from the list in question, as
the regulations did not apply to their properties.
Mr. Rygh brought private criminal proceedings
against the newspaper and its editor-in-chief,
Mrs. Haukom. Under Article 253 of the Penal
Code (defamation), the High Court (lagmannsrett)
declared the impugned statements null and void
and ordered the publishing firm and the editor-
in-chief to pay Mr. Rygh NOK 50,000 in compen-
sation for non-pecuniary damage. The Court was
of the opinion that there had not been sufficient
evidence for the allegations against Mr. Rygh.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and
ordered Tønsbergs Blad and Haukom to pay Mr
Rygh NOK 673,879 for costs.
Before the European Court of Human Rights,
Tønsbergs Blad and Haukom complained under
Article 10 of the Convention that the Norwegian
Courts' decisions had entailed an interference
with their right to freedom of expression that
could not be regarded as necessary in a democrat-
ic society. The Strasbourg Court in the first place
found that the purpose of the article was to illus-
trate a problem that the public had an interest
in being informed about. Indeed, a possible fail-
ure of a public figure to observe laws and regula-
tions aimed at protecting serious public interests,
even in the private sphere, might in certain cir-
cumstances constitute a matter of legitimate
public interest. The Court recalled that protec-
tion of the right of journalists to impart informa-
tion on issues of general interest required that
they act in good faith and on an accurate factu-
al basis and provide "reliable and precise" in-
formation in accordance with the ethics of
journalism. Even though the news item had
been presented in a somewhat sensationalist
style, the overall impression given by the newspa-
per report was that, rather than inviting the read-
er to reach any foregone conclusion about any
failure on Mr. Rygh's part, it had raised question
marks with respect to both whether he had
breached the requirements in question and
whether those requirements should be main-
tained, modified or repealed. The Strasbourg
Court is of the opinion that the overall news cov-
erage by Tønsbergs Blad on that matter was pre-
sented in a balanced way and that the disputed
allegations were presented with precautionary
qualifications. The Court does not find that the
impugned accusation was capable of causing
such injury to personal reputation as could
weigh heavily in the balancing exercise to be car-
ried out under the necessity test in Article 10 § 2
of the Convention. As to the further question
whether the applicants had acted in good faith
and complied with the ordinary journalistic obli-
gation to verify a factual allegation, the European
Court found substantial evidence to corrobo-
rate the newspaper's contention that the Munic-
ipality at the time held the view that Mr. Rygh
was in breach of the relevant residence require-
ments. The journalist could not in the Court's
opinion be blamed for not having ascertained for
himself, whether the residence requirements were
applicable to the property used by Mr. Rygh. On
the contrary, in view of the relatively minor na-
ture and limited degree of the defamation at is-
sue and the important public interests in-
volved, the Court was satisfied that the
newspaper had taken sufficient steps to verify the
truth of the disputed allegation and acted in
good faith. Yet the applicants had had to face ju-
dicial defamation proceedings pursued at three
levels. These proceedings had led to their state-
ments being declared null and void and their be-
ing ordered to pay the plaintiff NOK 50,000 in
compensation for non-pecuniary damage and to
reimburse him NOK 673,829 for his legal expens-
es, in addition to bearing their own costs. In the
circumstances, the proceedings had resulted in
an excessive and disproportionate burden be-
ing placed on the applicants, which was capable
of having a chilling effect on press freedom in
the respondent State. The Strasbourg Court
came to the conclusion that the reasons relied on
by the Norwegian authorities, although relevant,
were not sufficient to show that the interference
complained of had been "necessary in a demo-
cratic society". The Court considered that there
had been no reasonable relationship of propor-
tionality between the restrictions placed by the
measures applied by the Supreme Court on the
applicants' right to freedom of expression and
the legitimate aim pursued. Accordingly, there
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has been a violation of Article 10 of the Conven-
tion.
57.- Case of Colaço Mestre and Sociedade Inde-
pendente de Comunicação (SIC) v. Portugal, 26
April 2007 (defamation, television interview, al-
legations of bribery in football, damages, jour-
nalistic ethics)
In 1996, as part of a television programme enti-
tled Os donos da bola (masters of the ball), SCI (the
TV channel of SIC) broadcast an interview con-
ducted by Mr. Colaço Mestre with Gerhard Aign-
er, who at the time was General Secretary of
UEFA. The interview, in French, focussed on alle-
gations concerning bribery of referees in Portugal
and the actions of Mr. Pinto da Costa, the then
President of the Portuguese Professional Foot-
ball League and Chairman of the football club FC
Porto. Mr. Colaço Mestre described Mr. Pinto da
Costa as "the referees' boss" and seemed to be
eliciting comments from his interviewee about
the concurrent functions exercised by Mr. Pinto
da Costa at the time. Mr. Pinto da Costa lodged a
criminal complaint against Mestre and SIC ac-
cusing them of defamation. The Oporto Crimi-
nal Court sentenced Mr. Colaço Mestre to a fine
or an alternative 86-day term of imprisonment,
and ordered the journalist and the television
channel to pay the claimant damages of approxi-
mately EUR 3,990. In 2002 the Oporto Court of
Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by Mestre and
SIC and upheld their conviction
The European Court of Human Right however is
of the opinion that this sanction was a breach of
Article 10 of the Convention. The Court noted
that Mr. Pinto da Costa played a major role in
Portuguese public life and that the interview
concerned the debate on bribery in football, a
question of public interest. Moreover, the inter-
view had not concerned the private life but
solely the public activities of Mr. Pinto da Costa
as Chairman of a leading football club and Presi-
dent of the National League. As to the expres-
sions used during the interview, the Court con-
sidered that there had been no breach of
journalistic ethics. In the context of the heated
debate at the time about bribery of Portuguese
referees the interview had been broadcast in a
Portuguese football programme intended for an
audience with a particular interest in and knowl-
edge of the subject-matter. The Court further
considered that the fact that Mr. Colaço Mestre
had not been speaking in his mother tongue,
when he conducted the interview with the UEFA-
Secretary General, might have had an impact on
the wording of his questions. The Court also
found that the punishment of a journalist by sen-
tencing him to pay a fine, together with an award
of damages against him and the television chan-
nel employing him, might seriously hamper the
contribution of the press to discussion of mat-
ters of public interest and should not be envis-
aged unless there were particularly strong rea-
sons for doing so. However, that was not the case
here. In those circumstances the Court consid-
ered that, whilst the reasons advanced by the Por-
tuguese courts to justify the applicants' convic-
tion might be regarded as relevant, they were not
sufficient and, accordingly, did not serve to meet
a pressing social need. The Court held, therefore,
that there had been a violation of Article 10.
58.- Case of Dupuis a.o. v. France, 7 June 2007
(breach of professional secrecy, presumption of
innocence, state affair, book, journalists, crime
reporting, journalistic ethics)
In this judgment the Court unanimously is of the
opinion that the French authorities have violated
the freedom of expression of two journalists and
a publisher (Fayard) of a book in 1996. Both jour-
nalists were convicted for using confidential in-
formation published in their book "The Ears of
the President" (Les Oreilles du President). The book
focussed on the "Elysée eavesdropping opera-
tions", an illegal system of telephone tapping and
record-keeping, orchestrated by the highest of-
fice of the French State and directed against nu-
merous figures from civil society, including jour-
nalists and lawyers. The French Courts found the
two journalists, Dupuis and Pontaut, guilty of
the offence of using information obtained
trough a breach of the confidentiality of the in-
vestigation or of the professional confidentiality.
It was also argued that the publication could be
detriment for the presumption of innocence of
Mr. G.M., the deputy director of President Mit-
terrand's private office at the material time, who
was placed under formal investigation for breach
of privacy under suspicion of being the responsi-
ble person for the illegal telephone tapping.
The European Court observes that the subject of
the book concerned a debate of considerable
public interest, an affair of state, which was of
interest to public opinion. The Court also re-
fers to the status of Mr. G.M. as a public person,
clearly involved in political life at the highest level
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of the executive while the public had a legitimate
interest to be informed about the trial, and in
particular, about the facts dealt with or revealed
in the book. The Court finds it legitimate that
special protection should be granted to the con-
fidentiality of the judicial investigation, in
view of the stakes of criminal proceedings, both
for the administration of justice and for the right
of persons under investigation to be presumed
innocent. However, at the time when the book
was published, the case had already undergone
wide media coverage and it was already well
known that Mr. G.M. had been placed under in-
vestigation in this case. Hence the Court is of the
opinion that the protection of the information
on account of its confidentiality did not consti-
tute an overriding requirement. The Court also
questions whether there was still an interest in
keeping information confidential when it had al-
ready been at least partly made public and was
likely to be widely known, having regard to the
media coverage of the case. The Court further
considers that it is necessary to take the greatest
care in assessing the need to punish journalists
for using information obtained through a breach
of the confidentiality of an investigation or of
professional confidentiality when those journal-
ists are contributing to a public debate of such
importance, thereby playing their role as
"watchdogs" of democracy. According to the
Court, the journalists had acted in accordance
with the standards governing their profession as
journalists, since the impugned publication was
relevant not only to the subject matter but also to
the credibility of the information supplied, pro-
viding evidence of its accuracy and authenticity.
Lastly, the Court underlines that the interference
with freedom of expression might have a chilling
effect on the exercise of that freedom – an effect
that the relatively moderate nature of the fine, as
in the present case, would not suffice to negate.
As the judgment against the two journalists had
constituted a disproportionate interference with
their right to freedom of expression it was there-
fore not necessary in a democratic society. Ac-
cordingly, there has been a violation of Article 10
of the Convention.
59.- Case of Hachette Filipacchi (Paris Match) v.
France, 14 June 2007 (photograph of dead body,
injunction to publish statement, privacy, human
dignity, chilling effect, journalistic ethics)
After the Prefect of Corsica, Claude Erignac, was
murdered in Ajaccio in February 1998, an issue of
the weekly magazine Paris-Match contained an ar-
ticle entitled "La République assassinée" (The
murdered Republic). The article was illustrated
by a photograph of the Prefect's body lying on
the road, facing the camera. The widow and
children of Prefect Erignac sought injunctions
against several companies, including the publish-
ing company of Paris-Match, Hachette Filipacchi
Associés. They contended that publication of the
photograph of the bloodied and mutilated
body of their relative was not information which
could possibly be useful to the public, but was
prompted purely by commercial considerations
and constituted a particularly intolerable in-
fringement of their right to respect for their pri-
vate life. The urgent applications judge issued an
injunction requiring the Hachette Filipacchi
company to publish at its own expense in Paris-
Match a statement informing readers that Mrs.
Erignac and her children had found the photo-
graph showing the dead body of Prefect Erignac
published in Paris-Match deeply distressing. Few
days later the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the
injunction, noting, among other considerations,
that publication of the photograph, while Prefect
Erignac's close family were still mourning his
loss, and given the fact that they had not given
their consent, constituted a gross disturbance of
their grief, and accordingly of the intimacy of
their private life. It ruled that such a photograph
infringed human dignity and ordered the Ha-
chette Filipacchi company to publish at its own
expense in Paris-Match a statement informing
readers that the photograph had been published
without the consent of the Erignac family, who
considered its publication an intrusion into the
intimacy of their private life. On 20 December
2000 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal
on points of law by the applicant company.
Relying on Article 10, the publishing house of
Paris-Match complained before the European
Court of Human Rights of the injunction requir-
ing it to publish, on pain of a coercive fine, a
statement informing readers that the photo-
graph had been published without the consent of
the Erignac family. The Court considered that
the obligation to publish a statement amounted
to an interference by the authorities with the
company's exercise of its freedom of expression.
The Court noted that the practice of requiring
publication of a statement was sanctioned by a
long tradition of settled French case-law and was
regarded by the French courts as "one of the ways
of making good damage caused through the
press." It considered that this case-law satisfied
the conditions of accessibility and foreseeability
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required for a finding that this form of interfer-
ence was "prescribed by law" within the mean-
ing of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The Court
also considered that the interference complained
of had pursued a legitimate aim (the protection
of the rights of others) and it noted that the
rights concerned fell within the scope of Article 8
of the Convention, guaranteeing the right to re-
spect for private and family life. The crucial ques-
tion which the Court had to answer was whether
the interference had been "necessary in a demo-
cratic society", within the framework of duties
and responsibilities inherent in exercise of the
freedom of expression. In this respect the Court
reiterated that the death of a close relative and
the ensuing mourning, which were a source of in-
tense grief, must sometimes lead the authorities
to take the necessary measures to ensure respect
for the private and family lives of the persons
concerned. In the present case, the offending
photograph had been published only few days af-
ter the murder and after the funeral. The Court
considered that the distress of Mr. Erignac's close
relatives should have led journalists to exercise
prudence and caution, given that he had died
in violent circumstances which were traumat-
ic for his family, who had expressly opposed
publication of the photograph. The result of
publication, in a magazine with a very high circu-
lation, had been to heighten the trauma felt by
the victim's close relatives in the aftermath of the
murder, so that they were justified in arguing
that there had been an infringement of their
right to respect for their private life. The Court
also considered that the wording of the state-
ment Paris-Match had been ordered to publish,
revealed the care the French courts had taken
to respect the editorial freedom of Paris-Match.
That being so, the Court considered that of all
the sanctions which French legislation permit-
ted, the order to publish the statement was the
one which, both in principle and as regards its
content, was the sanction entailing the least re-
strictions on exercise of the applicant company's
rights. It noted that the Hachette Filipacchi
company had not shown in what way the or-
der to publish the statement had actually had
a dissuasive effect on the way Paris-Match had
exercised and continued to exercise its right to
freedom of expression. In conclusion the Court
considered that the order requiring Paris-Match to
publish a statement, for which the French courts
had given reasons which were both "relevant and
sufficient", had been proportionate to the legiti-
mate aim it pursued, and therefore "necessary in
a democratic society". Accordingly, the Court
held by 5 votes to 2 that there had been no viola-
tion of Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The two dissenting judges ex-
pressed their firm disagreement with the finding
of the majority in two separate dissenting opin-
ions, annexed to the judgment.
60.- Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bul-
garia, 11 October 2007 (refusal to grant broad-
casting licence, media authority, independence
and transparency, judicial review)
In 2000 Glas Nadezhda EOOD, of which Mr. Elenk-
ov is the manager, applied to the State Telecom-
munications Commission (the "STC") for a li-
cence to set up a radio station to broadcast
Christian programmes in and around Sofia. The
STC refused to grant the licence, basing its refus-
al on the decision taken by the National Radio
and Television Committee (the "NRTC") which
found that, on the basis of the documents sub-
mitted by Glas Nadezhda EOOD, the proposed ra-
dio station would not meet its requirements to
make social and business programmes or to tar-
get regional audiences. The proposals also failed
to fully meet its requirements to produce original
programmes, to ensure audience satisfaction and
to provide the professional and technological re-
sources required.
Glas Nadezhda EOOD brought proceedings before
the Supreme Administrative Court for judicial re-
view of both STC's and NRTC's decision, but fi-
nally the Court held that the NRTC had total dis-
cretion in assessing whether an application for a
broadcasting licence had met certain criteria and
that this discretion was not open to judicial scru-
tiny. In the meantime, Mr. Elenkov attempted to
obtain a copy of the minutes of the NRTC's de-
liberations, which were meant to be available to
the public under the Access to Public Informa-
tion Act 2000. Despite his requests and a court
order, Mr. Elenkov was not given access to those
minutes.
Relying on Articles 9 (freedom of thought, con-
science and religion) and 10 (freedom of expres-
sion), the applicants complained that they were
refused a broadcasting licence. They also com-
plained under Article 13 (right to an effective
remedy) about the ensuing judicial review pro-
ceedings.
The Court is of the opinion that the interference
in the freedom of expression of the applicants did
not meet the requirements of lawfulnes as pre-
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scribed by Article 10 § 2. The NRTC had not held
any form of public hearing and its deliberations
had been kept secret, despite a court order oblig-
ing it to provide the applicants with a copy of its
minutes. Furthermore, the NRTC had merely
stated in its decision that Glas Nadezhda EOOD
had not or had only partially corresponded to a
number of its criteria. No reasoning was given to
explain why the NRTC came to that conclusion.
And no redress had been given for that lack of
reasoning in the ensuing judicial review proceed-
ings because it had been held that the NRTC's
discretion had not been reviewable. That, togeth-
er with the NRTC's vagueness concerning certain
criteria for programmes, had denied the appli-
cants legal protection against arbitrary interfer-
ence with their freedom of expression. The
Court notes that the guidelines adopted by the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
in the broadcasting regulation domain call for
open and transparent application of the regula-
tions governing the licensing procedure and spe-
cifically recommend that "[a]ll decisions taken...
by the regulatory authorities... be... duly reasoned
[and] open to review by the competent jurisdic-
tions" (Recommendation 2000/23 on the independ-
ence and functions of regulatory authorities for the
broadcasting sector). Consequently, the Court con-
cludes that the interference with the applicants'
freedom of expression had not been lawful and
held that there had been a violation of Article 10.
Having regard to its findings under Article 10,
the Court considers that it is not necessary to ad-
ditionally examine whether there has been a vio-
lation of Article 9 of the Convention. The Court
on the other hand comes to the conclusion that
there has been a violation of Article 13. The
Court observes that the Supreme Administrative
Court made it clear that it could not scrutinise
the manner in which that body had assessed the
compliance of Glas Nadezhda EOOD's programme
documents with the relevant criteria, that assess-
ment being within the NRTC's discretionary
powers. The Supreme Administrative Court thus
refused to interfere with the exercise of NRTC's
discretion on substantive grounds and did not
examine the issues going to the merits of the ap-
plicants' Article 10 grievance. Referring to its case
law in some similar cases, the Court concludes
that the approach taken by the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court – refusing to interfere with the ex-
ercise of NRTC's discretion on substantive
grounds – fell short of the requirements of Article
13 of the Convention.
61.- Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v.
France, 22 October 2007 – Grand Chamber (def-
amation of politician, freedom of artistic expres-
sion, political debate, hate speech), extract from
press release ECtHR
Mr Lindon is a writer, Mr Otchakovsky-Laurens
is the chairman of the board of directors of the
publishing company P.O.L., and Mr July was the
publication director of Libération. In August 1998
P.O.L. published a novel by Mr Lindon called Le
Procès de Jean-Marie Le Pen ("Jean-Marie Le Pen on
Trial"). The novel recounts the trial of a Front Na-
tional militant, who, while putting up posters for
his party with other militants, committed the
cold-blooded murder of a young man of North
African descent and admitted that it was a racist
crime. The novel is based on real events and in
particular the murders, in 1995, of Brahim
Bouaram, a young Moroccan who was thrown
into the River Seine by skinheads during a Front
National march, and of Ibrahim Ali, a young
Frenchman of Comorian origin who was killed in
Marseilles by Front National militants. The novel
raises questions about the responsibility of Mr Le
Pen, Chairman of the Front National, for murders
committed by militants, and about the effective-
ness of strategies to combat the far right. Follow-
ing the publication of the novel, the Front Nation-
al and Mr Le Pen brought defamation
proceedings against Mr Lindon and Mr Otchak-
ovsky-Laurens.
On 11 October 1999 Paris Criminal Court con-
victed Mr Otchakovsky-Laurens of defamation
and Mr Lindon of complicity in that offence.
They were each fined the equivalent of 2,286.74
euros (EUR) and ordered to pay, jointly,
EUR 3,811.23 in damages both to Mr Le Pen and
the Front National. The court found four passages
from the book to be defamatory:
1. that Mr Le Pen led "a gang of killers" and that
"people would have voted for Al Capone too"; 
2. that the Front National used violence against
anyone who left the party; 
3. that behind each of Mr Le Pen's assertions
"loomed the spectre of the worst abominations
of the history of mankind"; and, 
4. that he was a "vampire" who thrived on the
"bitterness of his electorate, but sometimes also
on their blood, like the blood of his enemies"
and that he was a liar who used defamation
against his opponents to deflect accusations
away from himself.
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On 16 November 1999 Libération published a pe-
tition signed by 97 contemporary writers in its
column "Rebonds" to protest about the convic-
tion of Mr Lindon and Mr Otchakovsky-Laurens.
The petition disputed whether the passages in
question were in fact defamatory and reproduced
them verbatim. Mr July was subsequently sum-
moned by the Front National and Mr Le Pen to ap-
pear before Paris Criminal Court, which, in a
judgment of 7 September 2000, found him guilty
of defamation and sentenced him to pay a fine
equivalent to EUR 2,286.74 and EUR 3,811.23 in
damages, for having reproduced the relevant pas-
sages from the novel.
In a judgment of 13 September 2000, on an ap-
peal lodged by Mr Lindon and Mr Otchakovsky-
Laurens, Paris Court of Appeal upheld their con-
victions in respect of three passages (1., 3. and 4.
above). The court reasoned that the author had
only sufficiently distanced himself from the
views expressed in relation to passage no. 2; the
other three passages had not been subjected to
basic verification and were not sufficiently dis-
passionate. On 27 November 2001 a further ap-
peal on points of law was dismissed by the Court
of Cassation.
On 21 March 2001 Mr July's conviction was up-
held by Paris Court of Appeal, which found that
the authors of the petition had intended to show
their support for Mr Lindon "by repeating with
approval, out of defiance, all the passages that
had been found defamatory by the court, and
without even really calling into question the de-
famatory nature of the remarks". The court went
on "its line of argument is built around reference
to precise facts. There was therefore an obligation
to carry out a meaningful investigation before
making particularly serious accusations such
as incitement to commit murder, and to avoid
offensive expressions". On 3 April 2002 the
Court of Cassation dismissed Mr July's appeal on
points of law.
In a judgment given by the Grand Chamber of
the ECtHR the complaints of Lindon, Otchako-
vsky-Laurens and July did not lead to a finding of
a violation of Article 10 by the French authorities.
The Court found that applicants' convictions
had a clear, legal basis (sections 29 and 32 of the
Freedom of the Press Act of 29 July 1881). French
case law indicated that Section 29 of the Act cov-
ered fiction, where the honour or reputation of a
clearly identified individual was concerned. The
European Court further found that their convic-
tion pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the
reputation or rights of others.
Concerning the writer and publisher
The Court reiterated that those who created or
distributed a work, for example of a literary
nature, contributed to the exchange of ideas and
opinions which was essential for a democratic
society. Hence the obligation on the State con-
cerned not to encroach unduly on their freedom
of expression. However, it appeared that the pen-
alty imposed on Mr Lindon and Mr Otchako-
vsky-Laurens concerned, not the arguments
expounded in the novel, but the content of cer-
tain passages. The Court recalled that novelists,
other creators and anyone exercising freedom of
expression had duties and responsibilities.
The domestic courts' view on whether the pas-
sages in question were defamatory could not be
criticised in view of the virulent content of those
passages and the fact that they specifically named
the Front National and its chairman. It was also
apparent that it was for the author's benefit that
the Court of Appeal sought to determine those
remarks from which the author really distanced
himself in his work. As a result, the court found
that one of the four passages was not defamatory.
The Court of Appeal's findings that the three
passages had not been subjected to basic verifica-
tion was in line with the European Court's case-
law. In order to assess the justification of a state-
ment, a distinction needed to be made between
statements of fact and value judgments. While
the existence of facts could be demonstrated, the
truth of value judgments was not susceptible of
proof. Even where a statement amounted to a val-
ue judgment, however, there had to exist a suffi-
cient factual basis to support it. Generally speak-
ing there was no need to make that distinction
when dealing with extracts from a novel. It never-
theless became fully pertinent when, as in the ap-
plicants' case, the work in question was not one
of pure fiction but introduced real characters or
facts. It was all the more acceptable to require the
applicants to show that the allegations contained
in the passages from the novel that were found to
be defamatory had a "sufficient factual basis" as
they were not merely value judgments but also al-
legations of fact. Overall the Court considered
that the Court of Appeal had adopted a measured
approach and that it had made a reasonable as-
sessment of the facts.
Having regard to the content of the offending
passages, the Court also considered that the
Court of Appeal's finding that they were not suf-
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ficiently "dispassionate" was compatible with its
case-law. It was true that, while an individual tak-
ing part in a public debate on a matter of general
concern was required not to overstep certain lim-
its as regards respect for the reputation and
rights of others, he or she was allowed to have re-
course to a degree of exaggeration or even provo-
cation, or to make somewhat immoderate state-
ments. It was also true that the limits of
acceptable criticism were wider as regards a poli-
tician – or a political party – such as Mr Le Pen
and the Front National – as such, than as regards
a private individual. This was particularly true in
the applicants' case as Mr Le Pen, a leading poli-
tician, was known for the virulence of his speech
and his extremist views, on account of which he
had been convicted a number of times on charges
of incitement to racial hatred, trivialising crimes
against humanity, making allowances for atroci-
ties, apologia for war crimes, proffering insults
against public figures and making offensive re-
marks. As a result, he had exposed himself to
harsh criticism and had therefore to display a
particularly high degree of tolerance in that con-
text.
The Court nevertheless considered that the
Court of Appeal made a reasonable assessment of
the facts in the applicants' case in finding that to
liken an individual, though he be a politician, to
the leader of "a gang of killers", to assert that a
murder, even one committed by a fictional char-
acter, was "advocated" by him, and to describe
him as a "vampire who thrives on the bitterness
of his electorate, but sometimes also on their
blood", "oversteps the permissible limits in such
matters".
Considering that those involved in political
struggles should show a minimum degree of
moderation and propriety, the Court also
noted that the passages were such as to stir up
violence and hatred, going beyond what was
tolerable in political debate, even in respect
of a figure who occupied an extremist posi-
tion in the political spectrum. The Court
therefore found that the "penalty" imposed on
the applicants was based on "relevant and suffi-
cient" reasons. The amount of the fine was also
moderate. The Court concluded that the meas-
ures taken against the applicants were not dis-
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and
that the interference with the applicants' right
to freedom of expression was necessary in a dem-
ocratic society. 
Concerning the newspaper
It appeared to the Court that Mr July was con-
victed because Libération had published a peti-
tion which reproduced extracts from the novel
containing "particularly serious allegations" and
offensive remarks, and whose signatories, repeat-
ing those allegations and remarks with approval,
denied that the extracts were defamatory in spite
of a finding to that effect against Mr Lindon and
Mr Otchakovsky-Laurens.
The Court reiterated that protection of the right
of journalists to impart information on issues of
general interest required that they act in good
faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide
"reliable and precise" information in accordance
with the ethics of journalism. Freedom of expres-
sion carried with it "duties and responsibilities",
which also applied to the media even with respect
to matters of serious public concern. Moreover,
those "duties and responsibilities" were liable to
assume significance when there was a question of
attacking the reputation of a named individual
and infringing the "rights of others". Thus, spe-
cial grounds were required before the media
could be dispensed from their ordinary obliga-
tion to verify factual statements that were defam-
atory of private individuals.
Having regard to the moderate nature of the fine
and the damages that Mr July was ordered to pay,
to the content of the passages and to the poten-
tial impact on the public of the remarks found to
be defamatory on account of their publication by
a national daily newspaper with a large circula-
tion, the Court found that the interference was
proportionate to the aim pursued. The Court
concluded that the domestic court could reason-
ably find that the interference with the exercise
by the applicant of his right to freedom of expres-
sion was necessary in a democratic society, in or-
der to protect the reputation and rights of Mr
Le Pen and the Front National. 
There had therefore been no violation of Article
10 concerning any of the applicants.
In a (remarkable) dissenting opinion, three judges
sharply disagree with the reasoning and findings of the
majority of the Court. The dissenters are of the opinion
that by seeking to ascertain the author's thoughts from
the remarks of fictional characters in a fictional situa-
tion, the French Court of Appeal imprisoned literature
in a set of rigid rules at odds with the freedom of artistic
creation and expression. In their view such a radical po-
sition represents a clear departure from the case-law of
the ECtHR, which has laid emphasis on the role of artis-
tic creation in political debate. The dissenters also em-
phasize that by endorsing — or even paraphrasing — the
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reasoning given by the domestic courts, adhering to the
logic they themselves adopted, the European Court in its
judgment has quite simply refrained from carrying out
its own review. The result is that European supervision
is lacking, or is at best considerably limited, and this
again represents a significant departure from the case-
law of the ECtHR in matters of criticism of politicians.
As regards Mr Jean-Marie Le Pen, it is argued by the dis-
senters that he should accept an even higher degree of tol-
erance being critisised precisely because he is a politician
who is known for the virulence of his discourse and for
his extremist views. It is clear in their view that the in-
sulting allegations had a sufficient factual basis, as they
could easily be derived from Mr J.-M. Le Pen's various
convictions throughout his political career, particularly
for the following offences: "trivialisation of crimes
against humanity, making allowances for atrocities".
The dissenters also believe that it is excessive and inaccu-
rate to claim that the novel in question constitutes an ap-
peal to violence or hatred. The work criticises a politician
who is himself inclined to make comments of such a na-
ture, as shown by the convictions pronounced against
him. In the present case, the expressions "chief of a gang
of killers" (p. 10) and "a vampire who thrives on the bit-
terness of his electorate, but sometimes also on their
blood" (p. 136) cannot be taken literally; their intention
is to convey the message that this politician, through his
discourse, encourages his followers to engage in acts of ex-
treme violence, especially against minorities, as the
Bouaram case itself showed. In this sense, these expres-
sions are also value judgments which have an established
factual basis. Finally with regard the conviction of Serge
July, the dissenters emphasize that it cannot be argued
that, by simply reporting in the newspaper Libération
on the support of 97 writers for Mathieu Lindon and by
publishing their opinion that the impugned passages
were not defamatory, July had failed in his duty to act in
good faith.
62.- Voskuil v. the Netherlands, 22 November
2007 and Tillack v. Belgium, 27 November 2007
(protection of journalistic sources)
In two judgments the ECtHR has given substan-
tial protection to the journalists' protection of
sources under Article 10 of the Convention. The
case of Voskuil v. the Netherlands concerns Mr
Voskuil's allegations that he was denied the right
not to disclose his source for two articles he had
written for the newspaper Sp!ts and that he was
detained for more than two weeks in an attempt
to compel him to do so. Voskuil had been sum-
moned to appear as a witness for the defence in
the appeal proceedings concerning three individ-
uals accused of arms trafficking. The court or-
dered the journalist to reveal the identity of a
source in the interests of those accused and the
integrity of the police and judicial authorities.
Voskuil invoked his right to remain silent (zwij-
grecht) and subsequently, the court ordered his
immediate detention. Only two weeks later the
Court of Appeal decided to lift the order for the
applicant's detention. It considered that the re-
port published by the applicant was implausible
and that the statement of Voskuil was no longer
of any interest in the proceedings concerning the
arms trafficking. In Strasbourg Voskuil com-
plained of a violation of his right of freedom of
expression and press freedom under Article 10 of
the Convention. The European Court recalled
that the protection of a journalist's sources is one
of the basic conditions for freedom of the press,
as reflected in various international instruments
including the Council of Europe's Committee of
Ministers Recommendation No. R (2000) 7.
Without such protection, sources might be de-
terred from assisting the press in informing the
public on matters of public interest and, as a re-
sult, the vital public-watchdog role of the press
might be undermined. The order to disclose a
source can only be justified by an overriding re-
quirement in the public interest. In essence the
Court was struck by the lengths to which the
Netherlands authorities had been prepared to go
to learn the source's identity. Such far-reaching
measures could but discourage those who had
true and accurate information relating to
wrongdoing from coming forward in the fu-
ture and sharing their knowledge with the
press. The Court found that the Government's
interest in knowing the identity of the journal-
ist's source had not been sufficient to override
the journalist's interest in concealing it. There
had therefore been a violation of Article 10.
The other case concerns the journalist H.M.
Tillack complaining of a violation by the Belgian
authorities of this right of protection of sources.
Tillack, a journalist working in Brussels for the
weekly magazine Stern, has been suspected of
having bribed a civil servant by paying him
EUR 8,000 in exchange for confidential informa-
tion concerning investigations in progress in the
European institutions. The European Anti-Fraud
Office OLAF opened an investigation in order
to identify the informant of Tillack. After the
investigation by OLAF failed to unmask the offi-
cial at the origin of the leaks, the Belgian judicial
authorities where requested to open an investiga-
tion in this case regarding an alleged breach of
professional confidence and bribery involving a
civil servant. On 19 March 2004 Tillack's home
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and workplace were searched and almost all his
working papers and tools were seized and
placed under seal (16 crates of papers, two boxes
of files, two computers, four mobile phones and
a metal cabinet). Tillack lodged an application
with the ECtHR, after the Belgian Supreme
Court had rejected his complaint under Article
10 of the Convention. The European Court em-
phasized that a journalist's right not to reveal her
or his sources could not be considered a mere
privilege to be granted or taken away depending
on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of their sourc-
es, but was part and parcel of the right to infor-
mation, to be treated with the utmost caution,
even more so in the applicant's case, where he
had been under suspicion because of vague,
uncorroborated rumours, as subsequently
confirmed by the fact that he had not been
charged. The Court also took into account the
amount of property seized and considered that
although the reasons given by the Belgian courts
were "relevant", they could not be considered
"sufficient" to justify the impugned searches.
The European Court accordingly found that
there had been a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention.
63.- Filatenko v. Russia, 6 December 2007 (crit-
ical questions, election period, television journal-
ist, defamation)
In 2000 the journalist Aleksandr Grigoryevich
Filatenko was convicted for defamation. The rea-
son for the defamation proceedings was a critical
question he formulated during a broadcast live
show he was presenting as a journalist working
for Tyva, the regional state television and radio
broadcasting company in the Tyva Republic of
the Russian Federation. The controversial ques-
tion, based on a question raised by a viewer by
phone, referred to an incident during which the
Tyva Republic flag had been torn off a car which
was campaigning in support of the Otechestvo
Party candidate. It was a matter of disagreement
as to how Filatenko had worded that question
during the programme. The plaintiffs' version
was that Filatenko had presented the incident as
if the Tyva flag had been torn down and stamped
on by people from the Edinstvo Campaign Head-
quarters. Filatenko denied having made any such
allegation: he only admitted to having specified
that the incident had taken place near the Edin-
stvo Campaign Headquarters. In the defamation
proceedings brought against Filatenko and the
broadcasting company by members of the Edin-
stvo Movement, the Kyzyl District Court
accepted the plaintiffs' version of how the ques-
tion had been worded. As the video recording of
the show had been lost, the district court relied
solely on witness testimonies confirming the
plaintiff's version of Filatenko's wording of the
question. Filatenko was found guilty of defama-
tion and ordered to pay approximately EUR 347
compensation for damages, while Tyva was
ordered to broadcast a rectification in the same
time slot as the original show.
In a judgment of 6 December 2007 the European
Court of Human Rights is of the opinion that
this conviction and court order violate of Article
10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. The Court reiterates that, as a general
rule, any opinions and information aired during
an electoral campaign should be considered
part of a debate on questions of public interest
and that there is little scope under Article 10 for
restrictions on such debate. Similarly, punishing
a journalist for having worded a question in a
certain way, thus seriously hampering the press'
contribution to a matter of public interest,
should not be envisaged unless there is particu-
larly strong justification. Therefore, the timing
(just before elections) and format of the show
(live and aimed at encouraging lively political
debate), necessitated very good reasons for any
kind of restriction on its participants' freedom
of expression. The European Court finds that
the Russian courts have failed to make an accept-
able assessment of the relevant facts and have
not given sufficient reasons for finding that
Filatenko's wording of the question had been
defamatory. Furthermore, there has been no
indication that the assumed allegation con-
tained in Filatenko's question had represented
an attack on anyone's personal reputation. The
Court is also of the opinion that there could be
no serious doubts about Filatenko's good faith.
He had merely requested a reaction from the
show's participants on an event of major public
concern, without making any affirmations.
According to the European Court Filatenko
could not be criticised for having failed to verify
facts, given the obvious constraints of a live tele-
vision show, while a representative of the Edin-
stvo political movement had been present and
invited to respond to the question. The Court
therefore concluded that the interference with
Filatenko's freedom of expression had not been
sufficiently justified, and hence violated Article
10 of the Convention.
(See also Makhmudov v. Russia, 26 July 2007; Dyuldin
and Kislov v. Russia and Chemodurov v. Russia, 31 Au-
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gust 2007 and Dzhavadov v. Russia, 27 September
2007)
64.- Stoll v. Switzerland, 10 December 2007 –
Grand Chamber (breach of confidence, matter of
public interest, journalistic ethics, diplomatic re-
lations, good/bad faith of journalist, sensational-
ism)
In December 1996 the Swiss ambassador to the
United States drew up a "strategic document",
classified as "confidential", concerning the pos-
sible strategies with regard the compensations
due to Holocaust victims for unclaimed assets
deposited in Swiss banks. The report was sent to
the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in
Berne and to a limited list of other persons. Mar-
tin Stoll, a journalist working for Sonntags-Zei-
tung, also obtained a copy of this document,
probably as a result of a breach of professional
confidence by one of the persons who had re-
ceived a copy of this strategic paper. Short time
later the Sonntags-Zeitung published two articles
by Martin Stoll, accompanied by extracts from
the document. The next days also other newspa-
pers published extracts from the report. In 1999
Stoll was sentenced to a fine of 800 Swiss francs
(520 euros) for publishing "official confidential
deliberations" within the meaning of Article 293
of the Criminal Code. This provision not only
punishes the person who is responsible for the
breach of confidence of official secrets, but also
those who helped as an accomplice to give pub-
licity to such secrets. The Swiss Press Council, to
which the case also had been referred in the
meantime, found that the way Stoll had focussed
on the confidential report, by shortening the
analysis and failing to place the report sufficient-
ly in context, had irresponsibly made some ex-
tracts appear sensational and shocking. In a judg-
ment of 25 April 2006, the Strasbourg Court of
Human Rights held, by four votes to three, that
the conviction of Stoll was to be considered as a
breach of the journalist's freedom of expression
as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Human Rights'
Convention. For the Court it was crucial that the
information contained in the report manifestly
raised matters of public interest, that the role of
the media as critic and watchdog also applies to
matters of foreign and financial policy and that
the protection of confidentiality of diplomatic
relations, although a justified principle, could
not be protected at any price. Furthermore, as
Stoll had only been convicted because he pub-
lished parts of the document in the newspaper,
the European Court was of the opinion that the
finding by the Swiss Press Council that he had
neglected his professional ethics by focussing on
some extracts in a sensationalist way, should not
be taken into account to determine whether or
not the publishing of the document was legiti-
mate.
In a judgment of 10 December 2007 the Grand
Chamber of the ECtHR has, by twelve votes to
five, "overruled" this finding of a violation of Ar-
ticle 10. Although the Grand Chamber recogniz-
es that the information contained in the ambas-
sador's paper concerned matters of public
interest and that the articles of Stoll were pub-
lished in a context of an important public, impas-
sioned debate in Switzerland with an interna-
tional dimension, it is of the opinion that the
disclosure of the ambassador's report was capa-
ble of undermining the climate of discretion
necessary to the successful conduct of diplo-
matic relations and of having negative reper-
cussions on the negotiations being conducted
by Switzerland. The judgment underlines that
the fact that Stoll did not act illegally himself by
obtaining the leaked document is not necessarily
a determining factor in assessing whether or not
he complied with his duties and responsibilities:
as a journalist he could not claim in good faith to
be unaware that disclosure of the document in
question was punishable under Article 293 of the
Swiss Criminal Code. Finally the Court empha-
sizes that the impugned articles were written
and presented in a sensationalist style, that
they suggested inappropriately that the ambassa-
dor's remarks were anti-Semitic, that they were of
trivial nature and were also inaccurate and
likely to mislead the reader. Like the Swiss Press
Council, the Court observes a number of short-
comings in the form of the published articles.The
Court comes to the conclusion that the "truncat-
ed and reductive form of the articles in question, which
was liable to mislead the reader as to the ambassador's
personality and abilities, considerably detracted from
the importance of their contribution to the public de-
bate" and that there has been no violation of Arti-
cle 10 of the Convention. 
The five dissenting judges express the opinion
that the majority decision is a "dangerous and un-
justified departure from the Court's well established
case-law concerning the nature and vital importance of
freedom of expression in democratic societies". The
judgment of the Grand Chamber also contrasts
remarkably with the principle enshrined in the
19 December 2006 Joint Declaration by the UN,
OSCE, OAS and ACHPR according to which
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"journalists should not be held liable for publishing clas-
sified or confidential information where they have not
themselves committed a wrong in obtaining it".
65.- Guja v. Moldova, 12 February 2008 –
Grand Chamber (protection of whistle blower,
matter of public interest, conditions for protect-
ing whistle blowing under Art. 10 Convention)
The ECtHR recently delivered a judgement on a
very particular and interesting case, concerning
the position of a "whistle-blower" who leaked
two letters to the press and was subsequently dis-
missed. The Court held that the divulgence of the
internal documents to the press was in casu pro-
tected by Article 10 of the Convention, which
guarantees the right to freedom of expression, in-
cluding the right to receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas. The applicant, Mr. Guja, was
Head of the Press Department of the Moldovan
Prosecutor General's Office, before he was dis-
missed, on the grounds that he had handed over
two secret letters to a newspaper and that, before
doing so, he had failed to consult the heads of
other departments of the Prosecutor General's
Office, a behaviour which constituted a breach of
the press department's internal regulations. Guja
was of the opinion that the letters were not confi-
dential and that, as they revealed that the Deputy
Speaker of Parliament, Vadim Mişin, had exer-
cised undue pressure on the Public Prosecutor's
Office, he had acted in line with the President's
anti-corruption drive and with the intention of
creating a positive image of the Office. Guja
brought a civil action against the Prosecutor
General's Office seeking reinstatement, but his
request failed. Relying on Article 10 of the Con-
vention, he complained to the Strasbourg Court
about his dismissal.
The European Court held that, given the particu-
lar circumstances of the case, external reporting,
even to a newspaper, could be justified, as the
case concerned the pressure by a high-ranking
politician on pending criminal cases. At the same
time, the Public Prosecutor had given the impres-
sion that he had succumbed to political pressure.
The Court also referred to the reports of interna-
tional non-governmental organisations (the In-
ternational Commission of Jurists, Freedom
House, and the Open Justice Initiative), which
had expressed concern about the breakdown of
the separation of powers and the lack of judicial
independence in Moldova. There is no doubt
that these are very important matters in a
democratic society, about which the public
has a legitimate interest in being informed
and which fall within the scope of political de-
bate. The Court considered that the public inter-
est in the provision of information on undue
pressure and wrongdoing within the Prosecu-
tor's Office is so important in a democratic soci-
ety, that it outweighs the interest in maintaining
public confidence in the Prosecutor General's
Office. Open discussion of topics of public
concern is essential to democracy and it is of
great importance if members of the public are
discouraged from voicing their opinions on such
matters. The Court, being of the opinion that
Guja had acted in good faith, finally noted that
it was the heaviest sanction possible (dismissal)
that had been imposed on the applicant. The
sanction not only had negative repercussions on
the applicant's career, but could also have a seri-
ous chilling effect on other employees from the
Prosecutor's Office and discourage them from
reporting any misconduct. Moreover, in view of
the media coverage of the applicant's case, the
sanction could also have a chilling effect on other
civil servants and employees.
Being mindful of the importance of the right to
freedom of expression on matters of general in-
terest, of the right of civil servants and other em-
ployees to report illegal conduct and wrongdoing
at their place of work, the duties and responsibil-
ities of employees towards their employers and
the right of employers to manage their staff, and
having weighed up the other different interests
involved in the applicant's case, the Court comes
to the conclusion that the interference with the
applicant's right to freedom of expression, in
particular his right to impart information, was
not "necessary in a democratic society". Accord-
ingly, there has been a violation of Article 10 of
the Convention.
(See also Kudeshkina v. Russia, 26 February 2009)
66.- Yalçin Küçük (n° 3) v. Turkey, 22 April
2008 (incitement to hatred and hostility, separa-
tist propaganda, membership of armed group, in-
terview on TV, antiterror, hate speech, no
incitement to violence or armed resistance)
Once more the European Court of Human
Rights has found a breach of freedom of expres-
sion by the Turkish authorities. Yalçýn Küçük, a
university professor and a writer, was prosecuted
on account of various speeches he gave and arti-
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cles he wrote concerning the Kurdish question. In
1999, the Ankara State Security Court found him
guilty of inciting hatred and hostility, of emit-
ting separatist propaganda and of belonging to
an armed group (art. 312 § 2 and art. 168 § 2 of
the Criminal Code and art. 8 of the Antiterrorism
Act nr. 3713). He was also convicted of assisting
an armed group (art. 169 Criminal Code) on the
basis of an interview for Med-TV in which Küçük
had welcomed the PKK-leader Abdullah Öcalan
as "Mister President" and had invited him to
make a statement about the Kurdish question.
Küçük had to undergo a prison sentence of six
years and six months and was ordered to pay a
fine of EUR 1,300. Relying on Article 6 § 1 and
Article 10 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, he complained that the proceedings
had been unfair and that his right to freedom of
expression had been breached.
The European Court in its judgment of 22 April
2008 considered that the grounds adopted by the
Turkish courts could not be regarded in them-
selves as sufficient to justify interference with
Külçük's right to freedom of expression. While
certain comments in the offending articles and
speeches sought to justify separatism, which thus
made them hostile in tone, taken as a whole they
did not, however, advocate the use of violence,
armed resistance or an uprising and did not
constitute hate speech, which, in the Court's
view, was the essential factor to be taken into con-
sideration. One speech by Külçük, however, con-
tained a sentence to be considered as incitement
to violence and therefore could not invoke the
protection guaranteed by Article 10 of the Con-
vention.
The European Court, referring to the nature and
the severity of the sanctions, found that Külçük's
conviction as a whole had been disproportionate
to the aims pursued and, accordingly, was not
"necessary in a democratic society". The Court
especially referred to the severity of the sentence
of imprisonment for six years and six months.
The Court held, unanimously, that there had
been a violation of Article 10 and that it did not
need to examine the complaints submitted under
Article 6 of the Convention. It awarded Küçük
EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
67.- Alithia Publishing Company Ltd. & Con-
stantinides v. Cyprus, 22 May 2008 (defamation,
journalistic ethics, malice, facts and value judg-
ments, credibility and reliability of evidence,
proof of allegations, accurate and reliable infor-
mation)
This case concerns the complaint about defama-
tion proceedings brought against Alithia Pub-
lishing Company Ltd, the publisher of the daily
morning newspaper Alithia and its editor-in-
chief, Alecos Constantinides. Both the publish-
ing company and the editor-in-chief were found
liable of defamation following the publication in
Alithia of a series of articles which alleged that a
former Minister of Defence, Mr Aloneftis, was
corrupt. According to final judgment by the Su-
preme Court the articles not only imputed to Mr
Aloneftis the commission of criminal offences
but had disparaged his moral character by pre-
senting him as an unscrupulous criminal driven
purely by self-interest. The lack of supporting ev-
idence and the seriousness of the defamatory al-
legations demonstrated the existence of malice
on the part of the applicants as well as their in-
tent to defame the former Minister. The facts on
which the publications had been based were con-
sidered inaccurate and the defendants were con-
sidered to have acted in flagrant disregard of the
requirement to verify the factual allegations they
had published. The Supreme Court upheld the
district court's judgment and the corresponding
award of damages.
The European Court in its judgment of 22 May
2008 noted that the Cypriot courts had made a
carefully balanced examination of the case
against the applicants and had concluded that
the applicants had not sufficiently proven their
primarily factual allegations. Indeed, the domes-
tic courts had found that the applicants had act-
ed maliciously and had blatantly disregarded the
principles of responsible journalism. The Court
found those findings persuasive in the circum-
stances and therefore held unanimously that
there had been no violation of Article 10.
The Court notes that the domestic courts' impo-
sition of a requirement on the press to act in
good faith in order to provide accurate and relia-
ble information is implicit in the protection of
Article 10 of the Convention. This would equally
apply in respect of reports on matters of public
interest, even where such reports deal with the
conduct of senior public officials acting in their
official capacity. According to the European
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Court the district court of the defendant state
conducted an extensive analysis of the appli-
cants' evidence and concluded that the appli-
cants had not in fact made sufficient effort to
investigate the matters they alleged in their re-
ports or to obtain and present the plaintiff's
position on the relevant allegations. It is held
crucial in this regard that the evidence of the ap-
plicants was dismissed as unreliable and that
both the district court and the Supreme Court
agreed that the applicants had acted maliciously.
The ECtHR does not see any reason to depart in
this respect from the well-reasoned findings of
the domestic courts, "which are, in any event, bet-
ter placed to assess the credibility and reliability
of the applicants' evidence". Given the lack of
good faith on the part of the applicants, the EC-
tHR does not find it necessary to examine wheth-
er there were any special grounds in the present
case for dispensing the applicants from their or-
dinary obligation to verify factual statements
that were defamatory of private individuals or,
indeed, public officials. The Court also considers
that it is not, in principle, incompatible with Ar-
ticle 10 to place on a defendant in libel proceed-
ings who wishes to rely on the defence of justifi-
cation the onus of proving to the civil standard
the truth of defamatory statements.
68. Meltex Ltd. and Mesrop Movsesyan v. Arme-
nia, 17 June 2008 (refusal to grant broadcasting
licence, independent media authority, guaran-
tees against arbitrariness)
The European Court of Human Rights held
unanimously that the refusal by the Armenian
authorities on seven several occasions to grant
the Meltex television company’s requests for
broadcasting licences, amounted to a violation of
Article 10 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights. The Court firstly recognised that the
independent broadcasting company Meltex was
to be considered as a ‘victim’ of an interference
in its freedom of expression by the Armenian
public authorities: by not recognising the appli-
cant company as the winner in the calls for ten-
ders it competed in, the NTRC (National Radio and
Television Commission) effectively refused the ap-
plicant company's bids for a broadcasting licence
and such refusals do indeed constitute interfer-
ences with the applicant company's freedom to
impart information and ideas. The Court also
made clear that States howsoever are permitted
to regulate by means of a licensing system the
way in which broadcasting is organised in
their territories, particularly in its technical
aspects and the grant of a licence may also be
made conditional on such matters as the na-
ture and objectives of a proposed station, its
potential audience at national, regional or lo-
cal level, the rights and needs of a specific au-
dience and the obligations deriving from in-
ternational legal instruments. The
compatibility of such interferences must be as-
sessed in the light of the requirements of para-
graph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention, which
means inter alia that the interference must be pre-
scribed by law in a way that guarantees protection
against arbitrary interferences by public authori-
ties. Indeed, the manner in which the licensing
criteria are applied in the licensing process must
provide sufficient guarantees against arbitrari-
ness, including the proper reasoning by the li-
censing authority of its decisions denying a
broadcasting licence (see also ECtHR 11 October
2007, Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bul-
garia).
The Court noted that the NTRC’s decisions had
been based on the Broadcasting Act (2000) and
other complementary legal acts, defining precise
criteria for the NTRC to make its choice, such as
the applicant company’s finances and technical
resources, its staff ’s experience and whether it
produced predominately in-house, Armenian
programmes. However, the Broadcasting Act
did not explicitly require at that time that the
licensing body should give reasons when ap-
plying those criteria. Therefore, the NTRC has
simply announced the winning company with-
out giving any reasons why that company had
met the requisite criteria and why Meltex had
not. There was no way of knowing on what basis
the NTRC had exercised its discretion to refuse a
licence. In this connection, the Court noted that
the guidelines adopted by the Committee of Min-
isters of the Council of Europe in the broadcast-
ing regulation domain call for open and trans-
parent application of the regulations governing
the licensing procedure and specifically recom-
mend that “all decisions taken ... by the regulato-
ry authorities ... be ... duly reasoned” (Rec.
(2000)23. See also Declaration of the Committee
of Ministers of 26 March 2008 on the independ-
ence and functions of regulatory authorities for
the broadcasting sector). The Court further took
note of the relevant conclusions reached by the
PACE in its Resolution of 27 January 2004 con-
cerning Armenia, where it stated that “the vague-
ness of the law in force had resulted in the NTRC
being given outright discretionary powers”. The
Court considered that a licensing procedure
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whereby the licensing authority gives no rea-
sons for its decisions does not provide ade-
quate protection against arbitrary interfer-
ences by a public authority with the
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
The Court therefore concluded that the interfer-
ence with Meltex’ freedom to impart information
and ideas, namely the seven denials of a broad-
casting licence, had not met the requirement of
lawfulness under the European Convention and
hence violated Article 10 of the Convention.
69.- Flux (n° 6) v. Moldova, 29 July 2008 (jour-
nalistic ethics and lack of factual basis for defam-
atory allegations)
After several successful complaints before the
Strasbourg Court of Human Rights related to
freedom of critical journalistic reporting, this
time the European Court by four votes to three
came to the conclusion that the conviction of the
Moldovan newspaper Flux was not to be consid-
ered as a violation of Article 10 of the Conven-
tion. The approach of the majority of the Court
regarding the (lack of) journalistic ethical quality
of the litigious articles published by Flux is strik-
ingly different than the one of the dissenting
judges.
In 2003 Flux published an article about a High
School in Chisinău, sharply criticising its princi-
pal. The article merely quoted an anonymous
letter it had received from a group of students'
parents. The letter alleged inter alia that the
school's principal used the school's funds for in-
appropriate purposes and that he had received
bribes of up to 500 US dollars for enrolling chil-
dren in the school. Flux refused short time later
to publish a reply from the school’s principal.
The text of the reply was then published in an-
other newspaper, the Jurnal de Chisinău. The reply
expressed that Flux had published an anonymous
letter without even visiting the school or con-
ducting any form of investigation, which showed
that its aim was purely sensationalism. It was said
that Flux had acted contrary to journalistic eth-
ics. Flux reacted to this reply by publishing a new
article, repeating some of the criticism pub-
lished in the first article and arguing that Flux
would certainly find persons willing to testify in
front of a court about the bribes. The principal
then brought civil proceedings for defamation
against Flux and the district court has found the
allegations of bribery to be untrue and defamato-
ry. The court stated that it had no reason to be-
lieve the three witnesses who had testified in
court that bribes were taken for the enrolment of
children in the school. The district court ex-
pressed the opinion that “to be able to declare pub-
licly that someone is accepting bribes, there is a need for
a criminal-court decision finding that person guilty of
bribery”. Since there was no such finding against
the principal, he should not have been accused of
bribery, according to the Moldovan district
court. The judgment of the district court was
confirmed by the Court of Appeal of Chisinâu
and the appeal with the Supreme Court of Justice
was dismissed. The newspaper was ordered to is-
sue an apology and to pay the principal 1,350
Moldovan Lei (MDL), the equivalent of 88 euros
(EUR) at the time.
Flux complained in Strasbourg under Article 10
of the Convention that the Moldovan courts' de-
cisions had entailed interference with its right to
freedom of expression that could not be regarded
as necessary in a democratic society. The Europe-
an Court in its judgment of 29 July 2008 attaches
major importance to the fact that despite the se-
riousness of the accusations of bribery the
journalist of Flux who wrote the article made
no attempt to contact the principal to ask his
opinion on the matter nor conducted any
form of investigation into the matters men-
tioned in the anonymous letter. Furthermore a
right of reply by the principal was refused by Flux,
although the language used in this reply was not
offensive. The new article in Flux as a reaction on
the reply published in Jurnal de Chisinău is regard-
ed by the Court as a form of reprisal for question-
ing the newspaper's professionalism. The Court
underlines however that it does not accept the
reasoning of the district court, namely that
the allegations of serious misconduct levelled
against the principal of the school should
have first been proved in criminal proceed-
ings. But the Court also makes clear that the
right to freedom of expression cannot be tak-
en to confer on newspapers an absolute right
to act in an irresponsible manner by charging
individuals with criminal acts in the absence
of a basis in fact at the material time and with-
out offering them the possibility to counter
the accusations. As there are limits to the right
to impart information to the public, a balance
must be struck between that right and the rights
of those injured, including the right to be pre-
sumed innocent of any criminal offence until
proven guilty. The Court also refers to the un-
professional behaviour of the newspaper and
the relatively modest award of damages which it
was required to pay in the context of a civil action
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and finds that the solution of the domestic
courts struck a fair balance between the compet-
ing interests involved. The Court comes to the
conclusion that the newspaper acted in flagrant
disregard of the duties of responsible journal-
ism and thus undermined the Convention rights
of others, while the interference with the exercise
of its right to freedom of expression was justified.
On these grounds, the Court held by four votes to
three that there has been no violation of Article
10 of the Convention. 
The three dissenting judges in their joint dissent-
ing opinion make clear however that they voted
without hesitation in favour of a finding of a vio-
lation of Article 10. They argue that in this case
the Court attached more value to professional be-
haviour of journalists than to the unveiling of
corruption. According to the dissenters the facts
show that the newspaper made enquiries about
persistent rumours, found three witnesses whose
integrity has not been put in doubt and who sup-
ported the allegations of corruption on oath. The
dissenters underline that the Court has penalised
the newspaper not for publishing untruths but
for so-called 'unprofessional behaviour'. The dis-
senting opinions express the fear that this judg-
ment of the Court has thrown the protection of
freedom of expression as far back as it possibly
could. And the dissenters continue: “Even if alarm-
ing facts are sufficiently borne out by evidence, in the
balancing exercise to establish proportionality, disre-
gard for professional norms is deemed by Strasbourg to
be more serious than the suppression of democratic de-
bate on public corruption. To put it differently, in the
Court's view the social need to fight poor journalism is
more pressing than that of fighting rich corruption. The
'chilling effect' of sanctions against press freedom dread-
ed by the Court's old case-law has materialised through
the Court's new one. (..) The serious inference of this
judgment is that freedom of expression also ceases to ex-
ist when it is punished for pushing forward for public de-
bate allegations of public criminality made by witnesses
certified as credible but in a manner considered unpro-
fessional. When subservience to professional good prac-
tice becomes more overriding than the search for truth it-
self it is a sad day for freedom of expression”.
70.- Leroy v. France, 2 October 2008 (incite-
ment to terrorism, cartoon condoning terrorism)
In 2002 the French cartoonist Denis Leroy (pseu-
donym Guezmer) was convicted because of a car-
toon published in a Basque weekly newspaper
Ekaitza. On 11 September 2001 the cartoonist
submitted to the magazine’s editorial team a
drawing representing the attack on the twin tow-
ers of the World Trade Centre, with a caption
which parodied the advertising slogan of a fa-
mous brand: “We have all dreamt of it... Hamas did it”
(Cfr. “Sony did it”). The drawing was published in
the magazine on 13 September 2001. In its next
issue, the magazine published extracts from let-
ters and emails received in reaction to the draw-
ing. It also published a reaction of the cartoonist
himself, in which he explained that when he
made the cartoon he was not taking into account
the human suffering (“la douleur humaine”)
caused by the attacks on WTC. He emphasized
that his aim was to illustrate the decline of the
US-symbols and he also underlined that cartoon-
ists illustrating actual events do not have much
time for distanced reflection: “Quand un dessina-
teur réagit sur l’actualité, il n’a pas toujours le bénéfice
du recul”. He also explained that his real intention
was governed by political and activist expression,
namely that of communicating his anti-Ameri-
canism trough a satirical image and illustrating
the decline of American imperialism.
The public prosecutor, on request of the regional
governor, brought proceedings against the car-
toonist and the newspaper’s publishing director
in application of Article 24, section 6 of the
French Press Act of 1881 which penalizes apart
from incitement to terrorism, also condoning
(glorifying) terrorism: ‘l’apologie du terrorisme’.
The publishing director was convicted for con-
doning terrorism, while Mr. Leroy was convicted
for complicity in condoning terrorism. Both were
ordered to pay a fine of EUR 1,500 each, to pub-
lish the judgment at their own expense in Ekaitza
and in two other newspapers and to pay the costs
of the proceedings. The Pau Court of Appeal held
that “by making a direct allusion to the massive
attacks on Manhattan, by attributing these at-
tacks to a well-known terrorist organisation and
by idealising this lethal project through the use
of the verb ‘to dream’, [thus] unequivocally prais-
ing an act of death, the cartoonist justifies the use
of terrorism, identifies himself through his use of
the first person plural (“We”) with this method of
destruction, which is presented as the culmina-
tion of a dream and, finally, indirectly encourages
the potential reader to evaluate positively the suc-
cessful commission of a criminal act.”
The cartoonist lodged an application with the
European Court of Human Rights, relying on Ar-
ticle 10 of the Convention guaranteeing freedom
of expression. Mr. Leroy complained that the
French courts had denied his real intention,
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which was governed by political and activist ex-
pression, namely that of communicating his anti-
Americanism through a satirical image. Such an
expression of an opinion, he argued, should be
protected under Article 10 of the Convention.
The Court considered that Mr. Leroy’s conviction
amounted indeed to an interference with the ex-
ercise of his right to freedom of expression. It re-
fused to apply Article 17 of the Convention
(prohibition of abuse of rights) in this case,
although the French government invoked this
article arguing that the cartoon by glorifying
terrorism was to be considered as an act aimed at
the destruction of the rights and freedoms guar-
anteed by the European Convention for the pro-
tection of Human Rights and that therefore the
cartoonist could not rely at all on the freedom of
expression guaranteed by this Convention. The
Court underlined that the message of the car-
toon, - the destruction of US imperialism -,
did not amount to a denial of the fundamen-
tal values of the Convention, in contrast e.g.
with incitement to racism, anti-Semitism,
Holocaust negationism and Islamophobia.
Hence in principle the cartoon was entitled to Ar-
ticle 10 protection. As the conviction of Mr. Leroy
was prescribed by French law and pursued several
legitimate aims, having regard to the sensitive na-
ture of the fight against terrorism, namely the
maintenance of public safely and the prevention
of disorder and crime, it especially remained to be
determined whether the interference by the
French authorities was “necessary in a democrat-
ic society”, according to Article 10 § 2 of the Con-
vention.
The Court noted at the outset that the tragic
events of 11 September 2001, which were at the
origin of the impugned expression, had given rise
to global chaos, and that the issues raised on that
occasion were subject to discussion as a matter
of public interest. The Court however consid-
ered that the drawing was not limited to criti-
cism of American imperialism, but supported
and glorified the latter’s violent destruction.
It based its finding on the caption which accom-
panied the drawing, and noted that the applicant
had expressed his moral support for those whom
he presumed to be the perpetrators of the attacks
of 11 September 2001. Through his choice of lan-
guage, the applicant commented approvingly on
the violence perpetrated against thousands of ci-
vilians and diminished the dignity of the victims,
as he submitted his drawing on the day of the at-
tacks and it was published on 13 September
2001, with no precautions on his part as to the
language used. In the Court’s opinion, this fac-
tor - the date of publication - was such as to in-
crease the cartoonist’s responsibility in his ac-
count of, and even support for, a tragic event,
whether considered from an artistic or a journal-
istic perspective. Also the impact of such a mes-
sage in a politically sensitive region, namely
the Basque Country, was not to be overlooked.
According to the Court the cartoon had pro-
voked a certain public reaction, capable of stir-
ring up violence and demonstrating a plausible
impact on public order in the region. All by all,
the Court considered that the grounds put for-
ward by the domestic courts in convicting Mr.
Leroy had been “relevant and sufficient”. Having
regard to the modest nature of the fine and the
context in which the impugned drawing had
been published, the Court found that the meas-
ure imposed on the cartoonist had not been dis-
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Ac-
cordingly, there had not been a violation of
Article 10 of the Convention. 
71.- Petrina v. Romania, 14 October 2008 (right
of privacy of public person, protection of reputa-
tion, lack of evidence of serious allegations)
In 1997, during a television programme that fo-
cussed on the problems on access to administra-
tive documents stored in the archives of the
former Romanian State security services, C.I., a
journalist with the satirical weekly Caţavencu, af-
firmed that a politician, Liviu Petrina, had been
active in the secret police Securitate. A few weeks
later, the same journalist published an article re-
iterating his allegations. Similar allegations of
collaboration by Petrina with the Securitate under
the regime of Ceauşescu were also published by
another journalist, M.D. Petrina lodged two sets
of criminal proceedings against the journalists
C.I. and M.D. for insult and defamation, but the
two journalists were acquitted. The Romanian
Courts referred to the European Court’s case law
regarding Article 10 of the Convention, guaran-
teeing the right of journalists to report on mat-
ters of public interest and to criticise politicians,
esp. as the allegations expressed by the journalists
had been general and indeterminate. A few years
later however, a certificate was issued by the na-
tional research council for the archives of the
State Security Department Securitate stating that
Petrina was not among the people listed as hav-
ing collaborated with the Securitate.
Following the acquittal of the two journalists by
the Romanian Courts, Petrina complaint in
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Strasbourg that his right to respect for his hon-
our and his good name and reputation had been
violated, relying on Article 8 of the Convention
(right to respect for private and family life). The
Court accepted that the acquittal by the jour-
nalists could raise an issue under the positive
obligations of the Romanian authorities to
help to respect Petrina’s privacy, including his
good name and reputation.
The European Court recognised that the discus-
sion on the collaboration of politicians with the
Securitate was a highly sensitive social and moral
issue in the Romanian historical context. Howev-
er, the Court found that in spite of the satirical
character of Caţavencu and in spite of the media-
tisation of the debate, the articles in question had
been bound to offend Petrina, as there was no ev-
idence at all that Petrina had ever belonged to the
Securitate. It also considered that the allegations
were very concrete and direct, and certainly not
“general and undetermined” and with no ironic
or humorous note whatsoever. The Court did
not believe that C.I. and M.D. could invoke in
this case the right of journalists to exaggerate
or provocate, as there was no factual basis at
all for the allegations. The journalists’ allega-
tions had overstepped the bounds of the accepta-
ble, accusing Petrina of having belonged to a
group that used repression and terror to serve the
regime of Nikolai Ceauşescu.
Accordingly, the European Court was not at all
convinced that the reasons given by the domestic
courts to protect the freedom of expression (Arti-
cle 10) were sufficient to take precedence over
Petrina’s reputation, as protected under Article 8
of the Convention. The Court found unanimous-
ly there has been a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention. Petrina was awarded 5,000 EUR in
respect of non-pecuniary, moral damages.
(See also Andreescu v. Romania, 8 June 2010)
72.- TV Vest SA and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v.
Norway, 11 December 2008 (ban on political ad-
vertising, freedom of political expression, margin
of appreciation)
On 11 December 2008 the European Court of
Human Rights delivered an important judgment
regarding a ban on political advertising on televi-
sion. The crucial question the Court had to de-
cide on was whether a blanket ban of political
advertisements on TV, as it was applied in Nor-
way, was to be considered 'necessary in a demo-
cratic society' from the scope of Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. In
principle, there is little scope under Article 10
of the Convention for restrictions on political
speech or on debate on questions of public in-
terest. However, a ban on paid political ad’s on
TV exists in many countries in Europe, such as in
the UK, Sweden, Denmark, France, Belgium and
Norway. According to art. 3, 1 (3) of the Norwe-
gian Broadcasting Act 1992 broadcasters “cannot
transmit advertisements for life philosophy or political
opinions through television”. The European Court
decided unanimously that an application of this
ban was in breach of Article 10 of the Conven-
tion.
The case goes back to the application by TV Vest
AS Ltd., a television company in Stavanger, on the
west coast of Norway, and the regional branch of
a Norwegian political party, the Rogaland Pen-
sioners Party (Rogaland Pensjonistparti). A fine was
imposed on TV Vest for broadcasting adverts for
the Pensioners Party, in breach of the Broadcast-
ing Act. This fine had been imposed by the State
Media Administration (Statens medieforvaltning)
and had been confirmed by the Supreme Court
(Høyesterett) which found, among other things,
that allowing political parties and interest
groups to advertise on television would give rich-
er parties and groups more scope for marketing
their opinions than their poorer counterparts.
The Supreme Court also maintained that the
Pensioners Party had many other means available
to put across its message to the public. The Pen-
sioners Party had argued that it was a small polit-
ical party, representing only 1,3 % of the elector-
ate, without powerful financial means or support
from strong financial groups, that it seldom got
any focus in editorial television broadcasting and
thus had a real need to establish direct communi-
cation between itself and the electorate. The Par-
ty was never identified either in national or local
opinion polls.
The European Court said to accept that the lack
of consensus in Europe regarding the necessi-
ty to ban political advertisements on TV,
spoke in favour of granting States greater discre-
tion than would normally be allowed in decisions
with regard to restrictions on political debate.
The Court however came to the conclusion that
the arguments in support of the prohibition in
Norway, such as the safeguarding of the quality
of political debate, guaranteeing pluralism,
maintaining the independence of broadcast-
ers from political parties and preventing that
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powerful financial groups would take advan-
tage having access to commercial political ad-
vertisements on TV, were relevant but not suffi-
cient reasons to justify the total prohibition of
this form of political advertising. The Court espe-
cially noted that the Pensioners Party did not
come under the category of parties or groups that
had been the primary targets of the prohibition.
In contrast to the major political parties, which
were given a large amount of attention in the ed-
ited television coverage, the Pensioners Party was
hardly mentioned in Norwegian television.
Therefore, paid advertising on television be-
came the only way for the Party to get its mes-
sage across to the public through that type of
medium.
The Court was not persuaded that the ban had
the desired effect and it explicitly rejected the
view expounded by the Norwegian Government
that there was no viable alternative to a blanket
ban. In the Court's view there was no reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the
legitimate aim pursued by the prohibition on
political advertising and the means deployed
to achieve that aim. The restriction which the
prohibition and the imposition of the fine en-
tailed on the applicants' exercise of their freedom
of expression cannot therefore be regarded as
having been necessary in a democratic society. Ac-
cordingly, there has been a violation of Article 10
of the Convention.
It is obvious that the judgment of 11 December
2008 will initiate or renew the debate in many
countries in Europe whether or not a ban on po-
litical advertising on television is still a legitimate
restriction on freedom of political speech and ac-
cess to paid political advertising.
73.- Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Swe-
den, 16 December 2008 (property rights, right to
receive information, antenna installation, hori-
zontal effect)
The applicants, Adnan Khurshid Mustafa, and
his wife, Weldan Tarzibachi, are Swedish nation-
als of Iraqi origin. Relying on Article 10 (freedom
to receive information) and Article 8 (right to re-
spect for private and family life), they complained
that they and their three children were forced to
move from their rented flat in Rinkeby (a suburb
of Stockholm) in June 2006. The reason of their
eviction was their refusal to remove a satellite
dish in their flat after the landlord had initiat-
ed proceedings against them, as he considered
the installation of a satellite antenna as a breach
of the tenancy agreement that stipulated that
‘outdoor antennae’ were not allowed to be set up
on the house. The proceedings continued, also
after Mr. Khursid Mustafa and Mrs. Tarzibachi
had dismantled the outdoor antenna and re-
placed it by an antenna installation in the kitch-
en on an iron stand from which an arm, on which
the satellite dish was mounted, extended through
a small open window. Finally a Swedish Court of
Appeal had found that the tenants had disre-
garded the tenancy agreement and that they
should dismantle the antenna, if not the ten-
ancy agreement should not be prolonged. The
Swedish Court was of the opinion that the ten-
ants were fully aware of the importance the land-
lord attached to the prohibition of the installa-
tion of satellite antennae and that although the
installation in the kitchen did not pose a real
safety threat, their interests to keep the antenna
installation relying on their right to receive televi-
sion programmes of their choice, could not be al-
lowed to override the weighty and reasonable in-
terest of the landlord that order and good
custom be upheld.
The circumstance that the conflict in this case
was a dispute between two private parties, was
not a reason for the European Court to declare
the application inadmissible. Indeed, the Court
found that the applicants’ eviction was the result
of a domestic court’s ruling, making the Swedish
State responsible within the meaning of Article 1
of the Convention for any resultant breach of Ar-
ticle 10 of the Convention. The European Court
observed that the satellite dish enabled the appli-
cants to receive television programmes in Arabic
and Farsi from their country of origin (Iraq).
That information included political and social
news and was of particular interest to them as an
immigrant family who wished to maintain con-
tact with the culture and language of their coun-
try of origin. There had not been any other means
at the relevant time for the applicants to have ac-
cess to such programmes and the dish could not
be placed anywhere else. Nor could news ob-
tained from foreign newspapers and radio pro-
grammes in any way be equated with information
available via television broadcasts. It had not
been shown either that the landlord installed
broadband or internet access or other alternative
means which gave the tenants in the building the
possibility to receive these television pro-
grammes. Furthermore, the landlord’s concerns
about safety had been examined by the domestic
courts who had found that the installation had
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been safe. And there were certainly no aesthetic
reasons to justify the removal of the antenna, as
the flat was located in one of the suburbs of
Stockholm, in a tenement house with no particu-
lar aesthetic aspirations. Moreover, the fact that
the applicants had effectively been evicted
from their home with their three children, a
flat in which they had lived for more than six
years, had been disproportionate to the aim pur-
sued, namely the landlord’s interest of upholding
order and good custom. The Court therefore con-
cluded that the interference with the applicants’
right to freedom of information had not been
“necessary in a democratic society”: Sweden had
failed in its positive obligation to protect the
right of the applicants to receive information.
The European Court held unanimously that
there had been a violation of Article 10, while it
further held unanimously that there was no need
to examine the complaint under Article 8. The
applicants were awarded EUR 6,500 in respect of
pecuniary damage, EUR 5,000 in respect of non-
pecuniary damage and EUR 10,000 for costs and
expenses.
74.- A. v. Norway, 9 April 2009 (right of privacy,
presumption of innocence, picture, crime report-
ing)
The European Court in this judgment clarified
the relation between the freedom of the press
(Art. 10) vis à vis the right of privacy (Art. 8) and
the presumption of innocence (Art. 6 § 2) in a
case of crime reporting in the media. The appli-
cant, A, is a Norwegian national with a criminal
past. The case concerns A’s complaint about the
unfavourable outcome of a defamation suit he
brought against the Fœdrelandsvennen newspaper
following their publication of two articles con-
cerning the preliminary investigation into a mur-
der case which implicated him. A had been ques-
tioned about the murder of two young women as
a possible witness but was released after 10 hours.
The police’s interest in A attracted considerable
media attention. Fœdrelandsvennen disclosed de-
tails of A’s criminal convictions and stated that
he had allegedly been seen by witnesses in the
very same area and at the same time as the girls
were killed. A television station, TV2, had also re-
ported in a news broadcast on the case and had
presented A as a murderer.
A brought defamation proceedings against the
Fœdrelandsvennen newspaper and TV2 as further
investigation and proceedings had made clear
that he had nothing to do with the murder case.
The Norwegian courts found in his favour and
awarded him compensation as regards the TV2
report. In respect of the newspaper articles, how-
ever, the domestic courts agreed that the publi-
cations had been defamatory in as much as
they were capable of giving the ordinary read-
er the impression that the applicant was re-
garded as the most probable perpetrator of
the murders, yet concluded that, on balance,
the newspaper had been right to publish the
articles, as it had acted in the interest of the
general public, which had the right to be in-
formed of the developments in the investiga-
tion and pursuit of the perpetrators. Relying
on Article 6 § 2 (presumption of innocence) and
Article 8 (right to respect for private and family
life), A complained in Strasbourg that the domes-
tic courts’ findings – in justification of the
Fœdrelandsvennen newspaper publishing defama-
tory material about him – had affected negatively
his right to be presumed innocent until proven
otherwise as well as his private life. 
The Court dismissed A’s allegations under Article
6 § 2 as it found that Article not applicable to the
matters complained of, given in particular that
no public authority had charged A with a
criminal offence and that the disputed news-
paper publications did not amount to an af-
firmation that he was guilty of the crimes in
question. The Court however is of the opinion
that the articles had been defamatory in nature
as they had given the impression that the ap-
plicant had been a prime suspect in the mur-
der case of the two girls. While it had been un-
disputed that the press had the right to deliver
information to the public, and the public had the
right to receive such information, these consider-
ations did not justify the defamatory allegations
against A and the consequent harm done to him.
Indeed, the applicant had been persecuted by
journalists in order to obtain his pictures and in-
terviews, and in particular during a period in his
life when he had been undergoing rehabilitation
and reintegration into society. As a result of the
journalistic reports, he had found himself unable
to continue his work, had to leave his home and
had been driven into social exclusion. In the
Court's view there was no reasonable relation-
ship of proportionality between the interests re-
lied on by the domestic courts in safeguarding
Fædrelandsvennen' freedom of expression and
those of the applicant in having his honour, rep-
utation and privacy protected. The Court is
therefore not satisfied that the national courts
struck a fair balance between the newspaper's
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freedom of expression under Article 10 and the
applicant's right to respect for his private life un-
der Article 8, notwithstanding the wide margin of
appreciation available to the national authori-
ties. The Court concluded that the publications
in question had gravely damaged A’s reputa-
tion and honour and had been especially
harmful to his moral and psychological integ-
rity and to his private life, in violation of Arti-
cle 8.
75.- Times Newspapers Ltd. (nos. 1 and 2) v. the
United Kingdom, 10 March 2009 (internet pub-
lication rule)
The European Court of Human Rights held
unanimously that there had been no violation of
Article 10 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, because the British courts’ finding
that the Times Newspapers Ltd had libelled G.L. by
the continued publication on its Internet site
of two articles had not represented a dispropor-
tionate restriction on the newspaper’s freedom of
expression.
The applicant in this case, Times Newspapers
Ltd, is the owner and publisher of The Times news-
paper, registered in England. It published two ar-
ticles, in September and October 1999 respective-
ly, reporting on a massive money-laundering
scheme carried out by an alleged Russian mafia
boss, G.L., whose name was set out in full in the
original article. Both articles were uploaded onto
The Times website on the same day as they were
published in the paper version of the newspaper.
In December 1999, G.L. brought proceedings
for libel against the Times Newspapers Ltd, its
editor and the two journalists who signed the
two articles printed in the newspaper. The de-
fendants did not dispute that the articles were
potentially defamatory but contended that the
allegations were of such a kind and seriousness
that they had a duty to publish the information
and the public had a corresponding right to
know. While the first libel action was underway,
the articles remained on The Times website, where
they were accessible to Internet users as part of
the newspaper’s archive of past issues. In Decem-
ber 2000, G.L. brought a second action for libel in
relation to the continuing Internet publication
of the articles. Following this the defendants add-
ed a notice to both articles in the Internet archive
announcing that they were subject to libel litiga-
tion and were not to be reproduced or relied on
without reference to Times Newspapers Legal
Department.
Times Newspapers subsequently argued that only
the first publication of an article posted on the
Internet should give rise to a cause of action in
defamation and not any subsequent downloads
by Internet readers. Accordingly, Times Newspa-
pers submitted, the second action had been com-
menced after the limitation period for bringing
libel proceedings had expired. The British
courts disagreed, holding that, in the context
of the Internet, the common law rule accord-
ing to which each publication of a defamatory
statement gave rise to a separate cause of ac-
tion meant that a new cause of action accrued
every time the defamatory material was ac-
cessed (“the Internet publication rule”).
Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, the
Times Newspapers Ltd complained before the
Strasbourg Court that the Internet publication
rule breached its freedom of expression by expos-
ing them to ceaseless liability for libel. The Euro-
pean Court noted that while Internet archives
were an important source for education and
historical research, the press had a duty to act
in accordance with the principles of responsi-
ble journalism, including by ensuring the ac-
curacy of historical information. Further, the
Court observed that limitation periods in libel
proceedings were intended to ensure that
those defending actions were able to defend
themselves effectively and that it was, in prin-
ciple, for contracting States to set appropriate
limitation periods. The Court considered it sig-
nificant that although libel proceedings had been
commenced in respect of the two articles in ques-
tion in December 1999, no qualification was add-
ed to the archived copies of the articles on the In-
ternet until December 2000. The Court noted
that the archive was managed by the applicant it-
self and that the domestic courts had not sug-
gested that the articles be removed from the ar-
chive altogether. Accordingly, the Court did not
consider that the requirement to publish an ap-
propriate qualification to the Internet version of
the articles constituted a disproportionate inter-
ference with the right to freedom of expression.
There was accordingly no violation of Article 10.
Having regard to this conclusion, the Court did
not consider it necessary to consider the broader
chilling effect allegedly created by the Internet
publication rule. It nonetheless observed that, in
the present case, the two libel actions related to
the same articles and both had been com-
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menced within 15 months of the initial publi-
cation of the articles. The Times Newspaper’s
ability to defend itself effectively was therefore
not hindered by the passage of time. Accordingly,
the problems linked to ceaseless liability did not
arise. However, the Court emphasised that while
individuals who are defamed must have a real op-
portunity to defend their reputations, libel pro-
ceedings brought against a newspaper after
too long a period might well give rise to a dis-
proportionate interference with the freedom
of the press under Article 10 of the Conven-
tion.
76.- TASZ v. Hungary, 14 April 2009 and Kene-
di v. Hungary, 26 May 2009 (access to official
documents held by public authorities)
The European Court of Human Rights in the
spring of 2009 delivered two important judg-
ments in which it recognised the right of access
to official documents. The Court made clear that
when public bodies hold information that is
needed for public debate, the refusal to provide
documents in this matter to those who are re-
questing for access, is a violation of the right
to freedom of expression and information
guaranteed under Article 10 of the Conven-
tion. The case of TASZ v. Hungary concerns a re-
quest by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union
(Társaság a Szabadságjogokért, TASZ) to Hungary’s
Constitutional Court to disclose a parliamentar-
ian's complaint questioning the legality of new
criminal legislation concerning drug-related of-
fences. The Constitutional Court refused to re-
lease the information. As the Court finds that the
applicant was involved in the legitimate gather-
ing of information on a matter of public impor-
tance and that the Constitutional Court's mo-
nopoly of information amounted to a form of
censorship, it concludes that the interference
with the applicant's rights was a violation of Ar-
ticle 10 of the Convention. 
The European Court’s judgment refers indeed to
the “censorial power of an information monopoly”
when public bodies refuse to release information
needed by the media or civil society organisations
to perform their “watchdog” function. The Court
refers to its consistent case law in which it has rec-
ognised that the public has a right to receive in-
formation of general interest and that the most
careful scrutiny on the part of the Court is
called for when the measures taken by the na-
tional authority are capable of discouraging
the participation of the press, one of society's
“watchdogs”, in the public debate on matters
of legitimate public concern, even measures
which merely make access to information
more cumbersome. It is also underlined that the
law cannot allow arbitrary restrictions which may
become a form of indirect censorship should the
authorities create obstacles to the gathering of
information, this by itself being an essential pre-
paratory step in journalism and inherently a
protected part of press freedom. The Court
emphasises once more that the function of the
press, including the creation of forums of public
debate, is not limited to the media or profession-
al journalists. Indeed, in the present case, the
preparation of the forum of public debate was
conducted by a non-governmental organisation.
The Court recognises civil society's important
contribution to the discussion of public affairs
and qualified the applicant association, which is
involved in human rights litigation, as a social
“watchdog”. The Court is of the opinion that in
these circumstances the applicant’s activities
warrant similar Convention protection to that af-
forded to the press. Furthermore, given that the
applicant's intention was to impart to the public
the information gathered from the constitution-
al complaint in question, and thereby to contrib-
ute to the public debate concerning legislation
on drug-related offences, its right to impart in-
formation was clearly impaired.
It is to be underlined that this European Court’s
judgment is obviously a new step in the direction
of the recognition by the Court of a right of ac-
cess to public documents under Article 10 of the
Convention, although the Court is still reluctant
to affirm this explicitly. The Court recalls that
“Article 10 does not (..) confer on the individual a right
of access to a register containing information on his per-
sonal position, nor does it embody an obligation on the
Government to impart such information to the individ-
ual” and that “it is difficult to derive from the Conven-
tion a general right of access to administrative data and
documents”. But the judgment also states that “the
Court has recently advanced towards a broader inter-
pretation of the notion of “freedom to receive informa-
tion” (..) and thereby towards the recognition of a right
of access to information”, referring to its decision in
the case of Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Repub-
lic, ECtHR 10 July 2006, Appl. 19101/03). The
Court notes that “the right to freedom to receive infor-
mation basically prohibits a Government from restrict-
ing a person from receiving information that others wish
or may be willing to impart to him”. In this case the
information sought by the applicant was ready
and available and did not require the collection
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of any data by the Government. Therefore, the
Court considers that the State had an obligation
not to impede the flow of information sought by
the applicant.
In another judgment with Hungary as the de-
fendant state the Court has confirmed the appli-
cability of the right to freedom of expression and
information guaranteed under Article 10 of the
Convention in matters of access to official doc-
uments. The case concerns the attempt of a his-
torian, Mr. János Kenedi, to have access to certain
documents deposited at the Ministry of the Inte-
rior regarding the functioning of the State Secu-
rity Services in Hungary in the 1960s. Mr Kene-
di’s, who earlier published several books on the
functioning of secret services in totalitarian re-
gimes, complained to the European Court about
the Hungarian authorities’ protracted reluctance
to enforce a court order granting him unrestrict-
ed access to these documents. For several years
Kenedi tried to get access to relevant informa-
tion from the Ministry, but to no avail. After
continued refusals, he obtained domestic court
orders to enforce access. The Ministry, however,
continued to obstruct, for example by requiring
that Kenedi would sign a declaration of confiden-
tiality. Kenedi refused, also because the Court or-
der had not mentioned confidentiality as a re-
quirement. At the moment of the proceedings in
Strasbourg Kenedi still did not have access to all
documents he requested for.
The European Court held unanimously that
there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to
a fair hearing) of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, on account of the excessively long
proceedings - over ten years - with which Mr Ken-
edi sought to gain and enforce his access to doc-
uments concerning the Hungarian secret servic-
es. Article 10 (freedom of expression and information)
was also violated in the Court's view. It reiterated
that "access to original documentary sources for legiti-
mate historical research was an essential element of the
exercise of the applicant's right to freedom of expres-
sion". The Court noted that Mr Kenedi had ob-
tained a court judgment granting him access to
the documents in question, following which the
domestic courts had repeatedly found in his fa-
vour in the ensuing enforcement proceedings.
The administrative authorities had persist-
ently resisted their obligation to comply with
the domestic judgment thus hindering Mr
Kenedi’s access to documents he had needed
to write his study. The Court concluded that the
authorities had acted arbitrarily and in defiance
of domestic law. Their obstructive actions had
also led to the finding of a violation of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention. The Court held, therefore
that the authorities had misused their powers by
delaying Mr Kenedi’s exercise of his right to free-
dom of expression, in violation of Article 10.
Finally, Article 13 ECHR (effective remedy) had
also been violated, since the Hungarian system
did not provide for an effective way of remedying
the violation of the freedom of expression in this
situation. The Court found that the procedure
available in Hungary at the time and designed
to remedy the violation of Mr Kenedi’s Article
10 rights had proven ineffective. There had,
therefore, been a violation of Article 13 read in
conjunction with Article 10 of the Convention.
Again the Court does not formulate a general
right of access to (official) documents. The Court
is however of the opinion that the access was nec-
essary for the applicant to accomplish the publi-
cation of a historical study. The Court noted that
the intended publication fell within the appli-
cant’s freedom of expression as guaranteed by Ar-
ticle 10 of the Convention.
77.- Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz VGT
(no. 2) v. Switzerland (Grand Chamber), 30
June 2009 (political advertising, commercial, ex-
ecution of judgment, new violation)
After two earlier judgments by the European
Court of Human Rights, the Grand Chamber of
the Court again held that there has been a viola-
tion of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the
European Convention on Human Rights on ac-
count of the continued prohibition to broadcast
on Swiss Television a commercial by an ani-
mals’ right association. In response to various
advertisements produced by the meat industry,
Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) made a
television commercial expressing criticism of bat-
tery pig-farming, including a scene showing a
noisy hall with pigs in small pens. The advertise-
ment concluded with the exhortation: “Eat less
meat, for the sake of your health, the animals and the en-
vironment!”. Permission to broadcast the com-
mercial was refused on 24 January 1994 by the
Commercial Television Company and at final in-
stance by the Federal Court, which dismissed an
administrative-law appeal by VgT on 20 August
1997. The commercial was considered as political
advertising, prohibited under the Swiss Broad-
casting Act. VgT lodged an application with the
European Court of Human Rights, which in a
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judgment of 28 June 2001 held that the Swiss au-
thorities’ refusal to broadcast the commercial in
question was in breach of freedom of expression.
According to the European Court, VgT had sim-
ply intended to participate in an on-going gener-
al debate on the protection and rearing of ani-
mals and the Swiss authorities had not
demonstrated in a relevant and sufficient man-
ner why the grounds generally advanced in sup-
port of the prohibition of political advertising
could also serve to justify the interference in the
particular circumstances of the case. The Court
found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention
and awarded VgT 20,000 Swiss francs (approxi-
mately EUR 13,300 at the time) for costs and ex-
penses.
On 1 December 2001, on the basis of the Europe-
an Court’s judgment, VgT applied to the Swiss
Federal Court for a review of the final domestic
judgment prohibiting the commercial from be-
ing broadcast. In a judgment of 29 April 2002 the
Federal Court however dismissed the application,
holding among other things that VgT had not
demonstrated that there was still any purpose in
broadcasting the commercial. As the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which is
responsible for supervising the execution of the
European Court’s judgments, had not been in-
formed that the Federal Court had dismissed
VgT’s application for a review, it adopted a final
resolution regarding the case in July 2003, refer-
ring to the possibility of applying to the Federal
Court to reopen the proceedings.
In July 2002 VgT lodged an application with the
European Court concerning the Federal Court’s
refusal of its request to reopen the proceedings
and the continued prohibition on broadcasting
its television commercial. In a Chamber judg-
ment of 4 October 2007 the European Court held
by five votes to two that there had been a viola-
tion of Article 10. On 31 March 2008 the panel of
the Grand Chamber accepted a request by the
Swiss Government for the case to be referred to
the Grand Chamber under Article 43 of the Con-
vention. The Swiss government argued inter alia
that the application by VgT was inadmissible, as
it concerned a subject – execution of the Court’s
judgments – which, by virtue of Article 46, fell
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commit-
tee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The
Grand Chamber of the European Court reiterat-
ed that the findings of the European Court of a
violation were essentially declaratory and that it
was the Committee of Ministers’ task to super-
vise execution. The Committee of Ministers’ role
in that sphere did not mean however that meas-
ures taken by a respondent State to remedy a vio-
lation found by the Court could not raise a new
issue and thus form the subject of a new applica-
tion. In the present case the Federal Court’s judg-
ment of 29 April 2002 refusing the reopen the
proceedings had been based on new grounds and
therefore constituted new information of which
the Committee of Ministers had not been in-
formed and which would escape all scrutiny un-
der the Convention if the Court were unable to
examine it. Accordingly, the Government’s pre-
liminary objection on that account was dis-
missed.
On the merits of the case the Court firstly noted
that the refusal of VgT’s application to reopen
the proceedings following the Court’s judgment
of 28 June 2001 constituted fresh interference
with the exercise of its rights under Article 10 § 1.
The Court emphasized that freedom of expres-
sion is one of the preconditions for a functioning
democracy and that genuine, effective exercise of
this freedom did not depend merely on the
State’s duty not to interfere, but could also re-
quire positive measures. In the present case Swit-
zerland had been under an obligation to execute
the Court’s judgment of 28 June 2001 in good
faith, abiding by both its conclusions and its spir-
it. In that connection the reopening of domestic
proceedings had admittedly been a significant
means of ensuring the full and proper execution
of the Court’s judgment, but could certainly not
be seen as an end in itself, especially since the Fed-
eral Court dismissed the application of VgT on
overly formalistic grounds. Moreover, by decid-
ing that VgT had not sufficiently shown that it
still had an interest in broadcasting the commer-
cial, the Federal Court did not offer an explana-
tion of how the public debate on battery farm-
ing had changed or become less topical since
1994, when the commercial was initially meant to
have been broadcast. Nor did it show that after
the European Court's judgment of 28 June 2001
the circumstances had changed to such an extent
as to cast doubt on the validity of the grounds on
which the Court had found a violation of
Article 10. The European Court also rejected
the argument that VgT had alternative op-
tions for broadcasting the commercial in is-
sue, for example via private and regional chan-
nels, since that would require third parties, or
VgT itself, to assume a responsibility that falls to
the national authorities alone: that of taking ap-
propriate action on a judgment of the European
Court. Finally the argument that the broadcast-
ing of the commercial might be seen as unpleas-
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ant, in particular by consumers or meat traders
and producers, cannot justify its continued pro-
hibition, as freedom of expression is also ap-
plicable to “information” or “ideas” that of-
fend, shock or disturb. Such are indeed the
demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmind-
edness without which there is no “democratic so-
ciety”. In the absence of any new grounds that
could justify continuing the prohibition from
the standpoint of Article 10, the Swiss authori-
ties had been under an obligation to authorise
the broadcasting of the commercial, without
taking the place of VgT in judging whether the
debate in question was still a matter of public
interest. The Court therefore held by 11 votes to
six that there had been a violation of Article 10.
Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Con-
vention the Court awarded VgT
4,000 euros (EUR) for costs and expenses.
78.- Féret v. Belgium, 16 July 2009 (political ex-
pression, incitement to racism and discrimina-
tion, proportionality of sanction)
In an interesting but highly controversial judg-
ment the European Court has focussed on the
limits of freedom of expression in a case of incite-
ment to hatred and discrimination (‘hate
speech’). The Court held by four votes to three
that there had been no violation of Article 10 of
the European Convention of Human Rights in
respect of the conviction of the chairman of the
Belgian political party “Front National”, Mr. Dan-
iel Féret. Mr. Féret was convicted by a Belgian
criminal court for publicly inciting to racism, ha-
tred and discrimination, following complaints
concerning leaflets distributed by the Front Na-
tional during election campaigns.
Between July 1999 and October 2001 the distri-
bution of leaflets and posters by the Front Nation-
al led to complaints by individuals and associa-
tions for incitement to hatred, discrimination
and violence, filed under the law of 30 July 1981
which penalised certain acts and expressions in-
spired by racism or xenophobia. Mr. Féret was the
editor in chief of the party’s publications and was
a member of the Belgian House of Representa-
tives at the relevant time. His parliamentary im-
munity however was waived on the request of the
Principal Public Prosecutor at the Brussels Court
of Appeal and in November 2002 criminal pro-
ceedings were brought against Féret as author
and editor-in-chief of the offending leaflets
which were also distributed on the Internet
through the website of Féret and Front National.
In 2006 the Brussels Court of Appeal found that
the offending conduct on the part of Mr. Féret
had not fallen within his parliamentary activity
and that the leaflets contained passages that rep-
resented a clear and deliberate incitement to dis-
crimination, segregation or hatred, for reasons of
race, colour or national or ethnic origin. The
court sentenced Mr. Féret to 250 hours of com-
munity service related to the integration of immi-
grants, together with a 10-month suspended
prison sentence. It declared him ineligible for ten
years and ordered him to pay one euro to each of
the civil parties.
Relying on Article 10 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, Féret applied to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights alleging that the
conviction for the content of his political party’s
leaflets represented an excessive restriction on his
right to freedom of expression. The European
Court however disagreed with this assumption,
as it considered the sanction by the Belgian au-
thorities sufficiently precisely prescribed by law
and necessary in a democratic society for the pro-
tection of public order and for the protection of
the reputation and the rights of others, meeting
the requirements of Article 10 § 2 of the Conven-
tion. The European Court observed that the leaf-
lets presented immigrant communities as crimi-
nally-minded and keen to exploit the benefits
they derived from living in Belgium, and that
they also sought to make fun of the immigrants
concerned, with the inevitable risk of arousing,
particularly among less knowledgeable mem-
bers of the public, feelings of distrust, rejec-
tion or even hatred towards foreigners. Al-
though the Court recognised that freedom of
expression is especially important for elected rep-
resentatives of the people, it reiterated that it
was crucial for politicians, when expressing
themselves in public, to avoid comments that
might foster intolerance. The impact of racist
and xenophobic discourse was magnified in an
electoral context, in which arguments naturally
became more forceful. To recommend solu-
tions to immigration-related problems by ad-
vocating racial discrimination was likely to
cause social tension and undermine trust in
democratic institutions. In the present case
there had been a compelling social need to
protect the rights of the immigrant communi-
ty, as the Belgian courts had done. With regard
to the penalty imposed on Mr. Féret, the Europe-
an Court noted that the Belgian authorities had
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preferred a 10-year period of ineligibility rather
than a penal sanction, in accordance with the
Court’s principle of restraint in criminal proceed-
ings. The Court thus found that there had been
no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The
Court furthermore found that Article 17 of the
Convention (abuse clause) was not applicable
in this case. 
Three dissenting judges disagreed with the find-
ings of the Court on the non-violation of Article
10, arguing that the leaflets were in essence part
of a sharp political debate in election time. The
dissenters expressed the opinion that the leaflets
did not incite to violence nor to any concrete
discriminatory act and that criminal convic-
tions in the domain of freedom of political de-
bate and hate speech should only be consid-
ered as necessary in a democratic society in
cases of direct incitement to violence or dis-
criminatory acts. They argue that the reference
to a potential impact of the leaflets in terms of in-
citement to discrimination or hatred does not
sufficiently justify an interference in the freedom
of expression. The dissenters also emphasize
the disproportionate character of the sanc-
tion in terms of 250 hours of community service
or a 10-month suspended prison sentence, to-
gether with the Belgian Court’s decision declar-
ing Mr. Féret’s ineligibility for a period of ten
years. The majority of the European Court how-
ever could not be persuaded by the dissenters’ ar-
guments: the four judges of the majority are of
the opinion that the Belgian authorities have act-
ed within the scope of the justified limitations re-
stricting freedom of political expression, as the li-
tigious leaflets contained, in the eyes if the Court,
incitement to hatred and discrimination based
on nationality or ethnic origin.
(See also Decision ECtHR, 20 April 2010, Jean-Marie
Le Pen v. France, Appl. no. 18788/09)
79.- Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, 16 July 2009 (po-
litical expression, horizontal effect, journalist,
disciplinary sanction, employee) 
In this case the European Court of Human
Rights found that the freedom of expression of a
journalist employed by the Polish public televi-
sion (Telewizja Polska Spółka Akcjna, TVP) has been
unduly restricted. The journalist, Helena Wojtas-
Kaleta, was disciplinary sanctioned after criticis-
ing in public the direction of TVP. This sanction
and the confirmation of it by the Polish courts is
considered a violation of Article 10 of the Euro-
pean Convention for Human Rights.
In 1999 the national newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza
published an article reporting that two classical
music programmes had been taken off the air by
TVP. The article quoted an opinion expressed by
Ms Wojtas-Kaleta in her capacity of the President
of the Polish Public Television Journalists’ Union in
which she criticised this decision by the TVP di-
rector. In addition, Ms Wojtas-Kaleta signed an
open letter in protest against the above measure.
The letter was addressed to the Board of TVP and
stated among other things that while classical
music was the heritage of the nation, its continu-
ous dissemination was seriously jeopardised by
diminishing its time on the air and polluting air
time instead with violence and pseudo-musical
kitsch. Ms Wojtas-Kaleta was reprimanded in
writing by her employer for failing to observe the
company’s regulations which required her to pro-
tect her employer’s good name. Following an un-
successful objection to the reprimand, she
brought a claim against TVP before the district
court requesting the withdrawal of the repri-
mand. However, first the district court and later
the Court of appeal dismissed her claim and
found that Ms Wojtas-Kaleta had behaved in an
unlawful manner and that this was a necessary
and sufficient prerequisite for the disciplinary
measure imposed on her. The courts found that
she had acted to the detriment of her employer by
breaching her obligation of loyalty and, con-
sequently, the employer had been entitled to
impose the reprimand on her.
Ms Wojtas-Kaleta complained in Strasbourg that
the Polish judicial authorities had violated her
freedom of expression by having referred merely
to her obligations as an employee while disre-
garding her right as a journalist to comment on
matters of public interest. The Court considered
that where a State had decided to create a public
broadcasting system, the domestic law and prac-
tice had to guarantee that the system provided a
pluralistic audiovisual service. The Polish public
television company had been entrusted with a
special mission including, among other things,
assisting the development of culture with em-
phasis on the national intellectual and artistic
achievements. In her comments and open letter
Ms Wojtas-Kaleta had essentially referred to
widely shared concerns of public interest
about the declining quality of music pro-
grammes on public television and her state-
ments had relied on a sufficient factual basis
and at the same time amounted to value judg-
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ments which were not susceptible of proof.
The Court further noted that Ms Wojtas-Kaleta
had to enjoy freedom of expression in all her ca-
pacities: as an employee of a public television, as
a journalist or as a trade-union leader. The Court
observes that the Polish courts took no note of
her argument that she had been acting in the
public interest. They limited their analysis to a
finding that her comments amounted to acting
to the employer's detriment. As a result, they did
not examine whether and how the subject matter
of Ms Wojtas-Kaleta’s comments and the context
in which they had been made could have affected
the permissible scope of her freedom of expres-
sion. Such an approach is not compatible with
the Convention standards. The Court notes that
the tone of the impugned statements was
measured and that she did not make any per-
sonal accusations against named members of
the management. Finally, the journalist’s
good faith had never been challenged neither
by her employer nor by the domestic authori-
ties involved in the proceedings. Being mindful
of the importance of the right to freedom of ex-
pression on matters of general interest, of Ms
Wojtas-Kaleta’s professional obligations and re-
sponsibilities as a journalist, and of the duties
and responsibilities of employees towards their
employers, and having weighed up the other dif-
ferent interests involved in the present case, the
Court comes to the conclusion that the interfer-
ence with her right to freedom of expression was
not “necessary in a democratic society”. Accord-
ingly, the Court held that there had been a viola-
tion of Article 10.
80.- Manole a.o. v. Moldova, 17 September 2009
(pluralism, independent media, public broad-
casting, political control, censorship) and 13 July
2010 (art. 41)
The European Court of Human Rights found
that from February 2001 until September 2006
the Moldovan authorities have violated freedom
of expression by not sufficiently guaranteeing
the independence of Teleradio-Moldova
(TRM), the state-owned broadcasting compa-
ny, which was transformed in 2002 into a pub-
lic broadcasting company. Nine journalist, edi-
tors and producers, who were all employed by
TRM in that period complained that public
broadcasting company was subjected to political
control by the government and the ruling politi-
cal party, with a lack of guarantees of pluralism in
its editorial policy and news and information
programmes. Relying on Article 10 of the Euro-
pean Convention they complained that as jour-
nalists at TRM they were subjected to a censor-
ship regime. They also claimed that the political
control over news and political information
worsened after February 2001 when the Commu-
nist Party won a large majority in Parliament :
senior TRM-management was replaced by those
who were loyal to the Government, only a trusted
group of journalists were used for reports of a po-
litical nature which where edited to present the
ruling party in a favourable light, other journal-
ists were reprimanded, interviews were cut and
programmes were taken off the air, while opposi-
tion parties were allowed only very limited oppor-
tunity to express their views. After a strike by
TRM-journalists protesting against the govern-
ment’s media policy and the control over TRM, a
large number of journalists was not retained in
post after a structural reorganisation of TRM.
The journalists claimed that they were dismissed
for political reasons and appealed in court. Un-
successfully however. In the meantime a number
of reports by international organisations and
non-governmental organisations such as the
Council of Europe, OSCE and the Moldovan
Centre for Independent Journalism (IJC) af-
firmed that domestic law in Moldova did not
sufficiently guarantee the independence of
editorial policy at TRM and that the political
parties of the opposition were not adequately
represented in the TRM news and informa-
tion programmes. The nine journalists lodged
an application with the European Court in
March 2002, arguing that their rights of freedom
of expression had been violated, due to the cen-
sorship regime imposed on them. They also
claimed that the Moldovan State had not dis-
charged its positive obligations under Article 10
because it had failed to enact legislation which
would offer safeguards against abusive interfer-
ences by public authorities.  
In its judgment the European Court takes as
starting point the fundamental truism that there
can be no democracy without pluralism. A sit-
uation whereby a powerful economic or political
group in a society is permitted to obtain a posi-
tion of dominance over the audiovisual media
and thereby exercise pressure on broadcasters
and eventually curtail their editorial freedom
undermines the fundamental role of freedom of
expression in a democratic society as enshrined in
Article 10 of the Convention, in particular where
it serves to impart information and ideas of gen-
eral interest, which the public is moreover enti-
tled to receive. The Court further observes that it
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is the State itself that must be the ultimate
guarantor of pluralism and that the State has a
duty to ensure that the public has access
through television and radio to impartial and
accurate information and a range of opinion
and comment, reflecting the diversity of polit-
ical outlook within the country. Journalists and
other professionals working in the audiovisual
media should not be prevented from imparting
this information and comment. Furthermore it
is indispensable for the proper functioning of
democracy that a (dominant) public broad-
caster transmits impartial, independent and
balanced news, information and comment
and in addition provides a forum for public
discussion in which a broad spectrum as pos-
sible of views and opinions can be expressed.
The Court concludes on the evidence and reports
by the Council of Europe, OSCE and IJC that
there was a significant bias towards reporting on
the activities of the President and the Govern-
ment in TRM’s television news and other pro-
gramming and that this policy by TRM has in-
deed affected the applicants as journalist, editors
and producers at TRM. The Court also finds that
domestic law from February 2001 onwards did
not provide any guarantee of political balance
in the composition of TRM’s senior manage-
ment and supervisory body nor any safeguard
against interference from the ruling political par-
ty in the bodies’ decision-making and function-
ing. Also after 2002 there was no safeguard to
prevent 14 of the 15 members of the Observers’
Council being appointees loyal to the ruling par-
ty, while this Council was precisely responsible
for appointing TRM’s senior management and
monitoring its programmes for accuracy and ob-
jectivity. In the light in particular of the virtual
monopoly enjoyed by TRM over audiovisual
broadcasting in Moldova, the Court finds that
the Moldovan State authorities failed to comply
with their positive obligation. The legislative
framework throughout the period in question
was flawed : it did not provide sufficient safe-
guards against the control of TRM's senior man-
agement, and thus its editorial policy, by the po-
litical organ of the Government. As Moldovan
law did not provide any mechanism or effec-
tive domestic remedy to challenge at national
level the administrative practice of censorship
and political control over TRM, the Court also
rejects the Moldovan Government’s objection
that the applicants had not exhausted the reme-
dies available to them under national law, as re-
quired by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. On
that basis, the Court finds a violation of Article
10 of the Convention
In its judgment of 13 July 2010 deciding on the
just satisfaction (art. 41 ECHR) the Court con-
firmed that the applicants, as journalists and ed-
itors employed by TRM, were directly affected by
the failure by the State to prevent censorship and
political influence at TRM. On the basis that the
applicants' complaints concerned principally the
deficiencies in the legislative framework and the
practice of censorship at TRM, the Court referred
to the fact that they were exempted from the re-
quirement to exhaust domestic remedies (see EC-
tHR’s judgment of 17 September 2010, §§ 112-
113). The Court did not, however, make any find-
ings as regards the applicants' individual em-
ployment histories. Nor did it examine whether
the applicants had exhausted domestic remedies
in respect of the various disciplinary, reinstate-
ment, dismissal and redundancy measures taken
against them. It follows that the Court does not
consider it appropriate in the present case to
award compensation in respect of any pecuniary
damage suffered by the applicants as a result of
any such measure. Moreover, although the Court
cannot in the present proceedings examine the
new legislation to determine whether the situa-
tion which gave rise to the violation has been
remedied, the Court notes with satisfaction
that measures have been taken by the national
authorities to reform the legal framework
with a view to bringing to an end the adminis-
trative practice that gave rise to the violation.
In all the circumstances, it awards each applicant
EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
81.- Financial Times Ltd. a.o. v. the United King-
dom, 15 December 2009 (journalist, protection
of sources, conduct of the source, reliable content
of leaked information)
In 2002 British courts decided in favour of a dis-
closure order in the case of Interbrew SA v. Finan-
cial Times and others. The case concerns the order
against four newspapers (FT, The Times, The
Guardian and The Independent) and the news
agency Reuters to deliver up their original copies
of a leaked and (apparently) partially forged doc-
ument about a contemplated takeover by Inter-
brew (now: Anheuser Busch InBev NV) of SAB
(South African Breweries). In a judgment of 15
December 2009 the European Court of Human
Rights (Fourth Section) has come to the conclu-
sion that this disclosure order was a violation of
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the right of freedom of expression and informa-
tion, which includes press freedom and the right
of protection of journalistic sources as protected
by Article 10 of the European Convention of Hu-
man Rights.
On the basis of a leaked report by a person X and
further investigations by journalists, the British
media in November and December 2001 had re-
ported that Interbrew (now: Anheuser Bush In-
Bev NV), had been plotting a bid for SAB. The
media coverage had a clear impact on the market
in shares of Interbrew and SAB, Interbrew’s share
price decreasing, while both the share price and
the volume of SAB’s shares traded had obviously
increased. On request of Interbrew, the High
Court on 19 December 2001 ordered delivery up
of the documents under the so-called Norwich
Pharmacal principle. This principle implies
that if a person through no fault of his own
becomes involved in the wrongdoing of others
so as to facilitate that wrongdoing, he comes
under a duty to assist the person who has been
wronged by giving him full information and
disclosing the identity of the wrongdoer. The
four newspapers and the news agency were or-
dered not to alter, deface or dispose or otherwise
deal with the documents received by person X
and to deliver up the documents to Interbrew’s
solicitor within 24 hours. The newspapers and
Reuters appealed, but the disclosure order was
confirmed by the Court of Appeal. In the London
Court’s judgment it is emphasized that what
matters critically, is the sources purpose in this
case: “It was on any way a maleficent one, calculated to
do harm whether for profit or for spite, and whether to
the investing public or Interbrew or both”. The public
interest in protecting the source of such a leak
was considered not sufficient to withstand the
countervailing public interest in letting Inter-
brew seek justice in the courts against the
source. It was also underlined that there is “no
public interest in the dissemination of falsehood”, as the
judge had found that the document, leaked by
person X to the media, was partially forged. The
Court of Appeal said: “While newspapers cannot be
asked to guarantee the veracity of everything they report,
they in turn have to accept that the public interest in pro-
tecting the identity of the source of what they have been
told is disinformation may not be great”. Hence the
Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals. On 9 July
2002 the House of Lords refused the newspapers’
leave to appeal, following which Interbrew re-
quired the newspapers and Reuters to comply
with the court order for delivery up of the docu-
ments. The newspapers and Reuters however
have kept on refusing to comply and applied to
the European Court of Human Rights, arguing
that their rights under Article 10 of the Conven-
tion had been violated.
The European Court of Human Rights has come
to the conclusion that the British judicial author-
ities in the Interbrew case have indeed neglected
the interests related to the protection of journal-
istic sources, by overemphasizing the interests
and arguments in favour of source disclosure.
The Court accepts that the disclosure order in the
Interbrew case was prescribed by law (Norwich
Pharmacal and Section 10 of the Contempt of Court
Act 1981) and was intended to protect the rights
of others and to prevent the disclosure of infor-
mation received in confidence, both of which are
legitimate aims. The Court however does not
consider the disclosure order necessary in a dem-
ocratic society. First the Court in general terms
reiterates that freedom of expression constitutes
one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society and that, in that context, the safeguards
guaranteed to the press are particularly impor-
tant : “protection of journalistic sources is one of the ba-
sic conditions for press freedom. Without such protec-
tion, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in
informing the public on matters of public interest. As a
result, the vital “public watchdog” role of the press may
be undermined and the ability of the press to provide ac-
curate and reliable reporting may be adversely affected”
(§ 59). Disclosure orders of journalistic sources
have a detrimental impact not only on the
source in question, whose identity may be re-
vealed, but also on the newspaper against which
the order is directed, whose reputation may be
negatively affected in the eyes of future poten-
tial sources by the disclosure, and on the mem-
bers of the public, who have an interest in receiv-
ing information imparted through anonymous
sources and who are also potential sources them-
selves. The Courts accepts that it may be true that
the public perception of the principle of non-dis-
closure of sources would suffer no real damage
where it was overridden in circumstances
where a source was clearly acting in bad faith
with a harmful purpose and disclosed inten-
tionally falsified information. The Court
makes clear however that domestic courts should
be slow to assume, in the absence of compelling
evidence, that these factors are present in any par-
ticular case. The Court emphasizes most impor-
tantly that “the conduct of the source can never be
decisive in determining whether a disclosure order
ought to be made but will merely operate as one, al-
beit important, factor to be taken into consideration
in carrying out the balancing exercise required un-
der Article 10 § 2” (§ 63).
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Applying these principles to the Interbrew case
the European Court of Human Rights comes to
the conclusion that the British Courts have giv-
en too much weight to the alleged bogus char-
acter of the leaked document and to the as-
sumption that the source had acted mala fide.
While the Court considers that there may be cir-
cumstances in which the source's harmful pur-
pose would in itself constitute a relevant and suf-
ficient reason to make a disclosure order, the
legal proceedings against the four newspapers
and Reuters did not allow X's purpose to be as-
certained with the necessary degree of certainty.
The Court therefore does not place signifi-
cant weight on X's alleged purpose in the
present case, but does clearly emphasize the
public interest in the protection of journalis-
tic sources. The Court accordingly, finds that
Interbrew's interests in eliminating, by pro-
ceedings against X, the threat of damage
through future dissemination of confidential
information and in obtaining damages for
past breaches of confidence were, even if con-
sidered cumulatively, insufficient to outweigh
the public interest in the protection of journal-
ists' sources. The judicial order to deliver up the
report at issue is considered a violation of Article
10 of the Convention. The European Court was
unanimous in its judgment, although it took the
Court seven years to come to its conclusion.
82.- Ürper (n° 2) v. Turkey, 26 January 2010
(prior restraint, newspapers, terrorist propagan-
da)
The European Court of Human Rights in this
case again found a series of gross violations of
press freedom in Turkey. The Court’s judgment
in the case of Ürper a.o. v. Turkey condemns firm-
ly the bans on future publication of four
newspapers.
At the material time the applicants were the own-
ers, executive directors, editors-in-chief, news di-
rectors and journalists of four daily newspapers
published in Turkey: Ülkede Özgür Gündem, Gün-
dem, Güncel and Gerçek Demokrasi. The publica-
tion of all four newspapers was suspended, pur-
suant to section 6(5) of the Prevention of
Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), by various Cham-
bers of the Istanbul Assize Court, between 16 No-
vember 2006 and 25 October 2007, for periods
ranging from 15 days to a month in respect of
various news reports and articles. The impugned
publications were deemed to be propaganda
in favour of a terrorist organisation, the PKK/
KONGRA-GEL, as well as the approval of
crimes committed by that organisation and its
members.
he applicants alleged under Article 10 of the Con-
vention that the suspension of the publication
and distribution of their newspapers constituted
an unjustified interference with their freedom of
expression. The European Court reiterates that
Article 10 of the Convention does not, in
terms, prohibit the imposition of prior re-
straints on publication. However, the dangers
inherent in prior restraints are such that they
call for the most careful scrutiny. This is espe-
cially so as far as the press is concerned, for
news is a perishable commodity and to delay
its publication, even for a short period, may well
deprive it of all its value and interest. As freedom
of the press was at stake, the national authorities
had only a limited margin of appreciation to de-
cide whether there was a “pressing social need” to
take the measures in question. The Court is of the
opinion that, different to earlier cases the Court
dealt with, the restraints under scrutiny were not
imposed on particular types of news reports or
articles, but on the future publication of entire
newspapers, whose content was unknown at the
time of the national court's decisions. In the
Court's view, both the content of section 6(5) of
Law no. 3713 and the judges' decisions in the in-
stant case stem from the hypothesis that the ap-
plicants, whose “guilt” was established without
trial in proceedings from which they were exclud-
ed, would re-commit the same kind of offences in
the future. The Court finds, therefore, the pre-
ventive effect of the suspension orders en-
tailed implicit sanctions on the applicants to
dissuade them from publishing similar arti-
cles or news reports in the future, and hinder
their professional activities. The Court consid-
ers that less draconian measures could have been
envisaged, such as the confiscation of particular
issues of the newspapers or restrictions on the
publication of specific articles. The Court con-
cludes that by suspending the publication and
distribution of the four newspapers involved,
albeit for short periods, the domestic courts
largely overstepped the narrow margin of ap-
preciation afforded to them and unjustifiably
restricted the essential role of the press as a pub-
lic watchdog in a democratic society. The practice
of banning the future publication of entire peri-
odicals on the basis of section 6(5) of
Law no. 3713 went beyond any notion of “neces-
sary” restraint in a democratic society and, in-
stead, amounted to censorship. There has accord-
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ingly been a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention.
83.- Laranjeira Marques Da Silva v. Portugal,
19 January 2010 (journalist, defamation of poli-
tician, presumption of innocence, breach of the
secret of the criminal investigation)
With this judgment the European Court of Hu-
man Rights has clarified how court and crime re-
porting can rely on the right to freedom of ex-
pression guaranteed by Article 10 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Con-
victing a journalist or a publisher for breach
of the secrecy of a criminal investigation or
because of defamation of a politician can only
be justified when it is necessary in a democrat-
ic society and under very strict conditions.
The applicant in this case, Mr Laranjeira Marques
da Silva, was the editor of the regional weekly
newspaper Notícias de Leiria at the relevant time.
In 2000 he wrote two articles about criminal
proceedings brought against J., a doctor and
politician well known in the region, for the
sexual assault of a patient. In an editor’s note he
called upon readers for further testimonies relat-
ing to other possible incidents of a similar nature
involving J. A short time later Mr Laranjeira
Marques da Silva was charged with a breach of
the segredo de justiça, a concept similar to confi-
dentiality of the judicial investigation, and with
the defamation of J. The Leiria District Court
held in 2004 that Mr Laranjeira Marques da Silva
had overstepped his responsibilities as a journal-
ist and had aroused widespread suspicion to-
wards J. by insinuating, without justification,
that the latter had committed similar acts involv-
ing other victims. He was found guilty of a breach
of the segredo de justiça and of defamation. He was
sentenced to a daily fine payable within 500 days
and ordered to pay EUR 5,000 in damages to J.
On appeal, the applicant challenged his convic-
tion concerning the segredo de justiça on the
ground that he had obtained access to the infor-
mation in question lawfully. On the defamation
issue he argued that he had simply exercised his
right to freedom of expression and that his arti-
cles had been based on facts and, moreover, were
related to a subject of general interest. The Court
of Appeal dismissed his appeal in 2005. A consti-
tutional appeal and later an extraordinary appeal
seeking harmonisation of the case law with the
Supreme Court were also unsuccessful. In Stras-
bourg, Mr. Laranjeira Marques da Silva com-
plained essentially that his conviction had in-
fringed his right to freedom of expression.
As to the applicant’s conviction for breach of the
segredo de justiça, the European Court was of the
opinion that the Portuguese authorities’ interfer-
ence with his freedom of expression had been
“prescribed by law” and that the interference in
question had pursued the legitimate aim of pro-
tecting the proper administration of justice and
the reputation of others. The Court however
pointed out that neither the concern to safe-
guard the investigation nor the concern to
protect the reputation of others can prevail
over the public’s interest in being informed of
certain criminal proceedings conducted
against politicians. It stressed that in this case
there was no evidence of any damaging effects on
the investigation, which had been concluded by
the time the first article was published. The pub-
lication of the articles did not breach the pre-
sumption of innocence, as the case of Mr. J. was in
hands of professional judges. Furthermore
there was nothing to indicate that the conviction
of Mr. Laranjeira Marques da Silva had contrib-
uted to the protection of the reputation of oth-
ers. The Court held unanimously that the inter-
ference in the right of freedom of expression of
the applicant was disproportionate and that
therefore there had been a violation of Article 10.
As to the conviction for defamation, the Court
accepted that the disputed articles dealt with
matters of general interest, as the public had the
right to be informed about investigations con-
cerning politicians, including investigations
which did not, at first sight, relate to their politi-
cal activities. Furthermore, the issues before the
courts could be discussed at any time in the press
and by the public. As to the nature of the two ar-
ticles, the Court pointed out that Mr Laranjeira
Marques da Silva had simply imparted informa-
tion concerning the criminal proceedings in
question, despite adopting a critical stance to-
wards the accused. The Court observed that it
was not its place or that of the national courts
to substitute their own views for those of the
press as to what techniques of reporting
should be adopted within the frame of judi-
cial reporting in the media (‘chronique judi-
ciaire’). As to the editor’s note, the Court takes
the view that, notwithstanding one sentence
which was more properly to be regarded as a val-
ue judgment, it had a sufficient factual basis in
the broader context of the media coverage of the
case. Hence, while the reasons given by the na-
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tional courts for Mr Laranjeira Marques da Sil-
va’s conviction had been relevant, the authorities
had not given sufficient reasons justifying the ne-
cessity of the interference with the applicant’s
right to freedom of expression. The Court further
noted that the penalties imposed on the appli-
cant had been excessive and liable to discourage
the exercise of media freedom. The Court there-
fore held, by five votes to two, that the conviction
for defamation did not correspond to a pressing
social need and that there has been a violation of
Article 10 of the Convention.
84.- Alfantakis v. Greece, 11 February 2010
(lawyer, defamation of public prosecutor)
In a case that received considerable media cover-
age in Greece, Georgis Alfantakis, a lawyer in Ath-
ens, was representing a popular Greek singer
(A.V.). The singer had accused his wife, S.P., of
fraud, forgery and use of forged documents caus-
ing losses to the State for nearly 150,000 euros.
On the recommendation of the public prosecu-
tor at the Athens Court of Appeal, D.M., it was
decided not to bring charges against S.P. While
appearing live as a guest on Greece’s main televi-
sion news programme ‘Sky’, Mr Alfantakis ex-
pressed his views on the criminal proceedings in
question, commenting in particular that he had
“laughed” on reading the public prosecutor’s re-
port, which he described as a “literary opinion
showing contempt for his client”. The public
prosecutor sued Mr Alfantakis for damages, ar-
guing that his comments had been insulting
and defamatory. Mr Alfantakis was ordered by
the Athen’s Court Appeal to pay damages for
about 12,000 euro.  Alfantakis applied to the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights, relying on Arti-
cle 10 of the European Convention of Human
Right. He complained about the civil judgment
against him which he considered an unaccepta-
ble interference in his freedom of expression.
According to the European Court it was not dis-
puted that the interference by the Greek authori-
ties with Alfantakis’s  right to freedom of expres-
sion had been “prescribed by law” – by both the
Civil Code and the Criminal Code – and had pur-
sued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputa-
tion of others. The Court took notice of the fact
that the offending comments were directed at a
member of the national legal service, creating the
risk of a negative impact both on his profes-
sional image and on public confidence in the
proper administration of justice. Lawyers are
entitled to comment in public on the administra-
tion of justice, but they are also expected to ob-
serve certain limits and rules of conduct. Howev-
er, instead of ascertaining the direct meaning of
the phrase uttered by the applicant, the Greek
courts had carried out their own interpretation
of what the phrase might have implied. In doing
so, the domestic courts have relied on particu-
larly subjective considerations, potentially as-
cribing to the applicant intentions he had not
in fact had.  Nor had the Greek courts made a
distinction between facts and value judgments,
instead simply determining the effect produced
by the phrases “when I read it, I laughed” and “lit-
erary opinion”. The Greek courts had also ig-
nored the extensive media coverage of the case, in
the context of which Mr Alfantakis’s appearance
on the television news was more indicative of an
intention to defend his client’s arguments in
public than of a desire to impugn the public pros-
ecutor’s character. Lastly, they had not taken ac-
count of the fact that the comments had been
broadcast live and could therefore not have been
rephrased. The Court came to the conclusion
that the civil judgment ordering Mr Alfantakis to
pay damages was not based on sufficient and per-
tinent arguments and therefore had not met a
“pressing social need”. Hence there had been a vi-
olation of Article 10. The Court awarded Mr Al-
fantakis 12,939 euros in respect of pecuniary
damage.
85.- Akdaş v. Turkey, 16 February 2010 (seizure
of novel by Apollinaire, conviction of publisher,
morals, obscenity, public access of work belong-
ing to European cultural heritage, margin of ap-
preciation)
The applicant in this case, Rahmi Akdaş is a pub-
lisher. In 1999 he published the Turkish transla-
tion of the erotic novel Les onze mille verges by
the French writer Guillaume Apollinaire (“The
Eleven Thousand Rods” – On Bir Bin Kırbaç in
Turkish), which contains graphic descriptions of
scenes of sexual intercourse, with various practic-
es such as sadomasochism or vampirism. Akdaş
was convicted under the Criminal Code for pub-
lishing obscene or immoral material liable to
arouse and exploit sexual desire among the pop-
ulation. The publisher argued that the book was
a work of fiction, using literary techniques such
as exaggeration or metaphor, and that the post-
face to the edition in question was written by spe-
cialists in literary analysis. He added that the
book did not contain any violent overtones and
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that the humorous and exaggerated nature of the
text was more likely to extinguish sexual desire.
The seizure and destruction of all copies of the
book was ordered and Akdaş was given a fine of
1,100 euros, a fine that may be converted into
days of imprisonment. In a final judgment of 11
March 2004 the Court of Cassation quashed the
part of the judgment concerning the order to de-
stroy copies of the book, in view of a 2003 legisla-
tive amendment. It upheld the remainder of the
judgment. Akdaş paid the fine in full
in November 2004.
Relying on Article 10, Akdaş complained about
this conviction and about the seizure of the book.
Before the European Court it was not disputed
that there had been an interference in Akdaş’
freedom of expression, that the interference had
been prescribed by law and that it had pursued a
legitimate aim, namely the protection of morals.
The Court however found the interference not
necessary in a democratic society.
The Court reiterated that those who promoted
artistic works also had “duties and responsibili-
ties”, the scope of which depended on the situa-
tion and the means used. As the requirements of
morals vary from time to time and from place to
place, even within the same State, the national
authorities are supposed to be in a better posi-
tion than the international judge to give an opin-
ion on the exact content of those requirements,
as well as on the “necessity” of a “restriction” in-
tended to satisfy them.
Nevertheless, the Court had regard in the present
case to the fact that more then a century had
elapsed since the book had first been published
in France (in 1907), to its publication in various
languages in a large number of countries and to
the recognition it had gained through publica-
tion in the prestigious “La Pléiade” series. Ac-
knowledgment of the cultural, historical and
religious particularities of the Council of Eu-
rope’s member States could not go so far as to
prevent public access in a particular language,
in this instance Turkish, to a work belonging
to the European literary heritage. Accordingly,
the application of the legislation in force at the
time of the events had not been intended to satis-
fy a pressing social need. In addition, the heavy
fine imposed and the seizure of copies of the
book had not been proportionate to the legit-
imate aim pursued and had thus not been nec-
essary in a democratic society, within the mean-
ing of Article 10. For that reason, the Court
found a violation of Akdaş’ right to freedom of
expression.
86.- Renaud v. France, 25 February 2010 (In-
ternet, defamation, insult, political debate)
In this case the European Court of Human
Rights delivered a judgment regarding defama-
tion and insult on the Internet. The Court is of
the opinion that the sharp and polemical criti-
cism of a public figure was part of an ongoing
emotional political debate and that the criminal
conviction for defamation and insult amounted
to a violation of the freedom of expression guar-
anteed by Article 10 of the European Convention
of Human Rights.
The applicant in this case is Patrice Renaud. He is
the founder of a local association (‘Comité de
défense du quartier sud de Sens’) opposing a big con-
struction project planned in the city of Sens. To
this end he also initiated a website, sharply crit-
icising the mayor of Sens, who was supporting
and promoting the building project. In 2005, and
on appeal in 2006, Renaud was convicted in crim-
inal proceedings for defaming and publicly in-
sulting a citizen discharging a public mandate,
on account of remarks concerning the mayor of
Sens. On the website he had inter alia compared
the urban policy of the mayor with the policy of
the former Romanian dictator Ceaucescu. Re-
naud was convicted for defamation because of
the specific allegation that the mayor was stimu-
lating and developing delinquency in the city cen-
tre in order to legitimise her policy of security
and public safety. Also the insinuation that the
mayor was illegally putting public money in her
own pockets was considered defamatory, while
the article on the website in which Renaud had
written that the mayor was cynical, schizophrenic
and that she was a liar, was considered as public
insult. Renaud was convicted to pay a fine of 500
euro and an award of civil damages to the mayor
of 1.000 euro.
Relying on Article 10 (freedom of expression), Re-
naud complained of his conviction before the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights. The European
Court recognises that the applicant, being the
chairman of the local association of residents op-
posing the construction project and being the
webmaster of the Internet site of the association,
took part in a public debate while criticizing
public officials and politicians. The Court ad-
mits that some of the wordings used by Renaud
were very polemical and virulent, but that on
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the other hand a mayor must tolerate such
kind of criticism as part of public debate which
is essential in a democracy. The Court is of the
opinion that when a debate relates to an emo-
tional subject such as the daily life of the local
residents and their housing facilities, politicians
must show a specific tolerance towards them
being criticised and that they have to accept ”les
débordements verbaux ou écrits”. The Court con-
siders the allegations of Renaud as value judg-
ments with a sufficient factual basis and comes
to the conclusion that the French judicial author-
ities have neglected the interest and importance
of freedom of expression in the matter at issue.
The conviction of Mr. Renaud as being an inter-
ference in his right to freedom of expression does
not meet any pressing social need, while at the
same time such a conviction risks to have a chill-
ing effect to take part in public debate of this
kind. Therefore the European Court finds a vio-
lation of Article 10 of the Convention.
87.- Flinkkilä a.o. v. Finland (and Jokitaipale
a.o. v. Finland; ltalehti and Karhuvaara v. Fin-
land; Soila v. Finland and Tuomela a.o. v. Fin-
land), 6 April 2010 (journalist, right of privacy,
public figure, matter of public concern, reporting
criminal case)
The European Court of Human Rights in five
judgments of 6 April 2010 has come to the con-
clusion that Finland has violated the right of
freedom of expression by giving too much pro-
tection to the right of private life under Article 8
of the Convention. In all five cases the Court was
of the opinion that the criminal conviction of
journalists and editors-in-chief and the order to
pay damages for disclosing the identity of a pub-
lic person’s partner amounted to an unaccepta-
ble interference in the freedom of expression
guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Con-
vention of Human Rights. 
All applicants in the five cases are journalists, ed-
itors-in-chief and publishing companies that
have been involved in the publishing in 1997 of a
total of nine articles in a newspaper and in several
magazines concerning A., the National Concilia-
tor at the time, and B., his female partner. The ar-
ticles focused primarily on the private and profes-
sional consequences for A. of an incident in 1996.
This incident had earlier been reported in the
Finnish print media and on television, including
the revelation of B’. identity. During that inci-
dent A. and B. entered A.’s home late at night
while A.’s wife was there and, as a result of an en-
suing fight, B. was sentenced to a fine and A. was
sentenced to a conditional term in prison. A few
weeks later a newspaper and several magazines
came back on the incident and the court case, this
time with more background information, inter-
views or comment. All articles mentioned B. by
name and gave separately other details about her,
including her age, name of her workplace, her
family relationships and her relationship with A.,
as well as her picture.
A. and B. requested that criminal investigation be
conducted in respect of the journalists for having
written about the incident and the surrounding
circumstances. The journalists and media com-
panies were sentenced by the domestic courts to
pay fines and damages for invasion of B.’s pri-
vate life. The Finnish courts found in particular
that since B. was not a public figure, the fact
alone that she happened to be the girl-friend of a
well-known person in society was not sufficient
to justify revealing her identity to the public. In
addition, the fact that her identity had been re-
vealed previously in the media did not justify the
subsequent invasions of her private life. The
courts further held that even the mere dissemina-
tion of information about the private life of
someone was sufficient to cause them damage or
suffering. Therefore, the absence of intent on the
part of the applicants to hurt B. was irrelevant.
The Finnish courts concluded that the journal-
ists and the media had had no right to reveal facts
relating to B.’s private life or to publish her pic-
ture as they did.
The journalists, editors-in-chief and media com-
panies complained under Article 10 of the Con-
vention about their convictions and the high
amounts they had to pay as damages to B. Having
examined in earlier case law the domestic Crimi-
nal Code provision in question, the European
Court found its contents quite clear: the spread-
ing of information, an insinuation or an image
depicting the private life of another person,
which was conducive to causing suffering, quali-
fied as invasion of privacy. In addition, even the
exception stipulated in that provision - concern-
ing persons in a public office or function, in pro-
fessional life, in a political activity or in another
comparable activity - was equally clearly worded.
Even though there had been no precise definition
of private life in the law, if the journalists or the
media had had any doubts about the remit of
that term, they should have either sought advice
about its content or refrained from disclosing
B.’s identity. In addition, the applicants were
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professional journalists and therefore could
not claim not to have known the boundaries
of the said provision since the Finnish Guide-
lines for Journalists and the practice of the
Council for Mass Media, albeit not binding,
provided even stricter rules than the Criminal
Code.
However, there had been no evidence, or indeed
any allegation, of factual misrepresentation or
bad faith on the part of the applicants. Nor had
there been any suggestion that they had obtained
information about B. by illicit means. While it
had been clear that B. had not been a public fig-
ure, she had been involved in an incident together
with a well-known public figure with whom she
had been in a close relationship. Therefore, B.
could have reasonably been taken to have entered
the public domain. In addition, the disclosure of
B.’s identity had been of clear public interest in
view of A.’s conduct and his ability to continue in
his post as a high-level public servant. The inci-
dent had been widely publicised in the media, in-
cluding in a programme broadcast nationwide
on prime-time television. Thus, the articles in
question had not disclosed B.’s identity in this
context for the first time. Moreover, even if the
events were presented in a somewhat colourful
manner to boost the sales of the magazines, this
is not in itself sufficient to justify a conviction for
breach of privacy. Finally, in view of the heavy fi-
nancial sanctions imposed on the applicants, the
European Court noted that B. had already been
paid a significant sum for damages by the televi-
sion company for having exposed her private life
to the general public. Similar damages had been
ordered to be paid to her also in respect of other
articles published in other magazines by the oth-
er applicants listed above, which all stemmed
from the same facts. Accordingly, in view of the
severe consequences for the applicants against
the circumstances of the cases, the European
Court held that there had been a violation of Ar-
ticle 10 of the Convention in all five cases. 
Under Article 41 of the Convention (just satisfac-
tion), it held that Finland was to pay the appli-
cants sums ranging between EUR 12,000 and
EUR 39,000 for pecuniary damage, between EUR
2,000 and EUR 5,000 for non-pecuniary damage,
and between EUR 3,000 and EUR 5,000 in re-
spect of costs and expenses.
(See also Ruokanen a.o. v. Finland, 6 April 2010)
88.- Fattulayev v. Azerbaijan, 22 April 2010
(journalist, criticizing government, imprison-
ment, order for immediate release from prison)
This case concerns the conviction and imprison-
ment of the founder and chief editor of the news-
papers Gündəlik Azərbaycan, published in the Az-
erbaijani language, and Realny Azerbaijan,
published in the Russian language. The newspa-
pers were widely known for often publishing
articles harshly criticising the Government
and various public officials. At the time of the
judgment Eynulla Fatullayev was serving a prison
sentence.
In 2007 two sets of criminal proceedings were
brought against the applicant in connection with
two articles published by him in Realny Azerbai-
jan. The first set of criminal proceedings related
to an article and to separate Internet postings.
Fatullayev had signed under the article, which he
had written after his visit earlier that year to the
area of Nagorno-Karabakh and other territories
controlled by the Armenian military forces, but
denied authorship of the Internet postings. The
statements made in the article and the postings
differed from the commonly accepted version of
the events at the town of Khojaly during the war
in Nagorno-Karabakh, according to which hun-
dreds of Azerbaijani civilians had been killed by
the Armenian armed forces with the reported as-
sistance of the Russian army. Four Khojaly survi-
vors and two former soldiers involved in the Kho-
jaly battle brought a criminal complaint against
Mr Fatullayev for defamation and for falsely ac-
cusing Azerbaijani soldiers of having committed
an especially grave crime. The courts upheld the
claims against the applicant, convicted him of
defamation and sentenced him to two years and
six months’ imprisonment. Fatullayev was arrest-
ed in the courtroom and taken to a detention
centre on the same day. In addition, in civil pro-
ceedings brought against Fatullayev before the
above mentioned first set of criminal proceed-
ings, he was ordered to publish a retraction of his
statements, an apology to the refugees from Kho-
jaly and the newspaper’s readers, and to pay ap-
proximately 8,500 euros personally, and another
8,500 euros on behalf of his newspaper, in respect
of non-pecuniary damage.
The second set of criminal proceedings related to
an article entitled “The Aliyevs Go to War”. In it
Fatullayev expressed the view that, in order for
President Ilham Aliyev to remain in power in Az-
erbaijan, the Azerbaijani Government had
sought the support of the United States (US) in
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exchange for Azerbaijan’s support for the US “ag-
gression” against Iran. He speculated about a
possible US-Iranian war in which Azerbaijan
could also become involved, and provided a long
and detailed list of strategic facilities in Azerbai-
jan that would be attacked by Iran if such a sce-
nario developed. He concluded that the Azerbai-
jani Government should have maintained
neutrality in its relations with both the US and
Iran, and that it hadn’t realised all the dangerous
consequences of the geopolitical game it was
playing, like for example the possible deaths of
Azeris in both Azerbaijan and Iran. The criminal
proceedings against the applicant in connection
with this article were brought by the Ministry of
National Security in May 2007. Before the appli-
cant was formally charged with the offence of
threat of terrorism, however, the Prosecutor Gen-
eral made a statement to the press, noting that
Mr Fatullayev’s article constituted a threat of ter-
rorism. He was found guilty as charged and con-
victed of threat of terrorism. The total sentence
imposed on him was eight years and six months’
imprisonment. In his defence speech at the trial
and in his appeals to the higher courts, Fatullayev
complained that his presumption of innocence
was breached as a result of the Prosecutor Gener-
al’s statement to the press; his complaints were
summarily rejected.
Relying on Articles 6 and 10, Fatullayev com-
plained of being criminally convicted for several
of his published statements and of not having
had a fair trial in that connection. Apart from
finding breaches of Art. 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial,
no impartial tribunal) and Art. 6 § 2 (breach of
presumption of innocence) of the Convention,
the Court found that the conviction of Fatullayev
in both criminal cases amounted to a manifest vi-
olation of Art. 10.
With regard to the first criminal conviction, the
Court acknowledged the very sensitive nature of
the issues discussed in the applicant’s article and
that the consequences of the events in Khojaly
were a source of deep national grief. Thus, it was
understandable that the statements made by
the applicant may have been considered
shocking or disturbing by the public. Howev-
er, the Court recalled that freedom of infor-
mation applied not only to information or
ideas that were favourably received, but also
to those that offended, shocked or disturbed.
In addition, it was an integral part of freedom of
expression to seek historical truth. Various mat-
ters related to the Khojaly events still appeared to
be open to ongoing debate among historians,
and as such should have been a matter of general
interest in modern Azerbaijani society. It was es-
sential in a democratic society that a debate on
the causes of acts of particular gravity which
might amount to war crimes or crimes against
humanity should have been able to take place
freely. Further, the press had a vital role of a “pub-
lic watchdog” in a democratic society. Although
it ought not to overstep certain bounds, in partic-
ular in respect of the reputation and rights of
others, the duty of the press was to impart infor-
mation and ideas on political issues and on other
matters of general interest.
The Court considered that the article had been
written in a generally descriptive style with the
aim of informing Azerbaijani readers of the reali-
ties of day-to-day life in the area in question. The
public had been entitled to receive information
about what was happening in the territories over
which their country had lost control in the after-
math of the war. The Fatullayev had attempted to
convey, in a seemingly unbiased manner, various
ideas and views of both sides of the conflict. The
article had not contained any statements directly
accusing the Azerbaijani military or specific indi-
viduals of committing the massacre and deliber-
ately killing their own civilians.
As regards the Internet postings, the Court ac-
cepted that the Fatullayev’s authorship of those
statements had been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. It further accepted that, by making those
statements without relying on any relevant factu-
al basis, he might have failed to comply with
the journalistic duty to provide accurate and
reliable information. Nevertheless, taking note
of the fact that he had been convicted of defama-
tion, the Court found that those postings had
not undermined the dignity of the Khojaly vic-
tims and survivors in general and, more specifi-
cally, the four private prosecutors who were Kho-
jaly refugees. It therefore held that the domestic
courts had not given “relevant and sufficient”
reasons for Fatullayev’s conviction of defama-
tion.
In addition, the Court held that the imposition
of a prison sentence for a press offence would be
compatible with journalists’ freedom of expres-
sion only in exceptional circumstances, notably
where other fundamental rights have been seri-
ously impaired, as, for example, in cases of hate
speech or incitement to violence. As this had not
been the case, there had been no justification for
the imposition of a prison sentence on Fatul-
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layev. There had accordingly been a violation of
Article 10 of the Convention in respect of the ap-
plicant’s first criminal conviction.
With regard to the second criminal conviction,
the Court reached a similar conclusion. The arti-
cle “The Aliyevs Go to War” had focused on Az-
erbaijan’s specific role in the dynamics of interna-
tional politics relating to US-Iranian relations. As
such, the publication had been part of a polit-
ical debate on a matter of general and public
concern. The applicant had criticised the Az-
erbaijani Government’s foreign and domestic po-
litical moves. At the same time, a number of other
media sources had also suggested during that pe-
riod that, in the event of a war, Azerbaijan was
likely to be involved and speculated about possi-
ble specific Azerbaijani targets for Iranian at-
tacks. The fact that Fatullayev had published a
list of specific possible targets, in itself, had nei-
ther increased nor decreased the chances of a hy-
pothetical Iranian attack. Fatullayev, as a journal-
ist and a private individual, had not been in a
position to influence or exercise any degree of
control over any of the hypothetical events dis-
cussed in the article. Neither had Fatullayev
voiced any approval of any such possible attacks,
or argued in favour of them. It had been his
task, as a journalist, to impart information
and ideas on the relevant political issues and
express opinions about possible future conse-
quences of specific decisions taken by the
Government. Thus, the domestic courts’ finding
that the applicant had threatened the State with
terrorist acts had been arbitrary. The Court con-
sidered that Fatullayev’s second criminal convic-
tion and the severity of the penalty imposed on
him had constituted a grossly disproportionate
restriction of his freedom of expression. Fur-
ther, the circumstances of the case had not justi-
fied the imposition of a prison sentence on him.
There had accordingly been a violation of Article
10 in respect Fatullayev’s second criminal convic-
tion.
In application of Article 46 of the Convention
(execution of the judgment), the Court noted
that Fatullayev was currently serving the sentence
for the press offences in respect of which it had
found Azerbaijan in violation of the Convention.
Having considered unacceptable that Fatullayev
still remained imprisoned and the urgent need to
put an end to the violations of Article 10, the
Court held, by six votes to one, that Azerbai-
jan had to release the applicant immediately.
Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Con-
vention, the Court held that Azerbaijan is to pay
Fatullayev 25,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-
pecuniary damage and EUR 2,822 in respect of
costs and expenses.
(ps: The Azerbaijani authorities have refused so far (July
2011) to execute the order. On the contrary, on 6 July
2010 a Baku district court has convicted Fatullayev of
drug possession and sentenced him to 30 months in pris-
on. It is believed that the charge of drug possession has
been based on fabricated evidence and was intended to
keep Fatullayev in prison despite the ECtHR’s ruling)
89.- Andreescu v. Romania, 8 June 2010 (human
rights activist, criticizing public official, defama-
tion, press conference, access to personal files held
by former secret police, public debate, high level of
damages)
The applicant, Gabriel Andreescu, is a well-
known human rights activist in Romania. He
was among those who campaigned for the intro-
duction of the law no. 187 that gives all Romani-
an citizens the right to inspect the personal files
held on them by the Securitate (the former Roma-
nian intelligence service and secret police). The
law also allows access to information of public in-
terest relating to persons in public office who
may have been Securitate agents or collaborators.
A public agency, the National Council for the
Study of the Archives of the Securitate (Consiliul
Na?ional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securit??ii, CN-
SAS) is responsible for the application of Law no.
187. In 2000 Andreescu submitted two requests
to the CNSAS: one to be allowed access to the in-
telligence file on him personally and the other
seeking to ascertain whether or not the members
of the Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church
had collaborated with the Securitate. He received
no reply and organised a press conference at
which he criticised A.P., a member of the CNSAS,
making reference to some of A.P.’s past activities.
Andreescu’s remarks on A.P.’s past received wide-
spread media coverage.
A.P. made a criminal complaint against An-
dreescu, accusing him of insult and defama-
tion. After being acquitted in first instance, An-
dreescu was ordered by the Bucharest County
Court to pay a criminal fine together with a high
amount in compensation for non-pecuniary
damage. The appeal Court ruled that he had not
succeeded in demonstrating the truth of his as-
sertion that A.P. had collaborated with the Se-
curitate. Furthermore a certificate issued by the
CNSAS had meanwhile stated that A.P. had not
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collaborated. 
Relying on the European Convention of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Andreescu
lodged an application with the European Court
of Human Rights about his conviction for defa-
mation. Although the interference by the Roma-
nian authorities with Andreescu’s freedom of ex-
pression had been prescribed by law and had
pursued the legitimate aim of protecting A.P.’s
reputation, the European Court considered that
the sanction was a violation of  Article 10 of the
Convention. The Court holds that Andreescu’s
speech had been made in the specific context of a
nationwide debate on a particularly sensitive top-
ic of general interest, namely the application of
the law concerning citizens’ access to the person-
al files kept on them by the Securitate, enacted
with the aim of unmasking that organisation’s
nature as a political police force, and on the sub-
ject of the ineffectiveness of the CNSAS’s activi-
ties. In that context, it had been legitimate to dis-
cuss whether the members of that organisation
satisfied the criteria required by law for holding
such a position. Andreescu’s remarks had been a
mix of value judgments and factual elements and
he had especially alerted public opinion to the
fact that he was voicing suspicions rather than
certainties. The Court noted that those suspi-
cions had been supported by references to A.P.’s
conduct and to undisputed facts such as his
membership of the transcendental meditation
movement and the modus operandi of Securitate
agents. According to the Court, Andreescu had
acted in good faith in an attempt to inform the
public. As his remarks had been made orally at a
press conference, he had no opportunity of re-
phrasing, refining or withdrawing them. The Eu-
ropean Court is also of the opinion that the Ro-
manian court by convicting Andreescu had paid
no attention to the context in which the re-
marks at the press conference had been made.
It had certainly not given “relevant and suffi-
cient” reasons for convicting Andreescu. The
Court noted furthermore that the high level of
damages – representing more than 15 times the
average salary in Romania at the relevant time –
could be considered as a measure apt to deter the
media and opinion leaders from fulfilling their
role of informing the public on matters of gener-
al interest. As the interference with Andreescu’s
freedom of expression had not been justified by
relevant and sufficient reasons, the Court held
that there had been a violation of Article 10. It
found also a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Conven-
tion (right to fair trial) due to Andreescu’s convic-
tion without evidence being taken from him in
person, especially after he had been acquitted at
first instance. The Court held that Romania was
to pay Andreescu 3,500 euros in respect of pecu-
niary damage, 5,000 euros for non-pecuniary
damage and 1,180 euros for costs and expenses.
90.- Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands,
14 September 2010  - Grand Chamber (protec-
tion of journalistic sources, adequate procedural
guarantees, including the guarantee of prior re-
view by a judge or an independent and impartial
body)
On 31 March 2009 the Chamber of the Third Sec-
tion of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) delivered a highly controversial judg-
ment in the case of Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the
Netherlands. With a 4/3 decision the Court was of
the opinion that the order to hand over a CD-
ROM with photographs in the possession of the
editor-in-chief of a weekly magazine claiming
protection of journalistic sources, did not
amount to a violation of Article 10 of the Europe-
an Convention of Human Rights. The finding
and motivation of the majority of the Chamber
was not only strongly disapproved in the world of
media and journalism, but was also firmly criti-
cised by the dissenting judges. Sanoma Uitgevers
B.V. requested for a referral to the Grand Cham-
ber, this request being supported by a large
number of media, NGOs advocating media free-
dom and professional organisations of journal-
ists. On 14 September 2009 the panel of five
Judges decided to refer the case to the Grand
Chamber in application of Article 43 of the Con-
vention. By referring the case to the Grand Cham-
ber the panel accepted that the case raised a seri-
ous question affecting the interpretation or
application of Article 10 of the Convention and/
or concerned a serious issue of general impor-
tance.
On 14 September 2010, the 17 judges of the
Grand Chamber unanimously reached the con-
clusion that the order to hand over the CD-
ROM to the public prosecutor was a violation
of the journalists’ rights to protect their
sources. It noted that orders to disclose sources
potentially had a detrimental impact, not only on
the source, whose identity might be revealed, but
also on the newspaper or publication against
which the order was directed, whose reputation
might be negatively affected in the eyes of future
potential sources by the disclosure, and on mem-
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bers of the public, who had an interest in receiv-
ing information imparted through anonymous
sources. Protection of journalists’ sources is in-
deed to be considered “a cornerstone of free-
dom of the press, without which sources may be
deterred from assisting the press in informing
the public on matters of public interest. As a re-
sult the vital public-watchdog role of the press
may be undermined and the ability of the
press to provide accurate and reliable infor-
mation to the public may be adversely affect-
ed”. In essence the Grand Chamber is of the opin-
ion that the right to protect journalistic sources
should be safeguarded by sufficient procedural
guarantees, including the guarantee of prior re-
view by a judge or an independent and impartial
decision-making body, before the police or the
public prosecutor have access to information ca-
pable of revealing such sources. Although the
public prosecutor, like any public official, is
bound by requirements of basic integrity, in
terms of procedure he or she is a “party” defend-
ing interests potentially incompatible with jour-
nalistic source protection and can hardly be seen
as objective and impartial so as to make the nec-
essary assessment of the various competing inter-
ests. As in the case of Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. The
Netherlands an ex ante guarantee of a review by a
judge or independent and impartial body was not
existing, the Grand Chamber is of the opinion
that “the quality of the law was deficient in
that there was no procedure attended by ade-
quate legal safeguards for the applicant com-
pany in order to enable an independent as-
sessment as to whether the interest of the
criminal investigation overrode the public in-
terest in the protection of journalistic sourc-
es”. Emphasizing the importance of the protec-
tion of journalistic sources for press freedom in a
democratic society the Grand Chamber of the
European Court finds a violation of Article 10 of
the Convention. The judgment implies that
member states of the Convention shall build in
procedural safeguards in their national law in
terms of a judicial review or other impartial as-
sessment by an independent body based on clear
criteria of subsidiarity and proportionality and
prior to any disclosure of information capable of
revealing the identity or the origin of journalists’
sources.
91.- Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v.
Spain, 21 September 2010 (protection of hon-
our, allegations of unlawfull dealings, obligation
to verify factual statements, journalist acted in
good faith using effective possibilities to verify in-
formation, no violation of the right to protection
of reputation) 
In this case the European Court was again called
upon to consider the positive obligations of a
member state to adequately protect the right to
protection of reputation under Article 8 of the
European Convention. The applicant was the
wife of a senior judge recently deceased. In an ar-
ticle published in the El Mundo newspaper it was
alleged that the judge’s wife had engaged in un-
lawful dealings with a company involving
“dirty money”. The article was based on ac-
counting data received from an anonymous
source. El Mundo had verified the accounting
data with the company accountant who had re-
cently been dismissed. The accountant had veri-
fied the information, and confirmed that the fi-
nancial transactions at issue had been unlawful.
The article also contained a statement from the
applicant denying any links with the company
at issue.
The applicant and her husband brought proceed-
ings against the newspaper for the protection of
their honour. At first instance, a district court
held that there had been an unlawful interference
with the right of the applicant to respect for her
honour, as the journalist had based the article
solely of the statements of the accountant, with-
out additional verification. On appeal, however,
the Constitutional Court quashed the judgment,
finding that the journalist has used all effective
possibilities to verify the information by contact-
ing the accountant. Moreover, the fact the ac-
countant had been dismissed from the company
did not affect his reliability, while the Constitu-
tional Court also had regard to the applicant’s
statement of denial being published in the arti-
cle. 
Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco made an ap-
plication to European Court claiming that the
Constitutional Court had failed in its positive
obligations under Article 8 to adequately protect
their right to protection of their honour and rep-
utation. The Court firstly noted the article con-
cerned a subject of general interest. However, giv-
en that the article also targeted a specific
individual, the journalist had a duty to ensure
that the article had a sufficient factual basis.
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Moreover, the Court emphasised that the article
had the characteristics of a neutral report, includ-
ing the verification of the accounting data by the
accountant, and a denial by the person accused. 
The Court considered that the essential question
before it was whether the journalist had acted in
good faith and whether he had fulfilled the ob-
ligation – incumbent on all journalists – to
verify factual statements. The Court noted that
by verifying the authenticity of the accounting
data with the former accountant of the company,
the journalist had used all effective possibilities
to verify his information. Furthermore, contact-
ing the applicant to give her the opportunity to
comment on the information at issue showed the
journalist had fulfilled his obligation of dili-
gence. Finally, the Court agreed with the Consti-
tutional Court that the lawfulness of the means
by which the information had been obtained
was not relevant in determining whether there
had been a breach of the right to respect for pri-
vate life. The European Court concluded that the
journalist’s right to impart information in the
general interest had to be given more weight
than the applicant’s right to protection of her
reputation and honour, and consequently, there
had been no violation of Article 8.
92.- Saaristo a.o. v. Finland, 12 October 2010
(private life of political communications manag-
er, right to protection of privacy)  
Saaristo a.o. v. Finland concerns the scope of pro-
tection of the private life of a presidential candi-
date’s communications manager. The applicants
in this case were a journalist and the editor, re-
spectively, of the newspaper Ilta-Sanomat. They
were convicted of a violation of privacy following
the publication of an article entitled “The ex-hus-
band of [R.U.] and the person in charge of communica-
tions for the Aho campaign have found each other.” The
article described how the former husband of a
political reporter had found a new partner, O.T.,
a communications manager of one of the presi-
dential candidates, Esko Aho. The article con-
tained details of O.T.’s private life, including her
family life, and photographs. 
Following a request from the communications
manager, the public prosecutor brought criminal
charges against the applicants for invasion of
privacy. The applicants were convicted for hav-
ing violated O.T.’s private life, and were fined 270
EUR and 650 EUR respectively. The applicants
were also jointly ordered to pay damages and
costs to O.T. amounting to nearly 11,500 EUR.
The Supreme Court upheld the convictions on
appeal, holding that despite O.T.’s position as a
communications manager in a presidential cam-
paign, publication of private details was not jus-
tified by the public’s need to receive information
nor by the important interests of society.  
The journalist and the editor of Ilta-Sanomat
made an application to the European Court
claiming a violation of their right to freedom of
expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Euro-
pean Convention. The Court noted at the outset
that the facts in the article were presented in
an objective manner, and there had been no
misrepresentation or bad faith. Moreover, the
information had not been obtained by subter-
fuge or other illicit means.
The Court considered that O.T. was not a com-
pletely private person, making reference to her
function in the presidential election campaign,
and her role in publicly promoting the goals and
objectives of the candidate. Moreover, the Court
stated that, when taking up her duties as a com-
munications officer for one of the two presiden-
tial candidates, she must have understood that
her own person would also attract public interest
and that the scope of her private life would be-
come somewhat more limited. Therefore, the
European Court held that the Finnish Supreme
Court had not given sufficient weight to the po-
litical nature of O.T.’s functions and to the public
context in which she discharged those functions. 
The European Court held that the article had a
direct bearing on matters of public interest, as
her recruitment to the presidential campaign had
attracted political interest, and was an important
matter of public interest in the form of political
background information. 
The Court also noted the severity of the sanc-
tions, describing them as substantial, given that
the maximum compensation to victims of seri-
ous violence was 17,000 EUR. The Court con-
cluded that the reasons relied on by the do-
mestic courts, although relevant, were not
sufficient to show that the interference was
necessary in a democratic society. Moreover,
the sanctions imposed on the applicants were
disproportionate. There had therefore been a vi-
olation of Article 10.
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93.- Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland,
13 January 2011 (ban on posters, regulation of
the public space, reference to controversial web-
site)
The applicant association in this case was the
Swiss branch of the Raëlien Movement, an inter-
national association whose members believe life
on earth was created by extraterrestrials. The as-
sociation sought to conduct a poster campaign,
with the poster featuring extraterrestrials, flying
saucers, and the words “The message from the extra-
terrestrials. At last, science is replacing religion”. The
poster also included the website address of the
Raëlien Movement. The police authorities re-
fused permission for the poster campaign on the
grounds of public order and morals, and the do-
mestic courts upheld this decision. 
The Swiss courts held that although the poster it-
self was not objectionable, because the Raëlien
website address was included, the Courts had to
have regard to documents published on the Raël-
ien website. The courts held the poster campaign
should be banned on the basis that: (a) there was
a link on the website to a company which provid-
ed cloning services; (b) the association advocated
“geniocracy” i.e. government by those with a
higher intelligence; and (c) there had been allega-
tions of sexual offences against some members of
the association.
Mouvement Raëlien made an application to the
European Court arguing that the ban on its post-
er campaign was a violation of its right to free-
dom of expression under Article 10 of the Euro-
pean Convention. At the outset, the Court stated
that the case raised a novel issue which had not
been considered before by the Court, namely
whether the domestic authorities should allow
the applicant association disseminate its ideas
through an advertising campaign by making the
“domaine public” available.  
Importantly, the Court held that the domestic
authorities have a wide margin of apprecia-
tion where the authorities wish to regulate the
use of the “domaine public”, accepting the Gov-
ernment’s argument that allowing the poster
campaign might have implied that it endorsed or
tolerated the views of the Raëlien Movement.
Moreover, the Court reasoned that because the
Raëlien website was available to minors, the im-
pact of the posters was greater, and thus there
was an increased state-interest in banning the
poster campaign. The Court then approved the
carefully reasoned (“soigneusement motivé”) deci-
sions of the Swiss courts. The reasons given were
relevant and sufficient, with the Court finding it
legitimate to have regard to the Raëlien Move-
ment’s views on cloning, and finding the allega-
tions of sexual offences disturbing. 
Finally, the Court held that the ban was a propor-
tionate limitation on the right to freedom of ex-
pression, as the ban was limited to the “domaine
public”, and other means of communicating
were available to the Raëlien Movement. Thus,
the Court concluded that there had been no vio-
lation of Article 10. Judges Rozakis and Vaji? dis-
sented, noting that the association was a com-
pletely lawful association, and that Article 10 not
only protects the substance of ideas and informa-
tion expressed, but also the form in which they
are conveyed.
94.- Hoffer and Annen v. Germany, 13 January
2011 (anti-abortion pamphlets, criminal defa-
mation, reference to Holocaust)
The applicants in Hoffer and Annen v. Germany
were anti-abortion activists who had distributed
pamphlets outside a medical clinic in Nurem-
burg. The pamphlets urged support for ending
abortion in Germany; however, the pamphlets
also named a doctor at the clinic, Dr. F., describ-
ing him as a “Killing specialist for unborn children”.
Moreover, the back page of the pamphlet includ-
ed the following statements: “Stop the murder of
children in their mother’s womb on the premises of the
Northern medical centre. Then: Holocaust, Today: Ba-
bycaust”.  
The doctor and the medical centre initiated crim-
inal proceedings for defamation against the ap-
plicants. At first instance, the German courts
held that the actions should fail, as the pamphlet
was not intended to debase Dr. F., and only con-
veyed the applicants’ general rejection of abor-
tion. However, on appeal, it was held that the
statement “Then: Holocaust /Today: Babycaust” had
to be interpreted as putting the lawful activity of
Dr. F. on a level with the Holocaust, qualifying
him as a mass murderer, which amounted to
abusive insult. The applicants were convicted of
defamation and fined. 
Hoffer and Annen made an application to the Eu-
ropean Court, arguing that the convictions vio-
lated their right to freedom of expression under
Article 10 of the Convention. The Court applied
its usual preliminary assessment under Article
10: it considered that the convictions amounted
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to an “interference” with the applicants’ freedom
of expression, were “prescribed by law”, and pur-
sued the legitimate aim of protecting “the repu-
tation or rights of others”. The main question
was therefore whether the convictions were “nec-
essary in a democratic society”. 
Firstly, the Court noted that it must have regard
to the special degree of protection afforded to ex-
pression of opinions which were made in the
course of a debate on matters of public interest.
Secondly, the Court noted that the German
courts had accepted that all other statements in
the pamphlet, except the Holocaust reference,
were acceptable elements of public debate. 
However, the Court noted that in the view of the
domestic courts the applicants, by comparing the
performance of abortions to the mass-homicide
committed during the Holocaust, had violated
the physician’s personality rights in a particu-
larly serious way and could have been expected to
express their criticism in a way which was less det-
rimental to the physician’s honour. 
The Court further noted that the Federal Consti-
tutional Court acknowledged the fact that the
applicants’ statement could be interpreted in dif-
ferent ways, but considered that all possible inter-
pretations amounted to a very serious violation
of the physician’s personality rights. 
Finally, the Court observed that the impact an
expression of opinion has on another per-
son’s personality rights cannot be detached
from the historical and social context in
which the statement was made. The reference
to the Holocaust must also be seen in the spe-
cific context of the German past. 
Thus, the Court concluded that there had been
no violation of Article 10 as the convictions had
represented an adequate balance between the
applicants’ right to freedom of expression and
the doctor’s personality rights.
95.- MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, 18
January 2011 (celebrity, right of privacy, photo-
graphs, disproportionate legal costs)
Ten years ago, in 2001, the newspaper Daily Mir-
ror published an article on its front page under
the title: “Naomi: I am a drug addict”. Another
longer article inside the newspaper elaborated
top model Naomi Campbell’s addition treat-
ment, illustrated by photos taken secretly near
the Narcotics Anonymous centre she was attend-
ing at the time. As the newspaper continued to
publish more articles and new pictures related to
her attendance at Narcotics Anonymous, Ms.
Campbell sued the Daily Mirror for breach of her
privacy. At a final stage of the domestic proceed-
ing the House of Lords found that the publica-
tion of the articles could have been justified as a
matter of public interest, as Ms Campbell had
previously publicly denied drug use. The publica-
tion of the pictures however, in combination with
the articles, had breached her right to respect of
her private life. Apart from a modest award of
damages of 3500 GBP, the Daily Mirror’s pub-
lishing group, MGN, was ordered to pay Ms.
Campbell’s legal costs, included the ‘success fees’
agreed between Ms Campbell and her lawyers.
The total amount of the legal costs was more
than 1 million GBP. 
Relying on Article 10 of the European Conven-
tion MGN lodged an application with the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, complaining that
the finding by the British courts that it had
breached Ms Campbells’ privacy disregarded the
right to freedom of expression. MGN also argued
that the requirement to pay disproportionately
high success fees amounted to a violation of Ar-
ticle 10 of the Convention. This part of the appli-
cation was supported by third parties, such as
Open Society Justice Initiative, Media Legal De-
fence Initiative, Index on Censorship and Human
Rights Watch, all referring to the chilling effect of
high costs in defamation proceedings in the
United Kingdom on NGOs and small media or-
ganizations.
Regarding the breach of privacy the European
Court recalled that a balance had to be made
between the public interest in the publication
of the articles and the photographs of Ms
Campbell and the need to protect her private
life. By six votes to one the Court holds that there
has been no breach of Article 10. The Court
agrees with the reasoning by the House of Lords
that the public interest had been already satisfied
by the publication of the articles, while adding
the photographs was a disproportionate
breach of her right to respect for her private
life. Therefore, the interference in the right to
freedom of expression of the Daily Mirror was
considered necessary in a democratic society in
order to protect the rights of Ms Campbell.
However, the order to pay the success fees, up
to more than 365.000 GBP, is considered by the
European Court as a disproportionate interfer-
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ence in the right to freedom of expression, hav-
ing regard to the legitimate aims sought to be
achieved. The Court took into consideration that
the system of recoverable success fees may have a
chilling effect on media reporting and hence on
freedom of expression. Unanimously the Court
found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
96.- Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, 15 March 2011
(insult of the King, value judgments, provocative
language, public debate of general interest, dis-
proportionate prison sentence)
In a judgment of 15 March 2011 the European
Court of Human Rights has decided that an
elected representative’s conviction for causing se-
rious insult to the King of Spain was contrary to
his freedom of expression. The case concerns the
criminal conviction of a politician of a Basque
separatist political party, Mr. Otegi Mondragon,
following comments made to the press during an
official visit by the King to the province of Biscay.
During that press conference Mondragon, as
spokesperson for his parliamentary group
Sozialista Abertzaleak, stated in reply to a journal-
ist’s question that the visit of the King to Biscay
was a “genuine political disgrace”. He said that
the King, as “supreme head of the Guardia Civil
(police) and of the Spanish armed forces” was the
person in command of those who had tortured
those detained in a recent police operation
against a local newspaper, amongst them the
main editors of the newspaper. Mondragon
called the King “he who protects torture and im-
poses his monarchical regime on our people
through torture and violence”. Mondragon was
convicted for insult of the King on the basis of Ar-
ticle 490 § 3 of the Criminal Code and sentenced
to one year’s imprisonment and suspension of
his right to vote during that period. The Spanish
courts qualified the impugned comments as val-
ue judgments and not statements of fact, affect-
ing the inner core of the King’s dignity, independ-
ently of the context in which they had been made.
The European Court of Human Rights however
considers this criminal conviction a violation of
Article 10 of the Convention, as Mondragon’s
remarks had not been a gratuitous personal
attack against the King, nor did they concern
his private life or his personal honour. While
the Court acknowledged that Mondragon’s lan-
guage could be considered provocative, it reit-
erated that it was permitted, in the context of
a public debate of general interest, to have re-
course to a degree of exaggeration, or even
provocation. The King being the symbol of the
State cannot be shielded from legitimate criti-
cism, as this would amount to an over-protec-
tion of Heads of State in a monarchical sys-
tem. The phrases used by Mondragon, addressed
at journalists during a press conference, con-
cerned solely the King’s institutional responsi-
bility as Head and symbol of the State apparatus
and of the forces which, according to Mondrag-
on, had tortured the editors of a local newspaper.
The comments in issue had been made in a public
and political context that was outside the “essen-
tial core of individual dignity” of the King. The
European Court further emphasized the particu-
lar severity of the sentence. While the determina-
tion of sentences was in principle a matter for the
national courts, a prison sentence imposed for
an offence committed in the area of political dis-
cussion was compatible with freedom of expres-
sion only in extreme cases, such as hate speech or
incitement to violence. Nothing in Mondragon’s
case justified such a sentence, which inevitably
had a dissuasive effect. Thus, even supposing
that the reasons relied upon by the Spanish
courts could be accepted as relevant, they were
not sufficient to demonstrate that the interfer-
ence complained of had been “necessary in a
democratic society”. The applicant’s conviction
and sentence were thus disproportionate to the
aim pursued, in violation of Article 10 of the
Convention.
97.- RTBF v. Belgium, 29 March 2011 (interim
injunction, constitutional guarantees against
prior restraint, legal basis)
In a judgment of 29 March 2011 the European
Court found a violation of Article 10 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights in the case
Radio-télévision belge de la communauté française (RT-
BF) v. Belgium. The case concerned an interim in-
junction ordered by an urgent-applications judge
against the RTBF, preventing the broadcasting of
a programme on medical errors and patients’
rights. The injunction prohibited the broadcast-
ing of the programme until a final court decision
in a dispute between a doctor named in the pro-
gramme and the RTBF. As the injunction consti-
tuted an interference by the Belgian judicial au-
thorities in the RTBF’s freedom of expression,
the European Court in the first place had to as-
certain whether that interference had a legal ba-
sis. Whilst Article 10 does not prohibit prior
restraints on broadcasting, such restraints re-
quire however a particularly strict legal frame-
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work, ensuring both tight control over the
scope of bans and effective judicial review to
prevent any abuse. As news is a perishable com-
modity, delaying its publication, even for a short
period, might deprive it of all its interest. In ascer-
taining whether the interference at issue had a le-
gal basis, the Court observed that the Belgian
Constitution authorized the punishment of of-
fences committed in the exercise of freedom of
expression only once they had been committed
and not before. Although some provisions of the
Belgian Judicial Code permitted in general terms
the intervention of the urgent-applications
judge, there was discrepancy in the case law as to
the possibility of preventive intervention in free-
dom of expression by that judge. The Belgian
law was thus not clear and there was no con-
sistent jurisprudence that could have enabled
the RTBF to foresee, to a reasonable degree,
the possible consequences of the broadcasting
of the programme in question. The European
Court observed that, without precise and specific
regulation of preventive restrictions on freedom
of expression, many individuals fearing attacks
against them in television programmes – an-
nounced in advance – might apply to the urgent-
applications judge, who would choose different
solutions to their cases and this would not be
conducive to preserving the essence of the free-
dom of imparting information. Although the Eu-
ropean Court considers a different treatment
between audiovisual and print media not un-
acceptable as such, e.g. regarding the licensing
of radio and television, it did not agree with the
Belgian Court of Cassation refusing to apply the
essential constitutional safeguard against cen-
sorship on broadcasting. According to the Euro-
pean Court it appeared artificial and there was
no clear legal framework to allow prior re-
straint as a form of censorship on broadcast-
ing. The Court is of the opinion that the legisla-
tive framework, together with the case-law of the
Belgian courts did not fulfill the condition of
foreseeability required by the Convention. As the
interference complained of could not be consid-
ered to be prescribed by law, there had thus been
a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The
judgment contains an important message to all
member states of the European Convention on
Human Rights: prior restraints require a particu-
larly strict, precise and specific legal framework,
ensuring both tight control over the scope of
bans both in print media and in audiovisual me-
dia services, combined with an effective judicial
review to prevent any abuse by the domestic au-
thorities.
98.- Kasabova v. Bulgaria, 19 April 2011, and
Bozkhov v. Bulgaria, 19 April 2011 (dispropor-
tionate sanctions on journalists, criminal defa-
mation)
The applicants in these two cases were journalists
who had been convicted for defamation follow-
ing articles in two different newspapers criticis-
ing four experts of the Burgas inspectorate of the
Ministry of Education. The four experts were
members of a school admissions commission set
up to compile lists of students to be accepted into
elite secondary schools on special medical
grounds. The articles contained allegations that
the experts in question had admitted children
based on false diagnoses in return for bribes.
The four experts brought criminal defamation
proceedings against the journalists. The Bulgari-
an courts held that the applicants had failed to
sufficiently research their articles and had thus
failed to act as responsible journalists. The Bul-
garian courts convicted the journalists of crimi-
nal defamation, and ordered the applicants to
pay 3,800 EUR and 3,200 EUR respectively in
fines, damages and costs. 
The journalists made an application to the Euro-
pean Court claiming their conviction and pun-
ishment was a violation of Article 10. The Court
first reiterated that it must apply the most care-
ful scrutiny when the sanctions imposed by a na-
tional authority are capable of discouraging the
participation of the press in debates over mat-
ters of legitimate public concern. 
The Court added that if the national courts apply
an overly rigorous approach to the assessment
of journalists’ professional conduct, the latter
could be unduly deterred from discharging
their function of keeping the public informed.
The courts must therefore take into account the
likely impact of their rulings not only on the in-
dividual cases before them but also on the me-
dia in general. 
The Court noted that the domestic courts had
ruled that the only way of corroborating the alle-
gation that someone had committed a criminal
offence was to show that he stood convicted of it.
The Court stated that it could not condone such
a position, holding that while a final conviction
in principle amounts to incontrovertible proof
that a person has committed an offence, to cir-
cumscribe in such a way the manner of proving
allegations of criminal conduct in the context of
a libel case is plainly unreasonable. Allegations
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in the press cannot be put on an equal footing
with those made in criminal proceedings.  
However, the Court held that the domestic
courts’ findings that the journalists had failed to
sufficiently research their articles was not mani-
festly unreasonable. In relation to the criminal
law sanctions imposed on Kasabova and Bozhk-
ov, the Court stated that nature and severity of
the penalties must not be such as to dissuade
the press from taking part in the discussion of
matters of legitimate public concern.  
The Court noted that the fines, together with the
damages and costs awarded, were equivalent to
almost seventy minimum monthly salaries of
the first applicant, and represented fifty-seven
minimum monthly salaries of the second appli-
cant.  Moreover, the Court cited evidence that
demonstrated the applicants struggled for years
to pay the sums in full. Consequently, the Court
concluded that the sanctions imposed by the do-
mestic courts were disproportionate, and there
had therefore been a violation of Article 10.
99.- Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel
v. Ukraine, 5 May 2011 (liability for journalistic
material obtained from Internet)
The applicants were the editorial board and edi-
tor-in-chief of a local newspaper Pravoe Delo. The
newspaper published an anonymous letter al-
legedly written by an employee of the Ukrainian
Security Service, which contained allegations
that senior officials of a regional department of
the Security Service has been engaging in unlaw-
ful and corrupt activities, with links to organised
crime. The letter stated that G.T., the head of
Ukrainian Thai Boxing Federation, was “a mem-
ber of the organised criminal group  ... is a coor-
dinator and sponsor of murders”. The letter had
been downloaded from a news website, and
was published by the newspaper without modifi-
cation, and included a reference to the source of
the letter.
Subsequently, G.T. instituted defamation pro-
ceedings against the newspaper. The domestic
courts held that the publication of the letter had
been defamatory. It was also held that there were
no grounds to release the applicants from civil li-
ability under the Press Act, as the internet site
from which the letter had been downloaded was
not printed media registered pursuant to the
Press Act. The applicants were ordered to pub-
lish a retraction and an apology, and awarded
damages of 15,000 UAH (33,060 EUR). 
The newspaper’s board and the editor-in-chief
made an application to the European Court
claiming a violation of their right to freedom of
expression guaranteed under Article 10 of the Eu-
ropean Convention. It was claimed that there was
an absence of legal grounds under Ukrainian law
for an obligation to apologise in defamation cas-
es, and also that there was no provision in
Ukrainian law for allowing newspapers to pub-
lish material from the Internet without incurring
liability. 
With regard to the first issue, the European
Court held that the domestic court’s order to
publish an apology was not specifically provided
for in domestic law, and therefore violated Article
10, as it was not “prescribed by law”. In relation
to the second issue, the Court first noted that the
published letter was a verbatim reproduction of
material from a publicly accessible internet news-
paper. The Court also noted that the article refer-
enced the source of the material, and contained
comments from editorial board formally distanc-
ing themselves from the content.   
The Court referred to the Ukrainian Press Act
which grants journalists immunity from civil lia-
bility for verbatim reproduction of material pub-
lished in the press, and the Court noted that this
legislation generally conforms to the principle
of journalists’ freedom to disseminate state-
ments made by others.
However, the Court also observed that there ex-
isted no domestic regulation on State regulation
of internet media, and the Press Act did not con-
tain any provision on the status of internet-based
media or the use of information from the inter-
net. The Court held that having regard to the role
Internet plays in the context of professional me-
dia activities and its importance for the exercise
of the right to freedom of expression generally,
the absence of a sufficient legal framework at the
domestic level allowing journalists to use infor-
mation obtained from the Internet without
fear of incurring sanctions seriously hinders
the exercise of the vital function of the press as
a “public watchdog”. 
The Court concluded that given the lack of ade-
quate safeguards in the domestic law for journal-
ists using information obtained from the Inter-
net, the applicants could not have foreseen to
the an appropriate degree the consequences the
publication of the letter entailed. Therefore,
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there had been a violation of Article 10 as the in-
terference had not been “prescribed by law”.
100.- Mosley v. the United Kingdom, 10 May
2011 (public person, right of privacy, photo-
graphs and video, no prior notification)
In this case the European Court of Human
Rights decided that the right of privacy guaran-
teed by Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights does not require media to give
prior notice of intended publications to those
who feature in them. The applicant in this case
is Max Rufus Mosley, the former president of the
International Automobile Federation. In 2008,
the Sunday newspaper News of the World pub-
lished on its front page an article entitled “F1
boss has sick Nazi orgy with 5 hookers”, while
several pages inside the newspaper were also de-
voted to the story which included still photo-
graphs taken from video footage secretly record-
ed by one of the participants in the sexual
activities. An edited extract of the video, in addi-
tion to still images, were also published on the
newspaper’s website and reproduced elsewhere
on the internet. Mr Mosley brought legal pro-
ceedings against the newspaper claiming damag-
es for breach of confidence and invasion of priva-
cy. In addition, he sought an injunction to
restrain the News of the World from making availa-
ble on its website the edited video footage. The
High Court refused to grant the injunction be-
cause the material was no longer private as it had
been published extensively in print and on the In-
ternet. In subsequent privacy proceedings the
High Court found that there was no public inter-
est and thus no justification for publishing the li-
tigious article and accompanying images, which
had breached Mr Mosley’s right to privacy. The
court ruled that News of the World had to pay to
Mr. Mosley 60,000 GBP in damages.
Relying on Article 8 (right to private life) and Ar-
ticle 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the Euro-
pean Convention, Mr Mosley complained that,
despite the monetary compensation awarded to
him by the courts, he remained a victim of
breach of his privacy as a result of the absence
of a legal duty on the News of the World to notify
him in advance of their intention to publish
material concerning him, thus giving him the
opportunity to ask a court for an interim in-
junction and prevent the material’s publica-
tion. The European Court found indeed that the
publications in question had resulted in a fla-
grant and unjustified invasion of Mr Mosley’s
private life. The question which remained to be
answered was whether a legally binding pre-noti-
fication rule was required. The Court recalled
that States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation
in respect of the measures they put in place to
protect people’s right to private life. In the United
Kingdom, the right to private life had been pro-
tected with a number of measures: there was a
system of self-regulation of the press; people
could claim damages in civil court proceedings;
and, if individuals were aware of an intended
publication touching upon their private life, they
could seek an interim injunction preventing pub-
lication of the material. As a pre-notification re-
quirement would inevitably also affect politi-
cal reporting and serious journalism, the
Court stressed that such a measure required
careful scrutiny. In addition, a parliamentary in-
quiry on privacy issues had been recently held in
the United Kingdom and the ensuing report had
rejected the need for a pre-notification require-
ment. The Court further noted that Mr Mosley
had not referred to a single jurisdiction in which
a pre-notification requirement as such existed,
nor had he indicated any international legal texts
requiring States to adopt such a requirement.
Furthermore, as any pre-notification obligation
would have to allow for an exception if public in-
terest was at stake, a newspaper should be able to
opt not to notify an individual if it believed that
it could subsequently defend its decision on the
basis of the public interest in the information
published. The Court observed in that regard
that a narrowly defined public interest excep-
tion would increase the chilling effect of any
pre-notification duty. Anyway, a newspaper
could choose under a system in which a pre-noti-
fication requirement was applied, to run the risk
to decline to notify, preferring instead to pay a
subsequent fine. The Court emphasized that
any pre-notification requirement would only
be as strong as the sanctions imposed for fail-
ing to observe it. But at the same time the Court
emphasized that particular care had to be taken
when examining constraints which might oper-
ate as a form of censorship prior to publication.
Although punitive fines and criminal sanctions
could be effective in encouraging pre-notifica-
tion, that would have a chilling effect on journal-
ism, even political and investigative reporting,
both of which attracted a high level of protection
under the Convention. That ran the risk of being
incompatible with the Convention requirements
of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article
10 of the Convention. Having regard to the chill-
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ing effect to which a pre-notification require-
ment risked giving rise, to the doubts about its
effectiveness and to the wide margin of appre-
ciation afforded to the United Kingdom in that
area, the Court concluded that Article 8 did not
require a legally binding pre-notification require-
ment.
© Dirk VOORHOOF, GHENT/COPENHAGEN,
July 2011
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European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
FRESSOZ AND ROIRE V. FRANCE, 21 JANUARY 1999
APPLICATION NO. 29183/95 – GRAND CHAMBER
THE FACTS
I. The circumstances of the case
1. Mr Roger Fressoz and Mr Claude Roire, who
are French nationals, lived in Paris at the material
time. Mr Fressoz was born in 1921 and is a former
publishing director of the weekly satirical news-
paper Le Canard enchaîné. Mr Roire was born in
1939 and is a journalist on Le Canard enchaîné.
A. The article at the heart of the case
2. September 1989 was a period of industrial un-
rest within the Peugeot motor company. The
workforce's demands included pay rises, which
the management, led by the company chairman
and managing director Mr Jacques Calvet, re-
fused to award.
3. On 27 September 1989, Le Canard enchaîné pub-
lished an article by Mr Roire under the headline:
"Calvet turbo-charges his salary"
with the subhead:
"His tax forms reveal more than he does. The Peugeot
boss has given himself a 45.9% rise over the last two
years."
The article itself included the following:
"When Jacques Calvet appeared on the Antenne 2 pro-
gramme 'L'heure de vérité' in October 1988, he refused to
answer a question about his pay. This is seen as a public-
relations blunder on the part of the Peugeot boss, but the
Canard is now in a position to put it right, thanks to the
famous M.D.'s three most recent tax-assessment forms,
which have come into our hands by chance. At the time
of the broadcast, he was earning 185,312 francs net per
month. 
These documents show that, between 1986 and 1988,
Calvet's total salary (plus benefits in kind and sickness
benefit) rose by 45.9%. According to Peugeot's own fig-
ures, the average pay of the group's 158,000 workers rose
by 6.7% over the same two years – in other words, almost
seven times less than the boss's. 
M.D.'s blues 
Calvet has turned Peugeot around in spectacular style,
but in a recent interview on Antenne 2 he said he was un-
der stress due to his group's position in the face of the
Japanese offensive. It would appear that this painful psy-
chological crisis has not prevented him from swelling his
income – though it should be noted that Calvet is far
from Number 1 in the hit-parade of chief executives' sal-
aries.
In 1987 he awarded himself a 17% increase in his annual
pay, bringing it to 1,786,171 francs – that is, 148,847
francs a month. Why? Probably because the Revenue had
grabbed a big slice of his previous year's income. And
this dreadful tax-pay spiral continued its destructive
course the following year. In 1988, in order to scrape by,
Calvet was forced to give himself another rise, of 24%. His
salary that year came to 2,223,747 francs, i.e. 185,312
francs a month after deductions..."
The article was illustrated by a box reproducing a
photocopy of that part of each of the three notic-
es of assessment to tax which detailed Mr Cal-
vet's "total taxable income" and showed the
amounts he had received by way of "salary, bene-
fits in kind and sickness benefit". Each of the
three totals was circled in pencil.
B. The criminal proceedings against the appli-
cants
1. The investigative stage
4. On 2 October 1989 Mr Calvet lodged a crimi-
nal complaint against a person or persons
unknown, together with an application to join
the proceedings as a civil party claiming dam-
ages, with the senior investigating judge at Paris
tribunal de grande instance. He submitted that the
events in question must have involved the
unlawful removal and possession of the originals
or copies of documents normally held by the tax
authorities and amounted to the offences of
misappropriation of deeds or documents by a
public servant, breach of professional confi-
dence, misappropriation of documents for the
time needed to reproduce them and handling
unlawfully obtained documents.
5. On 5 October 1989 the public prosecutor
applied to the investigating judge for an investi-
gation to be opened into allegations of theft,
breach of professional confidence, unlawful
removal of deeds or documents by a public serv-
ant and handling unlawfully obtained goods.
6. On 25 October 1989 the Minister for the
Budget also lodged a criminal complaint,
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together with an application to join the proceed-
ings as a civil party claiming damages, against a
person or persons unknown for unlawful
removal of government documents and breach
of professional confidence. On 11 December
1989 the public prosecutor requested that a fur-
ther investigation be opened.
7. In the course of the investigation, an analysis
of the computer reference number on the copy
documents in Mr Roire's possession revealed
that they were photocopies of the part of the tax-
assessment notice which is kept by the tax
authorities and is not intended to leave their
premises. An inspection of the premises con-
firmed that the locks on the cabinets containing
the documents had not been forced and that the
alarm protecting the premises outside working
hours had not been activated.
An examination of the original of Mr Calvet's
tax assessment for 1988 revealed a palm-print
belonging to the Divisional Director of Taxes.
However, it was asserted that this person had
called up the relevant tax file on 27 September
1989 at the request of the Head of the Revenue
and the Director of Taxes for the département.
The person or persons responsible for unlawfully
removing the document from the tax authori-
ties' premises could not be identified, with the
result that no one was ever charged under that
head.
8. On 8 March 1991 the applicants were charged
with handling copies of notices of assessment to
tax obtained through a breach of professional
confidence, unlawful removal of deeds or docu-
ments and theft.
9. On 20 December 1991 the public prosecutor
filed a report recommending that no one should
be charged with the offences of theft or breach of
professional confidence, that all the charges
against the first applicant should be dropped
and that the second applicant should be com-
mitted for trial before the Criminal Court on
charges of handling photocopies of Mr Calvet's
tax assessments obtained through a breach of
professional confidence by an unidentified tax
official.
10. On 27 January 1992 the investigating judge
ordered that, as no culprit had been identified,
the proceedings for theft and breach of profes-
sional confidence should be discontinued. The
judge committed both applicants for trial before
the Criminal Court on charges of handling con-
fidential information concerning Mr Calvet's
income obtained through a breach of profes-
sional confidence by an unidentified tax official
and of handling stolen photocopies of Mr Cal-
vet's tax assessments.
2. In Paris Criminal Court
11. The applicants submitted two arguments in
their defence: first, that the conditions for pub-
lishing directors to be criminally liable, laid
down in section 42 of the Freedom of the Press
Act of 29 July 1881 (see paragraph 25 below) did
not apply and, second, that the elements of the
offences with which they had been charged, as
defined in Article 460 of the Criminal Code (see
paragraph 27 below), were not made out in their
case.
12. At the trial Mr Fressoz stated that the first
time he had seen the extracts from the tax assess-
ments printed in the newspaper was when he
looked at the proofs before personally passing
the article for press. He said he had asked Mr
Roire "whether his documents were sound in
journalistic terms", that is to say, "whether the
information was accurate and had been
checked". He acknowledged that, as a general
rule, passing copy for press was the responsibil-
ity of an editorial assistant, who, "if there is a
problem, consults the editor and, in the last
resort, the publishing director".
The second applicant stated that the photocop-
ies of the tax assessments had been sent anony-
mously in an envelope addressed to him by
name, about a fortnight before they were used in
the paper. He explained that he had "checked the
plausibility" of the information in the docu-
ments, in particular by looking up the level of
Mr Calvet's remuneration in specialist works
including Fortune France. He said that he had also
checked with various persons to ensure that the
documents were photocopies of "genuine" tax-
assessment notices. He specified that he had also
verified that they really were tax-authority docu-
ments, adding that once it appeared that there
was no proof that they had been obtained unlaw-
fully, "the overriding consideration was the doc-
uments' significance". 
13. In a judgment of 17 June 1992, Paris Criminal
Court acquitted the applicants, holding that the
principal offences of theft and breach of profes-
sional confidence had not been made out because
it had proved impossible to identify who had dis-
closed the documents or to establish the circum-
mwb-3164-european.media.law.book  Page 91  Wednesday, August 17, 2011  2:33 PM
92
Case Law
stances in which the offences had been commit-
ted.
In relation to the offence of breach of profes-
sional confidence, the court held as follows:
"... 
In the instant case, while it has been established that the
originals of the documents in question are notices of as-
sessment to tax held on Mr Calvet's tax file, it cannot be
inferred from this that the person guilty of wrongfully
taking them for the time needed to photocopy them, or
of disclosing them to third parties, or of divulging the in-
formation contained in them, necessarily fell within one
of the categories of person defined in the above-men-
tioned provision [Article L. 103 of the Code of Tax Proce-
dure]; since the tax authorities themselves have
suggested that the perpetrator might be 'someone from
outside'... – whatever the security regulations at the time.
The fact that the status and professional functions of the
person responsible for the disclosure are unknown there-
fore rules out any possibility of proving one of the essen-
tial elements of the offence of breach of professional
confidence.
Consequently, there is no formal proof that this offence
was committed, so that the charge against the defen-
dants of handling the fruits of a breach of professional
confidence has not been made out..."
In relation to the theft charge, the court held:
"... In particular, it has not been shown that the person
who originally copied the documents had any unlawful
intention or had such an intention at the time of taking
the documents.
Hence, without further rehearsing the numerous ques-
tions remaining unanswered concerning how these doc-
uments found their way into Mr Roire's hands, we find
that the elements of the offence of theft have not been
sufficiently proved.
Unless it can be precisely established that, in the first
place, an act defined as a serious crime (crime) or other
major offence (délit) was committed, and its elements can
be made out, the prerequisite for an offence of handling
is lacking, and the defendant must be acquitted."
14. On 25 and 26 June 1992 respectively, the pub-
lic prosecutor and the civil parties claiming dam-
ages appealed. 
3. In Paris Court of Appeal
15. In a judgment of 10 March 1993, Paris Court
of Appeal reversed the judgment and found the
applicants guilty of handling photocopies of
Mr Calvet's tax returns obtained through a
breach of professional confidence by an uniden-
tified tax official. Mr Fressoz and Mr Roire were
sentenced to, respectively, fines of 10,000 and
5,000 French francs (FRF) and ordered, jointly
and severally, to pay Mr Calvet FRF 1 by way of
damages for non-pecuniary damage and FRF
10,000 by way of reimbursement of legal costs
under Article 475-1 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure.
The Court of Appeal held as follows:
"This Court cannot agree with the manner in which the
court below analysed the facts. The results of the investi-
gations show that only a tax official familiar with the de-
partment could have leaked the documents, since no
outside party had requested Jacques Calvet's file and
that file was found, on the morning of 27 September
1989, in its normal condition, with the documents filed
according to the particular practice of Chaillot Tax Of-
fice. It is certain that a third party, someone who was not
a civil servant or was from outside the tax department,
could not – without attracting attention – have taken
documents filed in two separate places in the file, photo-
graphed or photocopied them and put them back in ex-
actly the right place, given that the file is kept in a metal
cabinet in a locked room to which there is access only for
authorised persons.
Contrary to the court below, we therefore hold that, in
this case, it has been established that the offence of
breach of professional confidence was committed, and
that the fact that the culprit has not been identified is ir-
relevant.
Mr Roire told the investigating judge that the photocop-
ies of Jacques Calvet's tax notices were sent to him anon-
ymously at the newspaper, in an envelope addressed to
him personally. He confirmed that he had questioned
various people in order to ensure that they were indeed
copies of genuine tax documents.
Mr Roire's article, containing a reproduction of the doc-
uments in question, was submitted to Roger Fressoz, the
publishing director of Le Canard enchaîné, who, personal-
ly, passed it for press.
Mr Fressoz told the investigating judge that he saw the
extracts from Jacques Calvet's tax notices at that point.
He explained that – as a general rule – copy is passed for
press by the senior editorial assistant, who, if there is a
problem, consults the editor and, in the last resort, him-
self.
The offence of handling the fruits of a breach of profes-
sional confidence was characterised, in the instant case,
by the publication of documents obtained in breach of
the provisions of Article L. 103 of the Code of Tax Proce-
dure and Article 378 of the Criminal Code and was com-
mitted by Mr Roire and Mr Fressoz given that, in the
light of the nature of the documents and of the checks
which Mr Roire says he carried out, the defendants must
have known that those documents came from a tax file.
Moreover, this explains why the article was passed for
press by Mr Fressoz, the publishing director, and not an
editorial assistant or the editor. It is worth recalling that,
although Mr Fressoz was not the person to whom the
documents were sent, he saw them before giving his au-
thorisation to publish the article reproducing extracts
from them. Therefore, both the actus reus and the mens rea
of the offence of handling the fruits of a breach of pro-
fessional confidence are present in his case as well as in
that of the author of the article, Mr Roire..."
4. In the Court of Cassation 
16. Mr Fressoz and Mr Roire appealed to the
Court of Cassation on points of law. In their
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grounds of appeal (and subsequently in a reply to
Mr Calvet's pleadings), they submitted two argu-
ments.
As the first ground of appeal, Mr Fressoz argued
that, since he was a publishing director as
defined in the Act of 29 July 1881, the lower
courts were not empowered to convict him of a
handling offence under the general criminal law,
but only of one of the offences specially defined
in that Act. In his reply, he pointed out that the
other side was confusing "handling" with "pub-
lishing", submitting that Mr Calvet was con-
cerned, not by the handling but by the
publication – something which did not contra-
vene any provision of the press laws, so that the
prosecution had resorted to another, inappropri-
ate, charge, that of handling.
As the second ground, both applicants argued
that the elements of the offence with which they
had been charged, as defined in the relevant
domestic law, including sections 5, 6 and 42 of
the 1881 Act, were not made out in their case.
On that point, they maintained that Mr Calvet's
tax assessments were not covered by a duty to
preserve confidentiality – so that there could
have been no breach of such a duty – but con-
tained information which was available to the
public. They argued that a journalist could not
lawfully be convicted of "handling information"
and submitted that the Court of Appeal had
failed to demonstrate how the actus reus and mens
rea of the offence with which they had been
charged – namely possession or control of the
thing in question and knowledge that it had
been obtained unlawfully – were made out in
their case. With regard to the fact that the Court
of Appeal had deduced that Mr Roire must have
known that the documents had been obtained
unlawfully since, when he had received them, he
had verified that they were indeed copies of tax
assessments, Mr Roire submitted that he had
"merely fulfilled his duty as a journalist: before
publishing information, he had checked that it
was genuine, as required by the obligation on all
journalists to exercise caution and verify
sources". 
17. The Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal
on 3 April 1995, holding as follows:
"...
The grounds [of the Court of Appeal's judgment], fol-
lowing as they do from findings of fact which are not
subject to review by this Court, show that the appellate
court, having established that the defendants knowingly
had in their possession or control documents obtained
through a breach of professional confidence, contrary to
Article L. 103 of the Code of Tax Procedure, did not mis-
direct themselves in law as alleged [by the appellants].
In particular, the Court of Appeal cannot be held to have
misinterpreted Article 460 of the Criminal Code as it
stood at the time, in which the only offence defined is
that of handling stolen goods, since, although it found
the applicants guilty of handling unlawfully obtained
photocopies, it rightly dismissed the charge of handling
unlawfully obtained information on which the journal-
ists were committed for trial before the Criminal Court.
Information, whatever its nature or source, is covered
neither by Article 460 nor by Article 321-1 of the Crimi-
nal Code which came into force on 1 March 1994, so
that, if a problem arose – that is, if certain information
were published and that publication were challenged by
the persons concerned – the only legal provisions govern-
ing it would be those specifically concerning the freedom
of the press or of audiovisual communication..."
II. Relevant Domestic Law
A. Freedom of the Press Act of 29 July 1881
18. The relevant sections of the Freedom of the
Press Act of 29 July 1881 provide as follows:
Section 1
"Anyone may print or sell books and other publica-
tions".
Section 5
"Any newspaper or periodical may be published without
prior authorisation or the payment of any security, pro-
vided that the declaration required by section 7 has been
made".
Section 6
"All press publications must have a publishing direc-
tor..."
Section 42
"The following persons shall be liable, as principals and
in the following order, to penalties for serious crimes
(crimes) or other major offences (délits) committed
through the press:
(1) publishing directors or publishers, whatever their
profession or title and, in the circumstances defined in
section 6(2), joint publishing directors; 
(2) in the absence of any of the foregoing, the actual of-
fenders;
..."
B. The Code of Tax Procedure
19. The relevant Articles of the Code of Tax Pro-
cedure provide as follows:
Article L. 103 "The duty to preserve professional confi-
dentiality, as defined in Article 378 of the Criminal Code,
applies to any person who is required, in the course of his
duties or exercise of his powers, to take any action con-
cerning the assessment, inspection or recovery of, or dis-
putes over, any taxes, duties, imposts or levies referred to
in the General Tax Code. The duty shall cover all infor-
mation obtained in the course of the above-mentioned
operations."
Article L. 111-1 "A list of the persons liable for income tax
or corporation tax shall be drawn up, distinguishing be-
tween the two types of tax as levied in each municipality.
...
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The list shall be kept by the Revenue Department for
each area and shall be available for consultation by the
taxpayers in that area. The Department may order it to
be posted.
...
The list concerning income tax shall also show, in the
manner provided for by decree and for each taxpayer, the
number of dependants' allowance tax units applicable,
the amount of tax payable and the total tax credits.
...
Publishing or otherwise disseminating the lists referred
to above or any information relating to those lists which
concerns a named person is forbidden on pain of a tax
fine under Article 1768 ter of the [General Tax] Code".
C. The Criminal Code
20. At the material time, Article 460 of the Crim-
inal Code provided:
"Anyone who knowingly handles any goods (or any part
thereof) taken, misappropriated or obtained by means of
a serious crime (crime) or other major offence (délit) shall
be liable to between three months' and five years' impris-
onment or a fine of between FRF 10,000 and FRF
2,500,000 or both. The amount of the fine may be in-
creased to a sum exceeding FRF 2,500,000 but not ex-
ceeding half the value of the goods handled..."
(..)
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF
THE CONVENTION
25. The applicants submitted that their convic-
tion by the Paris Court of Appeal had infringed
Article 10 of the Convention, which provides:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to re-
ceive and impart information and ideas without interfer-
ence by public authority and regardless of frontiers...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such for-
malities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judi-
ciary."
The Government contested that submission; the
Commission agreed with it.
A. The Government's preliminary objection
26. As they had done before the Commission, the
Government pleaded failure to exhaust domestic
remedies. Mr Fressoz and Mr Roire had confined
themselves to denying the charge of handling
stolen goods that had been brought against
them. At no stage, not even as an alternative sub-
mission, had they sought to argue that there was
a contradiction between the charges on which
they had been found guilty and the principle of
freedom of expression. Thus, they had not com-
plained, either expressly or in substance, of a
breach of Article 10 of the Convention before the
domestic courts even though they might have
succeeded on that point of law, which had been
admissible before the national courts. They had
accordingly failed to afford the French courts an
opportunity to decide whether the criminal pro-
ceedings that had been brought against them
were compatible with the principle of freedom of
expression. Consequently, domestic remedies
had not been exhausted and the Court, consist-
ent with its decision in the Ahmet Sadýk v. Greece
case (see the judgment of 15 November 1996, Re-
ports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, p. 1654, §§
32-33), was unable to hear the case.
27. The applicants replied that they had raised in
substance the complaint of a violation of Article
10 of the Convention before the Court of Cassa-
tion, as their pleadings before that court showed
(see paragraph 23 above). After referring to the
Act of 29 July 1881, which established the princi-
ple of freedom of the press, they had argued,
firstly, that Mr Calvet's tax assessments were not
confidential as they were available to the public
and, secondly, that they could not in law be
guilty of "handling information". In any event,
arguing that there had been a breach of
Article 10 would not have prevented the ordinary
rules of law governing the handling of stolen
goods taking precedence over the protection of
freedom of expression.
28. In its decision on the admissibility of the
application, the Commission dismissed the
objection on the ground that the applicants had
made a complaint before the Court of Cassation
that was in substance connected with a breach of
Article 10. The Delegate of the Commission in
addition maintained before the Court that, as
the Court of Cassation's powers had been lim-
ited (it could not have reopened the Court of
Appeal's findings of fact), it was unlikely that
redress for the alleged violation would have been
obtained through an appeal on points of law. In
his opinion, there would have been little point in
the applicants' asserting their right to freedom
of expression when dissemination of the infor-
mation did not give rise to a risk of conviction
under the general law.
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29. Article 35 § 1, formerly Article 26, of the Con-
vention reads as follows:
"The Court may only deal with the matter after all do-
mestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the
generally recognised rules of international law, and with-
in a period of six months from the date on which the fi-
nal decision was taken."
30. The Court reiterates that the purpose of the
rule referred to above is to afford the Contracting
States the opportunity of preventing or putting
right – usually through the courts – the viola-
tions alleged against them before those allega-
tions are submitted to the Court. That rule must
be applied "with some degree of flexibility and
without excessive formalism"; it is sufficient that
the complaints intended to be made subsequent-
ly in Strasbourg should have been raised, "at least
in substance and in compliance with the formal
requirements and time-limits laid down in do-
mestic law", before the national authorities (see
the Castells v. Spain judgment of 23 April 1992,
Series A no. 236, p. 19, § 27, and the Akdivar and
Others v. Turkey judgment of 16 September
1996, Reports 1996-IV, pp. 1210-11, §§ 65-69).
31. The applicants are engaged in the business of
disseminating information and were convicted
after publishing documents. In the Court of Cas-
sation the applicants relied on various provisions
of the Freedom of the Press Act of 29 July 1881,
which, so far as the applicants' activities are con-
cerned, contains provisions equivalent to those
of Article 10. In their pleadings in support of
their appeal to that court, the applicants argued
that their article had not contravened any provi-
sion of the Freedom of the Press Act and that, as
a journalist, Mr Roire had simply been doing his
"duty" (see paragraph 23 above). In their plead-
ing in reply, the applicants criticised the prosecu-
tion for confusing "handling" with "publica-
tion" saying that they had been charged with
handling so that they could be prosecuted under
the general law rather than under the special pro-
visions governing the media (see paragraph 23
above). Indeed, by making a distinction in its
judgment between the law applicable to the in-
formation itself and the law applicable to the
document in which it was contained, the Court
of Cassation indirectly ruled on the scope of jour-
nalists' rights to information.
32. In these circumstances, the Court holds that
freedom of expression was in issue, if only
implicitly, in the proceedings before the Court of
Cassation and that the legal arguments made by
the applicants' in that court included a com-
plaint connected with Article 10 of the Conven-
tion.
The applicants' complaint under Article 10 of
the Convention was thus raised, at least in sub-
stance, before the Court of Cassation. The Gov-
ernment's objection of failure to exhaust
domestic remedies must therefore be dismissed.
B. The merits of the complaint
33. The applicants submitted that their convic-
tion for handling photocopies of tax returns ob-
tained through a breach of professional confi-
dence by an unidentified tax official had
infringed their right to freedom of expression.
34. The applicants' conviction was an "interfer-
ence" with the exercise of their right to freedom
of expression. Such interference breaches Article
10 unless it was "prescribed by law", pursued
one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in
paragraph 2 and was "necessary in a democratic
society" to attain such aim or aims. 
1. "Prescribed by law"
35. Those appearing before the Court agreed that
the interference was "prescribed by law", namely
Article 460 of the former Criminal Code and Ar-
ticle L. 103 of the Code of Tax Procedure. The
Court shares that view.
2. Legitimate aims
36. According to the applicants, the Government
and the Commission, the interference was in-
tended to protect the reputation or rights of oth-
ers and to prevent the disclosure of information
received in confidence. The Court sees no reason
to conclude otherwise.
3. "Necessary in a democratic society"
37. The Court must therefore consider whether
the interference was "necessary" in a democratic
society in order to achieve those aims.
(a) General principles
38. The Court reiterates the fundamental princi-
ples under its case-law concerning Article 10.
(i) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society.
Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applica-
ble not only to "information" or "ideas" that are
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or
as a matter of indifference, but also to those that
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offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands
of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness
without which there is no "democratic society"
(see the Handyside v. the United Kingdom judg-
ment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 23,
§ 49, and the Jersild v. Denmark judgment of 23
September 1994, Series A no. 298, p. 26, § 37).
(ii) The press plays an essential role in a demo-
cratic society. Although it must not overstep cer-
tain bounds, in particular in respect of the repu-
tation and rights of others and the need to
prevent the disclosure of confidential informa-
tion, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a man-
ner consistent with its obligations and responsi-
bilities – information and ideas on all matters of
public interest (see the De Haes and Gijsels v. Bel-
gium judgment of 24 February 1997, Reports
1997-I, pp. 233-34, § 37). In addition, the Court is
mindful of the fact that journalistic freedom also
covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggera-
tion, or even provocation (see the Prager and
Oberschlick v. Austria judgment of 26 April 1995,
Series A no. 313, p. 19, § 38). 
(iii) As a matter of general principle, the "necessi-
ty" for any restriction on freedom of expression
must be convincingly established. Admittedly, it
is in the first place for the national authorities to
assess whether there is a "pressing social need"
for the restriction and, in making their assess-
ment, they enjoy a certain margin of apprecia-
tion. In cases, such as the present one, concerning
the press, the national margin of appreciation is
circumscribed by the interest of democratic soci-
ety in ensuring and maintaining a free press. Sim-
ilarly, that interest will weigh heavily in the bal-
ance in determining, as must be done under
paragraph 2 of Article 10, whether the restriction
was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued
(see, mutatis mutandis, the Goodwin v. the United
Kingdom judgment of 27 March 1996, Reports
1996-II, pp. 500-01, § 40, and the Worm v. Austria
judgment of 29 August 1997, Reports 1997-V, p.
1551, § 47). 
(iv) The Court's task in exercising its supervisory
function is not to take the place of the national
authorities but rather to review under Article 10
the decisions they have taken pursuant to their
power of appreciation. In so doing, the Court
must look at the "interference" complained of in
the light of the case as a whole and determine
whether the reasons adduced by the national au-
thorities to justify it are "relevant and sufficient"
(see, among many other authorities, the Good-
win judgment cited above, pp. 500-01, § 40). 
(b) Application of the above principles to the
present case
39. Mr Fressoz and Mr Roire said that their arti-
cle had been published in the context of a public
debate of general interest to which changes in
Mr Calvet's earnings were, at the time, of particu-
lar relevance. The article was intended to contrib-
ute to a debate that went beyond the Peugeot
chairman as an individual, since his importance,
his role, the scale of the industrial dispute and
the size of the company concerned were all mat-
ters lending themselves to discussion. The pub-
lished article did not therefore concern Mr Cal-
vet's reputation or rights, but the management
of the company he ran.
The penalty imposed on them was all the more
unjust in that, under the Court of Cassation's
case-law, publishing details of a person's income
or assets did not constitute an interference with
his private life, especially if he exercised public or
quasi-public functions.
Nor had the penalty been necessary to secure
compliance with the duty to preserve confidenti-
ality. In the instant case only the tax officials had
been subject to confidentiality obligations.
Other people, such as members of the works'
council or of Mr Calvet's family, could have dis-
closed the information about his income. In any
event, Mr Fressoz and Mr Roire could not have
known that the photocopies of the tax assess-
ments sent to them anonymously had been
obtained through a breach of professional confi-
dence, as the national courts themselves had
been unable to establish such a breach, despite a
two-year investigation. 
By publishing part of the photocopied docu-
ments the applicants had been able to show that
their information was true and fulfil their duty
as journalists to communicate data that had
been verified and proof. 
Lastly, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and
the Court of Cassation was transparently artifi-
cial and its pernicious effects on freedom of the
press immediate. Mr Calvet had complained
solely because his income had been disclosed.
The fact that the applicants had been convicted
of the purely technical offence of handling pho-
tocopies disguised what was really a desire to
penalise them for publishing the information,
although publication in itself was quite lawful.
40. The Commission agreed in substance with
those submissions.
41. The Government maintained that it was the
breach of confidence regarding tax matters that
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had led to the applicants' conviction and that
conviction had been necessary to secure effective
preservation of confidentiality. It would be unre-
alistic to hope to secure compliance with a duty
to preserve confidentiality if any information,
including information that was to remain confi-
dential, could be disclosed with impunity.
Restrictions on freedom of expression were to be
assessed in the light of the responsibilities and
obligations of those concerned when the infor-
mation was obtained. The addressees of the let-
ter must have been aware that the documents
had been obtained unlawfully. Indeed, the sec-
ond applicant had not disputed knowing that
the documents came from a tax file and should
therefore have treated them as confidential.
Furthermore, disclosing the remuneration of
just one person, albeit the head of a major pri-
vate company, did not contribute to the debate
on a topic of interest to the public. The pub-
lished information concerned a particular situa-
tion that was too specific to be a matter of public
interest. It had been published solely with a view
to damaging Mr Calvet and putting him in a dif-
ficult position in the pay negotiations that were
under way.
French law made it possible for citizens to
obtain information concerning the income and
the tax liabilities of taxpayers in France. Thus
under Article L. 111 of the Code of Tax Proce-
dure (see paragraph 26 above) taxpayers in a
municipality were entitled to consult a list of the
people liable for tax and to find out those peo-
ple's taxable income and tax liability.
In any event, there could not have been a dispro-
portionate interference with freedom of expres-
sion as an alternative solution had been available
that would have allowed any right the public had
to information to be upheld, without the com-
mission of a criminal offence. The applicants
would not have been guilty of the offence of han-
dling photocopies if they had confined them-
selves to publishing the information about Mr
Calvet's income, without reproducing extracts
from the photocopies of the tax assessments
that had been sent to them by a person who was
rightfully subject to professional confidentiality
obligations. Admittedly, proceedings could have
been brought against them for press libel. How-
ever, the case-law of the Court of Cassation
established that journalists were entitled to
adduce evidence justifying their assertions, even
if obtained unlawfully. Subject to that condition,
the applicants could have disclosed the informa-
tion without restriction.
42. In the light of those arguments, the Court
must examine whether relevant and sufficient
reasons existed to justify the applicants' convic-
tion for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article
10.
43. The Court is unconvinced by the Govern-
ment's argument that the information was not a
matter of general interest. The article was pub-
lished during an industrial dispute – widely
reported in the press – at one of the major
French car manufacturers. The workers were
seeking a pay rise which the management were
refusing. The article showed that the company
chairman had received large pay increases during
the period under consideration while at the same
time opposing his employees' claims for a rise.
By making such a comparison against that back-
ground, the article contributed to a public
debate on a matter of general interest. It was not
intended to damage Mr Calvet's reputation but
to contribute to the more general debate on a
topic that interested the public (see, for example,
the Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland judgment of
25 June 1992, Series A no. 239, p. 28, § 66).
The Court of Cassation has held that questions
relating to the finances of public figures, such as
heads of major companies, do not concern their
private life. That is not something the Govern-
ment disputed.
44. Not only does the press have the task of
imparting information and ideas on matters of
public interest: the public also has a right to
receive them (see, among other authorities, the
following judgments: Observer and Guardian v.
the United Kingdom of 26 November 1991,
Series A no. 216, p. 30, § 59; Jersild, cited above,
p. 23, § 31; and De Haes and Gijsels, cited above,
p. 234, § 39). That is particularly true in the
instant case, as issues concerning employment
and pay generally attract considerable attention.
Consequently, an interference with the exercise
of press freedom cannot be compatible with
Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified
by an overriding requirement in the public inter-
est (see the Goodwin judgment cited above, p.
500, § 39).
45. Admittedly, people exercising freedom of
expression, including journalists, undertake
"duties and responsibilities" the scope of which
depends on their situation and the technical
means they use (see, mutatis mutandis, the Handy-
side judgment cited above, p. 23, § 49 in fine). In
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the present case the Court of Appeal held that in
the light of the nature of the documents and of
the checks which Mr Roire says he carried out,
the defendants must have known that the docu-
ments came from a tax file (see paragraph 22
above) and were therefore confidential. While
recognising the vital role played by the press in a
democratic society, the Court stresses that jour-
nalists cannot, in principle, be released from
their duty to obey the ordinary criminal law on
the basis that Article 10 affords them protection.
Indeed, paragraph 2 of Article 10 defines the
boundaries of the exercise of freedom of expres-
sion. It falls to be decided whether, in the partic-
ular circumstances of the case, the interest in the
public's being informed outweighed the "duties
and responsibilities" the applicants had as a
result of the suspect origin of the documents
that were sent to them.
46. The Court must in particular determine
whether the objective of protecting fiscal confi-
dentiality, which in itself is legitimate, consti-
tuted a relevant and sufficient justification for
the interference. In that connection, it must be
noted that although the applicants' conviction
was based solely on the reproduction in Le
Canard enchaîné of documents in the possession
of the tax authorities that were held to have been
communicated to Mr Fressoz and Mr Roire in
breach of professional confidence, it inevitably
concerned the disclosure of information. The
issue does however arise as to whether there was
any need to prevent the disclosure of informa-
tion that was already available to the public (see
the Weber v. Switzerland judgment of 22 May
1990, Series A no. 177, p. 23, § 51, and the
Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v. the Netherlands
judgment of 9 February 1995, Series A no. 306-A,
p. 15, § 41) and might already have been known
to a large number of people. As the Government
accepted, a degree of transparency exists regard-
ing earnings and pay rises. Thus local taxpayers
may consult a list of the people liable for tax in
their municipality, with details of each tax-
payer's taxable income and tax liability (see para-
graphs 26 and 48 above). While that information
cannot be disseminated, it is thus accessible to a
large number of people who may in turn pass it
on to others. Although publication of the tax
assessments in the present case was prohibited,
the information they contained was not confi-
dential. Indeed, the remuneration of people who,
like Mr Calvet, run major companies is regularly
published in financial reviews and the second
applicant said, without it being disputed, that he
had referred to information of that type in order
to check roughly how much Mr Calvet was earn-
ing (see paragraph 19 above). Accordingly, there
was no overriding requirement for the informa-
tion to be protected as confidential.
47. If, as the Government accepted, the informa-
tion about Mr Calvet's annual income was law-
ful and its disclosure permitted, the applicants'
conviction merely for having published the doc-
uments in which that information was con-
tained, namely the tax assessments, cannot be
justified under Article 10. In essence, that Article
leaves it for journalists to decide whether or not
it is necessary to reproduce such documents to
ensure credibility. It protects journalists' right to
divulge information on issues of general interest
provided that they are acting in good faith and
on an accurate factual basis and provide "reliable
and precise" information in accordance with the
ethics of journalism (see, in particular, the Good-
win judgment cited above, p. 500, § 39; the
Schwabe v. Austria judgment of 28 August 1992,
Series A no. 242-B, p. 34, § 34; and, as an example
of a finding to the contrary on the facts, the
Prager and Oberschlick judgment cited above, p.
18, § 37).
48. In the instant case, the Court notes that nei-
ther Mr Fressoz and Mr Roire's account of the
events nor their good faith has been called into
question. Mr Roire, who verified the authenticity
of the tax assessments, acted in accordance with
the standards governing his profession as a jour-
nalist. The extracts from each document were
intended to corroborate the terms of the article
in question. The publication of the tax assess-
ments was thus relevant not only to the subject
matter but also to the credibility of the informa-
tion supplied. 
49. In sum, there was not, in the Court's view, a
reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the legitimate aim pursued by the jour-
nalists' conviction and the means deployed to
achieve that aim, given the interest a democratic
society has in ensuring and preserving freedom
of the press. There has therefore been a violation
of Article 10 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 2
OF THE CONVENTION
50. The applicants complained of two breaches of
Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, which provides:
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"Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be pre-
sumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."
The national courts had failed to apply the pre-
sumption of innocence in two respects. Firstly,
Mr Fressoz's conviction had resulted from an un-
warranted extension to the special criminal-law
system created by the Act of 29 July 1881 (see par-
agraph 25 above) that rendered publishing direc-
tors strictly liable for press offences. Secondly,
the applicants should not have been convicted of
an offence under the general law as there was no
concrete evidence against them. In order to be
able to convict, the Court of Appeal had had to
resort to a purely hypothetical intellectual con-
struction whereby the applicants were presumed
to have known the fraudulent origin of the pho-
tocopies they had received.
51. The Government submitted that this com-
plaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the
provisions of the Convention. What the appli-
cants were in fact seeking to do was to challenge
the merits of their conviction by the Court of Ap-
peal. However, it was not for the Convention in-
stitutions to determine whether the national
courts had correctly assessed the evidence. In any
event, there had been no presumption of guilt
against the journalists in the Court of Appeal,
which had given perfectly valid reasons for its de-
cision. 
52. Having heard the arguments made before it
and in view of its conclusion that there had been
a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, the
Commission considered that the complaint
under Article 6 § 2 arose out of the same facts
and did not give rise to any issues of fact or law
requiring separate examination.
53. The Court reaches the same conclusion and
considers that, in the light of its finding in para-
graph 56 and the matters it took into account in
so finding, no separate issue arises under Article
6 § 2 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE
CONVENTION
(...)
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT unani-
mously
1. Dismisses the Government's preliminary objec-
tion;
2. Holds that there has been a breach of Article 10
of the Convention;
3. Holds that no separate issue arises under Arti-
cle 6 § 2 of the Convention;
4. Holds that the respondent Government is to
pay the applicants, within three months, 10,001
(ten thousand and one) French francs for pecu-
niary damage and 60,000 (sixty thousand)
French francs for costs and expenses, together
with simple interest at an annual rate of 3.36%
payable from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement;
5. Holds that the present judgment constitutes in
itself sufficient just satisfaction for any other
damage;
6. Dismisses the remainder of the claim for just
satisfaction.
ÖZGÜR GÜNDEM V. TURKEY, 16 MARCH 2000 
APPLICATION NO. 23144/93
AS TO THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
1. Özgür Gündem was a daily newspaper the main
office of which was situated in İstanbul. It was a
Turkish language publication with an estimated
national circulation of up to 45,000 copies and a
further unspecified international circulation. It
incorporated its predecessor, the weekly publica-
tion Yeni Ülke, which was produced between 1990
and 1992. Özgür Gündem was published from 30
May 1992 until April 1994. It was succeeded by
another newspaper, Özgür Ülke. 
2. The case concerns the allegations of the appli-
cants that Özgür Gündem was the subject of seri-
ous attacks and harassment which forced its
eventual closure and for which the Turkish au-
thorities are directly or indirectly responsible. 
A. Incidents of violence and threats concern-
ing Ozgür Gündem and persons associated
with it
3. The applicants made detailed submissions to
the Commission, listing the attacks made on
journalists, distributors and others associated
with the newspaper (see the Commission report,
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§§ 32-34). The Government, in their submissions
to the Commission, denied that some of these at-
tacks occurred (see the Commission report §§ 43-
62). In their submissions to the Court, neither
party has made any comment on the Commis-
sion's findings in this respect ( see §§ 141-142).
4. The following incidents are uncontested.
Seven persons connected with Özgür Gündem
were killed in circumstances originally regarded
as "unknown perpetrator" killings: (1) Yahya
Orhan, a journalist shot dead on 31 July 1992;
(2) Hüseyin Deniz, a member of staff of Özgür
Gündem, shot dead on 8 August 1992; (3) Musa
Anter, a regular columnist for Özgür Gündem,
shot dead on 20 September 1992; (4) Hafýz
Akdemir, a member of the staff of Özgür Gündem,
shot dead on 8 June 1992; (5) Kemal Kýlýç, the
Şanlýurfa representative of Özgür Gündem, shot
dead on 18 February 1992 (an application no.
22492/93 introduced by Cemal Kýlýç concerning
alleged State responsibility for this killing is
pending before the Court, see the Commission's
Report of 23.10.98); (6) Cengiz Altun, a reporter
of Yeni Ülke, shot dead on 24 February 1992; (7)
Ferhat Tepe, the Bitlis correspondent of Özgür
Gündem, found dead on 4 August 1993 after his
abduction on 28 July 1993. 
The following attacks occurred:
(1) on 16 November 1992 an arson attack on the
newsstand of Kadir Saka in Diyarbakýr; (2) an
armed attack on Esref Yaşa, also a newsagent, on
15 January 1993, in Diyarbakýr; (3) an armed
attack on the newsagent Haşim Yaşa on 15 June
1993 in Diyarbakýr (this incident and that con-
cerning the attack on Eşref Yaşa were the subject
of an application under the Convention, see the
Yaşa v. Turkey judgment of 2 September 1998,
Reports 1998-VI, p. 2411); on 26 September 1993,
Mehmet Balamir, a newsboy, was attacked with a
knife in Diyarbakýr as he was selling the newspa-
per; (4) in 1993, in Ergani, boys selling the news-
paper were attacked by a person with a knife; (5)
an arson attack on a newsagent in Mazidagý; (6)
in Bingöl, on 17 November 1992, the car of a
newsagent was destroyed by fire; (7) in Yükseko-
va, in October 1993, a bomb explosion damaged
a newsagency; (8) a bomb exploded at the
İstanbul office of the newspaper's successor
Özgür Ülke on 2 December 1994, killing one
employee and injuring eighteen others.
5. The applicants listed a large number of other
incidents (arson attacks, attacks and threats on
newsagents, distributors and newsboys) which
the Government stated either did not occur or
concerning which they stated that they had re-
ceived no information or complaint (see Com-
mission report, §§ 32-34 and 43-62). They also re-
ferred to the disappearance of the journalist Aysel
Malkaç on 7 August 1993 and to the detention
and ill-treatment of many journalists, one of
whom, Salih Tekin, was found, upon his applica-
tion to Strasbourg, to have been subject to inhu-
man and degrading treatment while in custody
(see Commission report, § 37; the Tekin v. Turkey
judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998-IV, pp.
1517-1518, §§ 53-54).
6. The applicants, and others acting on behalf of
the newspaper and its employees, addressed nu-
merous petitions to the authorities concerning
the threats and attacks which they claimed had
occurred. These are listed in the Commission re-
port (§ 35) and include letters from the applicant
Yaşar Kaya to the Governor of the State of Emer-
gency Region, the Minister of the Interior, the
Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, in-
forming them of the attacks and requesting in-
vestigations to be opened and measures of pro-
tection to be taken. No reply was made to the vast
majority of these letters. 
7. Written complaints were made by persons from
the newspaper about specific attacks, incidents
and threats concerning which the Government
stated that they had received no information or
complaint, including the attacks on child distrib-
utors in Diyarbakýr during 1993, the death of
newsagent Zülküf Akkaya in Diyarbakýr on 27
September 1993 and attacks on distributors by
persons with meat axes, also in Diyarbakýr, in
September 1993 (see Commission report, §
35(s)). A written request for protective measures
was made on 24 December 1992 to the Şanlýurfa
Governor on behalf of the persons involved in the
newspaper in Şanlýurfa, which was refused short-
ly before the journalist Kemal Kýlýç was shot
dead on 18 February 1993 (see Commission re-
port, § 35(l)). 
8. Following a request for security measures re-
ceived by the Diyarbakýr police on 2 December
1993, police escorted employees of the two com-
panies dealing with the distribution of newspa-
pers from the borders of Şanlýurfa province to
the distribution stores. Measures were also taken
with respect to deliveries of the newspaper from
the stores to newsagents. The Government sub-
mitted to the Commission that no other requests
for protection were received. Following the explo-
sion at the Özgür Ülke office on 2 December 1994
and a request from the owner, security measures,
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including patrolling, were taken by the authori-
ties.
B. The search and arrest operation at the
Özgür Gündem premises in Istanbul
9. On 10 December 1993, the police conducted a
search at the Özgür Gündem office in Istanbul.
During the operation, they took into custody
those present in the building (107 persons, in-
cluding the applicants Gurbetelli Ersöz and Fahri
Ferda Çetin) and seized all the documents and ar-
chives.
10. Two search and seizure documents dated 10
December 1993 record that the police found two
guns, ammunition, 2 sleeping bags and 25 gas
masks. In a further search and seizure document
dated 10 December 1993, it is stated that the fol-
lowing items had been found: photographs (de-
scribed as kept in envelopes with a label "PKK
Terrorist Organisation"), a tax receipt stamped
with the name ERNK (a wing of the PKK organi-
sation) for TRL 400,000,000, found in the desk of
the applicant Yaşar Kaya, and numerous printed
and handwritten documents, including an article
on Abdullah Öcalan. A document dated 24 De-
cember 1993 signed by a public prosecutor at the
Istanbul State Security Court listed the following
material as having been seized: in a sealed enve-
lope the military ID of Muzaffer Ulutaş killed in
Şirnak in March 1993, in a sealed box 1,350 injec-
tions kits, 1 typewriter, 1 video cassette and audio
cassette, and 40 books found at the house of the
applicant Fahri Ferda Çetin. As a result of these
mesures, the publication of the newspaper was
disrupted for two days.
11. In an indictment dated 5 April 1994, charges
were brought against the editor Gurbetelli Ersöz,
Fahri Ferda Çetin, Yaşar Kaya, the manager Ali
Rýza Halis and six others, alleging that they were
members of the PKK and had rendered the PKK
assistance and made propaganda in its favour.
The Government have stated that Gurbetelli
Ersöz and Ali Rýza Halis were convicted of aiding
and abetting the PKK, by judgment of the Istan-
bul State Security Court no. 5 on 12 December
1996. Gurbetelli Ersöz had previously been con-
victed of involvement with the PKK in or about
the end of December 1990 and had been released
from prison in 1992.
C. Prosecutions concerning issues of Özgür
Gündem
12. Numerous prosecutions were brought
against the newspaper (including the relevant ed-
itor, the applicant Yaşar Kaya as the owner and
publisher and the authors of the impugned arti-
cles), alleging that offences had been committed
by the publication of various articles. The prose-
cutions resulted in many convictions, carrying
sentences imposing fines and prison terms and
orders of confiscation of issues of the newspaper
and orders of closure of the newspaper for peri-
ods of three days to a month. 
The prosecutions were brought under provisions
rendering it an offence, inter alia, to publish mate-
rial insulting or vilifying the Turkish nation, the
Republic or other specific State officers or au-
thorities, material provoking feelings of hatred
and enmity on grounds of race, region or class,
materials constituting separatist propaganda,
disclosing the names of officials involved in
fighting terrorism or publishing the declarations
of terrorist organisations (see Relevant domestic
law below).
13. On 3 July 1993, Özgür Gündem published a
press release announcing that the newspaper was
charged with offences which cumulatively were
punishable by fines totalling TRL 8,617,441,000
and prison terms ranging between 155 years 9
months to 493 years and 4 months. 
14. During one period of 68 days in 1993, 41 is-
sues of the newspaper were ordered to be seized.
In twenty cases, closure orders were issued, three
for a period of one month, 15 for a period of 15
days and two for 10 days.
15. The applicants have further stated, uncon-
tested by the Government, that there have been
prosecutions in respect of 486 out of 580 editions
of the newspaper and that, pursuant to convic-
tions by the domestic courts, the applicant Yaşar
Kaya has been fined up to TRL 35 billion, while
journalists and editors together have had im-
posed sentences totalling 147 years' imprison-
ment and fines reaching the sum of TRL 21 bil-
lion. 
(..)
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
1. The Criminal Code (Law no. 765)
21. The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code
read as follows:
Article 36 § 1 "In the event of conviction, the court shall
order the seizure and confiscation of any object which
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has been used for the commission or preparation of the
crime or offence…"
Article 79 "A person who infringes various provisions of
this Code by a single act, shall be punished under the
provision which prescribes the heaviest punishment."
Article 159 § 1 "Whoever overtly insults or vilifies the
Turkish nation, the Republic, the Grand National As-
sembly, or the moral personality of the Government, the
Ministries or the military or security forces of the State
or the moral personality of the judicial authorities shall
be punished by imprisonment for one to six years."
Article 311 § 2 "Where incitement to commit an offence is
done by means of mass communication, of whatever
type – whether by tape recordings, gramophone records,
newspapers, press publications or other published mate-
rial – by the circulation or distribution of printed papers
or by the placing of placards or posters in public places,
the terms of imprisonment to which convicted persons
are liable shall be doubled…".
Article 312 "A person who expressly praises or condones
an act punishable by law as an offence or incites the pop-
ulation to break the law shall, on conviction, be liable to
between six months' and two years' imprisonment and a
heavy fine of from six thousand to thirty thousand Turk-
ish liras.
A person who incites the people to hatred or hostility on
the basis of a distinction between social classes, races, re-
ligions, denominations or regions, shall, on conviction,
be liable to between one and three years' imprisonment
and a fine of from nine thousand to thirty-six thousand
liras. If this incitement endangers public safety, the sen-
tence shall be increased by one third to one half.
The penalties to be imposed on those who have commit-
ted the offences defined in the previous paragraph shall
be doubled when they have done so by the means listed
in Article 311 § 2."
22. The conviction of a person pursuant to Arti-
cle 312 § 2 entails further consequences, particu-
larly with regard to the exercise of certain activi-
ties governed by special legislation. For example,
persons convicted of an offence under that Arti-
cle may not found associations (Law no. 2908,
section 4(2)(b)) or trade unions, nor may they be
members of the executive committee of a trade
union (Law no. 2929, section 5). They are also for-
bidden to found or join political parties (Law no.
2820, section 11(5)) and may not stand for elec-
tion to parliament (Law no. 2839, section 11(f3)).
2. The Press Act (Law no. 5680 of 15 July 1950)
23. The relevant provision of the Press Act 1950
reads as follows:
Section 3
"For the purposes of the present Law, the term 'periodi-
cals' shall mean newspapers, press agency dispatches and
any other printed matter published at regular intervals.
'Publication' shall mean the exposure, display, distribu-
tion, emission, sale or offer for sale of printed matter on
premises to which the public have access where anyone
may see it.
An offence shall not be deemed to have been committed
through the medium of the press unless publication has
taken place, except where the material in itself is unlaw-
ful."
3. The Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no.
3713 of 12 April 1991)
24. This law, promulgated with a view to prevent-
ing acts of terrorism, refers to a number of of-
fences defined in the Criminal Code which it de-
scribes as "acts of terrorism" or "acts perpetrated
for the purposes of terrorism" (sections 3 and 4)
and to which it applies. The relevant provisions
of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1991 read as
follows:
Section 6
"It shall be an offence, punishable by a fine of from five
million to ten million Turkish liras, to announce, orally
or in the form of a publication, that terrorist organisa-
tions will commit an offence against a specific person,
whether or not that person's... identity is divulged, pro-
vided that it is done in such a manner that he or she may
be identified, or to reveal the identity of civil servants
who have participated in anti-terrorist operations or to
designate any person as a target.
It shall be an offence, punishable by a fine of from five
million to ten million Turkish liras, to print or publish
declarations or leaflets emanating from terrorist organi-
sations.
…
Where the offences contemplated in the above para-
graphs are committed through the medium of periodi-
cals within the meaning of section 3 of the Press Act (Law
no. 5680), the publisher shall also be liable to a fine equal
to ninety per cent of the income from the average sales
for the previous month if the periodical appears more
frequently than monthly, or from the sales of the previ-
ous issue if the periodical appears monthly or less fre-
quently, or from the average sales for the previous month of the
daily newspaper with the largest circulation if the offence in-
volves printed matter other than periodicals or if the periodical
has just been launched1. However, the fine may not be less
than fifty million Turkish liras. The editor of the period-
ical shall be ordered to pay a sum equal to half the fine
imposed on the publisher."
Section 8
(before amendment by Law no. 4126 of 27 October 1995)
"Written and spoken propaganda, meetings, assemblies
and demonstrations aimed at undermining the territori-
al integrity of the Republic of Turkey or the indivisible
unity of the nation are prohibited, irrespective of the
methods used and the intention. Any person who engag-
es in such an activity shall be sentenced to not less than
two and not more than five years' imprisonment and a
fine of from fifty million to one hundred million Turkish
liras.
Where the crime of propaganda contemplated in the
above paragraph is committed through the medium of
1 The phrase in italics was deleted by a judgment of the
Constitutional Court on 31 March 1992 and ceased to
be in force on 27 July 1993.
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periodicals within the meaning of section 3 of the Press
Act (Law no. 5680), the publisher shall also be liable to a
fine equal to ninety per cent of the income from the aver-
age sales for the previous month if the periodical appears
more frequently than monthly, or from the average sales for
the previous month of the daily newspaper with the largest circu-
lation if the offence involves printed matter other than periodicals
or if the periodical has just been launched. However the fine
may not be less than one hundred million Turkish liras.
The editor of the periodical concerned shall be ordered
to pay a sum equal to half the fine imposed on the pub-
lisher and sentenced to not less than six months' and not
more than two years' imprisonment."
Section 8
(as amended by Law no. 4126 of 27 October 1995)
"Written and spoken propaganda, meetings, assemblies
and demonstrations aimed at undermining the territori-
al integrity of the Republic of Turkey or the indivisible
unity of the nation are prohibited. Any person who en-
gages in such an activity shall be sentenced to not less
than one and not more than three years' imprisonment
and a fine of from one hundred million to three hundred
million Turkish liras. The penalty imposed on a reof-
fender may not be commuted to a fine.
Where the crime of propaganda contemplated in the first
paragraph is committed through the medium of period-
icals within the meaning of section 3 of the Press Act
(Law no. 5680), the publisher shall also be liable to a fine
equal to ninety per cent of the income from the average
sales for the previous month if the periodical appears
more frequently than monthly. However, the fine may
not be less than one hundred million Turkish liras. The
editor of the periodical concerned shall be ordered to pay
a sum equal to half the fine imposed on the publisher
and sentenced to not less than six months' and not more
than two years' imprisonment.
Where the crime of propaganda contemplated in the first
paragraph is committed through the medium of printed
matter or by means of mass communication other than
periodicals within the meaning of the second paragraph,
those responsible and the owners of the means of mass
communication shall be sentenced to not less than six
months' and not more than two years' imprisonment
and a fine of from one hundred million to three hundred
million Turkish liras…"
4. Law no. 4126 of 27 October 1995 amending
sections 8 and 13 of Law no. 3713
25. The following amendments were made to the
Prevention of Terrorism Act 1991 after the enact-
ment of Law 4126 of 27 October 1995:
Temporary provision relating to section 2
"In the month following the entry into force of the pres-
ent Law, the court which has given judgment shall re-ex-
amine the case of a person convicted pursuant to section
8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) and,
in accordance with the amendment... to section 8 of Law
no. 3713, shall reconsider the term of imprisonment im-
posed on that person and decide whether he should be
allowed the benefit of sections 41 and 62 of Law no. 647
of 13 July 1965."
AS TO THE LAW
(..)
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF
THE CONVENTION 
29. The applicants complain that the newspaper
Özgür Gündem was forced to cease publication
due to the campaign of attacks on journalists and
others associated with the newspaper and due to
the legal steps taken against the newspaper and
its staff, invoking Article 10 of the Convention
which provides:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to re-
ceive and impart information and ideas without interfer-
ence by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licens-
ing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such for-
malities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judi-
ciary."
A. Concerning the allegations of attacks on
the newspaper and persons associated with it
30. The applicants claimed that the Government
of Turkey have, directly or indirectly, sought to
hinder, prevent and render impossible the pro-
duction of Özgür Gündem by the encouragement
of or acquiesence in unlawful killings and forced
disappearances, by harassment and intimidation
of journalists and distributors, and by failure to
provide any or any adequate protection for jour-
nalists and distributors when their lives were
clearly in danger and despite requests for such
protection.
The applicants relied on the findings in the
Commission's report that there was a disturbing
pattern of attacks on persons concerned with
1 This provision concerns substitute penalties and mea-
sures which may be ordered in connection with
offences attracting a prison sentence.
2 This provision concerns reprieves.
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Özgür Gündem and that the authorities, through
their failure to take measures of protection and
to conduct adequate investigations in relation to
the apparent pattern of attacks on Özgür Gündem
and persons connected with it, did not comply
with their positive obligation to secure to the
applicants their right to freedom of expression
guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention.
31. The Government emphasised that Özgür Gün-
dem was the instrument of the terrorist organisa-
tion PKK and espoused the aim of that organisa-
tion to destroy the territorial integrity of Turkey
by violent means. They disputed that any reliance
could be placed on previous judgments of the
Court or on the Susurluk report in deducing that
there was any official complicity in any alleged at-
tacks. In particular, the Susurluk report was not a
judicial document and had no probative value. 
The Government submitted that the Commis-
sion based its findings on general presumptions
unsupported by any evidence and that the appli-
cants had not substantiated their claims of a fail-
ure to protect the lives and physical integrity of
persons attached to Özgür Gündem. Nor had they
substantiated that the persons attacked were
related to the newspaper. They disputed that any
positive obligation extends to the protection and
promotion of the propaganda instrument of a
terrorist organisation but asserted that, in any
event, necessary measures were taken in response
to individual complaints, investigations being
carried out by public prosecutors as required.
32. The Court observes that the Government
have disputed the Commission's findings con-
cerning the pattern of attacks in general terms
without specifying which are, or in what way they
are, inaccurate. It notes that the Government
deny specifically that any weight can be given to
the Susurluk report and its description of acquies-
cence and connivance by State authorities in un-
lawful activities, some of which targeted Özgür
Gündem and journalists, of whom Musa Anter is
specifically named. 
In its judgment in the Yaşa case (the Yaşa v. Tur-
key judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports 1998-
VI, p. 2411, §§ 95-96), in which it was alleged
that the security forces had connived in an
attack on Esref Yaşa and his uncle who were both
involved in the sale and distribution of Özgür
Gündem in Diyarbakýr, the Court found that the
Susurluk report did not provide a basis for ena-
bling the perpetrators of the attack on Esref Yaşa
and his uncle to be identified. It did find that the
report gave rise to serious concerns and that it
was not disputed in the Yaşa case that there had
been a number of serious attacks on journalists,
newspaper kiosks and distributors of Özgür Gün-
dem. Furthermore, while the Susurluk report
indeed may not be relied on for establishing to
the required standard of proof that State offi-
cials were implicated in any particular incident,
the Court considers that the report, which was
drawn up at the request of the Prime Minister
and which he decided should be made public,
must be regarded as a serious attempt to provide
information on and analyse problems associated
with the fight against terrorism from a general
perspective and to recommend preventive and
investigative measures. On that basis, the report
can be relied on as providing factual substantia-
tion of the fears expressed by the applicants
from 1992 onwards that the newspaper and per-
sons associated with it were at risk of unlawful
violence. 
33. Having regard to the parties' submissions
and the findings of the Commission in its report,
the Court is satisfied that from 1992 to 1994
there were numerous incidents of violence, in-
cluding killings, assaults and arson attacks, in-
volving the newspaper and journalists, distribu-
tors and other persons associated with it. The
concerns of the newspaper, and its fears that it
was victim of a concerted campaign tolerated, if
not approved, by State officials, were brought to
the attention of the authorities (see paragraphs
14-15 above). It does not appear, however, that
any measures were taken to investigate this alle-
gation. Nor did the authorities respond by any
protective measures, save in two instances (see
paragraph 16 above).
34. The Court has long held that, although the
essential object of many provisions of the Con-
vention is to protect the individual against arbi-
trary interference by public authorities, there
may in addition be positive obligations inherent
in an effective respect of the rights concerned. It
has found that such obligations may arise under
Article 8 (see, amongst others, the Gaskin v. the
United Kingdom judgment of 7 July 1989, Series
A no. 160, §§ 42-49) and Article 11 (the Plattform
"Ärzte für das Leben" v. Austria judgment of 21
June 1988, Series A no. 139, § 32). Obligations to
take steps to undertake effective investigations
have also been found to accrue in the context of
Article 2 (e.g. the McCann and Others v. the Unit-
ed Kingdom judgment of 27 September 1995, Se-
ries A no. 324, § 161) and Article 3 (the Assenov
and Others v. Bulgaria judgment of 28 October
1998, Reports 1998-VIII, p. 3265, at § 102), while a
positive obligation to take steps to protect life
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may also exist under Article 2 (the Osman v. the
United Kingdom judgment of 28 October 1998,
Reports 1998-VIII, pp. 3159-3161, §§ 115-117).
35. The Court recalls the key importance of free-
dom of expression as one of the preconditions for
a functioning democracy. Genuine, effective exer-
cise of this freedom does not depend merely on
the State's duty not to interfere, but may require
positive measures of protection, even in the
sphere of relations between individuals (mutatis
mutandis, the X and Y v. the Netherlands judg-
ment of 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91, § 23). In
determining whether or not a positive obligation
exists, regard must be had to the fair balance that
has to be struck between the general interest of
the community and the interests of the individu-
al, the search for which is called for throughout
the Convention. The scope of this obligation will
inevitably vary, having regard to the diversity of
situations obtaining in Contracting States, the
difficulties involved in policing modern societies
and the choices which must be made in terms of
priorities and resources. Nor must such an obli-
gation be interpreted in such a way as to impose
an impossible or disproportionate burden on the
authorities (see, amongst other authorities, the
Rees v. the United Kingdom judgment of 17 Oc-
tober 1986, Series A no. 106, § 37, the Osman v.
the United Kingdom judgment, cited above,
§ 116). 
36. In the present case, the authorities were aware
that Özgür Gündem, and persons associated with
it, had been subject to a series of violent acts and
that the applicants feared that they were being
targeted deliberately in efforts to prevent publi-
cation and distribution of the newspaper. No re-
sponse however was given to almost all petitions
and requests for protection submitted by the
newspaper or its staff. The Government have only
been able to identify one protective measure con-
cerning the distribution of the newspaper which
was taken while the newspaper was still in exist-
ence. The steps taken after the bomb attack at the
İstanbul office in December 1994 concerned the
newspaper's successor. The Court finds, having
regard to the seriousness of the attacks and their
widespread nature, that the Government cannot
rely on the investigations lodged by individual
public prosecutors into specific incidents. It is
not persuaded by the Government's contention
that these investigations provided adequate or ef-
fective responses to the applicants' allegations
that the attacks were part of a concerted cam-
paign which was supported, or tolerated, by the
authorities.
37. The Court has noted the Government's sub-
missions concerning its strongly-held conviction
that Özgür Gündem and its staff supported the
PKK and acted as its propaganda tool. This does
not, even if true, provide a justification for failing
to take steps effectively to investigate and, where
necessary, provide protection against unlawful
acts involving violence. 
38. The Court concludes that the Government
have failed, in the circumstances, to comply with
their positive obligation to protect Özgür Gündem
in the exercise of its freedom of expression.
B. Concerning the police operation at the
Özgür Gündem premises in Istanbul on 10 De-
cember 1993
39. The applicants relied on the findings in the
Commission's report that the search and arrest
operation conducted on the premises of Özgür
Gündem in Istanbul, during which all the employ-
ees were detained and the archives, library and
administrative documents seized, disclosed an
interference with the newspaper's freedom of ex-
pression for which there was no convincing justi-
fication. In their submissions to the Commis-
sion, they stated that there were innocent
explanations for the allegedly incriminating ma-
terial found on the premises (see the Commis-
sion's report, § 36(i)).
40. The Government pointed to the materials
seized during the search, including injection kits,
gas masks, an ERNK receipt and the identity card
of a dead soldier, which, they submitted, were in-
controvertible proof of the links between the
newspaper and the PKK. They referred to the con-
viction on 12 December 1996 of the editor Gur-
betelli Ersöz and manager Ali Rýza Halis for aid-
ing the PKK. They also asserted that, of the 107
persons apprehended at the Istanbul office, 40
persons could claim no attachment to the news-
paper, which gave additional grounds for suspi-
cions of complicity with the terrorist organisa-
tion.
41. The Court finds that the operation, which re-
sulted in newspaper production being disrupted
for two days, constituted a serious interference
with the applicants' freedom of expression. It ac-
cepts that the operation was conducted accord-
ing to a procedure "prescribed by law" for the
purpose of preventing crime and disorder within
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article
10. It does not, however, find that a measure of
such dimension was proportionate to this aim.
No justification has been provided for the seizure
mwb-3164-european.media.law.book  Page 105  Wednesday, August 17, 2011  2:33 PM
106
Case Law
of the newspaper's archives, documentation and
library. Nor has the Court received an explana-
tion for the blanket apprehension of every person
found on the newspaper's premises, including
the cook, cleaner and heating engineer. The pres-
ence of 40 persons who were not employed by the
newspaper is not, in itself, evidence of any sinister
purpose or of the commission of any offence. 
42. As stated in the Commission's report, the ne-
cessity for any restriction in the exercise of free-
dom of expression must be convincingly estab-
lished (see, amongst other authorities, the Otto-
Preminger-Institut v. Austria judgment of 20
September 1994, Series A no. 295-A, § 50.) The
Court concludes that the search operation, as
conducted by the authorities, has not been
shown to be necessary, in a democratic society,
for the implementation of any legitimate aim.
C. Concerning the legal measures taken in re-
spect of issues of the newspaper
1. The applicants
43. The applicants claimed that the Government
also sought to hinder, prevent and render impos-
sible the production and distribution of Özgür
Gündem by means of unjustified legal proceed-
ings. They adopt the findings in the Commis-
sion's report that many of the prosecutions
brought against the newspaper in respect of the
contents of articles and news reports were unjus-
tified and disproportionate in their effects. They
submit that the Commission analysed thorough-
ly a representative sample of prosecutions in the
light of the principles established by the Court
and found that most of the impugned articles
contained no incitement to violence or com-
ments likely to exacerbate the situation which
could justify the measures imposed.
2. The Government
44. The Government submitted that the Com-
mission was selective in the manner in which it
examined domestic court decisions concerning
Özgür Gündem publications. It was furthermore
simplistic, in their view, to consider that only
words directly and expressly inciting to violence
might justifiably be prohibited, an approach
which the Commission had taken in examining
the articles. Implied, covert and veiled messages
could equally have a negative impact. The Gov-
ernment argued that the correct test was to exam-
ine the actual danger caused by the publication.
They also contended that the intention of the
newspaper, namely, that of acting as a tool of
propaganda for the PKK and of supporting its
aim of endangering territorial integrity of Tur-
key, was crucial in this assessment. It is for the do-
mestic authorities who are in contact with the vi-
tal forces of their countries to determine whether
safety or security is threatened and the Contract-
ing State must enjoy a wide margin of apprecia-
tion in any supervision carried out by Strasbourg.
3. The Commission
45. In its report, the Commission examined 21
court decisions concerning prosecutions in re-
spect of 32 articles and news reports. These pros-
ecutions related to various offences: insulting the
State and the military authorities under Article
159 of the Criminal Code, provoking racial and
regional hostility under Article 312 of the Crimi-
nal Code, reporting statements of the PKK under
section 6 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act
1991, identifying officials appointed to fight ter-
rorism under section 6 of the 1991 Act, and pub-
lishing separatist propaganda under section 8 of
the 1991 Act. The prosecutions resulted in con-
victions involving prison terms, fines and closure
of the newspaper. The Commission found that
the criminal convictions and the imposition of
sentences could be justified only in respect of
three publications. Its summaries of the articles
and court judgments are contained in its report
(§§ 160-237).
4. The Court's assessment
46. The Court, firstly, sees no reason for criticis-
ing the approach adopted by the Commission
which consisted in selecting domestic decisions
for examination. The Commission reviewed the
material and information provided by the par-
ties, including the convictions and acquittals in-
volved. Given the number of prosecutions and
decisions, a detailed analysis of all cases would
have been impracticable. The Commission iden-
tified decisions reflecting the different criminal
offences at stake in the domestic cases. The arti-
cles examined varied in subject-matter and form
and included news reports on different subjects,
interviews, a book review and a cartoon. The Gov-
ernment have not provided any reason for hold-
ing that this selection was biased, unrepresenta-
tive or otherwise gave a distorted picture; nor did
they identify any court decisions or articles which
should have been examined instead. 
47. The Court therefore accepts the approach
taken by the Commission and will examine
whether, in the cases which the latter included in
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its report, the measures imposed disclose any vio-
lation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
48. It finds, first, that prima facie these measures
constituted an interference with the freedom of
expression within the meaning of the first para-
graph of Article 10 and fall to be justified in
terms of the second paragraph. While the appli-
cants submit, in their memorial, that the 1991
Prevention of Terrorism Act provisions (see para-
graphs 32-33 above) are so vague and potentially
all-inclusive as to violate the letter and spirit of
Article 10, they have not provided any precise ar-
gument on why the measures in question should
not be considered as "prescribed by law".
The Court recalls that it has already considered
this point in previous judgments (see e.g. the
Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1), judgment of 8 July 1999,
to be published in the official reports of the
Court, §§ 45-46, and twelve other freedom of
expression cases concerning Turkey) and found
that measures imposed pursuant to the 1991 Act
could be regarded as "prescribed by law". The
applicants have provided no basis on which to
alter this conclusion. As in those other judg-
ments, the Court therefore finds that the meas-
ures taken can be said to have pursued the
legitimate aims of protecting national security
and territorial integrity and of preventing crime
and disorder (see e.g. Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1),
cited above, § 52).
49. The Court shall now examine whether these
measures were "necessary in a democratic socie-
ty" for achieving such aim or aims in the light of
the principles established in its case-law (see,
amongst recent authorities, the Zana v. Turkey
judgment of 25 November 1997, Reports 1997-
VII, p. 2533, § 51, the Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) judg-
ment, cited above, § 58). These may be summa-
rised as follows:
(i) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society
and one of the basic conditions for its progress
and for each individual's self-fulfilment. Subject
to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it extends not only
to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably
received or regarded as inoffensive or indifferent,
but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.
Such are the demands of the pluralism, tolerance
and broadmindedness without which there is no
"democratic society". As set forth in Article 10,
this freedom is subject to exceptions which
must, however, be construed strictly, and the
need for any restrictions must be established
convincingly.
(ii) The adjective "necessary", within the mean-
ing of Article 10 § 2, implies the existence of a
"pressing social need". The Contracting States
have a certain margin of appreciation in assess-
ing whether such a need exists, but that margin
goes hand in hand with European supervision,
embracing both the legislation and the decisions
applying it, even those given by an independent
court. The Court is therefore empowered to give
a final ruling on whether a given "restriction" is
reconcilable with the freedom of expression pro-
tected by Article 10.
(iii) In exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the
Court must look at the interference in the light
of the case as a whole, including the content of
the impugned statements and the context in
which they were made. In particular, it must
determine whether that interference was "pro-
portionate to the legitimate aims pursued" and
whether the reasons adduced by the national
authorities to justify it are "relevant and suffi-
cient". In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself
that the national authorities applied standards
which were in conformity with the principles
embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they
based themselves on an acceptable assessment of
the relevant facts.
50. As these cases also concern measures against
newspaper publications, they must equally be
seen in the light of the essential role played by the
press for ensuring the proper functioning of de-
mocracy (see, among many other authorities, the
Lingens v. Austria judgment of 8 July 1986, Series
A no. 103, p. 26, § 41; and the above-mentioned
Fressoz and Roire v. France judgment of 21 Janu-
ary 1999, to be published in the official reports of
the Court, § 45). While the press must not over-
step the bounds set, inter alia, for the protection
of the vital interests of the State, such as the pro-
tection of national security or territorial integrity
against the threat of violence or the prevention of
disorder or crime, it is nevertheless incumbent on
the press to convey information and ideas on po-
litical issues, even divisive ones. Not only has the
press the task of imparting such information and
ideas; the public has a right to receive them. Free-
dom of the press affords the public one of the
best means of discovering and forming an opin-
ion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders
(see the above-mentioned Lingens judgment, p.
26, §§ 41-42).
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(a) Prosecutions concerning the offence of insulting
the State and the military authorities (Article 159
of the Criminal Code)
51. The Commission examined in this context
three articles concerning the alleged destruction
of houses in Lice by the security forces which led
to the imposition of a prison sentence of ten
months and a closure order of 15 days, and a car-
toon depicting the Turkish Republic as a figure
labelled "kahpe1", which entailed the imposition
of a fine, a 10-month prison term and a closure
order of 15 days (see the Commission's report, §§
161-166).
52. The Court recalls that the dominant position
enjoyed by the State authorities makes it neces-
sary for them to display restraint in resorting to
criminal proceedings. The authorities of a demo-
cratic State must tolerate criticism, even if it may
be regarded as provocative or insulting. The
Court notes, in respect of the articles concerning
the destruction in Lice, that allegations of securi-
ty force involvement were circulating widely and
indeed are the subject of proceedings in Stras-
bourg (see e.g. no. 23656/94, Ayder and others v.
Turkey, Commission's report 21.10.1999, pend-
ing before the Court). The Commission also
found that the terms of the article were factual in
content and emotional, but not offensive, in
tone. In respect of the cartoon, it notes that the
domestic court rejected the claim that it was in-
tended as a joke but found that it disclosed "the
concentrated nature of the intention to insult".
The Court does not find any convincing reason,
however, for penalising any of these publications
as described above. It agrees with the Commis-
sion's findings that the measures taken were not
"necessary in a democratic society" for the pur-
suit of any legitimate aim.
(b) Prosecutions concerning the offence of provok-
ing racial and regional hostility (Article 312 of the
Criminal Code)
53. The case examined under this heading con-
cerned an article describing alleged attacks by se-
curity forces on villages in the south-eastern re-
gion and attacks made by terrorists, including
the killing of an imam (see the Commission's re-
port, §§ 167-169). The domestic court, which im-
posed a fine and a prison sentence of 16 months'
imprisonment on the author and issued a closure
order of one month, referred to the manner in
which the article was written, the reason why it
was written and the social context, without offer-
ing any explanation. The Court notes that it did
not rely on any alleged inaccuracy in the article.
The Commission found that the article was fac-
tual and of public interest and that it contained
no element of incitement to violence or overt
support for the use of violence by the PKK. The
Court does not find relevant and sufficient rea-
sons for imposing criminal convictions and pen-
alties in respect of this article and agrees with the
Commission that the interference was not justi-
fied under Article 10 paragraph 2 of the Conven-
tion.
(c) Prosecutions for reporting statements of the
PKK (section 6 of the 1991 Act)
54. The Commission reviewed seven court deci-
sions concerning convictions which were im-
posed in respect of eight articles, and which in-
volved fines and the confiscation of newspaper
issues. The articles included reports of declara-
tions of PKK organisations (e.g. ARGK), state-
ments, a speech and an interview with Abdullah
Öcalan, the PKK leader, a statement by the Euro-
pean representative of the PKK, an interview with
Osman Öcalan, a PKK commander, a statement
by the Dev-Sol European office, and an interview
with Cemil Bayýk, a PKK commander (see the
Commission's report, §§ 174-195). 
55. The Court recalls that the fact that interviews
or statements were given by a member of a pro-
scribed organisation cannot in itself justify an in-
terference with the newspaper's freedom of ex-
pression. Nor can the fact that the interviews or
statements contain views strongly disparaging of
Government policy. Regard must be had instead
to the words used and the context in which they
were published, with a view to determining
whether the texts taken as a whole can be consid-
ered as inciting to violence (see e.g. the Sürek and
Özdemir judgment of 8 July 1999, § 61).
56. The Court agrees with the Commission that
four of the eight articles cannot be regarded as in-
citing to violence, in view of their content, tone
and context. In particular, it finds that the state-
ment of the Dev-Sol office in Europe, which re-
counts alleged police maltreatment of persons at
a Turkish funeral in Germany, did not contain
any material relevant to public order concerns in
Turkey.
57. Three articles were found by the Commission
to contain passages which advocated intensifying
the armed struggle, glorified war and espoused
1 This word conveys a range of meanings, including
prostitute, tricky, deceitful.
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the intention to fight to the last drop of blood.
The Court agrees that, in the context of the con-
flict in the south-east, these could reasonably be
regarded as encouraging the use of violence (see
e.g. the Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) judgment, §§ 61-
62). Given also the relatively light penalties im-
posed, the Court finds that the measures com-
plained of were reasonably proportionate to the
legitimate aims of preventing crime and disorder
and could be justified as necessary in a democrat-
ic society within the meaning of the second para-
graph of Article 10.
(d) Prosecutions for identifying officials participat-
ing in the fight against terrorism (section 6 of the
1991 Act)
58. Five court decisions on six articles are con-
cerned under this heading. Penalties imposed in-
cluded fines, the confiscation of issues and, in
one instance, a closure order of fifteen days (see
the Commission's report, §§ 199-215).
59. The Court observes that the convictions and
sentences had been imposed because the articles
had identified by name certain officials in con-
nection with alleged misconduct, namely, the
death of the son of a DEP candidate during de-
tention, the allegation of official acquiescence in
the killing of Musa Anter, the forcible evacuation
of villages, the intimidation of villagers, the
bombing of Şirnak and the revenge killing of two
persons after a PKK raid on a gendarme head-
quarters. However, it is significant that in two of
the articles the officials named were not in fact al-
leged to be responsible for the misconduct but
merely implicated in the surrounding events. In
particular, concerning the death during deten-
tion, the Şýrnak security director was cited as
having previously re-assured the family that the
man would be released safely and the Şýrnak
chief public prosecutor was reported as being un-
available for comment. While three village guards
were named in the article concerning the revenge
killing, it was alleged that the gendarmes had
killed the two people. 
60. It is true that the other three articles alleged
serious misconduct by the officials named and
were capable of exposing them to public con-
tempt. However, as for the other articles, the
truth of their content was apparently not a factor
taken into account, and, if true, the matters de-
scribed were of public interest. Nor was it taken
into account that the names of the officials and
their role in fighting terrorism were already in the
public domain. Thus the State of Emergency
Governor, who was named in one article, was a
public figure in the region, while the gendarmerie
commanders and village guards named in the
other articles would have been well-known in
their districts. The interest in protecting their
identity was substantially diminished, therefore,
and the potential damage which the restriction
aimed at preventing was minimal. To the extent
therefore that the authorities had relevant rea-
sons to impose criminal sanctions, these could
not be regarded as sufficient to justify the restric-
tions placed on the newspaper's freedom of ex-
pression (see e.g. the Sürek v. Turkey (no. 2) judg-
ment of 8 July 1999, §§ 37-42). These measures
accordingly could not be justified in terms of Ar-
ticle 10 § 2 of the Convention.
(e) Prosecutions for statements constituting separa-
tist propaganda (section 8 of the 1991 Act)
61. Under this heading, the Commission identi-
fied six court decisions concerning twelve arti-
cles. The penalties imposed upon conviction in-
cluded terms of imprisonment of 20 months and
two years, fines, confiscation of issues and, in one
instance, a closure order of one month (see the
Commission's report, §§ 218-317).
62. The Court observes that the articles in ques-
tion included reports on economic or social mat-
ters (e.g. a dam project, public health), commen-
taries on historical developments in the south-
eastern region, a declaration condemning torture
and massacres in Turkey and calling for a demo-
cratic solution, and accounts of alleged destruc-
tion of villages in the south-east. The Court notes
that the use of the term "Kurdistan" in a context
which implies that it should be, or is, separate
from the territory of Turkey, and the claims by
persons to exercise authority on behalf of that en-
tity, may be highly provocative to the authorities.
However, the public enjoys the right to be in-
formed of different perspectives on the situation
in south-east Turkey, irrespective of how unpalat-
able those perspectives appear to the authorities.
The Court is not persuaded that, even against the
background of serious disturbances in the re-
gion, expressions which appear to support the
idea of a separate Kurdish entity must be regard-
ed as inevitably exacerbating the situation. While
several of the articles were highly critical of the
authorities and attributed unlawful conduct to
the security forces, sometimes in colourful and
pejorative terms, the Court nonetheless finds
that they cannot be reasonably regarded as advo-
cating or inciting the use of violence. Having re-
gard to the severity of the penalties imposed, it
concludes that the restrictions imposed on the
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newspaper's freedom of expression disclosed in
these cases were disproportionate to the aim pur-
sued and cannot be justified as "necessary in a
democratic society".
D. Conclusion
63. The Court concludes that the respondent
State has failed to take adequate protective and
investigative measures to protect Özgür Gündem's
exercise of its freedom of expression and that it
has imposed measures on the newspaper,
through the search and arrest operation of 10 De-
cember 1993 and through numerous prosecu-
tions and convictions in respect of issues of the
newspaper, which were disproportionate and un-
justified in the pursuit of any legitimate aim. As a
result of these cumulative factors, the newspaper
ceased publication. There has accordingly been a
breach of Article 10 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14
OF THE CONVENTION
64. The applicants claimed that the measures im-
posed on Özgür Gündem disclosed discrimina-
tion, invoking Article 14 of the Convention
which provides:
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Convention shall be secured without discrimination
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status."
65. The applicants asked the Court to reconsider
the opinion, expressed in the Commission's re-
port, that their complaints of discrimination
were unsubstantiated. They submitted that the
finding of a violation of Article 10 supports the
conclusion that they suffered discrimination on
the grounds of their national origin and associa-
tion with a national minority. They argue that
any expression of Kurdish identity was treated by
the authorities as advocacy of separatism and
PKK propaganda. In the absence of any justifica-
tion for the restrictive measures imposed with re-
gard to most of the articles examined by the
Commission, these measures could only be ex-
plained by prohibited discrimination.
66. The Government submitted that the appli-
cants' claims of discrimination were unsubstan-
tiated.
67. The Court recalls that it has found a violation
of Article 10 of the Convention. However, in
reaching the conclusion that the measures im-
posed in respect of 29 articles and news reports
were not necessary in a democratic society, it was
satisfied that they pursued the legitimate aims of
protecting national security and territorial integ-
rity or that of the prevention of crime or disorder.
There is no reason to believe that the restrictions
on freedom of expression which resulted can be
attributed to a difference of treatment based on
the applicants' national origin or to association
with a national minority. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that there has been no breach of Arti-
cle 14 of the Convention. 
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE
CONVENTION
(..)
FOR THESE REASONS THE COURT 
1. Decides unanimously to strike the case out of
the list insofar as it concerns Gurbetelli Ersöz;
2. Holds unanimously that there has been a viola-
tion of Article 10 of the Convention;
3. Holds unanimously that there has been no vio-
lation of Article 14 of the Convention;
4. Holds by six votes to one
(a) that the respondent State pay, within three
months;
(i) to the applicant company 9,000,000,000 (nine
thousand million) Turkish liras; (ii) to Fahri Fer-
da Çetin and Yaşar Kaya for non-pecuniary dam-
age 5,000 (five thousand) pounds sterling each to
be converted into pounds sterling at the ex-
change rate applicable at the date of delivery of
this judgment; (iii) to the applicants for costs and
expenses 16,000 (sixteen thousand) pounds ster-
ling less 9,195 (nine thousand, one hundred and
ninety five) French francs to be converted into
pounds sterling at the exchange rate applicable at
the date of delivery of this judgment;
(b) that simple interest at an annual rate of 7.5%
shall be payable from the expiry of the above-
mentioned three months until settlement;
5. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the ap-
plicants' claims for just satisfaction.
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PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE
GÖLCÜKLÜ
(..) 
PEDERSEN AND BAADSGAARD V. DENMARK, 17 DECEMBER 2004
APPLICATION NO. 49017/99 – GRAND CHAMBER
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
A. The television programmes produced by
the applicants
1. The applicants were two television journalists.
At the relevant time they were employed by one of
the two national TV stations in Denmark, Dan-
marks Radio. They produced two television pro-
grammes which were broadcast on 17 September
1990 at 8 p.m. and 22 April 1991 also at 8 p.m. It
was estimated that approximately 30% of all view-
ers above the age of twelve years saw the pro-
grammes. The programmes, described as docu-
mentaries, were called "Convicted of Murder"
(dømt for mord) and "The Blind Eye of the Police"
(Politiets blinde øje) respectively and dealt with a
murder trial in which on 12 November 1982 the
High Court of Western Denmark (Vestre Landsret)
had convicted a person, hereafter called X, of
murdering his wife on 12 December 1981 be-
tween approximately 11.30 a.m. and 1 p.m. X was
sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment. Upon ap-
peal the Supreme Court (Højesteret) upheld the
sentence in 1983. On 13 September 1990, subse-
quent to his release on probation, X requested
the Special Court of Revision (Den Særlige
Klageret) to reopen the case.
The applicants had commenced the preparation
of the programmes in March 1989, which
entailed establishing contact with witnesses
through advertising in the local paper and via
police reports. 
At the outset of both programmes it was stated
that they had been produced on the following
premise:
"In the programme we shall provide evidence by way of a
series of specific examples that there was no legal basis
for X's conviction and that by imposing its sentence, the
High Court of Western Denmark set aside one of the
fundamental tenets of the law in Denmark, namely that
the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt.
We shall show that a scandalously bad police investiga-
tion, in which the question of guilt had been prejudged
right from the start, and which ignored significant wit-
nesses and concentrated on dubious ones, led to X being
sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment for the murder of
his wife.
The programme will show that X could not have com-
mitted the crime of which he was convicted on 12 No-
vember 1982".
1. The first programme "Convicted of Murder"
3. At an early stage in the first programme, "Con-
victed of Murder", the following comment was
made:
"In the case against X, police inquiries involved about
900 people. More than 4,000 pages of reports were writ-
ten – and 30 witnesses appeared before the High Court of
Western Denmark.
We will try to establish what actually happened on the
day of the murder, 12 December 1981. We shall critically
review the police's investigations and evaluate the wit-
nesses' statements regarding the time of X's wife's disap-
pearance."
As part of the preparation of this first pro-
gramme, the applicants had invited the police in
the district of Frederikshavn, who had been re-
sponsible for the investigation of the murder
case, to take part in the programme. Having cor-
responded on this subject for some time, the
Chief of Police informed the applicants by letter
of 19 April 1990 that the police could not partic-
ipate in the programme as certain conditions for
giving the interview had not been complied with,
inter alia that the questions be sent in writing in
advance, 
4. Subsequent to the broadcast on 17 September
1990 of the first programme "Convicted of Mur-
der", the applicants were charged with defama-
tion in that in the programme they had unlawful-
ly connected the boyfriend of X's wife ("the
school teacher") to the death of two women re-
ferred to in the programme, one being X's wife.
The defamation case ended on 14 December
1993 before the High Court with a settlement, ac-
cording to which the applicants were to pay the
school teacher 300,000 Danish kroner (DKK),
apologise unreservedly, and give an undertaking
never to broadcast the programme again. 
2. The second programme "The Blind Eye of the Police"
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5. The applicants alleged that the Chief Superin-
tendent, at some unknown time before the
broadcast of the second programme, during a tel-
ephone conversation with the applicant Peder-
sen, had declined to participate in the pro-
gramme. 
6. In the introduction to the second programme,
"The Blind Eye of the Police", the following com-
ment was made:
"It was the police in the district of Frederikshavn who
were responsible at that time for the investigations
which led to the conviction of X. Did the police assume
right from the start that X was the killer and did they
therefore fail to investigate all the leads in the case, as
otherwise required by the law?
We have investigated whether there is substance in X's
serious allegations against the police in the district of
Frederikshavn."
7. Shortly afterwards in the programme the sec-
ond applicant interviewed a taxi driver, who ex-
plained that she had been interviewed by two po-
lice officers a few days after the disappearance of
X's wife, and that during this interview she had
mentioned two observations she made on
12 December 1981: she had seen a Peugeot taxi
(which was later shown to have no relevance to
the murder), and before that she had seen X and
his son at about 5-10 minutes past noon. She had
driven behind them for about one kilometre. The
reason why she could remember the date and
time so exactly was because she had had to attend
her grandmother's funeral on that date at 1 p.m.
8. The following comment was then made:
Commentator: So in December 1981, shortly after X's
wife disappears and X is in prison, the Frederikshavn Po-
lice is in possession of the taxi driver's statement in
which she reports that shortly after 12 o'clock that Sat-
urday she drives behind X and his son for about a kilo-
metre...So X and his son were in Mølleparken [residential
area] twice, and the police knew it in 1981.
9. The interview went on:
"Second applicant: What did the police officers say
about the information you provided?
Taxi driver: Well, one of them said that it couldn't be
true that X's son was in the car, but in fact I am 100% cer-
tain it was him because I also know the son because I
have driven him to day-care.
Second applicant: Why did he say that to you?
Taxi driver: Well, he just said that it couldn't be true that
the son was there.
Second applicant: That it couldn't be true that you saw
what you saw.
Taxi driver: No, that is, he didn't say that I hadn't seen X,
it just couldn't be true that the son was with him.
Second applicant: These were the two police officers who
questioned the taxi driver in 1981 and it was they who
wrote the police report.
We showed the taxi driver her statement from 1981,
which she had never seen before.
Taxi driver: It's missing, the bit about – there was only...
about the Peugeot, there was nothing about the rest, un-
less you have another one.
Second applicant: There is only this one.
Taxi driver: But it obviously cannot have been important.
Second applicant: What do you think about that?
Taxi driver: Well it says, I don't know, well I think when
you make a statement, it should be written down in any
case, otherwise I can't see any point in it, and especially
not in a murder case.
Commentator: So the taxi driver claims that already in
1981 she had told two police officers that she had seen X
and his son. Not a word of this is mentioned in this re-
port.
Second applicant: Why are you so sure that you told the
police this, which at that time was 1981.
Taxi driver:Well I am 100% sure of it and also, my hus-
band sat beside me in the living room as a witness so..., so
that is why I am 100% certain that I told them.
Second applicant: And he was there throughout the en-
tire interview?
Taxi driver: Yes, he was.
Second applicant: Not just part of the interview?
Taxi driver: No, he was there all the time.
Commentator: It was not until 1990, nine years later,
that the taxi driver heard of the matter again, shortly af-
ter the "Convicted of Murder" programme had been
shown; even though the taxi driver's report had been
filed as a so called 0-report, she was phoned by a Chief In-
spector of the Flying Squad (Rejseholdet) who had been
asked by the Public Prosecutor to do a couple of further
interviews.
Taxi driver: The Chief Inspector of the Flying Squad
called me and asked whether I knew if any of my col-
leagues knew anything they had not reported, or whether
I had happened to think of something, and I then told
him on the phone what I said the first time about the
Peugeot and that I had driven behind X and his son up to
Ryets Street, and then he said that if he found out about
anything which, otherwise... or if there was anything,
then he would... then he would get in touch with me
again, which he didn't do, not until a while afterwards
when he called me and asked whether I would come for
another interview.
Second applicant: When you told the Chief Inspector of
the Flying Squad in your telephone call that you fol-
lowed X, and his son was in the car, what did he say about
that?
Taxi driver: Well, he didn't say anything.
Second applicant:He did not say that you had never re-
ported this?
Taxi driver: No, he didn't."
10. The second applicant then conducted a short
interview with X's new counsel:
"Second applicant: Have you any comment on the expla-
nation the taxi driver has given now?
X's new counsel: I have no comment to make at this
time.
Second applicant: Why not?
X's new counsel: I have agreed with the public prosecu-
tor, and the President of the Special Court of Revision,
that statements to the press in this matter will in future
only be issued by the Special Court of Revision.
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Commentator: Even though X's new counsel does not
wish to speak about the case, we know from other sourc-
es that it was he who, in February this year, asked for the
taxi driver to be interviewed again. So in March she was
interviewed at Frederikshavn police station in the pres-
ence of the Chief Superintendent, which is clearly at
odds with what the public prosecutor previously stated
in public, namely that the Frederikshavn police would
not get the opportunity to be involved in the new inqui-
ries."
11. The interview with the taxi driver continued:
"Second applicant: And what happened at the interview?
Taxi driver: What happened was that I was shown into
the office of the Chief Inspector of the Flying Squad and
the Chief Superintendent was there too.
Second applicant: Was there any explanation given
about why he was present?
Taxi driver: No.
Second applicant: So what did you say in this interview?
Taxi driver: I gave the same explanations as I had done
the first time when I was interviewed at home.
Second applicant: 10 years before, that is.
Taxi driver: Yes.
Second applicant: And that was?
Taxi driver: Well, that I had driven behind X and his son
up to Ryets Street.
Second applicant: What did they say about that?
Taxi driver: They didn't say anything.
Second applicant: The report which was made in 1981,
did you see it?
Taxi driver: No.
Second applicant: Was it there in the room?
Taxi driver: There was a report there when I was being in-
terviewed, but I wasn't allowed to see it.
Second applicant: Did you expressly ask whether you
could see the old report?
Taxi driver: I asked whether I could see it but the Chief
Inspector of the Flying Squad said I couldn't..."
12. After the interview with the taxi driver the
commentator said:
"Now we are left with all the questions: why did the vital
part of the taxi driver's explanation disappear – and who
in the police or public prosecutor's office should carry
the responsibility for this?
Was it the two police officers who failed to write a report
about it?
Hardly, sources in the police tell us they would not dare.
Was it [the named Chief Superintendent] who decided
that the report should not be included in the case? Or did
he and the Chief Inspector of the Flying Squad conceal
the witness's statement from the defence, the judges and
the jury?..."
Pictures of the two police officers, the named
Chief Superintendent and the Chief Inspector of
the Flying Squad, were shown on the screen si-
multaneously and parallel with the above ques-
tions. The questions went on:
"Why did the Chief Inspector of the Flying Squad phone
the taxi driver shortly after the TV-programme 'Convict-
ed of Murder'? After all, the police had taken the view
that the taxi driver had no importance as a witness and
had filed her statement amongst the 0-reports.
Why did the Chief Inspector of the Flying Squad not call
her in for an interview when she repeated her original ex-
planation on the telephone?
Why was the taxi driver interviewed at the Frederikshavn
police station in the presence of the Chief Superinten-
dent, which was completely at odds with the public pros-
ecutor's public statement?
On 20 September last year [a named] Chief Constable
stated to [a regional daily]: 'all the information connect-
ed to the case has been submitted to the defendants, the
prosecution and the judges' Did the Chief Constable
know about the taxi driver's statement, when he made
this statement? Did the State Prosecutor know already in
1981 that there was a statement from a witness confirm-
ing that X had been in Mølleparken twice, and that X's
son had been with him both times? Neither of them have
agreed to make any statement at all about the case." 
13. In the meantime, on 11 March 1991, before
the broadcast of the programme "The Blind Eye
of the Police", at the request of X's new counsel,
the taxi driver had again been interviewed by the
police. She stated that on 12 December 1981 she
had attended her grandmother's funeral at
1 p.m. and that on her way to the funeral around
five or ten past noon she had driven behind X and
his son. She had arrived at the funeral at the last
minute before 1 p.m. She also explained that she
had told the police about this when first inter-
viewed in 1981. Later on 11 March 1991 the po-
lice made an enquiry which revealed that the fu-
neral of the taxi driver's grandmother had indeed
taken place on 12 December 1981, but at 2 p.m.
Thereafter, the police held three interviews with
the taxi driver during which she changed her
explanation, inter alia, as follows:
On 24 April 1991 she maintained having seen X
shortly after noon but agreed that the funeral
had taken place at 2 p.m. On her way to the
funeral she realised she had forgotten a wreath.
Thus, she had had to return to her home and
had consequently arrived at the funeral just
before 2 p.m.
On 25 April 1991 she stated that she was not
sure about the date or the time when she had
seen X and his son. Moreover, she was uncertain
whether, shortly after the murder, she had told
the police about having seen X. In addition, she
explained that during the shooting of her inter-
view, which had taken place on 4 April 1991, the
applicant Baadsgaard had suggested that she say
something like "where is the other report" when
he was to show her the report of 1981.
On 27 April 1991 she initially stated that she had
not seen X and his son on 12 December 1981.
She had never before connected this episode to
the funeral. She also admitted having made up
the story about the forgotten wreath, but had
wanted "things to fit". Later during the inter-
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view she maintained that she had seen X and his
son on 12 December 1981, but at around 1 p.m.
B. The criminal proceedings against the appli-
cants
14. On 23 May 1991 the Chief Superintendent re-
ported the applicants and the TV station to the
police for defamation. It appears, however, that
the prosecution's decision as to whether or not to
charge the applicants was adjourned pending the
decision whether to reopen X's case.
15. This was decided in the affirmative by the
Special Court of Revision on 29 November 1991
after two hearings and the examination of ten
witnesses, including the taxi driver. Two judges
(out of five) in the Special Court of Revision
found that new testimonial evidence had been
produced on which X might have been acquitted,
had it been available at the trial. Two other judges
found that no new testimonial evidence had been
produced on which X might have been acquitted,
had it been available at the trial. The fifth judge
agreed with the latter, but found that in other re-
spects special circumstances existed which made
it overwhelmingly likely that the available evi-
dence had not been judged correctly. According-
ly, the court granted a retrial.
16. In the meantime, following the television pro-
grammes, an inquiry had commenced into the
police investigation of X's case. The inquiry re-
sulted in a report of 29 July 1991 by the Regional
State Prosecutor, according to which the Police in
Frederikshavn had not complied with section
751 (2) of the Administration of Justice Act (Ret-
splejeloven). This provision, introduced on 1 Octo-
ber 1978, provides that a witness must be given
the opportunity to read through his or her state-
ment. The non-compliance had not been limited
to the investigation in X's case. Instead, allegedly
in order to minimise errors or misunderstand-
ings, the police in Frederikshavn usually inter-
viewed witnesses in the presence of two police of-
ficers and made sure that crucial witnesses
repeated their statements before a court as soon
as possible. In this respect the Regional State
Prosecutor noted that the High Court, before
which X had been convicted in 1982, had not
made any comments on the failure to comply
with section 751 (2) of the Administration of Jus-
tice Act with regard to the witnesses who were
heard before it in 1982. Finally, the Regional
State Prosecutor noted that the police in the dis-
trict of Frederikshavn were apparently not the
only police district failing to comply with the said
provision. The Regional State Prosecutor consid-
ered it unjustified to maintain that the taxi driver
when interviewed in December 1981 had stated
that she had seen X on the day of the murder.
During the inquiry this had been contradicted by
the two police officers who had interviewed the
taxi driver in 1981. Moreover, the inquiry did not
indicate that anybody within the Frederikshavn
police had suppressed any evidence in X's case or
in any other criminal case for that matter. 
Consequently, on 20 December 1991, the Prose-
cutor General (Rigsadvokaten) stated in a letter to
the Ministry of Justice that it was unfortunate
and open to criticism that the police in Frederik-
shavn had not implemented the above provision
as part of their usual routine and informed the
Ministry that he had made an agreement with
the State Police Academy that he would produce
a wider set of guidelines concerning the ques-
tioning of witnesses, which could be integrated
into the Police Academy's educational material.
17. X's retrial ended with his acquittal in a judg-
ment of 13 April 1992 by the High Court of West-
ern Denmark, sitting with a jury. 
18. A lawyer who represented the applicants in
another case had become aware of a letter of 18
May 1992 submitted by the Prosecutor General
to the Legal Affairs Committee of the Danish
Parliament (Retsudvalget) mentioning that subse-
quent to the broadcast of the programme "The
Blind Eye of the Police" the applicants had been
reported to the police by three police officers
from Frederikshavn. By letter of 10 July 1992 the
lawyer requested that the Prosecutor General
state whether the applicants had been charged,
and if so with what offence. By letter of 17 July
1992 he was told that no charge had been
brought against the applicants.
19. On 19 January 1993 the Chief Constable in
Gladsaxe informed the applicants that they were
charged with defaming the Chief Superintend-
ent. On 28 January 1993 the applicants were
questioned by the police in Gladaxe.
1. Preliminary procedural questions
20. A request of 11 February 1993 by the prosecu-
tion to seize the applicants' research material was
examined at a hearing in the Gladsaxe City Court
(Retten i Gladsaxe) on 30 March 1993 during
which the applicants' counsel, claiming that the
case concerned a political offence, requested that
a jury in the High Court - instead of the City
Court - try the case. Both requests were refused by
the Gladsaxe City Court on 28 May 1993. In June
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1993 the prosecution appealed against the deci-
sion on seizure and the applicants appealed
against the decision on venue. At the request of
one of the applicants' counsel, an oral hearing
was scheduled to take place in the High Court of
Eastern Denmark (Østre Landsret) on
15 November 1993. However, on 7 October 1993
counsel challenged one of the judges in the High
Court alleging disqualification and requested an
oral hearing on the issue. The High Court decid-
ed on 15 October 1993 to refuse an oral hearing
and on 11 November 1993 that the judge in ques-
tion was not disqualified. It appears that counsel
requested leave to appeal against this decision to
the Supreme Court (Højesteret), but to no avail. As
to the appeal against non-seizure and the ques-
tion of venue, hearings were held in the High
Court on 6 January and 7 March 1994, and by a
decision of 21 March 1994 the High Court up-
held the City Court's decisions. The applicants'
request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
was refused on 28 June 1994.
2. Proceedings before the City Court 
21. On 5 July 1994 the prosecution submitted an
indictment to the City Court. A preliminary hear-
ing was held on 10 November 1994 during which
it was agreed that the case would be tried over six
days in midJune 1995. However, as counsel for
one of the parties was ill, the final hearings were
re-scheduled to take place on 21, 24, 28 and 30
August and 8 September 1995.
22. On 15 September 1995 the Gladsaxe City
Court delivered a 68 page judgment, finding that
the questions put in the TV programme concern-
ing the named Chief Superintendent amounted
to defamatory allegations, which should be de-
clared null and void. However, the court did not
impose any sentence on the applicants as it found
that they had had reason to believe that the alle-
gations were true. The court also ruled in favour
of the applicants regarding a compensation
claim raised by the widow of the named Chief Su-
perintendent, who had died before the trial. The
judgment was appealed against by the applicants
immediately, and by the prosecution on
27 September 1995.
3. Proceedings before the High Court 
23. On 15 April 1996 the prosecutor sent a notice
of appeal to the High Court, and on 30 April
1996 he invited counsel for the applicants and
the attorney for the widow of the Chief Superin-
tendent to a meeting concerning the proceed-
ings. Counsel for one of the parties stated that he
was unable to attend before 17 June 1996, and ac-
cordingly the meeting was held on 25 June 1996.
The High Court received the minutes of the
meeting from which it appeared that counsel for
one of the parties was unable to attend the trial
before November 1996, and that he preferred the
hearings to take place in early 1997. On
16 August 1996 the High Court scheduled the
hearings for 24, 26 and 28 February and 3 and 4
March 1997.
24. On 6 March 1997 the High Court gave judg-
ment convicting the applicants of violating the
personal honour of the Chief Superintendent by
making and spreading allegations of an act likely
to disparage him in the esteem of his fellow citi-
zens, according to Article 267 § 1 of the Penal
Code. The allegations were declared null and
void. The applicants were each sentenced to
20 day-fines of DKK 400 (or 20 days' imprison-
ment in default) and ordered to pay compensa-
tion of DKK 75,000 to the estate of the deceased
Chief Superintendent.
4. Proceedings before the Leave-to-Appeal Board
25. On 6, 16 and 25 March 1997 the applicants
sought leave from the Leave-to-Appeal Board
(Procesbevillingsnævnet) to appeal to the Supreme
Court. Before deciding, the Board requested an
opinion from the prosecuting authorities, name-
ly the Chief of Police, the State Prosecutor and
the Prosecutor General. On 27 June 1997 their
joint opinion opposing leave to appeal was sub-
mitted. However, in the meantime it appears that
a lawyer representing the TV station Danmarks
Radio had contacted the State Prosecutor, pro-
posing that the public prosecution assist in
bringing the case before the Supreme Court as,
according to the TV station, the High Court's
judgment was incompatible with the Media Re-
sponsibility Act (Medieansvarsloven). Consequent-
ly, the public prosecutors initiated a new round
of consultation on this question, and their joint
opinion was forwarded to the Board on 3 Sep-
tember 1997. On 29 September 1997, having
heard the applicants' counsel on the prosecu-
tion's submissions, the Board granted the appli-
cants leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
5. Proceedings before the Supreme Court
26. The Prosecutor General submitted a notice of
appeal and the case file to the Supreme Court on
3 October and 6 November 1997 respectively.
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27. As counsel wanted to engage yet another
counsel, on 20 November 1997 they asked the
Supreme Court whether costs in this respect
would be considered legal costs. Moreover, they
stated that their pleadings could not be submit-
ted until early January 1998. On 17 March 1998
the Supreme Court decided on the question of
costs, and on 19 March 1998 scheduled the trial
for 12 and 13 October 1998.
28. By a judgment of 28 October 1998 the High
Court's judgment was upheld, though the com-
pensation payable to the estate was increased to
DKK 100,000. The majority of five judges held:
"In the programme 'The Blind Eye of the Police' the ap-
plicants not only repeated a statement by the taxi driver
that she had already explained to the police during their
inquiries in 1981 that shortly after noon on 12 December
1981 she had driven behind X for about one kilometre,
but also, in accordance with the common premise for the
programmes 'Convicted of Murder' and 'The Blind Eye
of the Police', took a stand on the truth of the taxi driv-
er's statement and presented matters in such a way that
viewers, even before the final sequence of questions, were
given the impression that it was a fact that the taxi driver
had given the explanation as she alleged she had done in
1981 and that the police were therefore in possession of
this explanation in 1981. This impression was strength-
ened by the first of the concluding questions: '... why did
the vital part of the taxi driver's explanation disappear
and who, in the police or public prosecutor's office,
should carry the responsibility for this?'. In connection
with the scenes about the two police officers they pose
two questions in the commentator's narrative, to which
the indictment relates; irrespective of the kind of ques-
tion, viewers undoubtedly received a clear impression
that a report had been made about the taxi driver's state-
ment that she had seen X at the relevant time on
12 December 1981; that this report had subsequently
been suppressed; and that such suppression had been de-
cided upon either by the named Chief Superintendent
alone or by him and the Chief Inspector of the Flying
Squad jointly. The subsequent questions in the com-
mentator's narrative do not weaken this impression, and
neither does the question of whether the Chief Consta-
ble or the public prosecutor were aware of the taxi driv-
er's statement. On this basis we find that in the
programme 'The Blind Eye of the Police' the applicants
made allegations against the named Superintendent
which were intended to discredit him in the eyes of his
peers, as described in Article 267 § 1 of the Penal Code
(Straffeloven). We find further that it must have been clear
to the applicants that they were, by way of their presenta-
tion, making such allegations.
The applicants have not endeavoured to provide any jus-
tification but have claimed that there is no cause of ac-
tion by virtue of Article 269 § 1 of the Penal Code – that
a party who in good faith justifiably makes an allegation
which is clearly in the general public interest or in the in-
terest of other parties...
As laid down in the Thorgeirson v. Iceland judgment (25
June 1992), there is a very extensive right to public criti-
cism of the police. As in that decision there is, however, a
difference between passing on and making allegations,
just as there is a difference between criticism being di-
rected at the police as such and at individual named offi-
cers in the police force. Even though being in the public
eye is a natural part of a police officer's duties, consider-
ation should also be given to his good name and reputa-
tion.
As stated, the two applicants did not limit themselves in
the programme to referring to the taxi driver's statement
or to making value judgments on this basis about the
quality of the police's investigations and the Chief Su-
perintendent's leadership thereof. Nor did the appli-
cants limit themselves to making allegations against the
police as such for having suppressed the taxi driver's ex-
planation; they made an allegation that the named Chief
Superintendent had committed a criminal offence by
suppressing a vital fact.
When the applicants were producing the programme
they knew that an application had been made to the Spe-
cial Court of Revision for the case against X to be re-
opened and that as part of the Court of Revision's
proceedings in dealing with the said application the taxi
driver had been interviewed by the police on 11 March
1991 at the request of X's defence as part of the proceed-
ings to reopen the case. In consequence of the ongoing
proceedings for reopening the case, the applicants could
not count on the Chief Superintendent and the two po-
lice officers who had interviewed the taxi driver in 1981
being prepared to participate in the programme and
hence possibly anticipate proceedings in the Court of Re-
vision. Making the allegations cannot accordingly be jus-
tified by lack of police participation in the programme.
The applicants' intentions, in the programme, of under-
taking a critical assessment of the police's investigation
were proper as part of the role of the media in acting as a
public watchdog, but this does not apply to every allega-
tion. The applicants had no basis for making such a seri-
ous allegation against a named police officer and the
applicants' opportunities for achieving the objects of the
programme in no way required the questions upon
which the charges are based to be included.
On this basis, and even though the exemptions provided
in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention must be narrowly in-
terpreted, and even though Article 10 protects not only
the content of utterances but also the manner in which
they are made, we concur that the allegation made was
not caught by the exemption in Article 269 § 1 of the Pe-
nal Code. Indeed, as a result of the seriousness of the al-
legation, we concur that there is no basis for the
punishment to be remitted in accordance with Article
269 § 2 of the Penal Code. We agree further that there are
no grounds for the remittal of a penalty under Article
272.
We also concur with the findings on defamation.
We agree with the High Court that the fact that the alle-
gation was made in a television programme on the na-
tional TV station 'Danmarks Radio' and hence could be
expected to get widespread publicity – as indeed it did –
must be regarded as an aggravating factor for the pur-
poses of Article 267 § 3. Considering that it is more than
seven years since the programme was shown, we do not
find, however, that there are sufficient grounds for in-
creasing the sentence.
For the reasons given by the High Court we find that the
applicants must pay damages to the heir of the Chief Su-
perintendent. In this, it should be noted that it cannot be
regarded as essential that the nature of the claim for
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damages was not stated in the writ of 23 May 1991 since
the Chief Superintendent's claim for financial compen-
sation could not relate to anything other than damages.
Due to the seriousness of the allegation and the manner
of its presentation, we find that the compensation
should be increased to DKK 100,000."
29. The minority of two judges who argued for
the applicants' acquittal held, inter alia:
"We agree that the statements covered by the indict-
ment, irrespective of their having been phrased as ques-
tions, have to be regarded as indictable under
Article 267 § 1 of the Penal Code and that the applicants
had the requisite intentions.
As stated by the majority, the question of culpability
must be decided in accordance with Article 269 § 1, tak-
en together with Article 267 § 1, interpreted in the light
of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights and the European Court of Human Right's re-
strictive interpretation of the exemptions under Article
10 § 2.
In reaching a decision, consideration must be given to
the basis on which the applicants made their allegations,
their formulation and the circumstances under which
the allegations were made, as well as the applicants' in-
tentions in the programme.
... We find that the applicants had cause to suppose that
the taxi driver's statement that she had seen X on
12 December 1981 shortly past noon was true. We fur-
ther find... that the applicants had reason to assume that
the taxi driver, when interviewed in 1981, had told the
two police officers that she had seen X...We accordingly
attach weight to the fact that it is natural for such an ob-
servation to be reported to the police; that it is also ap-
parent from her explanation in the police report of
11 March 1991 that she had already told the police about
her observations in 1981; and that her explanation about
the reaction of the police to her information that X's son
had been in the car strengthened the likelihood of her
having reported the observation at the interview in 1981.
... It is apparent from the TV programme that the appli-
cants were aware that the Frederikshavn police had not
at that time complied with the requirement to offer a
person interviewed an opportunity to see the records of
his or her statements. The applicants may accordingly
have had some grounds for supposing that the Decem-
ber report did not contain the taxi driver's full statement
or that there was another report thereon...
We consider that the applicants, in putting the questions
covered by the indictment, did not exceed the limits of
the freedom of expression which, in a case such as the
present one, relating to serious matters of considerable
public interest, should be available to the media. We also
attach some weight to the fact that the programme was
instrumental in the Court of Revision's decision to hear
witnesses and we attach some weight to X's subsequent
acquittal.
Overall, we accordingly find that [the allegation] is not
punishable by virtue of Article 269 § 1 of the Penal
Code...
[We agree that] the allegation should be declared null
and void since its veracity has not been proved..."
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 
30. The relevant provisions of the Danish Penal
Code applicable at the time read as follows:
Article 154
If a person in the exercise of a public office or function
has been guilty of false accusation, an offence relating to
evidence... or breach of trust, the penalty prescribed for
the particular offence may be increased by not more than
one-half. 
Article 164 1. Any person who gives false evidence before a
public authority with the intention that an innocent per-
son shall thereby be charged with, convicted of, or sub-
ject to the legal consequence of, a punishable act shall be
liable to mitigated detention (hæfte) or to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding six years. 
2. Similar punishment shall apply to any person who de-
stroys, distorts or removes evidence or furnishes false ev-
idence with the intention that any person shall thereby
be charged with, or convicted of, a criminal act...
Article 267 1. Any person who violates the personal hon-
our of another by offensive words or conduct or by mak-
ing or spreading allegations of an act likely to disparage
him in the esteem of his fellow citizens shall be liable to
a fine or to mitigated detention. 
2...
3. When imposing sentence it shall be considered an ag-
gravating circumstance if the insult was made in printed
documents or in any other way likely to give it wider cir-
culation, or in such places or at such times as greatly to
aggravate the offensive character of the act. 
Article 268 If an allegation has been maliciously made or
disseminated, or if the author has no reasonable ground
to regard it as true, he shall be guilty of defamation and
liable to mitigated detention or to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding two years. If the allegation has not
been made or disseminated publicly, the punishment
may, in mitigating circumstances, be reduced to a fine.
Article 269 1. An allegation shall not be punishable if its
truth has been established or if the author of the allega-
tion has in good faith been under an obligation to speak
or has acted in lawful protection of an obvious public in-
terest or of the personal interest of himself or of others.
2. The punishment may be remitted where evidence is
produced which justifies the grounds for regarding the
allegations as true.
Article 272 The penalty prescribed in Article 267 of the
Penal Code may be remitted if the act has been provoked
by improper behaviour on the part of the injured person
or if he is guilty of retaliation.
31. Section 751 of the Administration of Justice
Act read as follows: 
1. The relevant parts of the given testimonies must be in-
cluded in the reports and particularly important parts of
the testimonies should as far as possible be reported us-
ing the person's own words.
2. The person interviewed shall be given the opportunity
to acquaint himself with the report. Any corrections or
supplementary information shall be included in the re-
port. The person interviewed shall be informed that he is
not obliged to sign the report.
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3. Audio recordings of the interview may only take place
after informing the person interviewed. 
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF
THE CONVENTION
32. Complaining of the length of the criminal
proceedings, the applicants relied on Article 6 § 1
of the Convention which, in so far as relevant,
reads as follows:
"In the determination of... any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a... hearing within a reason-
able time by [a]... tribunal..." 
(..) 
(d) Conclusion 
42. Making an overall assessment of the complex-
ity of the case, the conduct of all concerned as
well as the total length of the proceedings, the
Court considers that the latter did not go beyond
what may be considered reasonable in this partic-
ular case. Accordingly, there has been no viola-
tion of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect
of the length of the proceedings.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF
THE CONVENTION
43. The applicants submitted further that the
judgment of the Danish Supreme Court amount-
ed to a disproportionate interference with their
right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Ar-
ticle 10 of the Convention, which reads as fol-
lows:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to re-
ceive and impart information and ideas without interfer-
ence by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licens-
ing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such for-
malities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judi-
ciary."
A. Submissions of those appearing before the
Court
1. The applicants
44. The applicants maintained that their ques-
tions in the programme "The Blind Eye of the Po-
lice" could not be seen as factual statements
whose truthfulness they could be required to
prove. Read as a whole and in their context, in the
applicants' view, it was apparent that the ques-
tions merely implied a range of possibilities in
the criticised handling of the investigation of the
murder case from 1981-82, especially as regards
the taxi driver's observations. The questions left
it to the viewers to decide, between various logical
explanations, who was responsible for the fail-
ures in the handling of the murder case. The
questions did not assert that the Chief Superin-
tendent had committed a violation of the Penal
Code. However, he had been the head of the po-
lice unit that performed the muchcriticised in-
vestigation that led to the wrongful conviction of
X. Accordingly, raising the hypothetical question
whether he in his official capacity could be re-
sponsible for the misplacing or concealment of
parts of the taxi driver's original statement was
neither unreasonable nor excessive. 
45. The applicants contended that the pro-
grammes were serious, wellresearched documen-
taries and that there could be no serious doubts
about their good faith, including when relying on
the taxi driver's account of the events. In their re-
quest for the case to be referred to the Grand
Chamber and later at the hearing, the applicants
submitted that the majority of the Chamber had
seemed to question whether the taxi driver in
1981 had actually given the explanation to the
police that she claimed to have done. The appli-
cants regretted the Chamber's assessment and
the method used in this respect with regard to re-
view of facts in a case under the European Con-
vention. In addition, although regretting that
they had failed to verify the time of the funeral,
the applicants contended that the taxi driver's ex-
planation had appeared highly plausible and
credible and she had had no reason not to tell the
truth about what she had observed on
12 December 1981. In addition, her testimony
had been a crucial element in the reopening of
the case by the Special Court of Revision and the
later acquittal of X. Moreover, the applicants had
reason to believe that a significant statement,
such as the one the taxi driver had allegedly given
to the police, would be the subject of a police re-
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port. Accordingly, and taking into consideration
the fact that the Frederikshavn police had failed
to comply with section 751 of the Administration
of Justice Act at the material time, it seemed likely
that someone within that police district had ei-
ther misplaced or concealed part of the taxi driv-
er's statement. 
46. The applicants found that the majority of the
Chamber had disregarded the Court's case law of
according to which police officials must accept
scrutiny by the public including the media on ac-
count of their sensitive functions. The applicants
emphasised that, like politicians, civil servants
were subject to wider limits of acceptable criti-
cism than private individuals, and that members
of the police force, including high-ranking police
officers, could not be considered to have the same
protection of their honour and reputation as af-
forded to judges. The applicants pointed out that
the criticism was limited to the Chief Superin-
tendent's performance as head of the investiga-
tion in the specific case and did not concern his
general professional qualities or performance or
his private activities. Furthermore, the applicants
alleged that, during a telephone conversation be-
tween the first applicant and the Chief Superin-
tendent, which had taken place at some un-
known time before the broadcast of the second
programme, the Chief Superintendent had de-
clined to participate in the programme. Thus, he
had not been precluded from participating in the
programme. 
2. The Government
47. The Government emphasised that the appli-
cants had not been convicted for expressing
strong criticism of the police, but exclusively for
having, on their own behalf, made the very specif-
ic, unsubstantiated and extremely serious accusa-
tion against the named Chief Superintendent
that he had intentionally suppressed evidence in
the murder case. The Danish Supreme Court had
fully recognised that the present case involved a
conflict between the right to impart ideas and the
right to freedom of expression and the protection
of the reputation of others, and it had properly
balanced the various interests involved in the case
in conformity with the principles embodied in
Article 10 of the Convention. 
48. Moreover, the Government pointed out, the
applicants had not been convicted for dissemi-
nating statements made by the taxi driver. In par-
ticular, she had made no allegation of suppres-
sion of evidence against the police in
Frederikshavn, much less against the Chief Su-
perintendent personally. In other words, the ap-
plicants had made an independent allegation to
the extent that a vital piece of evidence had been
suppressed and that such suppression had been
decided upon either by the Chief Superintendent
alone or by him and the Chief Inspector of the
Flying Squad jointly. Leaving the viewers with
these two options did not amount, as claimed by
the applicants, to a range of possibilities. On the
contrary, this was an allegation that the Chief Su-
perintendent had in either event taken part in the
suppression and thus committed a serious crimi-
nal offence, as also found by all three levels of ju-
risdiction, including the Supreme Court unani-
mously. 
49. In the Government's view the applicants' alle-
gation was of such a direct and specific nature
that it clearly went beyond the scope of a value
judgment. It had thus been fully legitimate to de-
mand justification as a condition for nonpunish-
ment. The applicants had the possibility of giving
such justification, but had not done so. In this re-
spect the Government referred both to the unan-
imous finding of the Supreme Court that the ap-
plicants had had no basis for making the
allegations, and to its consequent ruling that the
allegations were null and void. 
50. The Government disputed the applicants' al-
legation that it was a fact that the taxi driver
when questioned by the police in 1981 had
claimed to have seen X on 12 December 1981.
They observed that there was no authoritative
finding of any Danish authorities or courts on
this point. Also, setting aside the fact that the
Government could not accept that there was any
basis for jumping from the taxi driver's state-
ment to the serious allegation against the Chief
Superintendent, the Government submitted that
the applicants had in any event failed to examine
the validity of the taxi driver's statement, which
had emerged over nine years after the events had
taken place. The applicants had failed to check
simple facts such as whether the funeral of the
taxi driver's grandmother had actually taken
place at 1 p.m. The Government found it sadly
ironic that the programme, which by its own ac-
count aimed at clearing someone unjustly con-
victed in a court of law, had ended up unjustly
convicting someone else in the court of public
opinion. They pointed out that the applicants'
first programme had also resulted in a defama-
tion case. 
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51. The Government maintained that the Chief
Superintendent had been precluded from partic-
ipating in the programme "The Blind Eye of the
Police" at the time when X's request for a re-
opening of the murder trial was pending before
the Special Court of Revision. 
52. Finally, the Government submitted that the
programme "The Blind Eye of the Police" had
had no decisive influence on either the order to
re-open the murder trial or on the subsequent
judgment acquitting X.
B. Submissions by the Danish Union of Jour-
nalists 
53. In their comments submitted under Article
36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 61 § 3 of the
Rules of Court, the intervening party, the Danish
Union of Journalists (see paragraph 3 above)
maintained that it was essential to the function-
ing of the press that restrictions on their freedom
of expression be construed as narrowly as possi-
ble, with self-censorship being the most appro-
priate form of limitation. 
54. Moreover, when imparting information as to
the functioning of the police and the judiciary,
notably when deficiencies therein resulted in
miscarriages of justice, the press should have the
right both to investigate and to present their
findings with limited restrictions. 
55. With regard to the present case, the Danish
Union of Journalists contended that the appli-
cants had researched the case very thoroughly. In
this respect they had in fact been so successful
that they had not merely raised a debate on a
matter of serious public concern, they had also
ultimately been able to change the course of jus-
tice.
56. Accordingly, in the view of the Danish Union
of Journalists the Supreme Court judgment of
28 October 1998 amounted to an unjustified in-
terference with the applicants' freedom of ex-
pression. 
C. The Court's assessment
1. Whether there was an interference
57. It was common ground between the parties
that the judgment of the Danish Supreme Court
constituted an interference with the applicant's
right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by
Article 10 § 1 of the Convention. 
2. Whether the interference was justified
58. An interference will infringe the Convention
if it does not meet the requirements of paragraph
2 of Article 10. It should therefore be determined
whether it was "prescribed by law", whether it
pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set
out in that paragraph and whether it was neces-
sary in a democratic society" in order to achieve
those aims. It was not disputed that the interfer-
ence was prescribed by law and pursued a legiti-
mate aim, namely the protection of the reputa-
tion or rights of others, within the meaning of
Article 10 § 2. The Court endorses this assess-
ment. What is in dispute between the parties is
whether the interference was "necessary in a
democratic society."
(a) General principles
59. The test of "necessity in a democratic society"
requires the Court to determine whether the in-
terference complained of corresponded to a
"pressing social need". The Contracting States
have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing
whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in
hand with European supervision, embracing
both the legislation and the decisions applying it,
even those given by an independent court. The
Court is therefore empowered to give the final
ruling on whether a "restriction" is reconcilable
with freedom of expression as protected by Arti-
cle 10 (see, among many other authorities, Perna
v. Italy [GC], no. 48898/99, § 39, ECHR 2003-V,
and Association Ekin v. France, no. 39288/98, § 56,
ECHR 2001-VIII).
60. The Court's task in exercising its supervisory
function is not to take the place of the competent
domestic courts but rather to review under Arti-
cle 10 the decisions they have taken pursuant to
their power of appreciation (see Fressoz and Roire
v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, § 45, ECHR 1999-I).
This does not mean that the supervision is limit-
ed to ascertaining whether the respondent State
exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully or in
good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at
the interference complained of in the light of the
case as a whole, including the content of the com-
ments held against the applicants and the con-
text in which they made them (see News Verlags
GmbH & CoKG v. Austria, no. 31457/96, § 52,
ECHR 2000-I). 
61. In particular, the Court must determine
whether the reasons adduced by the national au-
thorities to justify the interference were "relevant
and sufficient" and whether the measure taken
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was "proportionate to the legitimate aims pur-
sued" (see Chauvy and Others v. France, no. 64915/
01, § 70, ECHR 2004-VI). In doing so, the Court
has to satisfy itself that the national authorities,
basing themselves on an acceptable assessment
of the relevant facts, applied standards which
were in conformity with the principles embodied
in Article 10 (see, among many other authorities,
Zana v. Turkey, judgment of 25 November 1997,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII, pp.
2547-48, § 51).
(b) Application of the above principles in the in-
stant case
62. The programmes "Convicted of Murder" and
"The Blind Eye of the Police" were produced by
the applicants on the premises "that there was no
legal basis for X's conviction and that by impos-
ing its sentence, the High Court of Western Den-
mark [on 12 November 1982] set aside one of the
fundamental tenets of the law in Denmark,
namely that the accused should be given the ben-
efit of the doubt" and "that a scandalously bad
police investigation, in which the question of
guilt had been prejudged right from the start,
and which ignored significant witnesses and con-
centrated on dubious ones, led to X being sen-
tenced to 12 years' imprisonment for the murder
of his wife" (see paragraph 11 above). The latter
premise is also implied by the title of the second
programme. Evidently, those topics were of seri-
ous public interest. 
Freedom of expression is applicable not only to
"information" or "ideas" that are favourably
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter
of indifference, but also to those that offend,
shock or disturb. As set forth in Article 10, this
freedom is subject to exceptions, which must,
however, be construed strictly, and the need for
any restrictions must be established convinc-
ingly (see, among other authorities, Jersild v. Den-
mark, judgment of 23 September 1994, Series A
no. 298, p. 23, § 31; Janowski v. Poland [GC], no.
25716/94, § 30, ECHR 1999-I; and Nilsen and
Johnsen v. Norway [GC], no. 23118/93, § 43,
ECHR 1999-VIII). Moreover, a constant thread
running through the Court's case-law is the
insistence on the essential role of a free press in
ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic
society. Although the press must not overstep
certain bounds, regarding in particular protec-
tion of the reputation and rights of others and
the need to prevent the disclosure of confiden-
tial information, its duty is nevertheless to
impart – in a manner consistent with its obliga-
tions and responsibilities – information and
ideas on all matters of public interest, including
those relating to the administration of justice
(see De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, judgment of 24
February 1997, Reports 1997-I, pp. 233-34, § 37).
Not only does the press have the task of impart-
ing such information and ideas; the public also
has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the
press would be unable to play its vital role of
"public watchdog" (see Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Ice-
land, judgment of 25 June 1992, Series A no. 239,
p. 27, § 63, and Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v.
Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 62, ECHR 1999-
III). Journalistic freedom also covers possible
recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even
provocation (see Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria,
judgment of 26 April 1995, Series A no. 313, p.
19, § 38; Thoma v. Luxembourg, no. 38432/97,
§§ 45 and 46, ECHR 2001-III; and Perna (cited
above, § 39).
The Danish Supreme Court clearly acknowl-
edged the weight to be attached to journalistic
freedom in a democratic society when stating
"that the applicants' intentions, in the pro-
gramme, of undertaking a critical assessment of
the police investigation were proper as part of
the role of the media in acting as a public watch-
dog" (see paragraph 37 above). 
63. However, the applicant journalists were not
convicted for alerting the public to what they
considered to be failings in the criminal investi-
gation made by the police, or for criticising the
conduct of the police or of named members of
the police force including the Chief Superintend-
ent, or for reporting the statements of the taxi
driver, all of which were legitimate matters of
public interest. Indeed, the Danish Supreme
Court recognised that there is a very extensive
right to public criticism of the police.
The applicants were convicted on a much nar-
rower ground, namely for making a specific alle-
gation against a named individual contrary to
Article 267 § 1 of the Penal Code. This provision
provides that "any person who violates the per-
sonal honour of another by offensive words or
conduct or by making or spreading allegations
of an act likely to disparage him in the esteem of
his fellow citizens shall be liable to a fine or to
mitigated detention" (see paragraph 39 above).
64. At all three levels of jurisdiction the Danish
courts - the Gladsaxe City Court on
15 September 1995, the High Court of Eastern
Denmark on 6 March 1997, and the Supreme
Court unanimously on 28 October 1998 - found
that the statements cited in the indictment, irre-
mwb-3164-european.media.law.book  Page 121  Wednesday, August 17, 2011  2:33 PM
122
Case Law
spective of their having been phrased as ques-
tions, had to be understood as containing factual
allegations of the kind covered by Article 267 § 1
of the Penal Code and that the applicants had the
requisite intentions. The courts at all three levels
of domestic jurisdiction found unanimously that
the applicants, by formulating the questions as
they did, had made the serious accusation that
the named Chief Superintendent had committed
a criminal offence during the investigation
against X, by intentionally suppressing a vital
piece of evidence in the murder case, namely the
taxi driver's explanation that she, at the time of
the murder on 12 December 1981 shortly after
noon, had seen X, with the result that X had been
wrongly convicted by the High Court sitting with
a jury on 12 November 1982. 
65. The Court agrees with the domestic courts
that the applicants, by introducing their se-
quence of questions with the question: "Why did
the vital part of the taxi driver's explanation dis-
appear - and who in the police or public prosecu-
tor's office should carry the responsibility for
this?" (see paragraph 21 above), took a stand on
the truth of the taxi driver's statement and pre-
sented the matters in such a way that viewers
were given the impression that it was a fact that
the taxi driver had given the explanation as she
claimed to have done in 1981; that the police
were therefore in possession of this explanation
in 1981; and that this report had subsequently
been suppressed. The Court notes in particular
that the applicants did not leave it open, or at
least include an appropriate question, as to
whether the taxi driver in 1981 had in fact given
the explanation to the police that, nine years lat-
er, she claimed she had.
66. Subsequently they asked: "Was it the two po-
lice officers who failed to write a report about it?
Hardly, sources in the police tell us, they would
not dare. Was it [the named Chief Superintend-
ent] who decided that the report should not be
included in the case? Or did he and the Chief In-
spector of the Flying Squad conceal the witness's
statement from the defence, the judges and the
jury?" (see paragraph 21 above). The Court agrees
with the Danish Supreme Court that the appli-
cants thereby left the viewers with only two op-
tions, namely that the suppression of the vital
part of the taxi driver's statement in 1981 had
been decided upon either by the Chief Superin-
tendent alone or by him and the Chief Inspector
of the Flying Squad jointly. In either case it fol-
lowed that the named Chief Superintendent had
taken part in the suppression and thus commit-
ted a serious criminal offence. The applicants did
not leave it open, or at least include the appropri-
ate questions, as to whether a report had been
made containing the alleged statement by the
taxi driver, and if so, whether anyone had deliber-
ately made it disappear.
67. In order to assess the justification of an im-
pugned statement, a distinction needs to be
made between statements of fact and valuejudg-
ments, in that while the existence of facts can be
demonstrated, the truth of value judgments is
not susceptible of proof. The requirement to
prove the truth of a value judgment is impossible
to fulfil and infringes freedom of opinion itself,
which is a fundamental part of the right secured
by Article 10 (see, for example, Lingens v. Austria,
judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 28, §
46 and Oberschlick v. Austria, Oberschlick v. Austria
(no. 1), judgment of 23 May 1991, Series A
no. 204, p. 27, § 63). The classification of a state-
ment as a fact or as a value judgment is a matter
which in the first place falls within the ambit of
the margin of appreciation of the national au-
thorities, in particular the domestic courts (see
Prager and Oberschlick, cited above, § 36). However,
even where a statement amounts to a value judg-
ment, there must exist a sufficient factual basis to
support it, failing which it will be excessive
(Jerusalem v. Austria, no. 26958/95, § 43, ECHR
2001II).
As regards the facts of the instant case, the Court
notes, as did the Supreme Court, that the appli-
cant journalists did not limit themselves to refer-
ring to the taxi driver's testimony and to making
value judgments on this basis about the conduct
of the police investigation and the Chief Superin-
tendent's leadership of that investigation (see
paragraph 37 above). The Court, like the Su-
preme Court, concludes that the accusation
against the named Chief Superintendent, al-
though made indirectly and by way of a series of
questions, was an allegation of fact susceptible of
proof. The applicants never endeavoured to pro-
vide any justification for their allegation, and its
veracity has never been proven. It was for this rea-
son that the courts at all three levels of jurisdic-
tion in Denmark unanimously declared it null
and void. 
68. In news reporting based on interviews, a dis-
tinction also needs to be made as to whether the
statement emanates from the journalist or is a
quotation of others, since punishment of a jour-
nalist for assisting in the dissemination of state-
ments made by another person in an interview
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would seriously hamper the contribution of the
press to discussion of matters of public interest
and should not be envisaged unless there are par-
ticularly strong reasons for doing so (see Jersild,
cited above, § 35). Moreover, a general require-
ment for journalists systematically and formally
to distance themselves from the content of a quo-
tation that might insult or provoke others or
damage their reputation is not reconcilable with
the press's role of providing information on cur-
rent events, opinions and ideas (see, for example,
Thoma v. Luxembourg, cited above, § 64). 
In the present case the applicants were not con-
victed for reproducing or reporting the state-
ments of others, as in Jersild (cited above). They
were, as is undisputed, themselves the authors of
the impugned questions and the allegations of
facts found by the Supreme Court to be inherent
in those questions. Indeed, in the programme
"The Blind Eye of the Police" none of the per-
sons appearing alleged that the named Chief
Superintendent had intentionally suppressed a
report which contained the taxi driver's state-
ment that she had seen X on the day of the mur-
der. The applicants drew their own conclusions
from the statements of the witnesses, in particu-
lar the taxi driver, in the form of an accusation of
deliberate interference with evidence, directed
against the Chief Superintendent. 
69. The Court observes in this respect that pro-
tection of the right of journalists to impart infor-
mation on issues of general interest requires that
they should act in good faith and on an accurate
factual basis and provide "reliable and precise"
information in accordance with the ethics of
journalism (see e.g. the Fressoz and Roire judgment
§ 54; the Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas judgment, §
58, and the Prager and Oberschlick judgment, § 37,
all cited above). Under the terms of paragraph 2
of Article 10 of the Convention, freedom of ex-
pression carries with it "duties and responsibili-
ties", which also apply to the media even with re-
spect to matters of serious public concern.
Moreover, these "duties and responsibilities" are
liable to assume significance when there is a
question of attacking the reputation of a named
individual and infringing the "rights of others".
Thus, special grounds are required before the me-
dia can be dispensed from their ordinary obliga-
tion to verify factual statements that are defama-
tory of private individuals. Whether such
grounds exist depends in particular on the nature
and degree of defamation in question and the ex-
tent to which the media can reasonably regard
their sources as reliable with respect to the allega-
tions (see, among other authorities, McVicar v. the
United Kingdom, no. 46311/99, § 84, ECHR 2002-
III and Bladet Tromsø cited above, § 66). Also of
relevance for the balancing of competing inter-
ests which the Court must carry out is the fact
that under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention indi-
viduals have a right to be presumed innocent of
any criminal offence until proven guilty (see,
among other authorities, Worm v. Austria, judg-
ment of 29 August 1997, Reports 1997-V, § 50,
and Du Roy and Malaurie v. France, no. 34000/96,
§ 34, ECHR 2000X).
During the domestic proceedings the applicants
never endeavoured to prove their allegation,
which was declared null and void. However,
invoking Article 10 of the Convention and Arti-
cle 269 § 1 of the Penal Code, the applicants
claimed that, even if their questions amounted
to an allegation, the latter could not be punisha-
ble because it had been disseminated in view of
an obvious general public interest and in view of
the interests of other parties. 
The Court must therefore examine whether the
applicants acted in good faith and complied
with the ordinary journalistic obligation to ver-
ify a factual allegation. This obligation required
that they should have relied on a sufficiently
accurate and reliable factual basis which could
be considered proportionate to the nature and
degree of their allegation, given that the more
serious the allegation, the more solid the factual
basis has to be. 
70. It is relevant to this assessment that the alle-
gation was made at peak viewing time on a na-
tional TV station in a programme devoted to ob-
jectivity and pluralism; that it was therefore seen
by a wide audience; and that the audio-visual me-
dia often have a much more immediate and pow-
erful effect than the print media. 
71. The Court must also take into consideration
the fact that the accusation was very serious for
the named Chief Superintendent and would have
entailed criminal prosecution had it been true.
The offence alleged was punishable with up to
nine years' imprisonment under Articles 154 and
164 of the Penal Code (see paragraph 39 above).
It is true that civil servants acting in an official ca-
pacity are, like politicians, subject to wider limits
of acceptable criticism than private individuals.
However, it cannot be said that civil servants
knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny
of their every word and deed to the extent politi-
cians do (see Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 2), judg-
ment of 1 July 1997, Reports 1997-IV, p. 1275, §
29; Janowski, cited above, § 33; and Thoma, cited
above, § 47). Thus, although the Chief Superin-
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tendent was subject to wider limits of acceptable
criticism than private individuals, being a public
official, a senior police officer and leader of the
police team which had carried out an admittedly
controversial criminal investigation, he could not
be treated on an equal footing with politicians
when it came to public discussion of his actions.
Even less so, as the allegation exceeded the notion
of "criticism of the Chief Superintendent's per-
formance as head of the investigation in the spe-
cific case" (see paragraph 56 above) and amount-
ed to an accusation that he had committed a
serious criminal act. Thus, it inevitably not only
prejudiced public confidence in him, but also dis-
regarded his right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty according to law. 
72. The police enquiries in the original criminal
trial against X involved about 900 people and
more than 4,000 pages of reports, and thirty wit-
nesses gave statements before the High Court in
1982 (see paragraph 12 above). When preparing
their programmes, the applicant journalists had
established contact with various witnesses
through advertising in the local paper and via po-
lice reports. 
73. Yet, with regard to the accusation for which
they were convicted, the applicants relied on one
witness in particular, namely the taxi driver. The
Court observes that during the programme "The
Blind Eye of the Police" the taxi driver claimed
that in 1981 she had told the two police officers
who interviewed her about two observations she
had made on the day of the murder: she had seen
a Peugeot taxi and she had seen X and his son
shortly after 12 o'clock on 12 December 1981.
The reason why she could remember the exact
date and time so well as to the latter observation
was because she had had to attend her grand-
mother's funeral on that date at 1 p.m.
(see paragraph 16 above). 
74. The applicants' interview with the taxi driver
was filmed on 4 April 1991. The applicants were
at that time aware that the taxi driver, at the re-
quest of X's new counsel, had been interviewed
by the police on 11 March 1991 and that during
that interview she had maintained that she had
told the police already in 1981 about having seen
X shortly after noon on 12 December 1981 (see
paragraphs 19-20 above). Despite the fact that
this witness appeared over nine years after the
events took place, the applicants did not check
whether there was an objective basis for her tim-
ing of events. This could easily have been done, as
shown by the police enquiry on 11 March 1991,
which revealed that the funeral of the taxi driver's
grandmother had taken place, not at 1 p.m., but
at 2 p.m. on 12 December 1981 (see paragraph 22
above). This fact was indeed important, not only
to the murder case, in which the crucial time was
between 11.30 a.m. and 1 p.m., but also to the re-
liability of the taxi driver, who in calculation
backwards from the time when the funeral took
place, claimed to be completely accurate in her
observations of the whereabouts of X. The Court
also notes that the applicant journalists found
their failure to verify the time of the funeral "re-
grettable". 
75. In addition, the Court observes that the taxi
driver at no point during the programme "The
Blind Eye of the Police" asserted that the two po-
lice officers had definitely made a report contain-
ing her crucial statement; or that a report con-
taining her crucial statement had been
suppressed deliberately; or that it was the named
Chief Superintendent who had intentionally sup-
pressed the report. This being so, taking into ac-
count the nature and the seriousness of the appli-
cant's allegation against the named Chief
Superintendent, the applicants' reliance on the
taxi driver's statement alone could not justify
their three-fold speculation that the taxi driver
had made her crucial statement to the police in
1981; that a report on it had been written; and
that the Chief Superintendent had intentionally
suppressed that report. 
76. The applicants had obtained a copy of the re-
port made by the two police officers in December
1981 mentioning the taxi driver's sighting on
12 December 1981 of a Peugeot taxi (which had
no relevance to the murder) (see paragraph 18
above). The report itself did not contain any indi-
cation that something might have been deleted
from it. Nor was there any evidence that another
report had existed containing the taxi driver's
statement that she had seen X on the relevant
day. 
77. When preparing the production of the pro-
grammes "Convicted of Murder" and "The Blind
Eye of the Police", the applicants became aware
that the police in Frederikshavn had not com-
plied with section 751 (2) of the Administration
of Justice Act, a provision which had been enact-
ed on 1 October 1978 and provided that a witness
should be given the opportunity to read his or
her statement (see paragraph 39 above). The non-
compliance was confirmed by the inquiry into
the specific police investigation of X's case fol-
lowing the broadcast of the applicants' television
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programmes (see paragraph 25 above). That in-
quiry resulted in a report of 29 July 1991 by the
Regional State Prosecutor, stating inter alia that
the police in Frederikshavn had not, in their usu-
al routine, implemented the relevant provision.
This noncompliance had not been limited to the
investigation in X's case. Instead, allegedly in or-
der to minimise errors or misunderstandings, the
police in Frederikshavn usually interviewed wit-
nesses in the presence of two police officers and
made sure that crucial witnesses repeated their
statements before a court as soon as possible. In
that connection the Regional State Prosecutor
noted that the High Court, before which X had
been convicted in 1982, had not made any com-
ments on the noncompliance with section 751 (2)
of the Administration of Justice Act with regard
to the thirty witnesses who were heard before it in
1982. Finally, the Regional State Prosecutor not-
ed that the police district of Frederikshavn was
apparently not the only police district which had
failed to comply with the said provision. Conse-
quently, on 20 December 1991 the Prosecutor
General found the noncompliance unfortunate
and open to criticism and he informed the Minis-
try of Justice that he would produce a wider set of
guidelines to be integrated into the Police Acade-
my's educational material. 
78. Notwithstanding this finding of a procedural
failure in the conduct of the investigation in X's
case, neither the inquiry nor the statement by the
Prosecutor General established that the taxi driv-
er when interviewed in December 1981 had in-
deed also claimed to have seen X on the day of the
murder (something that was in fact contradicted
by the two police officers who had interviewed
her in 1981, see paragraph 25 above); or that a re-
port had been written containing such a state-
ment; or that the existing police report of 1981
had not contained the taxi driver's full state-
ment; or that somebody within the Frederik-
shavn police had suppressed evidence in X's case
or any other criminal case for that matter. 
Accordingly, in the Courts' view, the fact that the
police in Frederikshavn had failed to comply
with section 751 (2) of the Administration of
Justice Act, whether taken alone or together with
the taxi driver's statement, could not provide a
sufficient factual basis for the applicants' accu-
sation that the Chief Superintendent had
actively tampered with evidence. 
79. The applicant journalists submitted that
their programmes and the taxi driver's testimony
had been a crucial element in the Special Court of
Revision's decision of 29 November 1991 to re-
open X's trial and the High Court's judgment of
13 April 1992 acquitting X. It is, however, to be
observed that counsel for X had already request-
ed a re-opening of the trial on 13 September
1990, four days before the broadcast of the appli-
cants' first programme "Convicted of Murder"
and more than six months before the broadcast
of programme "The Blind Eye of the Police" (see
paragraph 10 above). The Court also notes that
the Special Court of Revision was divided when
the retrial was granted on 29 November 1991, in
that only two judges out of five found that new
testimonial evidence, including the taxi driver's
statement, had been produced on which X might
have been acquitted had it been available at the
trial. The retrial was granted nevertheless because
the presiding judge found that in other respects
special circumstances existed which made it over-
whelmingly likely that the available evidence had
not been assessed correctly in 1982 (see para-
graph 24 above). Finally, although X was acquit-
ted by the High Court sitting with a jury on
13 April 1992, the judgment did not contain any
specific reasoning with regard to the jury's an-
swers to the particular questions put by the pub-
lic prosecution (see paragraph 26 above). Thus,
the assertion that the applicants' programmes or
the taxi driver's testimony were a crucial element
in the later acquittal of X amounts to specula-
tion. 
80. Even assuming that the applicants' pro-
grammes and the taxi driver's testimony were in-
strumental in the re-opening of the proceedings
and the acquittal of X, the Court notes that none
of those subsequent events, whether the re-open-
ing decision or the re-trial, in any way supported
the applicants' theory that led them to include
their serious allegation against the Chief Super-
intendent in their programme "the Blind Eye of
the Police" broadcast on 22 April 1991. 
81. The Frederikshavn police were, it is true, invit-
ed to participate in the first programme "Con-
victed of Murder", which was broadcast on
17 September 1990, four days after X had re-
quested that the Special Court of Revision order
a new trial. This invitation was declined, however,
since the applicant journalists were not willing to
furnish beforehand and in writing the questions
to be put to the police (see paragraph 12 above).
On the other hand, the applicants have not sub-
stantiated their allegation that the named Chief
Superintendent at some unknown time was in-
vited to participate in the second programme
"The Blind Eye of the Police", which was broad-
cast on 22 April 1991. In any event, noting espe-
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cially the statement by X's new counsel made
during the programme "The Blind Eye of the Po-
lice": "I have agreed with the public prosecutor
and the President of the Special Court of Revi-
sion that statements to the press in this matter
will in future only be issued by the Special Court
of Revision" (see paragraph 19 above), the Court
is satisfied that the named Chief Superintendent
was in fact precluded from publicly commenting
on the case while it was pending before the Spe-
cial Court of Revision. 
82. In assessing the necessity of the interference,
it is also important to examine the way in which
the relevant domestic authorities dealt with the
case and in particular whether they applied
standards which were in conformity with the
principles embodied in Article 10 of the Conven-
tion (see paragraph 70 above). A perusal of the
Supreme Court's judgment reveals that that
court fully recognised that the present case in-
volved a conflict between the right to impart in-
formation and protection of the reputation or
rights of others, a conflict it resolved by weighing
the relevant considerations in the light of the
case-law under the Convention. Thus, the Su-
preme Court clearly recognised that the appli-
cants' intention, in the programme, of undertak-
ing a critical assessment of the police's
investigation was a proper part of the role of the
media in acting as a public watchdog. However,
having balanced the relevant considerations, that
court found no basis for the applicants to make
such a serious charge against the named Chief
Superintendent as they did, in particular because
the applicants had sufficient other opportunities
to achieve the objects of the programme. 
83. On the basis of the various elements above
and having regard to the nature and degree of the
accusation, the Court sees no cause to depart
from the Supreme Court's finding that the appli-
cants lacked a sufficient factual basis for the alle-
gation, made in the television programme broad-
cast on 22 April 1991, that the named Chief
Superintendent had deliberately suppressed a vi-
tal piece of evidence in the murder case. The na-
tional authorities were thus entitled to consider
that there was a "pressing social need" to take ac-
tion under the applicable law in relation to that
allegation.
84. The nature and severity of the penalty im-
posed are also factors to be taken into account
when assessing the proportionality of the inter-
ference under Article 10 of the Convention (see,
for example, Ceylan v. Turkey [GC], no. 23556/94,
§ 37, ECHR 1999IV; Tammer v. Estonia, no 41205/
98, § 69, ECHR 2001-I; and Lešník v. Slovakia,
no. 35640/97, § 63, ECHR 2003IV). 
In the instant case the applicant journalists were
each sentenced to 20 day-fines of DKK 400,
amounting to DKK 8,000 (equivalent to approxi-
mately 1,078 euros (EUR)) and ordered to pay
compensation to the estate of the deceased Chief
Superintendent of DKK 100,000 (equivalent to
approximately EUR 13,469) (see paragraphs 33
and 37 above). The Court does not find these
penalties excessive in the circumstances or to be
of such a kind as to have a "chilling effect" on
the exercise of media freedom (see, mutatis
mutandis, Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], no. 28396/95,
§ 50, ECHR 1999-VII; Nikula v. Finland, no.
31611/96, § 54, ECHR 2002-II; and Elci and Oth-
ers v. Turkey, nos. 23145/93 and 25091/94, § 714,
13 November 2003). 
85. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court
considers that the conviction of the applicants
and the sentences imposed on them were not dis-
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and
that the reasons given by the Supreme Court in
justification of those measures were relevant and
sufficient. The interference with the applicants'
exercise of their right to freedom of expression
could therefore reasonably be regarded by the na-
tional authorities as necessary in a democratic so-
ciety for the protection of the reputation and
rights of others. 
86. There has accordingly been no violation of Ar-
ticle 10 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Holds unanimously that there has been no vio-
lation of Article 6 of the Convention;
2. Holds by 9 votes to 8 that there has been no vi-
olation of Article 10 of the Convention.
JOINT PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF
JUDGES ROZAKIS, TÜRMEN, STRÁŽNICKÁ,
BÎRSAN, CASADEVALL, ZUPANČIČ, MAR-
USTE AND HAJIYEV
(Translation)
1. We voted unanimously for the finding that
there had been no violation of Article 6 of the
Convention in the present case. On the other
hand, we cannot follow the majority as regards
their decision on Article 10 of the Convention,
which in our opinion has been breached.
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2. In this case the context of the application – in
particular X's acquittal after nearly 10 years in
prison following an alleged malfunctioning of
the Danish judicial system, which was incontest-
ably a serious question of general interest – sup-
ports our position. There is no need at this stage
to refer to the principles governing freedom of ex-
pression and the fundamental role of the press in
a democratic society, which have been reiterated
by the Court throughout its case-law (see para-
graph 71 of the judgment).
3. In a judgment of 28 October 1998 the Danish
Supreme Court (by a majority) convicted the ap-
plicants under Article 267 § 1 of the Penal Code,
for impugning the honour of a chief superin-
tendent of police. The Supreme Court held
(unanimously) that the statements covered by
the indictment, despite being framed as ques-
tions, had to be regarded as indictable under Ar-
ticle 267 and that the applicants had the requisite
intentions.
The applicants maintained that the questions
posed by them in the programme "The Blind Eye
of the Police", were to be read as a whole and in
context. It would then be seen that the questions
were not directed at defaming any particular per-
son and did not contain any assertion that the
Chief Superintendent had committed a viola-
tion of the Penal Code. In their submission, the
questions merely implied a range of possibilities
in the criticised police handling of the investiga-
tion of the murder case in 1981-82, especially as
regards the taxi driver's observations and the
identity of those responsible for concealing or
misplacing her important witness statement.
4. We consider that the questions asked by the ap-
plicants after the interview with the taxi driver
implied a range of possibilities in response to the
criticisms concerning the investigation conduct-
ed by the police under the responsibility of the
chief superintendent. The question why the taxi
driver's statement was not included in the file
and the identity of those responsible were mat-
ters left open for the television viewers to provide
their own answers. A careful reading of the ques-
tions raised after the interview supports our view
that:
(a) after the introductory explanations and be-
fore the journalists' questions the television
viewers were duly warned that these were merely
questions to which the applicants had no answer
("Now we are left with all the questions");
(b) the applicants raised broad-focus and logical
questions intended to cover the various possible
explanations why the witness's statement was
not in the file and left open the possibility that
the two police officers were responsible, although
they added that, according to police sources, this
was unlikely;
(c) they then referred to the possibility that the
chief superintendent had decided not to include
the witness evidence in the file, and expressed
doubt as to whether he had correctly assessed the
importance of the taxi driver's statement, but
without accusing him of contravening the Penal
Code;
(d) it was only after raising these questions that
the applicants entered into details ("Or did he
and the Chief Inspector of the Flying Squad con-
ceal the witness's statement from the defence, the
judges and the jury?") and implicitly accused the
two police officers, although, as we have pointed
out, this was only one possibility among others
which were evoked and left for the viewers alone
to decide.
As the questions posed by the applicants after the
interview were presented as possibilities, or in-
deed as value judgments or provocative hypothe-
ses concerning factual information given out
during the programme, we cannot agree with the
majority that they amounted to an accusation
that the chief superintendent had committed a
criminal offence.
5. Even if the questions amounted to an allega-
tion against the chief superintendent, the appli-
cants, as investigative journalists reporting on an
item of such high public interest, alerting the
public to a possible malfunctioning of the justice
system, could not have been expected to prove
their assertions beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Admittedly, the right of journalists to impart in-
formation on questions of general interest is pro-
tected only on condition that they express their
views in good faith and on a correct factual basis.
However, as paragraph 81 of the judgment makes
clear, the police investigation and the criminal
proceedings against X were complex and not
without difficulties. The applicants had also con-
ducted a large-scale search for witnesses when
preparing their programmes. The taxi driver was
one of those witnesses. During the programme
"The Blind Eye of the Police" she declared:
(a) that in 1981 she had told the two police offic-
ers who interviewed her about two observations
she had made on the day of the murder: she had
seen a Peugeot taxi (which had no relevance to
mwb-3164-european.media.law.book  Page 127  Wednesday, August 17, 2011  2:33 PM
128
Case Law
the murder) and she had seen X and his son at
about 12.05 or 12.10 p.m.;
(b) that she had driven behind them for about
one kilometre;
(c) that she remembered the date and time so
clearly because she had to attend her grandmoth-
er's funeral at 1 p.m. on that date;
(d) that she was 100% certain that she had told
the police about the latter observation because
her husband had sat beside her in the living room
throughout the entire interview in 1981 (see par-
agraph 18 of the judgment).
6. The interview with the taxi driver was prepared
on 4 April 1991. The applicants were at that time
aware that she, at the request of X's new counsel,
had been interviewed by the police on 11 March
1991 and that during that interview she had
maintained that she had already told the police
in 1981 that she had seen X shortly after noon on
12 December 1981. Furthermore, the applicants
were in possession of a copy of the report pro-
duced by the Frederikshavn police on the taxi
driver's statement of 1981. Since it did not con-
tain any information about her alleged observa-
tion, the applicants confronted the taxi driver
with the report during the programme. Never-
theless, the taxi driver upheld her statement that
she had already told the police about this obser-
vation in 1981.
The Prosecutor General confirmed in a letter of
20 December 1991 to the Ministry of Justice that
the Frederikshavn police at the relevant time had
not complied with section 751(2) of the Adminis-
tration of Justice Act, which provides that a wit-
ness must be given the opportunity to read his or
her statement He found this non-compliance un-
fortunate and open to criticism (see paragraph 25
of the judgment). Before or during the produc-
tion of their television programmes the appli-
cants became aware of this non-compliance on
the part of the Frederikshavn police. In our opin-
ion, this was another element reinforcing their re-
liance on the taxi driver, when the latter claimed
that something was missing from the police re-
port shown to her during the second programme
(see paragraph 18, previously mentioned).
7. Having regard to the foregoing, we consider
that when the second programme was broadcast,
on 22 April 1991, the applicants had a sufficient
factual basis to believe the taxi driver's version of
events and to believe that the report of
December 1981 did not contain her full state-
ment or that there was another report. The subse-
quent discovery that the funeral of the taxi driv-
er's grandmother had actually taken place one
hour later than the taxi driver had remembered
did not detract from the fact that at the relevant
time the applicants could reasonably assume that
the funeral actually had taken place at 1.00 p.m.
and that the taxi driver's statement could thus be
considered of crucial importance. The reasona-
bleness of their belief is not to be assessed with
the benefit of hindsight.
8. In addition, some weight must be attached to
the fact that the programme may have played a
role in the Special Court of Revision's decision to
grant a re-opening of the case, and the fact that X
was ultimately acquitted (see paragraphs 24 and
26 of the judgment). The fact that a person who
had been sentenced to twelve years' imprison-
ment for murder and spent almost ten years of
his life behind bars was later acquitted on a retri-
al, serves at least to confirm the high degree of
public interest involved in the TV programme in
its endeavour to alert the public to a possible mis-
carriage of justice. 
9. As the judgment makes clear, civil servants act-
ing in an official capacity are, like politicians,
subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism
than private individuals. We accept that a civil
servant should not be "treated on an equal foot-
ing with politicians" (paragraph 80 of the judg-
ment). However, their sensitive duties, which are
frequently crucial for the liberty, security and
well-being of society as a whole, place police offic-
ers at the centre of the social tension generated
on the one hand by their exercise of State power
and on the other by the right of the individual to
be protected against the abuse of power on their
part.
It seems obvious to us that a chief superintend-
ent of police, as a senior civil servant and the head
of the unit which had conducted the investiga-
tion which led to X's conviction, ultimately
quashed, must necessarily accept, regard being
had to his duties, powers and responsibilities,
that his acts and omissions should be subjected
to close and indeed rigorous scrutiny.
10. In short, we conclude that the justification
put forward by the Danish authorities for the in-
terference with the exercise by the applicant jour-
nalists of their right to the freedom of expression,
albeit relevant, were not sufficient to show that
that interference was "necessary in a democratic
society".
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TIMES NEWSPAPERS LTD (NOS. 1 AND 2) V. THE UNITED KINGDOM, 
10 MARCH 2009 - APPLICATIONS NOS. 3002/02 AND 23676/03
THE FACTS
I. The circumstances of the case
5. The applicant, Times Newspaper Ltd, is the
proprietor and publisher of The Times newspaper.
The applicant is registered in England.
A. The two articles in The Times
6. On 8 September 1999 The Times published a re-
port in the printed version of the newspaper
headlined “Second Russian Link to Money Laun-
dering”. This report stated:
“British and American investigators are examining the
role of an alleged second Russian mafia boss over possi-
ble involvement in money-laundering through the Bank
of New York.
Investigators are understood to be looking at links to
[G.L.: his name was set out in full in the original article],
whose company, Nordex has been described by the CIA
as an 'organisation associated with Russian criminal ac-
tivity'.
[G.L.]'s name surfaced in earlier money-laundering in-
vestigations which may have links to the Bank of New
York affair, in which millions of dollars of Russian mon-
ey are alleged to have been laundered.
The Russian-born businessman came to the attention of
European and American investigators in the early Nine-
ties. They suspected Nordex of using its former interna-
tional base in Vienna as a front for a large-scale money-
laundering operation. His name also figured in a British
police report in 1995, known as Operation Ivan, which
looked at the extent of the influence of the Russian mob
in London.
[G.L.] has repeatedly denied any wrong-doing or links to
criminal activity.
Nordex, which has since moved out of Vienna, is also al-
leged to have been involved in the smuggling of nuclear
weapons and by the mid-1990s reportedly controlled
about 60 businesses in the former Soviet Union and an-
other 40 companies in the West.
The Times has learnt that these included between eight
and ten off-shore companies in British jurisdictions, in-
cluding the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.
They were administered through a chartered accountant
in central London whose offices and home were raided in
1996 by officers from the City of London Police.
The companies were suspected of being used to help
launder money from Russia, which was then channelled
through European banks. No charges were ever filed
against the accountant.
At about the same time a Yugoslav associate said to have
been a frontman for [G.L.] was stopped and questioned
after arriving at a London airport. No charges were filed
against him.
The British investigation into Nordex is believed to have
failed because of the difficulty of establishing that the
money funnelled through off-shore companies con-
trolled by Nordex was linked to criminal activities.
[G.L.] is alleged to be a former business associate of Vik-
tor Chernomyrdin, the former Russian Prime Minister,
and in 1995 his name hit the headlines after it emerged
that he had been photographed with President Clinton
at a Democrat fund-raising event in 1993.
He is also alleged to have had business dealings with Se-
myon Mogilevich, the Hungarian-based mafia figure at
the centre of the Bank of New York investigation.”
7. On 14 October 1999 The Times published a sec-
ond article entitled “Trader linked to mafia boss,
wife claims”. This report stated:
“A Russian businessman under investigation by Swiss
authorities pursuing allegations of money-laundering
was a friend of [G.L.], a suspected mafia boss, the busi-
nessman's wife claims.
Lev Chernoi, the aluminium magnate under Swiss inves-
tigation, was given access to staff and a chauffeur by
[G.L.] when he moved to Israel, according to Lyudmila
Chernoi, Mr Chernoi's estranged wife ...
If Mrs Chernoi's allegation about a connection between
her husband and [G.L.] is true, it will raise further ques-
tions about Mr Chernoi. In 1996 the CIA described Nor-
dex, a company operated by [G.L.] and alleged to have
been used to launder money and smuggle nuclear weap-
ons, as an 'organisation associated with Russian crimi-
nal activity'.
In 1996 [G.L.] triggered a row in America after a photo-
graph was published of him with President Clinton in
1993. [G.L.] has denied any wrongdoing.”
8. Both articles were uploaded onto the appli-
cant's website on the same day as they were pub-
lished in its newspaper.
B. The commencement of proceedings
9. On 6 December 1999 G.L. brought proceed-
ings for libel in respect of the two articles printed
in the newspaper against the applicant, its editor
and the two journalists under whose by-lines the
articles appeared, (“the first action”). The
defendants did not dispute that the articles were
potentially defamatory and did not seek to prove
that the allegations were true. Instead, they
relied solely on the defence of qualified privilege,
contending that the allegations were of such a
kind and such seriousness that they had a duty
to publish the information and the public had a
corresponding right to know.
10. While the first action was underway, the arti-
cles remained on the applicant's website, where
they were accessible to Internet users as part of
the applicant's archive of past issues. On 6 De-
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cember 2000, G.L. brought a second action for li-
bel in relation to the continuing Internet publica-
tion of the articles (“the second action”). Initially,
the defendants' only defence to the second action
was one of qualified privilege. The two actions
were consolidated and set down for a split trial on
issues of liability and then quantum.
11. On 23 December 2000, the applicant added
the following preface to both articles in the Inter-
net archive:
“This article is subject to High Court libel litigation be-
tween [G.L.] and Times Newspapers. It should not be re-
produced or relied on without reference to Times
Newspapers Legal Department.”
C. The Internet publications proceedings
12. In or around March 2001 the defendants ap-
plied to re-amend their defence in the second ac-
tion in order “to contend that as a matter of law
the only actionable publication of a newspaper
article on the Internet is that which occurs when
the article is first posted on the Internet” (“the
single publication rule”). They argued that, as a
result, the second action was time-barred by sec-
tion 4A of the Limitation Act 1980.
13. On 19 March 2001 the High Court refused
permission to re-amend the defence, relying in
particular on the common law rule set out in
Duke of Brunswick v Harmer (see paragraph 20 be-
low) that each publication of a defamation gives
rise to a separate cause of action. The court held
that, in the context of the Internet, this meant
that a new cause of action accrued every time the
defamatory material was accessed (“the Internet
publication rule”).
14. On 20 March 2001 the High Court found that
the defendants had no reasonable grounds for
contending that after 21 February 2000 (the date
on which the defendants lodged their defence in
the first action) they remained under a duty to
publish the articles on the Internet. As a result,
the court struck out the defence of qualified priv-
ilege in relation to the second action. On 27
March 2001, judgment was entered for G.L. in
the second action, with damages to be assessed.
By this time the applicant had removed the arti-
cles from its website.
D. The Court of Appeal
15. The defendants appealed against the High
Court's order of 19 March 2001 rejecting the sin-
gle publication rule. They argued that the Inter-
net publication rule breached Article 10, point-
ing out that as a result of the rule newspapers
which maintained Internet archives were exposed
to ceaseless liability for re-publication of the de-
famatory material. The defendants argued that
this would inevitably have a chilling effect on the
willingness of newspapers to provide Internet ar-
chives and would thus limit their freedom of ex-
pression.
16. In its judgment of 5 December 2001, the
Court of Appeal, per Simon Brown LJ, dismissed
the appeal against the order in the second action,
stating:
“We do not accept that the rule in the Duke of Brunswick
imposes a restriction on the readiness to maintain and
provide access to archives that amounts to a dispropor-
tionate restriction on freedom of expression. We accept
that the maintenance of archives, whether in hard copy
or on the Internet, has a social utility, but consider that
the maintenance of archives is a comparatively insignifi-
cant aspect of freedom of expression. Archive material is
stale news and its publication cannot rank in importance
with the dissemination of contemporary material. Nor
do we believe that the law of defamation need inhibit the
responsible maintenance of archives. Where it is known
that archive material is or may be defamatory, the attach-
ment of an appropriate notice warning against treating it
as the truth will normally remove any sting from the ma-
terial.”
17. On 30 April 2002 the House of Lords refused
leave to appeal. The parties subsequently settled
the action and the applicant agreed to pay G.L. a
sum of money in full and final settlement of
claims and costs arising in both actions.
II. Relevant Domestic Law and Practice
A. The Limitation Act 1980
18. Section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980 (“the
1980 Act”) sets out a general limitation period of
six years in tort actions. Section 4A of the 1980
Act qualifies this limitation period as regards def-
amation actions and provides as follows:
“The time limit under section 2 of this Act shall not ap-
ply to an action for–
(a) libel or slander,
(b) slander of title, slander of goods or other malicious
falsehood,
but no such action shall be brought after the expiration
of one year from the date on which the cause of action ac-
crued.”
19. Section 32A of the 1980 Act provides:
“(1) It if appears to the court that it would be equitable
to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree
to which–
(a) the operation of section 4A of this Act prejudices the
plaintiff or any person whom he represents, and
(b) any decision of the court under this subsection would
prejudice the defendant or any person whom he repre-
sents,
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the court may direct that that section shall not apply to
the action or shall not apply to any specified cause of ac-
tion to which the action relates.
(2) In acting under this section the court shall have re-
gard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular
to–
(a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the
part of the plaintiff;
(b) where the reason or one of the reasons for the delay
was that all or any of the facts relevant to the cause of ac-
tion did not become known to the plaintiff until after
the end of the period mentioned in section 4A–
(i) the date on which any such facts did become known
to him, and
(ii) the extent to which he acted promptly and reasonably
once he knew whether or not the facts in question might
be capable of giving rise to an action; and
(c) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, rele-
vant evidence is likely–
(i) to be unavailable, or
(ii) to be less cogent than if the action had been brought
within the period mentioned in section 4A.”
B. The Internet publication rule
20. Duke of Brunswick v Harmer [1849] 14 QB 154
lays down a common law rule of some signifi-
cance. On 19 September 1830 an article was pub-
lished in the Weekly Dispatch. The limitation peri-
od for libel was, at that time, six years. The article
defamed the Duke of Brunswick. Seventeen years
after its publication an agent of the Duke pur-
chased a back number containing the article
from the Weekly Dispatch's office. Another copy
was obtained from the British Museum. The
Duke sued on those two publications. The de-
fendant contended that the cause of action was
time-barred, relying on the original publication
date. The court held that the delivery of a copy of
the newspaper to the plaintiff's agent constitut-
ed a separate publication in respect of which suit
could be brought.
21. In Godfrey v Demon Internet Limited [2001] QB
201 the respondent brought an action in defama-
tion against the appellants who were Internet
service providers. They had received and stored
on their news server an article, defamatory of the
respondent, which had been posted by an un-
known person using another service provider.
The judge stated:
“In my judgment the defendants, whenever they trans-
mit and whenever there is transmitted from the storage
of their news server a defamatory posting, publish that
posting to any subscriber to their ISP who accesses the
newsgroup containing that posting. Thus every time one
of the defendants' customers accesses 'soc culture thai'
and sees that posting defamatory of the plaintiff there is
a publication to that customer.”
C. The defence of qualified privilege
22. The leading case on the defence of qualified
privilege is Reynolds v Times Newspapers [2001] 2
AC 127. That case established that qualified priv-
ilege is an absolute defence to libel proceedings.
In the leading judgment before the House of
Lords, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead explained the
defence as follows:
“The underlying principle is conventionally stated in
words to the effect that there must exist between the
maker of the statement and the recipient some duty or
interest in the making of the communication. Lord At-
kinson's dictum, in Adam v. Ward [1917] A.C. 309, 334,
is much quoted:
'a privileged occasion is ... an occasion where the person
who makes a communication has an interest or a duty,
legal, social, or moral, to make it to the person to whom
it is made, and the person to whom it is so made has a
corresponding interest or duty to receive it. This reci-
procity is essential'.”.
D. Press Complaints Commission Code of
Conduct
23. The Press Complaints Commission has
adopted a code of conduct which is regularly re-
viewed and amended as required. Paragraph 1 of
the current Code of Conduct reads as follows:
“1. Accuracy
i) The Press must take care not to publish inaccurate,
misleading or distorted information, including pictures.
ii) A significant inaccuracy, misleading statement or dis-
tortion once recognised must be corrected, promptly
and with due prominence, and - where appropriate - an
apology published.
iii) The Press, whilst free to be partisan, must distinguish
clearly between comment, conjecture and fact.
iv) A publication must report fairly and accurately the
outcome of an action for defamation to which it has
been a party, unless an agreed settlement states other-
wise, or an agreed statement is published.”
E. The US single publication rule
24. Unlike the United Kingdom court, the courts
of the United States of America have chosen to
apply the “single publication rule”. In the case of
Gregoire v GP Putnam's Sons (1948) 81 N.E.2d 45 a
book originally put on sale in 1941 was still being
sold in 1946 following several reprints. The New
York Court of Appeals considered the rule in
Duke of Brunswick v Harmer, but concluded that it
was formulated “in an era which long antedated
the modern process of mass publication” and was
therefore not suited to modern conditions. In-
stead, the court held that the limitation period
started to run in 1941, when the book was first
put on sale. The court pointed out that
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“Under [the rule in Duke of Brunswick v Harmer] the Stat-
ute of Limitation would never expire so long as a copy of
such book remained in stock and is made by the publish-
er the subject of a sale or inspection by the public. Such
a rule would thwart the purpose of the legislature.”
25. The single publication rule was subsequently
applied to a website publication in Firth v State of
New York (2002) NY int 88. In that case, a report
published at a press conference on 16 December
1996 was placed on the internet the same day. A
claim was filed over a year later. The New York
Court of Appeals held that the limitation period
started when the report was first uploaded onto
the website and did not begin anew each time the
website version of the report was accessed by a us-
er. The court observed that:
“The policies impelling the original adoption of the sin-
gle publication rule support its application to the post-
ing of ... the report ... on the website ... These policies are
even more cogent when considered in connection with
the exponential growth of the instantaneous, worldwide
ability to communicate through the Internet ... Thus a
multiple publication rule would implicate an even great-
er potential for endless retriggering of the statute of lim-
itations, multiplicity of suits and harassment of
defendants. Inevitably, there would be a serious inhibito-
ry effect on the open, pervasive dissemination of infor-
mation and ideas over the Internet which is, of course, its
greatest beneficial promise.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF
THE CONVENTION
26. The applicant complains that the Internet
publication rule constitutes an unjustifiable and
disproportionate restriction of its right to free-
dom of expression as provided in Article 10 of
the Convention, which reads, insofar as relevant,
as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to re-
ceive and impart information and ideas without interfer-
ence by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licens-
ing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such for-
malities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
... for the protection of the reputation or rights of others
...”
A. Admissibility
27. The Court has consistently emphasised that
Article 10 guarantees not only the right to impart
information but also the right of the public to re-
ceive it (see Observer and Guardian v. the United
Kingdom, 26 November 1991, § 59(b), Series A no.
216; Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, §
53, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998I). In
light of its accessibility and its capacity to store
and communicate vast amounts of information,
the Internet plays an important role in enhancing
the public's access to news and facilitating the
dissemination of information generally. The
maintenance of Internet archives is a critical as-
pect of this role and the Court therefore consid-
ers that such archives fall within the ambit of the
protection afforded by Article 10.
28. The Court concludes that the applicant's
complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds. It must therefore be declared ad-
missible.
B. The merits
1. The parties' observations
a. The applicant
29. The applicant contended that the Internet
publication rule restricted its ability to maintain
a publicly accessible Internet archive. It pointed
to the “chilling effect” that the rule had upon
freedom of expression, which it said was aggra-
vated by the fact that it had not actively sought to
disseminate the information contained in its In-
ternet archive. The applicant submitted that Arti-
cle 10 required the adoption of a single publica-
tion rule.
30. The applicant contested the finding of the
Court of Appeal that the maintenance of archives
constituted an insignificant aspect of freedom of
expression. The applicant pointed to the impor-
tance of the integrity and availability of historical
records to an open and democratic society.
31. The applicant argued that since the defence of
qualified privilege was a complete defence to the
libel claim, it was under no obligation to publish
a qualification in respect of the relevant articles
until the litigation had been resolved. It pointed
out that the Code of Practice of the Press Com-
plaints Commission obliged newspapers to post
a notice or qualification where a publication had
been the subject of a judgment or settlement in
favour of the complainant. Any other approach
would require a large number of articles to be
qualified. Attempts to limit qualification to
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those articles which were potentially libellous
would be difficult: because the libellous nature of
a publication may change over time, the appli-
cant would be required to keep the entirety of its
Internet archive under review. The applicant
pointed out that approximately 500 items were
uploaded onto its Internet archive every day.
32. The applicant argued that it was open to the
Court to consider the general principle which
arose, notwithstanding the specific facts of the
case. Although the applicant accepted that G.L.'s
rights were also engaged, it considered that a sin-
gle publication rule would not constitute an ex-
cessive restriction on the right of effective access
to the court.
b. The Government
33. The Government relied on the conclusions in
the domestic proceedings that the journalists
had not demonstrated the requisite standard of
responsibility in respect of the two articles. They
further relied on the fact that no qualification
was added to the articles on the applicant's web-
site until 23 December 2000, over 12 months af-
ter the original libel proceedings were initiated.
34. Although the Government accepted that
maintaining archives had a social utility, they
considered that this was not an aspect of the ex-
ercise of freedom of expression which was of cen-
tral or weighty importance, archive material be-
ing “stale news”. In the present case, the
Government argued that there was no evidence
that the applicant had been prevented or deterred
from maintaining its online archive. Further-
more, the steps required of the applicant to re-
move the sting from its archive material were not
onerous.
35. As regards the applicant's claim of ceaseless
liability, the Government observed that no ques-
tion of ceaseless liability arose in the present case.
The Government pointed out that the second ac-
tion was contemporaneous with the first action
and did not raise stale allegations many years af-
ter the event. In any case, even under a single pub-
lication rule, (1) the continued publication of ar-
ticles which the applicant knew to be defamatory,
which were not qualified in any way and which
were not defended as true would constitute a sep-
arate actionable tort under English law; and (2) if
accompanied by a statutory discretion along the
lines of section 32A of the 1980 Act, the court
may well have exercised that discretion to allow
G.L. to bring the second action, having regard to
the circumstances.
36. The Government highlighted that the present
case also engaged the Article 8 and Article 6
rights of G.L. In the choice between the single
publication rule and the Internet publication
rule, these competing interests should be bal-
anced. They pointed to the fact that there was no
consistency of approach to this issue in other ju-
risdictions and concluded that, on the facts of
this case, the application of the Internet publica-
tion rule was a permissible and proportionate re-
striction on the applicant's right to freedom of
expression and did not violate Article 10.
2. The Court's assessment
37. The Court notes that judgment was entered
against the applicants in the second action. Fur-
thermore, the applicant subsequently agreed to
pay a sum of money in settlement of G.L.'s claims
and costs in both actions. The Court therefore
considers that the second action constituted an
interference with the applicant's right to free-
dom of expression. Such interference breaches
Article 10 unless it was “prescribed by law”, pur-
sued one or more of the legitimate aims referred
to in Article 10 § 2 and was “necessary in a demo-
cratic society” to attain such aim or aims.
a. “Prescribed by law”
38. The applicant does not contest the lawfulness
of the interference, which derived from the appli-
cation of the rule set out in Duke of Brunswick v
Harmer as developed in the case of Godfrey v De-
mon Internet Limited. The Court sees no reason to
hold that the interference was not lawful and
therefore concludes that the interference with
the applicant's right freedom of expression was
“prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article
10 § 2.
b. Legitimate aim
39. The Internet publication rule is aimed at pro-
tecting the rights and reputation of others. It has
not been disputed, and the Court also agrees,
that the interference has a legitimate aim.
c. “Necessary in a democratic society”
i. General principles
40. The Court reiterates that freedom of expres-
sion constitutes one of the essential foundations
of a democratic society and in that context the
safeguards guaranteed to the press are particular-
ly important. Whilst the press must not overstep
the boundaries set, inter alia, in the interest of
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“the protection of the reputation or rights of oth-
ers”, it is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart
information and ideas of public interest. Not
only does the press have the task of imparting
such information and ideas but the public also
has a right to receive them. In this way, the press
fulfils its vital role as a “public watchdog” (Ob-
server and Guardian v. the United Kingdom,
26 November 1991, § 59, Series A no. 216).
41. The Court observes that the most careful of
scrutiny under Article 10 is required where meas-
ures or sanctions imposed on the press are capa-
ble of discouraging the participation of the press
in debates on matters of legitimate public con-
cern (Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC],
no. 21980/93, § 64, ECHR 1999III). The Court
further recalls that particularly strong reasons
must be provided for any measure limiting access
to information which the public has the right to
receive (see Timpul Info-Magazin and Anghel v. Mol-
dova, no. 42864/05, § 31, 27 November 2007).
42. However, the Court reiterates that Article 10
does not guarantee a wholly unrestricted free-
dom of expression to the press, even with respect
to press coverage of matters of serious public
concern. When exercising its right to freedom of
expression, the press must act in a manner con-
sistent with its duties and responsibilities, as re-
quired by Article 10 § 2. These duties and respon-
sibilities assume particular significance when, as
in the present case, information imparted by the
press is likely to have a serious impact on the rep-
utation and rights of private individuals. Fur-
thermore, the protection afforded by Article 10
to journalists is subject to the proviso that they
act in good faith in order to provide accurate and
reliable information in accordance with responsi-
ble journalism (Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC],
no. 29183/95, § 54, ECHR 1999I and Bladet
Tromsø and Stensaas, cited above, § 65).
43. Finally, it should be recalled that in assessing
whether the interference was justified, it is not
the role of the Court to substitute its views for
those of the national authorities but to review the
case as a whole, in the light of Article 10, and con-
sider whether the decision taken by national au-
thorities fell within the margin of appreciation
allowed to the member States in this area (Handy-
side v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 50,
Series A no. 24).
ii. Application of the principles to the present
case
44. The applicants maintain that they are ex-
posed to litigation, without limit in time, on ac-
count of the adoption of the Internet publication
rule instead of the single publication rule.
45. The Court agrees at the outset with the appli-
cant's submissions as to the substantial contri-
bution made by Internet archives to preserving
and making available news and information.
Such archives constitute an important source for
education and historical research, particularly as
they are readily accessible to the public and are
generally free. The Court therefore considers
that, while the primary function of the press in a
democracy is to act as a “public watchdog”, it has
a valuable secondary role in maintaining and
making available to the public archives contain-
ing news which has previously been reported.
However, the margin of appreciation afforded to
States in striking the balance between the com-
peting rights is likely to be greater where news ar-
chives of past events, rather than news reporting
of current affairs, are concerned. In particular,
the duty of the press to act in accordance with the
principles of responsible journalism by ensuring
the accuracy of historical, rather than perishable,
information published is likely to be more strin-
gent in the absence of any urgency in publishing
the material.
46. The Court further observes that the introduc-
tion of limitation periods for libel actions is in-
tended to ensure that those who are defamed
move quickly to protect their reputations in or-
der that newspapers sued for libel are able to de-
fend claims unhindered by the passage of time
and the loss of notes and fading of memories that
such passage of time inevitably entails. In deter-
mining the length of any limitation period, the
protection of the right to freedom of expression
enjoyed by the press should be balanced against
the rights of individuals to protect their reputa-
tions and, where necessary, to have access to a
court in order to do so. It is, in principle, for con-
tracting States, in the exercise of their margin of
appreciation, to set a limitation period which is
appropriate and to provide for any cases in which
an exception to the prescribed limitation period
may be permitted (see Stubbings and Others v. the
United Kingdom, 22 October 1996, §§ 54-55, Re-
ports of Judgments and Decisions 1996IV).
47. On the facts of the present case, the Court
considers it significant that, although libel pro-
ceedings in respect of the two articles were initi-
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ated in December 1999, the applicant did not add
any qualification to the articles in its Internet ar-
chive until December 2000. The Court recalls the
conclusion of the Court of Appeal that the at-
tachment of a notice to archive copies of material
which it is known may be defamatory would
“normally remove any sting from the material”.
To the extent that the applicant maintains that
such an obligation is excessive, the Court ob-
serves that the Internet archive in question is
managed by the applicant itself. It is also note-
worthy that the Court of Appeal did not suggest
that potentially defamatory articles should be re-
moved from archives altogether. In the circum-
stances, the Court, like the Court of Appeal, does
not consider that the requirement to publish an
appropriate qualification to an article contained
in an Internet archive, where it has been brought
to the notice of a newspaper that a libel action
has been initiated in respect of that same article
published in the written press, constitutes a dis-
proportionate interference with the right to free-
dom of expression. The Court further notes that
the brief notice which was eventually attached to
the archive would appear to undermine the appli-
cant's argument that any qualification would be
difficult to formulate.
48. Having regard to this conclusion, it is not nec-
essary for the Court to consider in detail the
broader chilling effect allegedly created by the ap-
plication of the Internet publication rule in the
present case. The Court nonetheless observes
that the two libel actions brought against the ap-
plicant concerned the same two articles. The first
action was brought some two to three months af-
ter the publication of the articles and well within
the one-year limitation period. The second action
was brought a year later, some 14 or 15 months
after the initial publication of the articles. At the
time the second action was filed, the legal pro-
ceedings in respect of the first action were still
underway. There is no suggestion that the appli-
cant was prejudiced in mounting its defence to
the libel proceedings in respect of the Internet
publication due to the passage of time. In these
circumstances, the problems linked to ceaseless
liability for libel do not arise. The Court would,
however, emphasise that while an aggrieved ap-
plicant must be afforded a real opportunity to
vindicate his right to reputation, libel proceed-
ings brought against a newspaper after a signifi-
cant lapse of time may well, in the absence of ex-
ceptional circumstances, give rise to a
disproportionate interference with press free-
dom under Article 10.
49. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to
enable the Court to conclude that in the present
case, the finding by the domestic courts in the
second action that the applicant had libelled the
claimant by the continued publication on the In-
ternet of the two articles was a justified and pro-
portionate restriction on the applicant's right to
freedom of expression.
50. There has accordingly been no violation of Ar-
ticle 10 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
2. Holds that there has been no violation of Arti-
cle 10 of the Convention.
mwb-3164-european.media.law.book  Page 135  Wednesday, August 17, 2011  2:33 PM
136
Case Law
European Court of Justice
SCHMIDBERGER, 12 JUNE 2003 - C122/00
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Free movement of goods - Restriction resulting from actions of in-
dividuals - Obligations of the Member States - Decision not to pro-
hibit a demonstration by environmental protesters which resulted
in the complete closure of the Brenner motorway for almost 30
hours - Justification - Fundamental rights - Freedom of expression
and freedom of assembly - Principle of proportionality) 
In Case C-112/00, REFERENCE to the Court un-
der Article 234 EC by the Oberlandesgericht
Innsbruck (Austria) for a preliminary ruling in
the proceedings pending before that court be-
tween Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale
Transporte und Planzüge and Republic of
Austria, on the interpretation of Articles 30, 34
and 36 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment,
Articles 28 EC, 29 EC and 30 EC) read together
with Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10
EC), and on the conditions for liability of a Mem-
ber State for damage caused to individuals by a
breach of Community law, 
1. By order of 1 February 2000, received at the
Court on 24 March 2000, the Oberlandesgericht
Innsbruck (Innsbruck Higher Regional Court)
referred under Article 234 EC six questions for a
preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Arti-
cles 30, 34 and 36 of the EC Treaty (now, after
amendment, Articles 28 EC, 29 EC and 30 EC)
read together with Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now
Article 10 EC), and on the conditions for liability
of a Member State for damage caused to individ-
uals by a breach of Community law. 
2. Those questions were raised in proceedings be-
tween Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale
Transporte und Planzüge ('Schmidberger') and
the Republic of Austria concerning the permis-
sion implicitly granted by the competent author-
ities of that Member State to an environmental
group to organise a demonstration on the Bren-
ner motorway, the effect of which was to com-
pletely close that motorway to traffic for almost
30 hours. 
National law 
3. Paragraph 2 of the Versammlungsgesetz (Law
on assembly) of 1953, as subsequently amended
('VslgG') provides: 
'(1) A person desirous of arranging a popular
meeting or any meeting accessible to the public
and not limited to invited guests must give writ-
ten notice thereof to the authority (Paragraph
16) at least 24 hours in advance of the proposed
event, stating the purpose, place and time of the
meeting. The notice must reach the authority at
least 24 hours before the time of the proposed
meeting. 
(2) On demand the authority shall forthwith
issue a certificate concerning the notice...'. 
4. Paragraph 6 of the VslgG provides: 
'Meetings whose purpose runs counter to the crimi-
nal law or which, if held, are likely to endanger pub-
lic order or the common weal are to be banned by the
authorities.' 
5. Paragraph 16 of the VslgG provides: 
'For the purposes of the present law, the usual mean-
ing of the authority is: 
(a) in places within their competence, the Federal Po-
lice; 
(b) in the place where the Landeshauptmann [head
of government of the Land] has his seat of govern-
ment, where there is no Federal Police presence, the
Sicherheitsdirektion [the security services];... 
(c) in all other places, the Bezirksverwaltungsbe-
hörde [district administrative authority]'. 
6. Paragraph 42(1) of the Straßenverkehrs-ord-
nung (Highway Code) of 1960, as subsequently
amended ('the StVO'), prohibits the transport
by road of heavy goods trailers on Saturdays
from 15.00 hrs to midnight and on Sundays and
bank holidays from midnight to 22.00 hrs where
the maximum permitted total weight of the
heavy goods vehicle or of the trailer exceeds 3.5
tonnes. Further, according to Paragraph 42(2),
during the periods stated in Paragraph 42(1) the
movement of heavy goods vehicles, articulated
lorries and rigid-chassis lorries having a maxi-
mum permitted total weight in excess of 7.5
tonnes is prohibited. Certain exceptions are per-
mitted, in particular for the transport of milk,
perishable foodstuffs or animals for slaughter
(except for the transport of cattle on motor-
ways). 
7.Under Paragraph 42(6) of the StVO, the move-
ment of heavy goods vehicles having a maximum
permitted total weight in excess of 7.5 tonnes is
prohibited between 22.00 hrs and 05.00 hrs. The
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journeys made by vehicles emitting noise below a
certain level are not affected by that prohibition. 
8. Pursuant to Paragraph 45(2) et seq. of the
StVO, derogations in respect of road use may be
granted in respect of individual applications and
subject to certain conditions. 
9. Paragraph 86 of the StVO provides: 
'Marches. Unless provided otherwise, where it is in-
tended to use a road for outdoor meetings, public or
customary marches, local fêtes, parades or other such
assemblies, these must be declared in advance by
their organisers to the authority...'. 
The main proceedings and the questions re-
ferred for a preliminary ruling 
10. According to the file in the main proceedings,
on 15 May 1998 the Transitforum Austria Tirol,
an association 'to protect the biosphere in the Al-
pine region', gave notice to the Bezirkshaupt-
mannschaft Innsbruck (Innsbruck provincial
government) under Paragraph 2 of the VslgG and
Paragraph 86 of the StVO of a demonstration to
be held from 11.00 hrs on Friday 12 June 1998 to
15.00 hrs on Saturday 13 June 1998 on the Bren-
ner motorway (A13), resulting in that motorway
being closed to all traffic on the section from the
Europabrücke service area to the Schönberg toll
station (Austria). 
11. On the same day, the chairman of that associ-
ation gave a press conference following which
the Austrian and German media disseminated
information concerning the closure of the Bren-
ner motorway. The German and Austrian motor-
ing organisations were also notified and they too
offered practical information to motorists,
advising them in particular to avoid that motor-
way during the period in question. 
12. On 21 May 1998, the Bezirks-haupt-
mannschaft requested the Sicherheits-direktion
für Tirol (Directorate of security for Tyrol) to
provide instructions concerning the proposed
demonstration. On 3 June 1998, the Sicherheits-
direktor issued an order that it was not to be
banned. On 10 June 1998, there was a meeting of
members of various local authorities in order to
ensure that the demonstration would be free of
trouble. 
13. Considering that that demonstration was
lawful as a matter of Austrian law, the Bezirk-
shauptmannschaft decided not to ban it, but it
did not consider whether its decision might
infringe Community law. 
14. The demonstration took place at the stated
place and time. Consequently, heavy goods vehi-
cles which should have used the Brenner motor-
way were immobilised from 09.00 hrs on Friday
12 June 1998. The motorway was reopened to
traffic on Saturday 13 June 1998 at approxi-
mately 15.30 hrs, subject to the prohibition on
the movement of lorries in excess of 7.5 tonnes
during certain hours on Saturdays and Sundays
applicable under Austrian legislation. 
15. Schmidberger is an international transport
undertaking based at Rot an der Rot (Germany)
which operates six articulated heavy goods vehi-
cles with 'reduced noise and soot emission'. Its
main activity is the transport of timber from
Germany to Italy and steel from Italy to Ger-
many. Its vehicles generally use the Brenner
motorway for that purpose. 
16. Schmidberger brought an action before the
Landesgericht Innsbruck (Innsbruck Regional
Court) (Austria) seeking damages of ATS 140
000 against the Republic of Austria on the basis
that five of its lorries were unable to use the
Brenner motorway for four consecutive days
because, first, Thursday 11 June 1998 was a bank
holiday in Austria, whilst 13 and 14 June 1998
were a Saturday and Sunday, and second, the
Austrian legislation prohibits the movement of
lorries in excess of 7.5 tonnes most of the time at
weekends and on bank holidays. That motorway
is the sole transit route for its vehicles between
Germany and Italy. The failure on the part of the
Austrian authorities to ban the demonstration
and to intervene to prevent that trunk route
from being closed amounted to a restriction of
the free movement of goods. Since it could not
be justified by the protesters' right to freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly the restric-
tion was a breach of Community law in respect
of which the Member State concerned incurred
liability. In the present case, the damage suffered
by Schmidberger consisted of the immobilisa-
tion of its heavy goods vehicles (ATS 50 000), the
fixed costs in respect of the drivers (ATS 5 000)
and a loss of profit arising from concessions on
payment allowed to customers on account of the
substantial delays in transporting the goods and
the failure to make six journeys between Ger-
many and Italy (ATS 85 000). 
17. The Republic of Austria contended that the
claim should be rejected on the grounds that the
decision not to ban the demonstration was taken
following a detailed examination of the facts,
that information as to the date of the closure of
the Brenner motorway had been announced in
advance in Austria, Germany and Italy, and that
the demonstration did not result in substantial
traffic jams or other incidents. The restriction on
free movement arising from a demonstration is
permitted provided that the obstacle it creates is
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neither permanent nor serious. Assessment of
the interests involved should lean in favour of
the freedoms of expression and assembly, since
fundamental rights are inviolable in a demo-
cratic society. 
18. Having found that Schmidberger had not
shown either that its lorries would have had to
use the Brenner motorway on 12 and 13 June
1998 or that it had not been possible, after it had
become aware that the demonstration was due
to take place, to change its routes in order to
avoid loss, the Landesgericht Innsbruck dis-
missed the action by judgment of 23 September
1999 on the grounds that the transport com-
pany had neither discharged the burden (under
Austrian substantive law) of making out and
proving its claim for pecuniary loss nor com-
plied with its obligation (under Austrian proce-
dural law) to present all the facts on which the
application was based and which were necessary
for the dispute to be determined. 
19. Schmidberger then lodged an appeal against
that judgment before the Oberlandesgericht
Innsbruck, which considers that it is necessary to
have regard to the requirements of Community
law where, as in the present case, claims are made
which are, at least in part, founded on Commu-
nity law. 
20. It considers that it is necessary in that regard
to determine first whether the principle of the
free movement of goods, possibly in conjunction
with Article 5 of the Treaty, requires a Member
State to keep open major transit routes and
whether that obligation takes precedence over
fundamental rights such as the freedom of
expression and the freedom of assembly guaran-
teed by Articles 10 and 11 of the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ('ECHR'). 
21. If so, the national court asks, secondly,
whether the breach of Community law thus
established is sufficiently serious to give rise to
State liability. Questions of interpretation arise
in particular in determining the degree of preci-
sion and clarity of Article 5 as well as Articles 30,
34 and 36 of the Treaty. 
22. In the present case State liability might be
incurred as a result of either legislative defect -
the Austrian legislature having failed to adapt
the legislation on freedom of assembly to com-
ply with the obligations arising under Commu-
nity law, in particular under the principle of the
free movement of goods - or by reason of admin-
istrative fault - the competent national authori-
ties being required by the obligation of
cooperation and loyalty laid down by Article 5 of
the Treaty to interpret national law in such a way
as to comply with the requirements of that
Treaty as regards the free movement of goods, in
so far as those obligations arising from Commu-
nity law are directly applicable. 
23. Thirdly, the court seeks guidance as to the
nature and extent of the right to compensation
based on State liability. It asks how stringent are
the requirements as to proof of the cause and
amount of the damage occasioned by a breach of
Community law resulting from legislation or
administrative action and wishes to know, in
particular, whether a right to compensation also
exists where the amount of the damage can only
be assessed by general estimate. 
24. Lastly, the referring court harbours doubts as
to the national requirements for establishing a
right to compensation based on State liability. It
asks whether the Austrian rules on the burden
and standard of proof and on the obligation to
submit all facts necessary for the determination
of the dispute comply with the principle of legal
effectiveness, in so far as the rights based on
Community law cannot always be defined ab ini-
tio in their entirety and the applicant faces genu-
ine difficulty in stating correctly all the facts
required under Austrian law. Thus, in the
present case, the content of the right to compen-
sation based on State liability is so unclear, as
regards its nature and extent, as to make a refer-
ence for a preliminary ruling necessary. The rea-
soning of the court ruling at first instance is
likely to curtail claims based on Community law
by rejecting the application on the basis of prin-
ciples of national law and circumventing on
purely formal grounds relevant questions of
Community law. 
25. Considering that the resolution of the dis-
pute thus required an interpretation of Commu-
nity law, the Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck
decided to stay proceedings and refer the follow-
ing questions to the Court for a preliminary rul-
ing: 
'1. Are the principles of the free movement of goods
under Article 30 et seq. of the EC Treaty (now Article
28 et seq. EC), or other provisions of Community
law, to be interpreted as meaning that a Member
State is obliged, either absolutely or at least as far as
reasonably possible, to keep major transit routes
clear of all restrictions and impediments, inter alia,
by requiring that a political demonstration to be held
on a transit route, of which notice has been given,
may not be authorised or must at least be later dis-
persed, if or as soon as it can also be held at a place
away from the transit route with a comparable effect
on public awareness? 
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2. Where, on account of the failure by a Member
State to indicate in its national provisions on freedom
of assembly and the right to exercise it that, in the
weighing of freedom of assembly against the public
interest, the principles of Community law, primarily
the fundamental freedoms and, in this particular
case, the provisions on the free movement of goods,
are also to be observed, a political demonstration of
28 hours' duration is authorised and held which, in
conjunction with a pre-existing national generally
applicable ban on holiday driving, causes an essen-
tial intra-Community goods transit route to be
closed, inter alia, to the majority of heavy goods traf-
fic for four days, with a short interruption of a few
hours, does that failure constitute a sufficiently seri-
ous infringement of Community law in order to es-
tablish liability on the part of the Member State un-
der the principles of Community law, provided that
the other requirements for such liability are met? 
3. Where a national authority decides that there is
nothing in the provisions of Community law, in par-
ticular those concerning the free movement of goods
and the general duty of cooperation and solidarity
under Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10
EC), to preclude, and thus no ground on which to
ban, a political demonstration of 28 hours' duration
which, in conjunction with a pre-existing national
generally applicable ban on holiday driving, causes
an essential intra-Community goods transit route to
be closed, inter alia, to the majority of heavy goods
traffic for four days, with a short interruption of a
few hours, does that decision constitute a sufficiently
serious infringement of Community law in order to
establish liability on the part of the Member State un-
der the principles of Community law, provided that
the other requirements for such liability are met? 
4. Is the objective of an officially authorised political
demonstration, namely that of working for a healthy
environment and of drawing attention to the danger
to public health caused by the constant increase in the
transit traffic of heavy goods vehicles, to be deemed to
be of a higher order than the provisions of Communi-
ty law on the free movement of goods under Article
28 EC? 
5. Is there loss giving rise to a claim founded on State
liability where the person incurring the loss can prove
that he was in a position to earn income, in the
present case from the international transport of
goods by means of the heavy goods vehicles operated
by him but rendered idle by the 28 hour demonstra-
tion, yet is unable to prove the loss of a specific trans-
port journey? 
6. If the reply to Question 4 is in the negative: 
In order to comply with the obligation of cooperation
and solidarity incumbent under Article 5 of the EC
Treaty (now Article 10 EC) on national authorities,
in particular the courts, and with the principle of ef-
fectiveness, must application of national rules of sub-
stantive or procedural law curtailing the ability to as-
sert claims which are well founded under
Community law, such as in the present case a claim
founded on State liability, be deferred pending full
elucidation of the substance of the claim at Commu-
nity law, if necessary following a reference to the
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling?' 
Admissibility 
26. The Republic of Austria harbours doubts as
to the admissibility of the present reference and
submits essentially that the questions referred by
the Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck are purely hy-
pothetical and irrelevant to the determination of
the dispute in the main proceedings. 
27. The legal action brought by Schmidberger,
seeking to establish the liability of a Member
State for breach of Community law, requires the
company to adduce evidence of genuine damage
resulting from the alleged breach. 
28. Before the two national courts successively
seised of the dispute Schmidberger failed to
establish either the existence of specific individ-
ual loss - by substantiating with specific evidence
the statement that its heavy goods vehicles had
to use the Brenner motorway on the days when
the demonstration took place there, as part of
transport operations between Germany and Italy
- or, if appropriate, that it had complied with its
obligation to mitigate the damage that it claims
to have suffered, by explaining why it was not
able to choose a route other than the one closed. 
29. In those circumstances, answers to the ques-
tions referred are not necessary in order to ena-
ble the referring court to decide the case or, at
least, the request for a preliminary ruling is pre-
mature as long as the facts have not been found
and relevant evidence has not been fully adduced
before that court. 
30. In that regard, according to settled case-law,
the procedure provided for by Article 234 EC is
an instrument of cooperation between the Court
of Justice and national courts by means of which
the former provides the latter with interpreta-
tion of such Community law as is necessary for
them to give judgment in cases upon which they
are called to adjudicate (see, inter alia, Joined
Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Dzodzi [1990]
ECR I-3763, paragraph 33; Case C-231/89
Gmurzynska-Bscher [1990] ECR I-4003, paragraph
18; Case C-83/91 Meilicke [1992] ECR I-4871,
paragraph 22, and Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R
[2002] ECR I-7091, paragraph 31). 
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31. In the context of that cooperation, it is for
the national court seised of the dispute, which
alone has direct knowledge of the facts giving
rise to the dispute and must assume responsibil-
ity for the subsequent judicial decision, to deter-
mine in the light of the particular circumstances
of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling
in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the
relevance of the questions which it submits to
the Court. Consequently, where the questions
submitted concern the interpretation of Com-
munity law, the Court of Justice is, in principle,
bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-415/
93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59;
Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-
2099, paragraph 38; Case C-153/00 Der Weduwe
[2002] ECR I-0000, paragraph 31, and Case C-
318/00 Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins
[2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 41). 
32. However, the Court has also held that, in
exceptional circumstances, it can examine the
conditions in which the case was referred to it by
the national court (see, to that effect, PreussenEle-
ktra, cited above, paragraph 39). The spirit of
cooperation which must prevail in preliminary
ruling proceedings requires the national court
for its part to have regard to the function
entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to
contribute to the administration of justice in the
Member States and not to give opinions on gen-
eral or hypothetical questions (Bosman, para-
graph 60; Der Weduwe, paragraph 32, and Bacardi-
Martini and Cellier des Dauphins, paragraph 42). 
33. Thus, the Court has held that it has no juris-
diction to give a preliminary ruling on a ques-
tion submitted by a national court where it is
quite obvious that the interpretation or the
assessment of the validity of a provision of Com-
munity law sought by that court bears no rela-
tion to the actual facts of the main action or its
purpose, or where the problem is hypothetical,
or where the Court does not have before it the
factual or legal material necessary to give a use-
ful answer to the questions submitted to it (see
Bosman, paragraph 61, and Bacardi-Martini and
Cellier des Dauphins, paragraph 43). 
34. In the present case, it is by no means clear
that the questions referred by the national court
fall within one or other of the situations referred
to in the case-law cited in the preceding para-
graph. 
35. The action brought by Schmidberger seeks
compensation from the Republic of Austria for
the damage which the alleged breach of Commu-
nity law is said to have caused it, consisting in
the fact that the Austrian authorities did not ban
the demonstration which resulted in the Brenner
motorway being closed to all traffic for a contin-
uous period of almost 30 hours. 
36. It follows that the request for an interpreta-
tion of Community law made by the national
court has undeniably arisen in the context of a
genuine dispute between the parties to the main
proceedings and which cannot therefore be
regarded as hypothetical. 
37. Furthermore, it is apparent from the order
for reference that the national court has set out
in precise and detailed terms the reasons why it
considers it necessary for the determination of
the dispute before it to refer to the Court various
questions on the interpretation of Community
law including, in particular, that relating to the
factors to be taken into account when taking evi-
dence of the damage allegedly suffered by
Schmidberger. 
38. Moreover, it follows from the observations
submitted by the Member States in response to
the notification of the order for reference and by
the Commission pursuant to Article 23 of the
EC Statute of the Court of Justice that the infor-
mation in that order enabled them properly to
state their position on all the questions submit-
ted to the Court. 
39. It is clear from the second paragraph of Arti-
cle 234 EC that it is for the national court to
decide at what stage in the proceedings it is
appropriate for that court to refer a question to
the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling (see
Joined Cases 36/80 and 71/80 Irish Creamery Milk
Suppliers Association and Others [1981] ECR 735,
paragraph 5, and Case C-236/98 JämO [2000]
ECR I-2189, paragraph 30). 
40. It is equally undeniable that the referring
court has defined to the requisite legal standard
both the factual and legal context of its request
for interpretation of Community law and that it
has provided the Court with all the information
necessary to enable it to reply usefully to that
request. 
41. Furthermore, it is logical that the referring
court requests the Court, first, to determine
which types of damage can be taken into consid-
eration for the purposes of State liability for
breach of Community law - and, in particular,
requests it to clarify the question whether com-
pensation is in respect only of damage in fact
suffered or if it also covers loss of profit based on
general estimates, and whether and to what
extent the victim must try to avoid or mitigate
that loss -, before that court rules on the specific
evidence recognised as being relevant by the
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Court in the assessment of the damage in fact
suffered by Schmidberger. 
42. Lastly, in the context of an action for liability
on the part of a Member State, the referring
court not only asks the Court about the require-
ment that there be damage and the forms which
that may take and the detailed rules of evidence
in that regard, but also considers it necessary to
pose several questions on the other requirements
to be met in making out a claim based on such
liability and, in particular, as to whether the con-
duct of the relevant national authorities in the
main case constitutes a breach of Community
law and whether that breach is such as to entitle
the alleged victim to compensation. 
43. In the light of the foregoing, it cannot be
maintained that as regards the main proceedings
the Court is called upon to rule on a question
which is purely hypothetical or irrelevant for the
purposes of the decision which the national
court is called upon to give. 
44. On the contrary, it follows from those con-
siderations that the questions referred by that
court meet an objective need for the purpose of
settling the dispute before it, in the course of
which it is called upon to give a decision capable
of taking account of the Court's judgment, and
the information provided to the latter, in partic-
ular in the order for reference, enables it to reply
usefully to those questions. 
45. Consequently, the reference for a preliminary
ruling made by the Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck
is admissible. 
The questions referred for a preliminary rul-
ing 
46. It should be noted at the outset that the ques-
tions referred by the national court raise two dis-
tinct, albeit related, issues. 
47. First, the Court is asked to rule on whether
the fact that the Brenner motorway was closed to
all traffic for almost 30 hours without interrup-
tion, in circumstances such as those at issue in
the main proceedings, amounts to a restriction
of the free movement of goods and must there-
fore be regarded as a breach of Community law.
Second, the questions relate more specifically to
the circumstances in which the liability of a
Member State may be established in respect of
damage caused to individuals as a result of an
infringement of Community law. 
48. On the latter question, the national court
asks in particular for clarification of whether,
and if so to what extent, in circumstances such
as those of the case before it, the breach of Com-
munity law - if made out - is sufficiently mani-
fest and serious to give rise to liability on the
part of the Member State concerned. It also asks
the Court about the nature and evidence of the
damage to be compensated. 
49. Given that, logically, this second series of
questions need be examined only if the first
issue, as defined in the first sentence of para-
graph 47 of the present judgment, is answered in
the affirmative, the Court must first give a ruling
on the various points raised by that issue, which
is essentially the subject of the first and fourth
questions. 
50. In the light of the evidence in the file of the
main case sent by the referring court and the
written and oral observations presented to the
Court, those questions must be understood as
seeking to determine whether the fact that the
authorities of a Member State did not ban a
demonstration with primarily environmental
aims which resulted in the complete closure of a
major transit route, such as the Brenner motor-
way, for almost 30 hours without interruption
amounts to an unjustified restriction of the free
movement of goods which is a fundamental
principle laid down by Articles 30 and 34 of the
Treaty, read together, if necessary, with Article 5
thereof. 
Whether there is a restriction of the free movement of
goods 
51. It should be stated at the outset that the free
movement of goods is one of the fundamental
principles of the Community. 
52. Thus, Article 3 of the EC Treaty (now, after
amendment, Article 3 EC), inserted in the first
part thereof, entitled 'Principles', provides in
subparagraph (c) that for the purposes set out in
Article 2 of the Treaty the activities of the Com-
munity are to include an internal market charac-
terised by the abolition, as between Member
States, of obstacles to inter alia the free move-
ment of goods. 
53. The second paragraph of Article 7a of the EC
Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 14 EC)
provides that the internal market is to comprise
an area without internal frontiers in which the
free movement of goods is ensured in accordance
with the provisions of the Treaty. 
54. That fundamental principle is implemented
primarily by Articles 30 and 34 of the Treaty. 
55. In particular, Article 30 provides that quanti-
tative restrictions on imports and all measures
having equivalent effect are prohibited between
Member States. Similarly, Article 34 prohibits,
between Member States, quantitative restric-
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tions on exports and all measures having equiva-
lent effect. 
56. It is settled case-law since the judgment in
Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph
5) that those provisions, taken in their context,
must be understood as being intended to elimi-
nate all barriers, whether direct or indirect,
actual or potential, to trade flows in intra-Com-
munity trade (see, to that effect, Case C-265/95
Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959, para-
graph 29). 
57. In this way the Court held in particular that,
as an indispensable instrument for the realisa-
tion of a market without internal frontiers, Arti-
cle 30 does not prohibit only measures
emanating from the State which, in themselves,
create restrictions on trade between Member
States. It also applies where a Member State
abstains from adopting the measures required in
order to deal with obstacles to the free move-
ment of goods which are not caused by the State
(Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 30). 
58. The fact that a Member State abstains from
taking action or, as the case may be, fails to
adopt adequate measures to prevent obstacles to
the free movement of goods that are created, in
particular, by actions by private individuals on
its territory aimed at products originating in
other Member States is just as likely to obstruct
intra-Community trade as is a positive act (Com-
mission v France, cited above, paragraph 31). 
59. Consequently, Articles 30 and 34 of the
Treaty require the Member States not merely
themselves to refrain from adopting measures or
engaging in conduct liable to constitute an
obstacle to trade but also, when read with Article
5 of the Treaty, to take all necessary and appro-
priate measures to ensure that that fundamental
freedom is respected on their territory (Commis-
sion v France, cited above, paragraph 32). Article 5
of the Treaty requires the Member States to take
all appropriate measures, whether general or par-
ticular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations
arising out of the Treaty and to refrain from any
measures which could jeopardise the attainment
of the objectives of that Treaty. 
60. Having regard to the fundamental role
assigned to the free movement of goods in the
Community system, in particular for the proper
functioning of the internal market, that obliga-
tion upon each Member State to ensure the free
movement of products in its territory by taking
the measures necessary and appropriate for the
purposes of preventing any restriction due to the
acts of individuals applies without the need to
distinguish between cases where such acts affect
the flow of imports or exports and those affect-
ing merely the transit of goods. 
61. Paragraph 53 of the judgment in Commission
v France, cited above, shows that the case giving
rise to that judgment concerned not only
imports but also the transit through France of
products from other Member States. 
62. It follows that, in a situation such as that at
issue in the main proceedings, where the compe-
tent national authorities are faced with restric-
tions on the effective exercise of a fundamental
freedom enshrined in the Treaty, such as the free
movement of goods, which result from actions
taken by individuals, they are required to take
adequate steps to ensure that freedom in the
Member State concerned even if, as in the main
proceedings, those goods merely pass through
Austria en route for Italy or Germany. 
63. It should be added that that obligation of the
Member States is all the more important where
the case concerns a major transit route such as
the Brenner motorway, which is one of the main
land links for trade between northern Europe
and the north of Italy. 
64. In the light of the foregoing, the fact that the
competent authorities of a Member State did
not ban a demonstration which resulted in the
complete closure of a major transit route such as
the Brenner motorway for almost 30 hours on
end is capable of restricting intra-Community
trade in goods and must, therefore, be regarded
as constituting a measure of equivalent effect to
a quantitative restriction which is, in principle,
incompatible with the Community law obliga-
tions arising from Articles 30 and 34 of the
Treaty, read together with Article 5 thereof,
unless that failure to ban can be objectively justi-
fied. 
Whether the restriction may be justified 
65. In the context of its fourth question, the refer-
ring court asks essentially whether the purpose of
the demonstration on 12 and 13 June 1998 - dur-
ing which the demonstrators sought to draw at-
tention to the threat to the environment and
public health posed by the constant increase in
the movement of heavy goods vehicles on the
Brenner motorway and to persuade the compe-
tent authorities to reinforce measures to reduce
that traffic and the pollution resulting therefrom
in the highly sensitive region of the Alps - is such
as to frustrate Community law obligations relat-
ing to the free movement of goods. 
66. However, even if the protection of the envi-
ronment and public health, especially in that
region, may, under certain conditions, constitute
mwb-3164-european.media.law.book  Page 142  Wednesday, August 17, 2011  2:33 PM
European Media Law
143
a legitimate objective in the public interest capa-
ble of justifying a restriction of the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, including
the free movement of goods, it should be noted,
as the Advocate General pointed out at para-
graph 54 of his Opinion, that the specific aims
of the demonstration are not in themselves
material in legal proceedings such as those insti-
tuted by Schmidberger, which seek to establish
the liability of a Member State in respect of an
alleged breach of Community law, since that lia-
bility is to be inferred from the fact that the
national authorities did not prevent an obstacle
to traffic from being placed on the Brenner
motorway. 
67. Indeed, for the purposes of determining the
conditions in which a Member State may be lia-
ble and, in particular, with regard to the ques-
tion whether it infringed Community law,
account must be taken only of the action or
omission imputable to that Member State. 
68. In the present case, account should thus be
taken solely of the objective pursued by the
national authorities in their implicit decision to
authorise or not to ban the demonstration in
question. 
69. It is apparent from the file in the main case
that the Austrian authorities were inspired by
considerations linked to respect of the funda-
mental rights of the demonstrators to freedom
of expression and freedom of assembly, which
are enshrined in and guaranteed by the ECHR
and the Austrian Constitution. 
70. In its order for reference, the national court
also raises the question whether the principle of
the free movement of goods guaranteed by the
Treaty prevails over those fundamental rights. 
71. According to settled case-law, fundamental
rights form an integral part of the general princi-
ples of law the observance of which the Court
ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws
inspiration from the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States and from the
guidelines supplied by international treaties for
the protection of human rights on which the
Member States have collaborated or to which
they are signatories. The ECHR has special sig-
nificance in that respect (see, inter alia, Case C-
260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 41;
Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Commission [2001]
ECR I-1611, paragraph 37, and Case C-94/00
Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, paragraph 25).
72. The principles established by that case-law
were reaffirmed in the preamble to the Single
European Act and subsequently in Article F.2 of
the Treaty on European Union (Bosman, cited
above, paragraph 79). That provision states that
'[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950
and as they result from the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States, as general
principles of Community law.' 
73. It follows that measures which are incompat-
ible with observance of the human rights thus
recognised are not acceptable in the Community
(see, inter alia, ERT, cited above, paragraph 41,
and Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I-2629,
paragraph 14). 
74. Thus, since both the Community and its
Member States are required to respect funda-
mental rights, the protection of those rights is a
legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a
restriction of the obligations imposed by Com-
munity law, even under a fundamental freedom
guaranteed by the Treaty such as the free move-
ment of goods. 
75. It is settled case-law that where, as in the
main proceedings, a national situation falls
within the scope of Community law and a refer-
ence for a preliminary ruling is made to the
Court, it must provide the national courts with
all the criteria of interpretation needed to deter-
mine whether that situation is compatible with
the fundamental rights the observance of which
the Court ensures and which derive in particular
from the ECHR (see to that effect, inter alia, Case
12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 28). 
76. In the present case, the national authorities
relied on the need to respect fundamental rights
guaranteed by both the ECHR and the Constitu-
tion of the Member State concerned in deciding
to allow a restriction to be imposed on one of the
fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty. 
77. The case thus raises the question of the need
to reconcile the requirements of the protection
of fundamental rights in the Community with
those arising from a fundamental freedom
enshrined in the Treaty and, more particularly,
the question of the respective scope of freedom
of expression and freedom of assembly, guaran-
teed by Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, and of
the free movement of goods, where the former
are relied upon as justification for a restriction
of the latter. 
78. First, whilst the free movement of goods con-
stitutes one of the fundamental principles in the
scheme of the Treaty, it may, in certain circum-
stances, be subject to restrictions for the reasons
laid down in Article 36 of that Treaty or for over-
riding requirements relating to the public inter-
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est, in accordance with the Court's consistent
case-law since the judgment in Case 120/78
Rewe-Zentral ('Cassis de Dijon') [1979] ECR 649. 
79. Second, whilst the fundamental rights at
issue in the main proceedings are expressly rec-
ognised by the ECHR and constitute the funda-
mental pillars of a democratic society, it
nevertheless follows from the express wording of
paragraph 2 of Articles 10 and 11 of the Conven-
tion that freedom of expression and freedom of
assembly are also subject to certain limitations
justified by objectives in the public interest, in so
far as those derogations are in accordance with
the law, motivated by one or more of the legiti-
mate aims under those provisions and necessary
in a democratic society, that is to say justified by
a pressing social need and, in particular, propor-
tionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, to
that effect, Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997]
ECR I-3689, paragraph 26, Case C-60/00 Carpen-
ter [2002] ECR I-6279, paragraph 42, and Eur.
Court HR, Steel and Others v. The United King-
dom judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII, § 101). 
80. Thus, unlike other fundamental rights
enshrined in that Convention, such as the right
to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment, which
admit of no restriction, neither the freedom of
expression nor the freedom of assembly guaran-
teed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but
must be viewed in relation to its social purpose.
Consequently, the exercise of those rights may be
restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact
correspond to objectives of general interest and
do not, taking account of the aim of the restric-
tions, constitute disproportionate and unaccept-
able interference, impairing the very substance
of the rights guaranteed (see, to that effect, Case
C-62/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-
2575, paragraph 23, and Case C-404/92 P X v
Commission [1994] ECR I-4737, paragraph 18). 
81. In those circumstances, the interests involved
must be weighed having regard to all the circum-
stances of the case in order to determine whether
a fair balance was struck between those interests.
82. The competent authorities enjoy a wide mar-
gin of discretion in that regard. Nevertheless, it
is necessary to determine whether the restric-
tions placed upon intra-Community trade are
proportionate in the light of the legitimate
objective pursued, namely, in the present case,
the protection of fundamental rights. 
83. As regards the main case, it should be empha-
sised at the outset that the circumstances charac-
terising it are clearly distinguishable from the
situation in the case giving rise to the judgment
in Commission v France, cited above, referred to by
Schmidberger as a relevant precedent in the
course of its legal action against Austria. 
84. By comparison with the points of fact
referred to by the Court at paragraphs 38 to 53
of the judgment in Commission v France, cited
above, it should be noted, first, that the demon-
stration at issue in the main proceedings took
place following a request for authorisation pre-
sented on the basis of national law and after the
competent authorities had decided not to ban it. 
85. Second, because of the presence of demon-
strators on the Brenner motorway, traffic by
road was obstructed on a single route, on a sin-
gle occasion and during a period of almost 30
hours. Furthermore, the obstacle to the free
movement of goods resulting from that demon-
stration was limited by comparison with both
the geographic scale and the intrinsic serious-
ness of the disruption caused in the case giving
rise to the judgment in Commission v France, cited
above. 
86. Third, it is not in dispute that by that dem-
onstration, citizens were exercising their funda-
mental rights by manifesting in public an
opinion which they considered to be of impor-
tance to society; it is also not in dispute that the
purpose of that public demonstration was not to
restrict trade in goods of a particular type or
from a particular source. By contrast, in Commis-
sion v France, cited above, the objective pursued
by the demonstrators was clearly to prevent the
movement of particular products originating in
Member States other than the French Republic,
by not only obstructing the transport of the
goods in question, but also destroying those
goods in transit to or through France, and even
when they had already been put on display in
shops in the Member State concerned. 
87. Fourth, in the present case various adminis-
trative and supporting measures were taken by
the competent authorities in order to limit as far
as possible the disruption to road traffic. Thus,
in particular, those authorities, including the
police, the organisers of the demonstration and
various motoring organisations cooperated in
order to ensure that the demonstration passed
off smoothly. Well before the date on which it
was due to take place, an extensive publicity
campaign had been launched by the media and
the motoring organisations, both in Austria and
in neighbouring countries, and various alterna-
tive routes had been designated, with the result
that the economic operators concerned were
duly informed of the traffic restrictions applying
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on the date and at the site of the proposed dem-
onstration and were in a position timeously to
take all steps necessary to obviate those restric-
tions. Furthermore, security arrangements had
been made for the site of the demonstration. 
88. Moreover, it is not in dispute that the iso-
lated incident in question did not give rise to a
general climate of insecurity such as to have a
dissuasive effect on intra-Community trade
flows as a whole, in contrast to the serious and
repeated disruptions to public order at issue in
the case giving rise to the judgment in Commis-
sion v France, cited above. 
89. Finally, concerning the other possibilities
envisaged by Schmidberger with regard to the
demonstration in question, taking account of
the Member States' wide margin of discretion, in
circumstances such as those of the present case
the competent national authorities were entitled
to consider that an outright ban on the demon-
stration would have constituted unacceptable
interference with the fundamental rights of the
demonstrators to gather and express peacefully
their opinion in public. 
90. The imposition of stricter conditions con-
cerning both the site - for example by the side of
the Brenner motorway - and the duration - lim-
ited to a few hours only - of the demonstration
in question could have been perceived as an
excessive restriction, depriving the action of a
substantial part of its scope. Whilst the compe-
tent national authorities must endeavour to
limit as far as possible the inevitable effects upon
free movement of a demonstration on the public
highway, they must balance that interest with
that of the demonstrators, who seek to draw the
aims of their action to the attention of the pub-
lic. 
91. An action of that type usually entails incon-
venience for non-participants, in particular as
regards free movement, but the inconvenience
may in principle be tolerated provided that the
objective pursued is essentially the public and
lawful demonstration of an opinion. 
92. In that regard, the Republic of Austria sub-
mits, without being contradicted on that point,
that in any event, all the alternative solutions
which could be countenanced would have risked
reactions which would have been difficult to
control and would have been liable to cause
much more serious disruption to intra-Commu-
nity trade and public order, such as unauthor-
ised demonstrations, confrontation between
supporters and opponents of the group organis-
ing the demonstration or acts of violence on the
part of the demonstrators who considered that
the exercise of their fundamental rights had been
infringed. 
93. Consequently, the national authorities were
reasonably entitled, having regard to the wide
discretion which must be accorded to them in
the matter, to consider that the legitimate aim of
that demonstration could not be achieved in the
present case by measures less restrictive of intra-
Community trade. 
94. In the light of those considerations, the
answer to the first and fourth questions must be
that the fact that the authorities of a Member
State did not ban a demonstration in circum-
stances such as those of the main case is not
incompatible with Articles 30 and 34 of the
Treaty, read together with Article 5 thereof. 
The conditions for liability of the Member State 
95. It follows from the answer given to the first
and fourth questions that, having regard to all
the circumstances of a case such as that before
the referring court, the competent national au-
thorities cannot be said to have committed a
breach of Community law such as to give rise to
liability on the part of the Member State con-
cerned. 
96. In those circumstances, there is no need to
rule on the other questions referred concerning
some of the conditions necessary for a Member
State to incur liability for damage caused to indi-
viduals by that Member State's infringement of
Community law. 
Costs 
97. The costs incurred by the Austrian, Greek,
Italian, Netherlands and Finnish Governments
and by the Commission, which have submitted
observations to the Court, are not recoverable.
Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the
main action, a step in the proceedings pending
before the national court, the decision on costs is
a matter for that court. 
On those grounds, 
THE COURT,
in answer to the questions referred to it by the
Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck by order of 1 Feb-
ruary 2000, hereby rules: 
The fact that the authorities of a Member State
did not ban a demonstration in circumstances
such as those of the main case is not incompati-
ble with Articles 30 and 34 of the EC Treaty
(now, after amendment, Articles 28 EC and 29
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EC), read together with Article 5 of the EC Treaty
(now Article 10 EC). 
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COUNCIL OF EUROPE - COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RECOMMENDATION NO.
R (2000) 7 ON THE RIGHT OF JOURNALISTS NOT TO DISCLOSE THEIR SOURCES
OF INFORMATION
 Adopted 8 March 2000
The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of
Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of Eu-
rope,
Considering that the aim of the Council of
Europe is to achieve greater unity between its
members for the purpose of safeguarding and
realising the ideals and principles which are their
common heritage;
Recalling the commitment of the member states
to the fundamental right to freedom of expres-
sion as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms;
Reaffirming that the right to freedom of expres-
sion and information constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society
and one of the basic conditions for its progress
and the development of every individual, as
expressed in the Declaration on the Freedom of
Expression and Information of 1982;
Reaffirming the need for democratic societies to
secure adequate means of promoting the devel-
opment of free, independent and pluralist
media;
Recognising that the free and unhindered exer-
cise of journalism is enshrined in the right to
freedom of expression and is a fundamental pre-
requisite to the right of the public to be
informed on matters of public concern;
Convinced that the protection of journalists'
sources of information constitutes a basic condi-
tion for journalistic work and freedom as well as
for the freedom of the media;
Recalling that many journalists have expressed
in professional codes of conduct their obligation
not to disclose their sources of information in
case they received the information confiden-
tially;
Recalling that the protection of journalists and
their sources has been established in the legal
systems of some member states;
Recalling also that the exercise by journalists of
their right not to disclose their sources of infor-
mation carries with it duties and responsibilities
as expressed in Article 10 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms;
Aware of the Resolution of the European Parlia-
ment of 1994 on confidentiality for journalists'
sources and the right of civil servants to disclose
information;
Aware of Resolution No. 2 on journalistic
freedoms and human rights of the 4th European
Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy
held in Prague in December 1994, and recalling
Recommendation No. R (96) 4 on the protection
of journalists in situations of conflict and ten-
sion,
Recommends to the governments of member
states:
1. to implement in their domestic law and prac-
tice the principles appended to this recommen-
dation,
2. to disseminate widely this recommendation
and its appended principles, where appropriate
accompanied by a translation, and 
3. to bring them in particular to the attention of
public authorities, police authorities and the
judiciary as well as to make them available to
journalists, the media and their professional
organisations.
Appendix to Recommendation No. R (2000) 7
Principles concerning the right of journalists not
to disclose their sources of information
Definitions
For the purposes of this Recommendation:
a. the term "journalist" means any natural or
legal person who is regularly or professionally
engaged in the collection and dissemination of
information to the public via any means of mass
communication;
b. the term "information" means any statement
of fact, opinion or idea in the form of text, sound
and/or picture;
c. the term "source" means any person who pro-
vides information to a journalist;
d. the term "information identifying a source"
means, as far as this is likely to lead to the identi-
fication of a source:
i. the name and personal data as well as voice and
image of a source,
ii. the factual circumstances of acquiring infor-
mation from a source by a journalist,
iii. the unpublished content of the information
provided by a source to a journalist, and
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iv. personal data of journalists and their employ-
ers related to their professional work.
Principle 1 (Right of non-disclosure of journalists)
Domestic law and practice in member states
should provide for explicit and clear protection
of the right of journalists not to disclose infor-
mation identifying a source in accordance with
Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(hereinafter: the Convention) and the principles
established herein, which are to be considered as
minimum standards for the respect of this right.
Principle 2 (Right of non-disclosure of other persons)
Other persons who, by their professional rela-
tions with journalists, acquire knowledge of
information identifying a source through the
collection, editorial processing or dissemination
of this information, should equally be protected
under the principles established herein.
Principle 3 (Limits to the right of non-disclosure)
a. The right of journalists not to disclose infor-
mation identifying a source must not be subject
to other restrictions than those mentioned in
Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention. In
determining whether a legitimate interest in a
disclosure falling within the scope of Article 10,
paragraph 2 of the Convention outweighs the
public interest in not disclosing information
identifying a source, competent authorities of
member states shall pay particular regard to the
importance of the right of non-disclosure and
the pre-eminence given to it in the case-law of
the European Court of Human Rights, and may
only order a disclosure if, subject to paragraph b,
there exists an overriding requirement in the
public interest and if circumstances are of a suf-
ficiently vital and serious nature.
b. The disclosure of information identifying a
source should not be deemed necessary unless it
can be convincingly established that:
i. reasonable alternative measures to the disclo-
sure do not exist or have been exhausted by the
persons or public authorities that seek the dis-
closure, and 
ii. the legitimate interest in the disclosure clearly
outweighs the public interest in the non-disclo-
sure, bearing in mind that:
- an overriding requirement of the need for dis-
closure is proved,
- the circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and
serious nature,
- the necessity of the disclosure is identified as
responding to a pressing social need, and
- member states enjoy a certain margin of appre-
ciation in assessing this need, but this margin
goes hand in hand with the supervision by the
European Court of Human Rights.
c. The above requirements should be applied at
all stages of any proceedings where the right of
non-disclosure might be invoked.
Principle 4 (Alternative evidence to journalists' sources)
In legal proceedings against a journalist on
grounds of an alleged infringement of the hon-
our or reputation of a person, authorities should
consider, for the purpose of establishing the
truth or otherwise of the allegation, all evidence
which is available to them under national proce-
dural law and may not require for that purpose
the disclosure of information identifying a
source by the journalist.
Principle 5 (Conditions concerning disclosures)
a. The motion or request for initiating any action
by competent authorities aimed at the disclosure
of information identifying a source should only
be introduced by persons or public authorities
that have a direct legitimate interest in the dis-
closure.
b. Journalists should be informed by the compe-
tent authorities of their right not to disclose
information identifying a source as well as of the
limits of this right before a disclosure is
requested.
c. Sanctions against journalists for not disclosing
information identifying a source should only be
imposed by judicial authorities during court
proceedings which allow for a hearing of the
journalists concerned in accordance with Article
6 of the Convention.
d. Journalists should have the right to have the
imposition of a sanction for not disclosing their
information identifying a source reviewed by
another judicial authority.
e. Where journalists respond to a request or
order to disclose information identifying a
source, the competent authorities should con-
sider applying measures to limit the extent of a
disclosure, for example by excluding the public
from the disclosure with due respect to Article 6
of the Convention, where relevant, and by them-
selves respecting the confidentiality of such a
disclosure. 
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Principle 6 (Interception of communication, surveil-
lance and judicial search and seizure)
a. The following measures should not be applied
if their purpose is to circumvent the right of
journalists, under the terms of these principles,
not to disclose information identifying a source:
i. interception orders or actions concerning com-
munication or correspondence of journalists or
their employers,
ii. surveillance orders or actions concerning jour-
nalists, their contacts or their employers, or
iii. search or seizure orders or actions concerning
the private or business premises, belongings or
correspondence of journalists or their employers
or personal data related to their professional
work.
b. Where information identifying a source has
been properly obtained by police or judicial
authorities by any of the above actions, although
this might not have been the purpose of these
actions, measures should be taken to prevent the
subsequent use of this information as evidence
before courts, unless the disclosure would be jus-
tified under Principle 3.
Principle 7 (Protection against self-incrimination)
The principles established herein shall not in any
way limit national laws on the protection against
self-incrimination in criminal proceedings, and
journalists should, as far as such laws apply, enjoy
such protection with regard to the disclosure of
information identifying a source. 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RECOMMENDATION
REC (2003)13 ON THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE MEDIA IN
RELATION TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Adopted 10 July 2003
The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of
Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of Eu-
rope, 
Considering that the aim of the Council of
Europe is to achieve greater unity between its
members for the purpose of safeguarding and
realising the ideals and principles which are their
common heritage; 
Recalling the commitment of the member states
to the fundamental right to freedom of expres-
sion and information as guaranteed by Article 10
of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter
"the Convention"), which constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society
and one of the basic conditions for its progress
and for the development of every individual; 
Recalling that the media have the right to
inform the public due to the right of the public
to receive information, including information
on matters of public concern, under Article 10 of
the Convention, and that they have a profes-
sional duty to do so; 
Recalling that the rights to presumption of
innocence, to a fair trial and to respect for pri-
vate and family life under Articles 6 and 8 of the
Convention constitute fundamental require-
ments which must be respected in any demo-
cratic society; 
Stressing the importance of media reporting in
informing the public on criminal proceedings,
making the deterrent function of criminal law
visible as well as in ensuring public scrutiny of
the functioning of the criminal justice system; 
Considering the possibly conflicting interests
protected by Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the Conven-
tion and the necessity to balance these rights in
view of the facts of every individual case, with
due regard to the supervisory role of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in ensuring the
observance of the commitments under the Con-
vention; 
Recalling, furthermore, the right of the media
and journalists to create professional associa-
tions, as guaranteed by the right to freedom of
association under Article 11 of the Convention,
which is a basis for self-regulation in the media
field; 
Aware of the many initiatives taken by the media
and journalists in Europe to promote the
responsible exercise of journalism, either
through self-regulation or in co-operation with
the state through co-regulatory frameworks; 
Desirous to enhance an informed debate on the
protection of the rights and interests at stake in
the context of media reporting relating to crimi-
nal proceedings, and to foster good practice
throughout Europe while ensuring access of the
media to criminal proceedings; 
Recalling its Resolution (74) 26 on the right of
reply - position of the individual in relation to
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the press, its Recommendation No. R (85) 11 on
the position of the victim in the framework of
criminal law and procedure, its Recommenda-
tion No. R (97) 13 concerning the intimidation
of witnesses and the rights of the defence, and its
Recommendation No. R (97) 21 on the media
and the promotion of a culture of tolerance; 
Stressing the importance of protecting journal-
ists' sources of information in the context of
criminal proceedings, in accordance with its Rec-
ommendation No. R (2000) 7 on the right of
journalists not to disclose their sources of infor-
mation; 
Bearing in mind Resolution No. 2 on journalistic
freedoms and human rights adopted at the 4th
European Ministerial Conference on Mass
Media Policy (Prague, December 1994) as well as
the Declaration on a media policy for tomorrow
adopted at the 6th European Ministerial Confer-
ence on Mass Media Policy (Cracow, June 2000); 
Recalling that this recommendation does not
intend to limit the standards already in force in
member states which aim to protect freedom of
expression, 
Recommends, while acknowledging the diversity
of national legal systems concerning criminal
procedure, that the governments of member
states: 
1. take or reinforce, as the case may be, all meas-
ures which they consider necessary with a view to
the implementation of the principles appended
to this recommendation, within the limits of
their respective constitutional provisions, 
2. disseminate widely this recommendation and
its appended principles, where appropriate
accompanied by a translation, and 
3. bring them in particular to the attention of
judicial authorities and police services as well as
to make them available to representative organi-
sations of lawyers and media professionals. 
Appendix to Recommendation Rec (2003) 13
Principles concerning the provision of information
through the media in relation to criminal proceed-
ings 
Principle 1 - Information of the public via the media 
The public must be able to receive information
about the activities of judicial authorities and po-
lice services through the media. Therefore, jour-
nalists must be able to freely report and comment
on the functioning of the criminal justice system,
subject only to the limitations provided for under
the following principles. 
Principle 2 - Presumption of innocence 
Respect for the principle of the presumption of
innocence is an integral part of the right to a fair
trial. Accordingly, opinions and information
relating to on-going criminal proceedings
should only be communicated or disseminated
through the media where this does not prejudice
the presumption of innocence of the suspect or
accused. 
Principle 3 - Accuracy of information 
Judicial authorities and police services should
provide to the media only verified information
or information which is based on reasonable
assumptions. In the latter case, this should be
clearly indicated to the media. 
Principle 4 - Access to information 
When journalists have lawfully obtained infor-
mation in the context of on-going criminal pro-
ceedings from judicial authorities or police
services, those authorities and services should
make available such information, without dis-
crimination, to all journalists who make or have
made the same request. 
Principle 5 - Ways of providing information to the media 
When judicial authorities and police services
themselves have decided to provide information
to the media in the context of on-going criminal
proceedings, such information should be pro-
vided on a non-discriminatory basis and, wher-
ever possible, through press releases, press
conferences by authorised officers or similar
authorised means. 
Principle 6 - Regular information during criminal pro-
ceedings 
In the context of criminal proceedings of public
interest or other criminal proceedings which
have gained the particular attention of the pub-
lic, judicial authorities and police services should
inform the media about their essential acts, so
long as this does not prejudice the secrecy of
investigations and police inquiries or delay or
impede the outcome of the proceedings. In cases
of criminal proceedings which continue for a
long period, this information should be pro-
vided regularly. 
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Principle 7 - Prohibition of the exploitation of informa-
tion 
Judicial authorities and police services should
not exploit information about on-going criminal
proceedings for commercial purposes or pur-
poses other than those relevant to the enforce-
ment of the law. 
Principle 8 - Protection of privacy in the context of on-
going criminal proceedings 
The provision of information about suspects,
accused or convicted persons or other parties to
criminal proceedings should respect their right
to protection of privacy in accordance with Arti-
cle 8 of the Convention. Particular protection
should be given to parties who are minors or
other vulnerable persons, as well as to victims, to
witnesses and to the families of suspects,
accused and convicted. In all cases, particular
consideration should be given to the harmful
effect which the disclosure of information ena-
bling their identification may have on the per-
sons referred to in this Principle. 
Principle 9 - Right of correction or right of reply 
Without prejudice to the availability of other
remedies, everyone who has been the subject of
incorrect or defamatory media reports in the
context of criminal proceedings should have a
right of correction or reply, as the case may be,
against the media concerned. A right of correc-
tion should also be available with respect to
press releases containing incorrect information
which have been issued by judicial authorities or
police services. 
Principle 10 - Prevention of prejudicial influence 
In the context of criminal proceedings, particu-
larly those involving juries or lay judges, judicial
authorities and police services should abstain
from publicly providing information which
bears a risk of substantial prejudice to the fair-
ness of the proceedings. 
Principle 11 - Prejudicial pre-trial publicity 
Where the accused can show that the provision
of information is highly likely to result, or has
resulted, in a breach of his or her right to a fair
trial, he or she should have an effective legal rem-
edy. 
Principle 12 - Admission of journalists 
Journalists should be admitted to public court
hearings and public pronouncements of judge-
ments without discrimination and without prior
accreditation requirements. They should not be
excluded from court hearings, unless and as far
as the public is excluded in accordance with Arti-
cle 6 of the Convention. 
Principle 13 - Access of journalists to courtrooms 
The competent authorities should, unless it is
clearly impracticable, provide in courtrooms a
number of seats for journalists which is suffi-
cient in accordance with the demand, without
excluding the presence of the public as such. 
Principle 14 - live reporting and recordings in court
rooms 
Live reporting or recordings by the media in
court rooms should not be possible unless and
as far as expressly permitted by law or the com-
petent judicial authorities. Such reporting
should be authorised only where it does not bear
a serious risk of undue influence on victims, wit-
nesses, parties to criminal proceedings, juries or
judges. 
Principle 15 - Support for media reporting 
Announcements of scheduled hearings, indict-
ments or charges and other information of rele-
vance to legal reporting should be made
available to journalists upon simple request by
the competent authorities in due time, unless
impracticable. Journalists should be allowed, on
a non-discriminatory basis, to make or receive
copies of publicly pronounced judgments. They
should have the possibility to disseminate or
communicate these judgments to the public. 
Principle 16 - Protection of witnesses 
The identity of witnesses should not be dis-
closed, unless a witness has given his or her prior
consent, the identification of a witness is of pub-
lic concern, or the testimony has already been
given in public. The identity of witnesses should
never be disclosed where this endangers their
lives or security. Due respect shall be paid to pro-
tection programmes for witnesses, especially in
criminal proceedings against organised crime or
crime within the family. 
Principle 17 - Media reporting on the enforcement of
court sentences 
Journalists should be permitted to have contacts
with persons serving court sentences in prisons,
as far as this does not prejudice the fair adminis-
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tration of justice, the rights of prisoners and
prison officers or the security of a prison. 
Principle 18 - Media reporting after the end of court sen-
tences 
In order not to prejudice the re-integration into
society of persons who have served court sen-
tences, the right to protection of privacy under
Article 8 of the Convention should include the
right to protect the identity of these persons in
connection with their prior offence after the end
of their court sentences, unless they have
expressly consented to the disclosure of their
identity or they and their prior offence are of
public concern again or have become of public
concern again
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, EXPLANATORY MEMORAN-
DUM TO RECOMMENDATION REC (2003) 13 ON THE PROVISION OF INFORMA-
TION THROUGH THE MEDIA IN RELATION TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
I. Introduction 
1. The Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter
referred to as the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights or ECHR) guarantees freedom of ex-
pression and information under Article 10, the
right to the presumption of innocence and to a
fair trial under Article 6 and the right to respect
for private and family life under Article 8. 
2. The provision of information in relation to
court proceedings, and in particular criminal
proceedings, corresponds to the right of the pub-
lic to be informed on matters of public concern,
including justice. The right to a fair trial under
Article 6 of the ECHR includes hearings in public
and the public pronouncement of judgments.
Openness to the public can be achieved by the
media. However, Article 6 allows also for the ex-
clusion of the public and the media from all or
parts of the trial for a limited number of cases re-
ferred to in Article 6 itself. The exclusion of the
media would also have to comply with the nar-
rowly interpreted possible restrictions of free-
dom of expression and information under Article
10 of the ECHR. Where private information is
disclosed during a trial, Article 8 of the ECHR
may require the protection of the privacy of this
information. 
3. Prominent cases in several member states con-
cerning the media and the courts have caused
wide public attention and debate about such is-
sues as secrecy of investigations, the influence by
the media on witnesses and judges, the presence
of media in courtrooms as well as audiovisual re-
cordings of trials. 
4. Against this background, in 1996, the Steering
Committee on the Mass Media (CDMM) identi-
fied the issue of media reporting in relation to
criminal proceedings as being of common inter-
est to all member states, when it proposed the
creation of a Group of Specialists on media law
and human rights (MM-S-HR) with a view to de-
veloping common principles for the protection
of freedom of the media as well as other funda-
mental rights of individuals at stake before, dur-
ing and after criminal proceedings. After having
analysed national laws and practices as well as the
relevant case law of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, the MM-S-HR drew up a draft Rec-
ommendation on the provision of information
through the media in relation to criminal pro-
ceedings, which was finalised by the Steering
Committee and its Group of Specialists on free-
dom of expression and other fundamental rights
(MM-S-FR) in 2003. 
5. The Committee of Ministers adopted Recom-
mendation Rec(2003)13 at the 848th meeting of
the Ministers' Deputies on 10 July 2003. 
II. General commentary 
6. This recommendation is addressed to govern-
ments of member states and hence their public
authorities, including courts. Any recommenda-
tion of the Committee of Ministers is an instru-
ment of political commitment, and not a legally
enforceable instrument. Through its adoption by
the Committee of Ministers, it binds all member
states. 
7. The recommendation does not seek to directly
address the private sector, and in particular the
media or journalists. It is at the discretion of the
member states to use measures which they con-
sider appropriate in order to safeguard and pro-
tect the rights and interests of everyone in rela-
tion to criminal proceedings as outlined in this
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recommendation, depending on their respective
circumstances and legal traditions. 
8. The recommendation provides guidelines for
public authorities in the light of Articles 6, 8 and
10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. It does not intend to alter these provi-
sions as well as the obligations of member states
under the Convention. Furthermore, it does not
intend to limit the standards already in force in
member states which aim to protect freedom of
expression. 
9. In the preamble of the recommendation, cer-
tain related recommendations and one resolu-
tion are recalled. Resolution (74) 26 on the right
of reply recommends member states to recognise
the right of reply and correction where media re-
ports have been incorrect or otherwise infringe
the rights of individuals. Recommendation No. R
(85) 11 on the position of the victim in the frame-
work of criminal law and procedure includes the
recommendation, that "information and public
relations policies in connection with the investi-
gation and trial of offences should give due con-
sideration to the need to protect the victim from
any publicity which will unduly affect his private
life or dignity. If the type of offence or the partic-
ular status or personal situation and safety of the
victim make such special protection necessary, ei-
ther the trial before the judgment should be held
in camera or disclosure or publication of person-
al information should be restricted to whatever
extent is appropriate". In Recommendation No.
R (97) 13 concerning intimidation of witnesses
and the rights of the defence, member states are
recommended to take appropriate legislative and
practical measures to ensure that witnesses may
testify freely and without intimidation. In the
context of organised crime, the exclusion of the
media and/or the public from all or part of the
trial should be considered. Finally, Recommen-
dation No. R (97) 21 on the media and the pro-
motion of a culture of tolerance contains princi-
ples for media reporting without inciting to
ethnic intolerance. 
10. Following the case law of the European Court
of Human Rights concerning journalists' sourc-
es, the MM-S-FR had elaborated Recommenda-
tion (2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to
disclose their sources of information, which was
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 8
March 2000. Although the main focus of the
present recommendation is on the right of the
media to report about criminal proceedings, the
MM-S-FR felt that Recommendation (2000) 7
should be referred to in this context, as journal-
ists reporting about criminal proceedings might
also disseminate information received from con-
fidential sources. Recommendation (2000) 7 and
Article 10 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, as interpreted by the European
Court of Human Rights, would generally protect
those sources in such a case. 
11. Member states are held "to disseminate wide-
ly this recommendation and its Appendix, where
appropriate accompanied by a translation", as
the dissemination of the recommendation is a
prerequisite for its proper implementation. 
III. Commentary to the Recommendation 
12. The specific recommendations or principles
appear in the Appendix to the recommendation.
This Appendix is an integral part of the Recom-
mendation itself. It is only for sake of clarity that
the individual "principles concerning the provi-
sion of information through the media in rela-
tion to criminal proceedings" are grouped in the
Appendix. 
13. For the purposes of the recommendation, the
term "criminal proceedings" shall be understood
as any action taken by judicial authorities or po-
lice services as well as investigating bodies under
the framework of penal law and procedure. 
Principle 1 (Information of the public via the media) 
14. Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights guarantees the right of the public
to receive information of public concern. The
principle of a public hearing and a public pro-
nouncement of judgments under Article 6 ECHR
is part of the fair administration of justice. Since
media have a particular role in disseminating in-
formation to the public, they should be able to
disseminate information about the activities of
judicial authorities and police services. The right
of the public to receive information on matters of
public concern is of particular importance in this
context; it includes the right for the media to
freely report and comment on the functioning of
the criminal justice system. The European Court
of Human Rights established, for instance, that
the media are one of the means by which politi-
cians and public opinion can control and verify
whether judges are discharging their heavy re-
sponsibilities in a manner which is in conformity
with the aim which is the basis of the task en-
trusted to them.
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Principle 2 (Presumption of innocence) 
15. Article 6, paragraph 2 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights guarantees the right to
the presumption of innocence. This right is pri-
marily a procedural right vis-à-vis judicial au-
thorities, which defines the burden of proof in
criminal proceedings. However, the fair adminis-
tration of justice requires also that the presump-
tion of innocence is not prejudiced indirectly
through opinions and information relating to
pending criminal proceedings disseminated by
the media. The European Court of Human
Rights has stated that "journalists reporting on
criminal proceedings currently taking place
must, admittedly, ensure that they do not over-
step the bounds imposed in the interests of the
proper administration of justice and that they re-
spect the accused's right to be presumed inno-
cent" (Du Roy and Malaurie v. France (2000)
para. 34). This being said, the Court holds that an
absolute and general prohibition of media re-
porting about criminal proceedings would be un-
necessary and impede the right of the press to in-
form the public about matters which, although
relating to criminal proceedings, may be in the
public interest (ibid., para. 35 and 36). 
Principle 3 (Accuracy of information) 
16. The accuracy of information is important for
both the credibility of judicial authorities and po-
lice services as well as the credibility of the media.
Therefore, Principle 3 recommends that only ac-
curate information should be provided, i.e. infor-
mation based on facts or reasonable assump-
tions. Where the information is based on such
assumptions, this should be clearly indicated. Al-
though the truth of information might finally be
judged by a court of law only, this Principle shall
prevent that inaccurate information is provided
knowingly or even on purpose, since it could un-
dermine the authority of the law enforcement au-
thorities and of the judiciary as well as compro-
mise the rights of the parties to criminal
proceedings. 
Principle 4 (Access to information) 
17. Principle 4 recommends that journalists
should not be excluded from access to informa-
tion on an arbitrary basis, for instance due to per-
sonal, political or other reasons, where such in-
formation has already been obtained lawfully by
other journalists. 
18. National legal systems may also specifically
grant access to official documents in this context
in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights. 
Principle 5 ( Ways of providing information to the me-
dia) 
19. Under Principle 5, judicial authorities and po-
lice services should provide their information to
the media through organised and authorised
channels, rather than by judicial and police offic-
ers on an individual basis. The term "authorised
officers" is to be understood in a wide sense, indi-
cating that the authority concerned should des-
ignate a staff member for that purpose. Other
"similar authorised means" in the sense of this
Principle could include, for instance, the provi-
sion of oral information by official spokesper-
sons on the spot, as well as written information
material about a particular criminal proceeding
given to journalists in advance of a trial. 
20. Some national judicial authorities and police
services have developed their internal guidelines
for contacts with the media, including rules for
the preparation of press releases. Such internal
guidelines might be useful for ensuring a high
common standard among domestic authorities.
This will enhance the reliability of information
and should contribute to the quality of media re-
ports. Under national law, police services may
have less discretion than judicial authorities to
provide information to the media concerning
their work. 
Principle 6 (Regular information during criminal pro-
ceedings) 
21. Where journalists and the media are not in-
formed about criminal proceedings which have
gained the particular attention of the public
through the persons involved, the seriousness of
the facts or other circumstances of public con-
cern, it is likely that journalists will pursue their
own journalistic investigations. Such journalistic
investigations conducted in parallel to judicial
investigations may, under certain circumstances,
bear the risk of having a negative effect on those
judicial investigations, for example by publicly
disclosing information, portraying witnesses or
contacting criminal offenders. This being said,
parallel journalistic investigations might also
have positive effects, such as detecting witnesses
or suspects. 
22. Some member states have prescribed by do-
mestic law the secrecy of criminal investigations
and police inquiries as a fundamental procedural
principle. As stated by the European Court of
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Human Rights in its Du Roy and Malaurie judg-
ment of 3 October 2000, however, an absolute se-
crecy of criminal investigations would not be
compatible with Article 10 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. 
23. Principle 6 therefore recommends that, under
such circumstances, judicial authorities and po-
lice services should keep the media informed dur-
ing criminal investigations, so long as this does
not prejudice the secrecy of investigations and
police inquiries or delay or impede the outcome
of the proceedings. If there is nothing new to re-
port, judicial authorities and police services
should also mention this. 
Principle 7 (Prohibition of the exploitation of informa-
tion) 
24. The commercial exploitation of information
about on-going criminal proceedings by judicial
authorities and police services could undermine
the impartiality of the judiciary and the police. In
addition, it could exclude journalists and media
from access to such information due to its cost.
In the same vein, information should not be ex-
ploited for purposes other than those relevant to
the enforcement of the law. 
25. This Principle does not, however, exclude the
charging of fees for the provision of information
by judicial authorities or police services, in order
to cover the expenses pertaining to the produc-
tion and dissemination of that information. 
Principle 8 (Protection of privacy in the context of crim-
inal proceedings) 
26. Everyone has the right to the protection of
private and family life under Article 8 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights. Principle
8 recalls this protection for suspects, the accused,
convicted persons and other parties to criminal
proceedings, who must not be denied this right
due to their involvement in such proceedings.
The mere indication of the name of the accused
or convicted may constitute a sanction which is
more severe than the penal sanction delivered by
the criminal court. It furthermore may prejudice
the reintegration into society of the person con-
cerned. The same applies to the image of the ac-
cused or convicted. Therefore, particular consid-
eration should be given to the harmful effect
which the disclosure of information enabling
their identification may have on the persons re-
ferred to in this Principle. 
27. An even stronger protection is recommended
to parties who are minors, to victims of criminal
offences, to witnesses and to the families of sus-
pects, the accused and convicted persons. In this
respect, member states may also refer to Recom-
mendation No. R (85) 11 on the position of the
victim in the framework of criminal law and pro-
cedure and Recommendation No. R (97) 13 con-
cerning the intimidation of witnesses and the
rights of the defence. 
Principle 9 (Right of correction or right of reply) 
28. Member states are recommended to recognise
in their domestic law and practice a right of cor-
rection or reply or the possibility of bringing a
complaint to a press council under Resolution
(74) 26 on the right of reply. Principle 9 recalls
this right in relation to criminal proceedings,
where incorrect information may prejudice the
presumption of innocence, for example. In addi-
tion, Principle 9 recommends granting such a
right also against incorrect press releases of judi-
cial authorities and police services, which would
not otherwise qualify under Resolution (74) 26.
Judicial authorities and police services should
nevertheless bear in mind that there may be
greater danger of prejudicial influence if they do
not disclose information to the media. 
Principle 10 (Prevention of prejudicial influence) 
29. Opinions and information about matters
which are the subject of criminal proceedings
might, when they are disseminated publicly in
the media, have a prejudicial influence on the
presumption of innocence, as referred to in Prin-
ciple 2. This risk is especially high where juries or
lay judges are involved in criminal proceedings.
Therefore, Principle 10 recommends that judicial
authorities and police services should abstain
from publicly providing information which bears
a risk of substantial prejudicial influence to the
fairness of the proceedings. In this context, the
term "judicial authorities" shall also include
prosecutors and investigating judges. The evalua-
tion of the risk of prejudicial influence should be
made on a case-by-case basis, in the light of the
circumstances of each case. 
Principle 11 (Prejudicial pre-trail publicity) 
30. Virulent media reporting might, in exception-
al and rare cases, have a negative influence on a
given criminal proceeding, in particular on jury
members, lay judges and witnesses. It is not the
intention of this Recommendation to harmonise
the legal remedies for accused under such cir-
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cumstances. However, the MM-S-FR felt that a
recommendation containing principles on the
provision of information through the media in
relation to criminal proceedings should also con-
tain a principle recommending to member states
that there should be an effective legal remedy,
where the provision of information is likely to re-
sult, or has resulted, in a breach of the right to a
fair trial. 
Principle 12 (Admission of journalists) 
31. Article 6 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights guarantees the fundamental right to
a public hearing and the public pronouncement
of a judgment. Such publicity is achieved by al-
lowing the public to attend hearings and pro-
nouncements of judgments, as far as members of
the public are interested in attending, and de-
pending on the capacity of the courtroom. Where
seats in courtrooms are not sufficient to accom-
modate all persons interested, judicial authori-
ties might also consider transmitting a hearing
audio-visually to another courtroom, if such fa-
cilities exist. 
32. By admitting the media to public hearings
and pronouncements of judgments, much great-
er publicity can be achieved. Under certain cir-
cumstances, however, the fair administration of
justice may require the exclusion of the public
from all or part of a hearing under Article 6 of the
ECHR. 
33. Principle 12 recommends that journalists
should be admitted to public court hearings and
the public pronouncement of judgments with-
out discrimination and without prior formal and
pre-determined accreditation requirements. Any
discrimination would be contrary to the freedom
of the media as guaranteed under Article 10 of
the ECHR and could lead to a lack of publicity re-
quired under Article 6 of the ECHR. As a general
principle, the media should not be excluded from
court hearings, unless and as far as the public is
excluded in accordance with Article 6 of the
ECHR. 
Principle 13 (Access of journalists to courtrooms) 
34. Since the media provide wider public access
to court hearings through their reporting, court-
rooms should accommodate a sufficient number
of seats for journalists. Depending on the public
interest in a given hearing, larger courtrooms
with more seats should allow for greater accom-
modation. The latter obviously depends on the
circumstances and the availability of court-
rooms. The presence of the media should, howev-
er, not exclude the participation of individual
members of the public. 
Principle 14 (live reporting and recordings in courts
rooms) 
35. The live reporting or recording by the media
of the voice or image of persons present at court
hearings may have an undue influence on those
persons. Witnesses may either be intimidated or
attracted by cameras or the media, which might
have an impact on their true reporting of facts.
Victims may also feel intimidated by them. Rec-
ommendation No. R (85) 11 on the position of
the victim in the framework of criminal law and
procedure as well as Recommendation No. R (97)
13 concerning the intimidation of witnesses and
the rights of the defence refer to this phenome-
non. For instance, pictures could be taken before
the proceedings start. This being said, members
States are entitled to take any legal provisions
which they consider useful to protect certain cat-
egories of persons such as minors or handcuffed
accused persons. 
36. Principle 14 draws the attention of member
states to such a possible influence and recom-
mends that live reporting or recordings by the
media in courtrooms should only be possible
where expressly permitted by law or the compe-
tent judicial authorities. Such exceptional ex-
press permissions will provide a predictable and
non-discriminatory legal framework. For in-
stance, it might be determined that trials of his-
torical importance can be recorded or filmed and
possibly disseminated at a later stage. The same
may be applied to criminal proceedings at a supe-
rior court instance, especially where such pro-
ceedings are a mere review of the law or essential-
ly based on written submissions by the parties. 
Principle 15 (Support for media reporting) 
37. Judicial authorities may have an interest in
supporting reporting about criminal proceed-
ings by making available, upon simple request
and where practicable, announcements of sched-
uled hearings, charges and other relevant infor-
mation. Where they have such information, the
media will be less likely to produce inaccurate re-
ports which might have an undue influence on
juries and lay judges or prejudice the presump-
tion of innocence. Therefore, Principle 15 recom-
mends providing such support in due time and
where practicable. Such support should not be
made subject to accreditation. During the pro-
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ceedings, a representative of the court should be,
as far as possible, available for the media in order
to respond to their requests for clarification. Fi-
nally, journalists should be able to disseminate or
communicate judgments to the public, without
undermining the protection of privacy under Ar-
ticle 8 of the Convention of Human Rights. 
Principle 16 (Protection of witnesses) 
38. As mentioned above, media reporting about
witnesses may have an intimidating effect on
them, especially where the identity of a witness is
disclosed. This might even be contrary to the wit-
ness protection under Recommendation No. R
(97) 13 concerning the intimidation of witnesses
and the rights of the defence. Therefore, Principle
16 recommends that the identity of witnesses
should not be disclosed by the authorities to the
media or by the media themselves, unless a wit-
ness has given his or her prior consent, the iden-
tity of a witness is of public concern, or the testi-
mony has already taken place in public. 
Principle 17 (Media reporting on the enforcement of
court sentences) 
39. Public scrutiny over the fair administration of
justice is largely carried out through the media.
The enforcement of court sentences is part of this
administration of justice. Therefore, freedom of
the media should include the possibility for jour-
nalists of having contacts with persons serving
court sentences, as far as this does not prejudice
the fair administration of justice, the rights of
prisoners and prison officers or the security of a
prison. 
Principle 18 (Media reporting after the end of court sen-
tences) 
40. It is part of the fair administration of justice
to allow for the re-integration into society of per-
sons who have served their court sentences. Me-
dia reporting about cases and prisoners after the
end of court sentences may prejudice such re-in-
tegration. Therefore, Principle 18 recommends
that the right to the protection of privacy under
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights should include the identity of these per-
sons and their prior offence, unless they and their
prior offence are or have become of public con-
cern. A simple anniversary of a crime would thus
not be sufficient. However, persons and their of-
fences may, for instance, be of public concern if
those persons violate criminal law again or where
their prior offence was a crime without a limita-
tion period, such as crimes against humanity or
genocide. The latter crimes are, for example, de-
fined by the European Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes
against Humanity and War Crimes of 1974.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, DECLARATION ON THE
PROVISION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE MEDIA IN RELATION TO CRIMI-
NAL PROCEEDINGS  (2003)
Adopted 10 July 2003
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe, 
Recalling the commitment of the member states
to the fundamental right to freedom of expres-
sion, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter "the Con-
vention"); 
Reaffirming that the right to freedom of expres-
sion and information constitutes one of the es-
sential foundations of a democratic society and
one of the basic conditions for its progress and
for the development of every individual, as ex-
pressed in its Declaration on the Freedom of Ex-
pression and Information of 1982; 
Recalling the commitment to the fundamental
right to the presumption of innocence and to a
fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention and
the fundamental right to respect for private and
family life under Article 8 of the Convention; 
Recalling furthermore the right of the media and
journalists to create professional associations, as
guaranteed by the right to freedom of association
under Article 11 of the Convention, which is a ba-
sis for self-regulation in the media field; 
Considering the possibly conflicting interests
protected by Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the Conven-
tion and the necessity to balance these rights in
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view of the facts of every individual case, with due
regard to the supervisory role of the European
Court of Human Rights in ensuring the observ-
ance of the commitments under the Convention; 
Considering also the value which self-regulation
by the media and co-regulation can have in strik-
ing such a balance; 
Aware of the many initiatives taken by the media
and journalists in Europe to promote the respon-
sible exercise of journalism, either through self-
regulation or in co-operation with the state
through co-regulatory frameworks; 
Aware also of the need to enhance an informed
debate on the protection of the rights and inter-
ests at stake in the context of media reporting re-
lating to criminal proceedings; 
Desiring to strengthen the responsible exercise of
journalism in this context, notably by promoting
the adoption of good practice by the media
through codes of conduct or other initiatives; 
Concerned by the increasing commercialisation
of information in the context of criminal pro-
ceedings; 
Desiring at the same time to foster the right to
freedom of expression and information in rela-
tion to criminal proceedings, in particular by en-
suring access by the media to such proceedings; 
Recalling its Resolution (74) 26 of the right of re-
ply - position of the individual in relation to the
press, its Recommendation No. (85) 11 on the
position of the victim in the framework of crimi-
nal law and procedure, its Recommendation No.
R (97) 13 concerning the intimidation of witness-
es and the rights of the defence, its Recommenda-
tion No. R (97) 21 on the media and the promo-
tion of a culture of tolerance and its
Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 on the right of
journalists not to disclose their sources of infor-
mation; 
Bearing in mind Resolution No. 2 on journalistic
freedoms and human rights adopted at the 4th
European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media
Policy (Prague, December 1994) as well as the
Declaration on a media policy for tomorrow
adopted at the 6th European Ministerial Confer-
ence on Mass Media Policy (Cracow, June 2000); 
Aware of the seminars on media self-regulation
organised by the Steering Committee on the
Mass Media in Strasbourg on 7 and 8 October
1998, as well as by the European Commission
and Germany in Saarbrücken from 19 to 21 April
1999; 
Aware of the public consultation with media pro-
fessionals which was conducted by the Steering
Committee on the Mass Media in January 2002, 
Calls on member states: 
1. to encourage responsible reporting on criminal
proceedings in the media by supporting the
training of journalists in the field of law and
court procedure, in co-operation with the media
and their professional organisations, educational
institutions and the courts, in so far this is neces-
sary for understanding court proceedings and
the rights and interests of the parties to criminal
proceedings and the state which are at stake dur-
ing such proceedings; 
2. to support any self-regulatory initiatives by
which the media define professional ethical
standards with regard to media reports on crimi-
nal proceedings in order to ensure respect for the
principles contained in Recommendation
Rec(2003)13 of the Committee of Ministers to
member states on the provision of information
through the media in relation to criminal pro-
ceedings; 
3. to seek co-operation with self-regulatory bod-
ies in the media field; 
4. to involve professional associations in the me-
dia field in the relevant legislative processes con-
cerning media reporting on criminal proceed-
ings, for example via hearings or consultations; 
5. to make this Declaration available to the public
authorities and the courts as well as to the media,
journalists and their professional organisations. 
Invites the media and journalists: 
1. to organise themselves in voluntary profession-
al associations and foster pan-European co-oper-
ation between such associations; 
2. to draw up professional ethical guidelines and
standards for journalists, especially in relation to
media reports on criminal proceedings, where
such guidelines and standards do not yet exist,
and to foster compliance with such professional
ethical guidelines and standards; 
3. to treat in their reports both suspects and ac-
cused as innocent until found guilty by a court of
law, given that they enjoy that right under Article
6 of the Convention; 
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4. to respect the dignity, the security and, unless
the information is of public concern, the right to
privacy of victims, claimants, suspects, accused,
convicted persons and witnesses as well as of
their families, as guaranteed under Article 8 of
the Convention; 
5. not to recall a former offence of a person, un-
less it is of public concern or has become of pub-
lic concern again; 
6. to be sensitive to the interests of minors and
other vulnerable persons involved in criminal
proceedings; 
7. to avoid prejudicing criminal investigations
and court proceedings; 
8. to avoid prejudicial and pejorative references in
their reports on criminal proceedings, where
these are likely to incite xenophobia, discrimina-
tion or violence; 
9. to entrust reporting on criminal proceedings
to journalists with adequate training in these
matters.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, DECLARATION ON FREE-
DOM OF COMMUNICATION ON THE INTERNET (2003)
Adopted 28 May 2003
The member states of the Council of Europe, 
Recalling the commitment of member states to
the fundamental right to freedom of expression
and information, as guaranteed by Article 10 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 
Considering that freedom of expression and the
free circulation of information on the Internet
need to be reaffirmed; 
Aware at the same time of the need to balance
freedom of expression and information with
other legitimate rights and interests, in accord-
ance with Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms; 
Recalling in this respect the Convention on
Cybercrime and Recommendation Rec(2001)8
on self-regulation concerning cyber content; 
Recalling, furthermore, Resolution No. 1 of the
5th European Ministerial Conference on Mass
Media Policy (Thessaloniki, 11-12 December
1997); 
Concerned about attempts to limit public access
to communication on the Internet for political
reasons or other motives contrary to democratic
principles; 
Convinced of the necessity to state firmly that
prior control of communications on the Inter-
net, regardless of frontiers, should remain an
exception; 
Considering, furthermore, that there is a need to
remove barriers to individual access to the Inter-
net, and thus to complement measures already
undertaken to set up public access points in line
with Recommendation No. R (99) 14 on univer-
sal community service concerning new commu-
nication and information services; 
Convinced that freedom to establish services
provided through the Internet will contribute to
guaranteeing the right of users to access pluralis-
tic content from a variety of domestic and for-
eign sources; 
Convinced also that it is necessary to limit the
liability of service providers when they act as
mere transmitters, or when they, in good faith,
provide access to, or host, content from third
parties; 
Recalling in this respect Directive 2000/31/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of informa-
tion society services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on
electronic commerce); 
Stressing that freedom of communication on
the Internet should not prejudice the human
dignity, human rights and fundamental
freedoms of others, especially minors; 
Considering that a balance has to be found
between respecting the will of users of the Inter-
net not to disclose their identity and the need for
law enforcement authorities to trace those
responsible for criminal acts; 
Welcoming efforts by service providers to co-
operate with law enforcement agencies when
faced with illegal content on the Internet; 
Noting the importance of co-operation between
these agencies in the fight against such content, 
Declare that they seek to abide by the following
principles in the field of communication on the
Internet: 
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Principle 1: Content rules for the Internet 
Member states should not subject content on
the Internet to restrictions which go further
than those applied to other means of content
delivery. 
Principle 2: Self-regulation or co-regulation 
Member states should encourage self-regulation
or co-regulation regarding content disseminated
on the Internet. 
Principle 3: Absence of prior state control 
Public authorities should not, through general
blocking or filtering measures, deny access by
the public to information and other communi-
cation on the Internet, regardless of frontiers.
This does not prevent the installation of filters
for the protection of minors, in particular in
places accessible to them, such as schools or
libraries. 
Provided that the safeguards of Article 10, para-
graph 2, of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are
respected, measures may be taken to enforce the
removal of clearly identifiable Internet content
or, alternatively, the blockage of access to it, if
the competent national authorities have taken a
provisional or final decision on its illegality. 
Principle 4: Removal of barriers to the participation of
individuals in the information society 
Member states should foster and encourage
access for all to Internet communication and
information services on a non-discriminatory
basis at an affordable price. Furthermore, the
active participation of the public, for example by
setting up and running individual websites,
should not be subject to any licensing or other
requirements having a similar effect. 
Principle 5: Freedom to provide services via the Internet 
The provision of services via the Internet should
not be made subject to specific authorisation
schemes on the sole grounds of the means of
transmission used. 
Member states should seek measures to promote
a pluralistic offer of services via the Internet
which caters to the different needs of users and
social groups. Service providers should be
allowed to operate in a regulatory framework
which guarantees them non-discriminatory
access to national and international telecommu-
nication networks. 
Principle 6: Limited liability of service providers for I-
nternet content 
Member states should not impose on service
providers a general obligation to monitor con-
tent on the Internet to which they give access,
that they transmit or store, nor that of actively
seeking facts or circumstances indicating illegal
activity. 
Member states should ensure that service pro-
viders are not held liable for content on the
Internet when their function is limited, as
defined by national law, to transmitting infor-
mation or providing access to the Internet. 
In cases where the functions of service providers
are wider and they store content emanating from
other parties, member states may hold them co-
responsible if they do not act expeditiously to
remove or disable access to information or serv-
ices as soon as they become aware, as defined by
national law, of their illegal nature or, in the
event of a claim for damages, of facts or circum-
stances revealing the illegality of the activity or
information. 
When defining under national law the obliga-
tions of service providers as set out in the previ-
ous paragraph, due care must be taken to respect
the freedom of expression of those who made
the information available in the first place, as
well as the corresponding right of users to the
information. 
In all cases, the above-mentioned limitations of
liability should not affect the possibility of issu-
ing injunctions where service providers are
required to terminate or prevent, to the extent
possible, an infringement of the law. 
Principle 7: Anonymity 
In order to ensure protection against online sur-
veillance and to enhance the free expression of
information and ideas, member states should
respect the will of users of the Internet not to
disclose their identity. This does not prevent
member states from taking measures and co-
operating in order to trace those responsible for
criminal acts, in accordance with national law,
the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and other
international agreements in the fields of justice
and the police.
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COUNCIL OF EUROPE - COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RECOMMENDATION
REC(2004)16 ON THE RIGHT OF REPLY IN THE NEW MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
Adopted 15 December 2004
The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of
Article 15b of the Statute of the Council of Eu-
rope, 
Considering that the aim of the Council of
Europe is to achieve greater unity between its
members for the purpose of safeguarding and
promoting the ideals and principles which are
their common heritage; 
Recalling its Resolution (74) 26 on the right of
reply – position of the individual in relation to
the press, the provisions of which should apply
to all media; 
Noting that, since the adoption of this Resolu-
tion, a number of major technological develop-
ments have taken place, necessitating a revision
of this text in order to adapt it to the current sit-
uation of the media sector in Europe; 
Recalling, furthermore, that the European Con-
vention on Transfrontier Television (ETS No.
132) refers not only to the right of reply but also
to other comparable legal or administrative rem-
edies; 
Reaffirming that the right of reply should pro-
tect any legal or natural person from any infor-
mation presenting inaccurate facts concerning
that person and affecting his or her rights, and
considering consequently that the dissemination
of opinions and ideas must remain outside the
scope of this Recommendation; 
Considering that the right of reply is a particu-
larly appropriate remedy in the online environ-
ment due to the possibility of instant correction
of contested information and the technical ease
with which replies from concerned persons can
be attached to it; 
Considering that it is also in the interest of the
public to receive information from different
sources, thereby guaranteeing that they receive
complete information; 
Acknowledging that the right of reply can be
assured not only through legislation, but also
through co-regulatory or self-regulatory meas-
ures; 
Emphasising that the right of reply is without
prejudice to other remedies available to persons
whose right to dignity, honour, reputation or
privacy have been violated in the media, 
Recommends that the governments of the mem-
ber states should examine and, if necessary,
introduce in their domestic law or practice a
right of reply or any other equivalent remedy,
which allows a rapid correction of incorrect
information in online or off-line media along
the lines of the following minimum principles,
without prejudice to the possibility to adjust
their exercise to the particularities of each type
of media. 
Definition 
For the purposes of this Recommendation: 
The term "medium" refers to any means of com-
munication for the periodic dissemination to
the public of edited information, whether on-
line or off-line, such as newspapers, periodicals,
radio, television and web-based news services. 
Minimum principles 
1. Scope of the right of reply 
Any natural or legal person, irrespective of
nationality or residence, should be given a right
of reply or an equivalent remedy offering a possi-
bility to react to any information in the media
presenting inaccurate facts about him or her and
which affect his/her personal rights. 
2. Promptness 
The request for a reply should be addressed to
the medium concerned within a reasonably
short time from the publication of the contested
information. The medium in question should
make the reply public without undue delay. 
3. Prominence 
The reply should be given, as far as possible, the
same prominence as was given to the contested
information in order for it to reach the same
public and with the same impact. 
4. Free of charge 
The reply should be made public free of charge
for the person concerned. 
5. Exceptions 
By way of exception, national law or practice may
provide that the request for a reply may be re-
fused by the medium in question in the following
cases: 
– if the length of the reply exceeds what is neces-
sary to correct the contested information;
– if the reply is not limited to a correction of the
facts challenged;
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– if its publication would involve a punishable
act, would render the content provider liable to
civil law proceedings or would transgress stand-
ards of public decency;
– if it is considered contrary to the legally pro-
tected interests of a third party;
– if the individual concerned cannot show the
existence of a legitimate interest;
– if the reply is in a language different from that
in which the contested information was made
public;
– if the contested information is a part of a
truthful report on public sessions of the public
authorities or the courts. 
6. Safeguarding an effective exercise of the
right of reply 
In order to safeguard the effective exercise of the
right of reply, the media should make public the
name and contact details of the person to whom
requests for a reply can be addressed. 
For the same purpose, national law or practice
should determine to what extent the media are
obliged to conserve, for a reasonable length of
time, a copy of information or programmes
made publicly available or, at least, while a
request for inserting a reply can be made, or
while a dispute is pending before a tribunal or
other competent body. 
7. Electronic archives 
If the contested information is kept publicly
available in electronic archives and a right of re-
ply has been granted, a link should be established
between the two if possible, in order to draw the
attention of the user to the fact that the original
information has been subject to a response. 
8. Settlement of disputes 
If a medium refuses a request to make a reply
public, or if the reply is not made public in a man-
ner satisfactory for the person concerned, the
possibility should exist for the latter to bring the
dispute before a tribunal or another body with
the power to order the publication of the reply.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, DECLARATION ON FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION IN THE MEDIA IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM (2005)
Adopted 2 March 2005
Considering that the aim of the Council of Eu-
rope is to achieve a greater unity between its
members for the purpose of safeguarding and
promoting the ideals and principles which are
their common heritage; 
Considering the dramatic effect of terrorism on
the full enjoyment of human rights, in particular
the right to life, its threat to democracy, its aim
notably to destabilise legitimately constituted
governments and to undermine pluralistic civil
society and its challenge to the ideals of everyone
to live free from fear; 
Unequivocally condemning all acts of terrorism
as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by
whomever committed; 
Noting that every state has the duty to protect
human rights and fundamental freedoms of all
persons; 
Recalling its firm attachment to the principles of
freedom of expression and information as a
basic element of democratic and pluralist society
and a prerequisite for the progress of society and
for the development of human beings, as under-
lined in the case-law of the European Court of
Human Rights under Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights as well as in the
Committee of Ministers' Declaration on the
freedom of expression and information of 1982; 
Considering that the free and unhindered dis-
semination of information and ideas is one of
the most effective means of promoting under-
standing and tolerance, which can help prevent
or combat terrorism; 
Recalling that states cannot adopt measures
which would impose restrictions on freedom of
expression and information going beyond what
is permitted by Article 10 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, unless under the
strict conditions laid down in Article 15 of the
Convention; 
Recalling furthermore that in their fight against
terrorism, states must take care not to adopt
measures that are contrary to human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom
of expression, which is one of the very pillars of
the democratic societies that terrorists seek to
destroy; 
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Noting the value which self-regulatory measures
taken by the media may have in the particular
context of the fight against terrorism; 
Recalling Article 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, the Committee of Ministers'
Declarations on the freedom of expression and
information adopted on 29 April 1982, on the
protection of journalists in situations of conflict
and tension adopted on 3 May 1996, and its Rec-
ommendations No. R (97) 20 on hate speech,
No. R (97) 21 on the media and the promotion
of a culture of tolerance, No. R (2000) 7 on the
right of journalists not to disclose their sources
of information and Rec(2003)13 on the provi-
sion of information through the media in rela-
tion to criminal proceedings; 
Bearing in mind the Resolutions and Recom-
mendations of the Parliamentary Assembly on
terrorism; 
Recalling the Guidelines on Human Rights and
the Fight against Terrorism which it adopted on
11 July 2002, 
Calls on public authorities in member states: 
- not to introduce any new restrictions on free-
dom of expression and information in the media
unless strictly necessary and proportionate in a
democratic society and after examining carefully
whether existing laws or other measures are not
already sufficient; 
- to refrain from adopting measures equating
media reporting on terrorism with support for
terrorism; 
- to ensure access by journalists to information
regularly updated, in particular by appointing
spokespersons and organising press conferences,
in accordance with national legislation; 
- to provide appropriate information to the
media with due respect for the principle of the
presumption of innocence and the right to
respect for private life; 
- to refrain from creating obstacles for media
professionals in having access to scenes of terror-
ist acts that are not imposed by the need to pro-
tect the safety of victims of terrorism or of law
enforcement forces involved in an on-going anti-
terrorist operation, of the investigation or the
effectiveness of safety or security measures; in all
cases where the authorities decide to restrict
such access, they should explain the reasons for
the restriction and its duration should be pro-
portionate to the circumstances and a person
authorised by the authorities should provide
information to journalists until the restriction
has been lifted; 
- to guarantee the right of the media to know the
charges brought by the judicial authorities
against persons who are the subject of anti-ter-
rorist judicial proceedings, as well as the right to
follow these proceedings and to report on them,
in accordance with national legislation and with
due respect for the presumption of innocence
and for private life; these rights may only be
restricted when prescribed by law where their
exercise is likely to prejudice the secrecy of inves-
tigations and police inquiries or to delay or
impede the outcome of the proceedings and
without prejudice to the exceptions mentioned
in Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights; 
- to guarantee the right of the media to report on
the enforcement of sentences, without prejudice
to the right to respect for private life; 
- to respect, in accordance with Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights and
with Recommendation No. R (2000) 7, the right
of journalists not to disclose their sources of
information; the fight against terrorism does
not allow the authorities to circumvent this right
by going beyond what is permitted by these texts; 
- to respect strictly the editorial independence of
the media, and accordingly, to refrain from any
kind of pressure on them; 
- to encourage the training of journalists and
other media professionals regarding their pro-
tection and safety and to take, where appropriate
and, if circumstances permit, with their agree-
ment, measures to protect journalists or other
media professionals who are threatened by ter-
rorists; 
Invites the media and journalists to consider the fol-
lowing suggestions: 
- to bear in mind their particular responsibilities
in the context of terrorism in order not to con-
tribute to the aims of terrorists; they should, in
particular, take care not to add to the feeling of
fear that terrorist acts can create, and not to
offer a platform to terrorists by giving them dis-
proportionate attention; 
- to adopt self-regulatory measures, where they
do not exist, or adapt existing measures so that
they can effectively respond to ethical issues
raised by media reporting on terrorism, and
implement them; 
- to refrain from any self-censorship, the effect of
which would be to deprive the public of informa-
tion necessary for the formation of its opinion; 
- to bear in mind the significant role which they
can play in preventing "hate speech" and incite-
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ment to violence, as well as in promoting mutual
understanding; 
- to be aware of the risk that the media and jour-
nalists can unintentionally serve as a vehicle for
the expression of racist or xenophobic feelings or
hatred; 
- to refrain from jeopardising the safety of per-
sons and the conduct of antiterrorist operations
or judicial investigations of terrorism through
the information they disseminate; 
- to respect the dignity, the safety and the ano-
nymity of victims of terrorist acts and of their
families, as well as their right to respect for pri-
vate life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights; 
- to respect the right to the presumption of inno-
cence of persons who are prosecuted in the con-
text of the fight against terrorism; 
- to bear in mind the importance of distinguish-
ing between suspected or convicted terrorists
and the group (national, ethnic, religious or ide-
ological) to which they belong or to which they
claim to subscribe; 
- to assess the way in which they inform the pub-
lic of questions concerning terrorism, in particu-
lar by consulting the public, by analytical
broadcasts, articles and colloquies, and to
inform the public of the results of this assess-
ment; 
- to set up training courses, in collaboration with
their professional organisations, for journalists
and other media professionals who report on
terrorism, on their safety and the historical, cul-
tural, religious and geopolitical context of the
scenes they cover, and to invite journalists to fol-
low these courses. 
The Committee of Ministers agrees to monitor,
within the framework of the existing procedures,
the initiatives taken by governments of member
states aiming at reinforcing measures, in particu-
lar in the legal field, to fight terrorism as far as
they could affect the freedom of the media, and
invites the Parliamentary Assembly to do alike. 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, DECLARATION (2005)56
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
Adopted 13 May 2005
The member states of the Council of Europe, 
Recalling their commitment to building socie-
ties based on the values of human rights, democ-
racy, rule of law, social cohesion, respect for
cultural diversity and trust between individuals
and between peoples, and their determination to
continue honouring this commitment as their
countries enter the Information Age; 
Respecting the obligations and commitments as
undertaken within existing Council of Europe
standards and other documents; 
Recognising that information and communica-
tion technologies (ICTs) are a driving force in
building the Information Society and have
brought about a convergence of different com-
munication mediums; 
Considering the positive contribution the
deployment of ICTs makes to economic growth
and prosperity as well as labour productivity; 
Aware of the profound impact, both positive and
negative, that ICTs have on many aspects of
human rights; 
Aware, in particular, that ICTs have the potential
to bring about changes to the social, technologi-
cal and legal environment in which current
human rights instruments were originally devel-
oped; 
Aware that ICTs are increasingly becoming an
integral part of the democratic process; 
Recognising that ICTs can offer a wider range of
possibilities in exercising human rights; 
Recognising therefore that limited or no access
to ICTs can deprive individuals of the ability to
exercise fully their human rights; 
Reaffirming that all rights enshrined in the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) remain fully
valid in the Information Age and should con-
tinue to be protected regardless of new techno-
logical developments; 
Recognising the need to take into account in
national legislation new ICT-assisted forms of
human rights violations and the fact that ICTs
can greatly intensify the impact of such viola-
tions; 
Conclude that, to better respond to the new
challenges of protecting human rights in a rap-
idly evolving Information Society, member states
need to review and, where necessary, adjust the
application of human rights instruments; 
Undertake to adopt policies for the further
development of the Information Society which
are compliant with the ECHR and the case-law
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of the European Court of Human Rights, and
which aim to preserve, and whenever possible
enhance, democracy, to protect human rights, in
particular freedom of expression and informa-
tion, and to promote respect for the rule of law; 
Declare that when circumstances lead to the
adoption of measures to curtail the exercise of
human rights in the Information Society, in the
context of law enforcement or the fight against
terrorism, such measures shall comply fully with
international human rights standards. These
measures must be lawful and defined as precisely
as possible, be necessary and proportionate to
the aim pursued, and be subject to supervision
by an independent authority or judicial review.
Further, when such measures fall under the
scope of Article 15 of the ECHR, they need to be
reassessed on a regular basis with the purpose of
lifting them when the circumstances under
which they were adopted no longer exist; 
Declare that the exercise of the rights and
freedoms enshrined in the ECHR shall be
secured for all without discrimination, regard-
less of the technical means employed; 
Declare that they seek to abide by the principles
and guidelines regarding respect for human
rights and the rule of law in the Information
Society, found in section I below; 
Invite civil society, the private sector and other
interested stakeholders to take into account in
their work towards an inclusive Information
Society for all, the considerations in section II
below; 
Invite the Chair of the Committee of Ministers
to submit this Declaration, as a Council of
Europe contribution, to the Tunis Phase of the
World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS) for consideration. 
I. Human rights in the Information Society 
1. The right to freedom of expression, infor-
mation and communication 
ICTs provide unprecedented opportunities for all
to enjoy freedom of expression. However, ICTs
also pose many serious challenges to that free-
dom, such as state and private censorship. 
Freedom of expression, information and com-
munication should be respected in a digital as
well as in a non-digital environment, and should
not be subject to restrictions other than those
provided for in Article 10 of the ECHR, simply
because communication is carried in digital
form. 
In guaranteeing freedom of expression, member
states should ensure that national legislation to
combat illegal content, for example racism,
racial discrimination and child pornography,
applies equally to offences committed via ICTs. 
Member states should maintain and enhance
legal and practical measures to prevent state and
private censorship. At the same time, member
states should ensure compliance with the Addi-
tional Protocol to the Convention on Cyber-
crime and other relevant conventions which
criminalise acts of a racist and xenophobic
nature committed through computer systems.
In that context, member states should promote
frameworks for self- and co-regulation by private
sector actors (such as the ICT industry, Internet
service providers, software manufacturers, con-
tent providers and the International Chamber of
Commerce). Such frameworks would ensure the
protection of freedom of expression and com-
munication. 
Member states should promote, through appro-
priate means, interoperable technical standards
in the digital environment, including those for
digital broadcasting, that allow citizens the wid-
est possible access to content. 
2. The right to respect for private life and cor-
respondence 
The large-scale use of personal data, which in-
cludes electronic processing, collection, record-
ing, organisation, storage, adaptation or altera-
tion, retrieval, consultation, disclosure by
transmission or otherwise, has improved the effi-
ciency of governments and the private sector.
Moreover, ICTs, such as Privacy Enhancing Tech-
nology (PETs), can be used to protect privacy.
Nevertheless, such advances in technology pose
serious threats to the right to private life and pri-
vate correspondence. 
Any use of ICTs should respect the right to pri-
vate life and private correspondence. The latter
should not be subject to restrictions other than
those provided for in Article 8 of the ECHR, sim-
ply because it is carried in digital form. Both the
content and traffic data of electronic communi-
cations fall under the scope of Article 8 of the
ECHR and should not be submitted to restric-
tions other than those provided for in that provi-
sion. Any automatic processing of personal data
falls under the scope of the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with regard to Auto-
matic Processing of Personal Data and should
respect the provisions of that instrument. 
Member states should promote frameworks for
self- and co-regulation by private sector actors
with a view to protecting the right to respect for
private life and private correspondence. A key
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element of the promotion of such self- or co-reg-
ulation should be that any processing of per-
sonal data by governments or the private sector
should be compatible with the right to respect
for private life, and that no exception should
exceed those provided for in Article 8, paragraph
2, of the ECHR, or in Article 9, paragraph 2, of
the Convention for the Protection of Individuals
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data. 
3. The right to education and the importance
of encouraging access to the new information
technologies and their use by all without dis-
crimination 
New forms of access to information will stimu-
late wider dissemination of information regard-
ing social, economic and cultural aspects of life,
and can bring about greater inclusion and over-
come forms of discrimination. E-learning has a
great potential for promoting democratic citizen-
ship through education and enhancing the level
of people's knowledge throughout the world. At
the same time, there is a serious risk of exclusion
for the "computer illiterate" and for those with-
out adequate access to information technologies
for social, economic or cultural reasons. 
Computer literacy is a fundamental prerequisite
for access to information, the exercise of cultural
rights and the right to education through ICTs.
Any regulatory measure on the media and new
communication services should respect and,
wherever possible, promote the fundamental val-
ues of pluralism, cultural and linguistic diversity,
and non-discriminatory access to different
means of communication. 
Member states should facilitate access to ICT
devices and promote education to allow all per-
sons, in particular children, to acquire the skills
needed to work with a broad range of ICTs and
assess critically the quality of information, in
particular that which would be harmful to them. 
4. The prohibition of slavery and forced la-
bour, and the prohibition of trafficking in hu-
man beings 
The use of ICTs has expanded the possibilities
for trafficking in human beings and has created
a new virtual form of this practice. 
In a digital environment, such as the Internet,
when trafficking in human beings contravenes
Article 4 of the ECHR, it should be treated in the
same manner as in a non-digital environment. 
Member states should maintain and enhance
legal and practical measures to prevent and com-
bat ICT-assisted forms of trafficking in human
beings. 
5. The right to a fair trial and to no punish-
ment without law 
ICTs facilitate access to legal material and
knowledge. Moreover, public transmission of
court proceedings and transparency of informa-
tion regarding trials facilitates better public
scrutiny of court proceedings. Trials can be con-
ducted more efficiently by using ICT-facilities.
However, given the speed of ICT-driven commu-
nication and the resulting wide-ranging impact,
ICTs can greatly intensify pre-trial publicity and
influence witnesses and public opinion before
and during a trial. Moreover, ICTs allow crimes
not covered by legal frameworks, which may
hinder combating infringements of human
rights. The global reach of ICTs, in particular the
Internet, can create problems of jurisdiction and
also raise issues on the ability to apply legal
frameworks to instances of human rights viola-
tion. 
In the determination of their civil rights and
obligations or any criminal charge against them,
everyone is entitled, in conformity with Article 6
of the ECHR, to identical protection in a digital
environment, such as the Internet, to that which
they would receive in a non-digital environment.
The right of no punishment without law applies
equally to a digital and a non-digital environ-
ment. 
Member states should promote codes of conduct
for representatives of the media and information
service providers, which stress that media report-
ing on trials should be in conformity with the
prescriptions of Article 6 of the ECHR. They
should also consider whether there is a need to
develop further international legal frameworks
on jurisdiction to ensure that the right to no
punishment without law is respected in a digital
environment. 
6. The protection of property 
In the ICT environment, the protection of prop-
erty refers mainly to intellectual property, such as
patents, trademarks and copyrights. ICTs pro-
vide unprecedented access to material covered by
intellectual property rights and opportunities for
its exploitation. However, ICTs can facilitate the
abuse of intellectual property rights and hinder
the prosecution of offenders, due to the speed of
technology changes, the low cost of dissemina-
tion of content, the volume of infringement, the
difficulty in tracking offences across internation-
al borders and the decentralised nature of file
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sharing. Innovation and creativity would be dis-
couraged and investment diminished without ef-
fective means of enforcing intellectual property
rights. 
Intellectual property rights must be protected in
a digital environment, in accordance with the
provisions of international treaties in the area of
intellectual property. At the same time, access to
information in the public domain must be pro-
tected, and attempts to curtail access and usage
rights prevented. 
Member states should provide the legal frame-
work necessary for the above-mentioned goals.
They should also seek, where possible, to put the
political, social services, economic, and research
information they produce into the public
domain, thereby increasing access to informa-
tion of vital importance to everyone. In so doing,
they should take note of the Council of Europe's
Convention on Cybercrime, in particular Article
10, on offences related to infringements of copy-
right and related rights. 
7. The right to free elections 
ICTs have the potential, if appropriately used, to
strengthen representative democracy by making
it easier to hold elections and public consulta-
tions which are accessible to all, raise the quality
of public deliberation, and enable citizens and
civil society to take an active part in policy mak-
ing at national, regional and local levels. ICTs can
make all public services more efficient, respon-
sive, transparent and accountable. At the same
time, improper use of ICTs may subvert the prin-
ciples of universal, equal, free and secret suffrage,
as well as create security and reliability problems
with regard to some e-voting systems. 
E-voting should respect the principles of demo-
cratic elections and referendums and be at least
as reliable and secure as democratic elections and
referendums which do not involve the use of elec-
tronic means. 
Member states should examine the use of ICTs in
fostering democratic processes with a view to
strengthening the participation, initiative,
knowledge and engagement of citizens, improv-
ing the transparency of democratic decision mak-
ing, the accountability and responsiveness of
public authorities, and encouraging public de-
bate and scrutiny of the decision-making process.
Where member states use e-voting, they shall take
steps to ensure transparency, verifiability and ac-
countability, reliability and security of the e-vot-
ing systems, and in general ensure their compati-
bility with Committee of Ministers'
Recommendation Rec(2004)11 on legal, opera-
tional and technical standards for e-voting. 
8. Freedom of assembly 
ICTs bring an additional dimension to the exer-
cise of freedom of assembly and association, thus
extending and enriching ways of enjoying these
rights in a digital environment. This has crucial
implications for the strengthening of civil socie-
ty, for participation in the associative life at work
(trade unions and professional bodies) and in the
political sphere, and for the democratic process
in general. At the same time, ICTs provide exten-
sive means of monitoring and surveillance of as-
sembly and association in a digital environment,
as well as the ability to erect electronic barriers,
severely restricting the exercise of these rights. 
All groups in society should have the freedom to
participate in ICT-assisted associative life as this
contributes to the development of a vibrant civil
society. This freedom should be respected in a
digital environment, such as the Internet, as well
as in a non-digital one and should not be subject
to restrictions other than those provided for in
Article 11 of the ECHR, simply because assembly
takes place in digital form. 
Member states should adapt their legal frame-
works to guarantee freedom of ICT-assisted
assembly and take the steps necessary to ensure
that monitoring and surveillance of assembly
and association in a digital environment does
not take place, and that any exceptions to this
must comply with those provided for in Article
11, paragraph 2, of the ECHR. 
II. A multi-stakeholder governance approach
for building the Information Society: the
roles and responsibilities of stakeholders 
Building an inclusive Information Society, based
on respect for human rights and the rule of law,
requires new forms of solidarity, partnership and
cooperation among governments, civil society,
the private sector and international organisa-
tions. Through open discussions and exchanges
of information worldwide, a
multi-stakeholder governance approach will
help shape agendas and devise new regulatory
and non-regulatory models which will account
for challenges and problems arising from the
rapid development of the Information Society. 
1. Council of Europe member states 
Council of Europe member states should pro-
mote the opportunities afforded by ICTs for full-
er enjoyment of human rights and counteract the
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threats they pose in this respect, while fully com-
plying with the ECHR. The primary objective of
all measures taken should be to extend the bene-
fits of ICTs to everyone, thus encouraging inclu-
sion in the Information Society. This can be done
by ensuring effective and equitable access to
ICTs, and developing the skills and knowledge
necessary to exploit this access, including media
education. 
The exercise of human rights should be subject
to no restrictions other than those provided for
in the ECHR or the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights, simply because it is
conducted in a digital environment. At the same
time, determined efforts should be undertaken
to protect individuals against new and intensi-
fied forms of human rights violations through
the use of the ICTs. 
Taking full account of the differences between
services delivered by different means and peo-
ple's expectations of these services, member
states, with a view to protecting human rights,
should promote self- and co-regulation by pri-
vate sector actors to reduce the availability of
illegal and of harmful content and to enable
users to protect themselves from both. 
2. Civil society 
Civil society actors have been and always will be
instrumental in shaping the society in which they
live, and the Information Society is no exception.
To successfully build an Information Society
which complies with the standards defined by
the ECHR requires the full participation of civil
society in both determining strategies and imple-
menting them. Civil society can contribute to de-
veloping a common vision for maximising the
benefits of ICTs for all and provide its own input
into future common regulatory measures that
will best promote human rights. 
At the Council of Europe, one major channel of
civil society input is the Conference of Interna-
tional
Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs). 
In addition, civil society, in partnership with
governments and the business sector, is invited
to preserve and enhance its role of drawing
attention to and combating the abuse and mis-
use of ICTs, which are detrimental to both indi-
viduals and democratic society in general. 
At a trans-national level, civil society is urged to
cooperate in the sharing of objectives, best prac-
tice and experience with respect to expanding
the opportunities held by the Information Soci-
ety. 
3. Private sector 
Private sector actors are urged to play a role in up-
holding and promoting human rights, such as
freedom of expression and the respect of human
dignity. This role can be fulfilled most effectively
in partnership with governments and civil socie-
ty. 
In cooperation with governments and civil soci-
ety, private sectors actors are urged to take meas-
ures to prevent and counteract threats, risks and
limitations to human rights posed by the misuse
of ICTs or their use for illegal purposes, and to
promote e-inclusion. In addition, they are
invited to establish and further broaden the
scope of codes of conduct and other forms of
self-regulation for the promotion of human
rights through ICTs. 
Private sector actors are also invited to initiate
and develop self- and co-regulatory measures on
the right to private life and private correspond-
ence, as well as on the issue of upholding free-
dom of expression and communication. 
Self- and co-regulatory measures with regard to
private life and private correspondence should
emphasise in particular that any processing of
personal data should comply with the right to
private life. Against this background, private sec-
tor actors should pay particular attention to,
inter alia, the following current issues: 
- the collection, processing and monitoring of
traffic data;
- the monitoring of private correspondence via e-
mail or other forms of electronic communica-
tion; 
- the right to privacy in the work place;
- camera observation;
- biometric identification;
- malware, including spam;
- the collection and use of genetic data and
genetic testing. 
With regard to self- and co-regulatory measures
which aim to uphold freedom of expression and
communication, private sector actors are
encouraged to address in a decisive manner the
following issues: 
- hate speech, racism and xenophobia and incita-
tion to violence in a digital environment such as
the Internet;
- private censorship (hidden censorship) by
Internet service providers, for example blocking
or removing content, on their own initiative or
upon the request of a third party;
- the difference between illegal content and
harmful content. 
Finally, private sector actors are urged to partici-
pate in the combat against virtual trafficking of
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child pornography images and virtual traffick-
ing of human beings. 
4. The Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe will raise awareness of
and promote accession to the Convention on Cy-
bercrime and its Additional Protocol, and the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data, on a worldwide basis. The Convention
Committee will monitor the implementation of
these conventions and their additional protocols
and will, if need be, propose any amendments. 
In accordance with the Action Plan adopted by
the 7th European Ministerial Conference on
Mass Media Policy (Kiev, 10-11 March 2005), the
Steering Committee on the Media and New
Communications Services (CDMC) will: 
- take any necessary initiatives, including the
preparation of guidelines, inter alia, on the roles
and responsibilities of intermediaries and other
Internet actors in ensuring freedom of expres-
sion and communication;
- promote the adoption by member states of
measures to ensure, at the pan-European level, a
coherent level of protection for minors against
harmful content in traditional and new elec-
tronic media, while securing freedom of expres-
sion and the free flow of information;
- establish a regular pan-European forum to
exchange information and best practice between
member states and other stakeholders on meas-
ures to promote inclusion in the Information
Society;
- monitor the impact of the development of new
communication and information services on the
protection of copyright and neighbouring
rights, so as to take any initiative which might
prove necessary to secure this protection. 
The objectives of the project "Good governance
in the Information Society" will be further
defined, taking into account the Council of
Europe's work in the fields of e-voting and e-
governance, and in particular its achievements
represented by Committee of Ministers' Recom-
mendation Rec(2004)11 on legal, operational and
technical standards for e-voting, and Recom-
mendation Rec(2004)15 on electronic governance
("e-governance"). 
The Consultative Committee of the Convention
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (T-PD)
will look into the application of data protection
principles to worldwide telecommunication net-
works.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RECOMMENDATION CM/
REC(2007)3 ON THE REMIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE MEDIA IN THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY
Adopted 31 January 2007
The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of
Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of Eu-
rope, 
Considering that the aim of the Council of
Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its
members for the purpose of safeguarding and
realising the ideals and principles that are their
common heritage; 
Recalling the commitment of member states to
the fundamental right to freedom of expression
and information, as guaranteed by Article 10 of
the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 
Recalling the importance for democratic socie-
ties of a wide variety of independent and autono-
mous media, able to reflect the diversity of ideas
and opinions, and that new information and
communication techniques and services must be
effectively used to broaden the scope of freedom
of expression, as stated in its Declaration on the
freedom of expression and information (April
1982); 
Bearing in mind Resolution No. 1 on the future
of public service broadcasting adopted at the 4th
European Ministerial Conference on Mass
Media Policy (Prague, December 1994); 
Recalling its Recommendation No. R (96) 10 on
the guarantee of the independence of public
service broadcasting and its Recommendation
Rec(2003)9 on measures to promote the demo-
cratic and social contribution of digital broad-
casting, as well as its Declaration on the
guarantee of the independence of public service
broadcasting in the member states (September
2006); 
Recalling Recommendation 1641 (2004) of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe on public service broadcasting, calling
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for the adoption of a new major policy docu-
ment on public service broadcasting taking
stock of recent technological developments, as
well as the report on public service broadcasting
by the Parliamentary Assembly's Committee on
Culture, Science and Education (Doc. 10029,
January 2004), noting the need for the evolution
and modernisation of this sector, and the posi-
tive reply of the Committee of Ministers to this
recommendation; 
Bearing in mind the political documents
adopted at the 7th European Ministerial Confer-
ence on Mass Media Policy (Kyiv, March 2005)
and, more particularly, the objective set out in
the Action Plan to examine how the public serv-
ice remit should, as appropriate, be developed
and adapted by member states to suit the new
digital environment;
Recalling the UNESCO Convention on the pro-
tection and promotion of the diversity of cul-
tural expressions (October 2005), which attaches
considerable importance to, inter alia, the crea-
tion of conditions conducive to diversity of the
media including through public service broad-
casting; 
Conscious of the need to safeguard the funda-
mental objectives of the public interest in the
information society, including freedom of
expression and access to information, media plu-
ralism, cultural diversity, and the protection of
minors and human dignity, in conformity with
the Council of Europe standards and norms; 
Underlining the specific role of public service
broadcasting, which is to promote the values of
democratic societies, in particular respect for
human rights, cultures and political pluralism;
and with regard to its goal of offering a wide
choice of programmes and services to all sectors
of the public, promoting social cohesion, cul-
tural diversity and pluralist communication
accessible to everyone; 
Mindful of the fact that growing competition in
broadcasting makes it more difficult for many
commercial broadcasters to maintain the public
value of their programming, especially in their
free-to-air services; 
Conscious of the fact that globalisation and
international integration, as well as the growing
horizontal and vertical concentration of pri-
vately-owned media at the national and interna-
tional levels, have far-reaching effects for states
and their media systems; 
Noting that in the information society, the pub-
lic, and especially the younger generations, more
and more often turn to the new communication
services for content and for the satisfaction of
their communication needs, at the expense of
traditional media; 
Convinced therefore that the public service remit
is all the more relevant in the information soci-
ety and that it can be discharged by public serv-
ice organisations via diverse platforms and an
offer of various services, resulting in the emer-
gence of public service media, which, for the pur-
pose of this recommendation, does not include
print media; 
Recognising the continued full legitimacy and
the specific objectives of public service media in
the information society; 
Persuaded that, while paying attention to market
and competition questions, the common inter-
est requires that public service media be pro-
vided with adequate funds for the fulfilment of
the public service remit as conferred on them; 
Recognising the right of member states to define
the remits of individual public service media in
accordance with their own national circum-
stances; 
Acknowledging that the remits of individual
public service media may vary within each mem-
ber state, and that these remits may not necessar-
ily include all the principles set out in this
recommendation, 
Recommends that the governments of mem-
ber states: 
i. guarantee the fundamental role of the public
service media in the new digital environment, set-
ting a clear remit for public service media, and en-
abling them to use new technical means to better
fulfil this remit and adapt to rapid changes in the
current media and technological landscape, and
to changes in the viewing and listening patterns
and expectations of the audience; 
ii. include, where they have not already done so,
provisions in their legislation/regulations spe-
cific to the remit of public service media, cover-
ing in particular the new communication
services, thereby enabling public service media to
make full use of their potential and especially to
promote broader democratic, social and cultural
participation, inter alia, with the help of new
interactive technologies; 
iii. guarantee public service media, via a secure
and appropriate financing and organisational
framework, the conditions required to carry out
the function entrusted to them by member
states in the new digital environment, in a trans-
parent and accountable manner; 
iv. enable public service media to respond fully
and effectively to the challenges of the informa-
tion society, respecting the public/private dual
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structure of the European electronic media land-
scape and paying attention to market and com-
petition questions; 
v. ensure that universal access to public service
media is offered to all individuals and social
groups, including minority and disadvantaged
groups, through a range of technological means; 
vi. disseminate widely this recommendation and,
in particular, bring to the attention of public
authorities, public service media, professional
groups and the public at large, the guiding prin-
ciples set out below, and ensure that the neces-
sary conditions are in place for these principles
to be put into practice. 
Guiding principles concerning the remit of public
service media in the information society 
I. The public service remit: maintaining the
key elements 
1. Member states have the competence to define
and assign a public service remit to one or more
specific media organisations, in the public and/
or private sector, maintaining the key elements
underpinning the traditional public service re-
mit, while adjusting it to new circumstances.
This remit should be performed with the use of
state-of-the-art technology appropriate for the
purpose. These elements have been referred to on
several occasions in Council of Europe docu-
ments, which have defined public service broad-
casting as, amongst other things: 
a) a reference point for all members of the pub-
lic, offering universal access; 
b) a factor for social cohesion and integration of
all individuals, groups and communities; 
c) a source of impartial and independent infor-
mation and comment, and of innovatory and
varied content which complies with high ethical
and quality standards;
d) a forum for pluralistic public discussion and a
means of promoting broader democratic partici-
pation of individuals;
e) an active contributor to audiovisual creation
and production and greater appreciation and
dissemination of the diversity of national and
European cultural heritage. 
2. In the information society, relying heavily on
digital technologies, where the means of content
distribution have diversified beyond traditional
broadcasting, member states should ensure that
the public service remit is extended to cover pro-
vision of appropriate content also via new com-
munication platforms. 
II. Adapting the public service remit to the in-
formation society 
a. A reference point for all members of the public, with
universal access offered 
3. Public service media should offer news, infor-
mation, educational, cultural, sports and enter-
tainment programmes and content aimed at the
various categories of the public and which, taken
as a whole, constitute an added public value com-
pared to those of other broadcasters and content
providers. 
4. The principle of universality, which is funda-
mental to public service media, should be
addressed having regard to technical, social and
content aspects. Member states should, in par-
ticular, ensure that public service media can be
present on significant platforms and have the
necessary resources for this purpose. 
5. In view of changing user habits, public service
media should be able to offer both generalist and
specialised contents and services, as well as per-
sonalised interactive and on-demand services.
They should address all generations, but espe-
cially involve the younger generation in active
forms of communication, encouraging the pro-
vision of user-generated content and establish-
ing other participatory schemes. 
6. Member states should see to it that the goals
and means for achievement of these goals by
public service media are clearly defined, in par-
ticular regarding the use of thematic services and
new communication services. This may include
regular evaluation and review of such activities
by the relevant bodies, so as to ensure that all
groups in the audience are adequately served. 
b. A factor for social cohesion and integration of all indi-
viduals, groups and communities 
7. Public service media should be adapted to the
new digital environment to enable them to fulfil
their remit in promoting social cohesion at local,
regional, national and international levels, and to
foster a sense of co-responsibility of the public
for the achievement of this objective. 
8. Public service media should integrate all com-
munities, social groups and generations, includ-
ing minority groups, young people, old persons,
the most disadvantaged social categories, per-
sons with disabilities, while respecting their dif-
ferent identities and needs. In this context,
attention should be paid to the content created
by and for such groups, and to their access to,
and presence and portrayal in, public service
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media. Due attention should be also paid to gen-
der equality issues. 
9. Public service media should act as a trusted
guide of society, bringing concretely useful
knowledge into the life of individuals and of dif-
ferent communities in society. In this context,
they should pay particular attention to the needs
of minority groups and underprivileged and dis-
advantaged social categories. This role of filling
a gap in the market, which is an important part
of the traditional public service media remit,
should be maintained in the new digital environ-
ment. 
10. In an era of globalisation, migration and
integration at European and international levels,
the public service media should promote better
understanding among peoples and contribute to
intercultural and inter-religious dialogue. 
11. Public service media should promote digital
inclusion and efforts to bridge the digital divide
by, inter alia, enhancing the accessibility of pro-
grammes and services on new platforms. 
c. A source of impartial and independent information
and comment, and of innovatory and varied content
which complies with high ethical and quality standards 
12. Member states should ensure that public
service media constitute a space of credibility and
reliability among a profusion of digital media,
fulfilling their role as an impartial and independ-
ent source of information, opinion and com-
ment, and of a wide range of programming and
services, satisfying high ethical and quality stand-
ards. 
13. When assigning the public service remit,
member states should take account of the public
service media's role in bridging fragmentation,
reducing social and political alienation and pro-
moting the development of civil society. A
requirement for this is the independent and
impartial news and current affairs content,
which should be provided on both traditional
programmes and new communication services. 
d. A forum for public discussion and a means of promot-
ing broader democratic participation of individuals 
14. Public service media should play an impor-
tant role in promoting broader democratic de-
bate and participation, with the assistance,
among other things, of new interactive technolo-
gies, offering the public greater involvement in
the democratic process. Public service media
should fulfil a vital role in educating active and
responsible citizens, providing not only quality
content but also a forum for public debate, open
to diverse ideas and convictions in society, and a
platform for disseminating democratic values. 
15. Public service media should provide ade-
quate information about the democratic system
and democratic procedures, and should encour-
age participation not only in elections but also
in decision-making processes and public life in
general. Accordingly, one of the public service
media's roles should be to foster citizens' inter-
est in public affairs and encourage them to play
a more active part. 
16. Public service media should also actively pro-
mote a culture of tolerance and mutual under-
standing by using new digital and online
technologies. 
17. Public service media should play a leading
role in public scrutiny of national governments
and international governmental organisations,
enhancing their transparency, accountability to
the public and legitimacy, helping eliminate any
democratic deficit, and contributing to the
development of a European public sphere. 
18. Public service media should enhance their
dialogue with, and accountability to, the general
public, also with the help of new interactive serv-
ices. 
e. An active contributor to audiovisual creation and pro-
duction and to a greater appreciation and dissemination
of the diversity of national and European cultural herit-
age 
19. Public service media should play a particular
role in the promotion of cultural diversity and
identity, including through new communication
services and platforms. To this end, public service
media should continue to invest in new, original
content production, made in formats suitable for
the new communication services. They should
support the creation and production of domestic
audiovisual works reflecting as well local and re-
gional characteristics. 
20. Public service media should stimulate crea-
tivity and reflect the diversity of cultural activi-
ties, through their cultural programmes, in
fields such as music, arts and theatre, and they
should, where appropriate, support cultural
events and performances. 
21. Public service media should continue to play
a central role in education, media literacy and
life-long learning, and should actively contribute
to the formation of knowledge-based society.
Public service media should pursue this task,
taking full advantage of the new opportunities
and including all social groups and generations. 
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22. Public service media should play a particular
role in preservation of cultural heritage. They
should rely on and develop their archives, which
should be digitised, thus being preserved for
future generations. In order to be accessible to a
broader audience, the audiovisual archives
should, where appropriate and feasible, be acces-
sible online. Member states should consider pos-
sible options to facilitate the accomplishment of
such projects. 
23. In their programming and content, public
service media should reflect the increasingly
multi-ethnic and multicultural societies in
which they operate, protecting the cultural herit-
age of different minorities and communities,
providing possibilities for cultural expression
and exchange, and promoting closer integration,
without obliterating cultural diversity at the
national level. 
24. Public service media should promote respect
for cultural diversity, while simultaneously
introducing the audience to the cultures of other
peoples around the world. 
III. The appropriate conditions required to
fulfil the public service remit in the informa-
tion society 
25. Member states should ensure that the specific
legal, technical, financial and organisational con-
ditions required to fulfil the public service remit
continue to apply in, and are adapted to, the new
digital environment. Taking into account the
challenges of the information society, member
states should be free to organise their own na-
tional systems of public service media, suited to
the rapidly changing technological and social re-
alities, while at the same time remaining faithful
to the fundamental principles of public service. 
a. Legal conditions 
26. Member states should establish a clear legal
framework for the development of public service
media and the fulfilment of their remit. They
should incorporate into their legislation provi-
sions enabling public service media to exercise, as
effectively as possible, their specific function in
the information society and, in particular, allow-
ing them to develop new communication servic-
es. 
27. To reconcile the need for a clear definition of
the remit with the need to respect editorial inde-
pendence and programme autonomy and to
allow for flexibility to adapt public service activi-
ties rapidly to new developments, member states
should find appropriate solutions, involving, if
needed, the public service media, in line with
their legal traditions. 
b. Technical conditions 
28. Member states should ensure that public
service media have the necessary technical re-
sources to fulfil their function in the information
society. Developing a range of new services would
enable them to reach more households, to pro-
duce more quality contents, responding to the ex-
pectations of the public, and to keep pace with
developments in the digital environment. Public
service media should play an active role in the
technological innovation of the electronic media,
as well as in the digital switchover. 
c. Financial conditions 
29. Member states should secure adequate fi-
nancing for public service media, enabling them
to fulfil their role in the information society, as
defined in their remit. Traditional funding mod-
els relying on sources such as licence fees, the
state budget and advertising remain valid under
the new conditions. 
30. Taking into account the developments of the
new digital technology, member states may con-
sider complementary funding solutions paying
due attention to market and competition ques-
tions. In particular, in the case of new personal-
ised services, member states may consider
allowing public service media to collect remuner-
ations. Member states may also take advantage
of public and community initiatives for the crea-
tion and financing of new types of public service
media. However, none of these solutions should
endanger the principle of universality of public
service media or lead to discrimination between
different groups of society. When developing
new funding systems, member states should pay
due attention to the nature of the content pro-
vided in the interest of the public and in the
common interest. 
d. Organisational conditions 
31. Member states should establish the organisa-
tional conditions for public service media that
provide the most appropriate background for the
delivery of the public service remit in the digital
environment. In doing so they should pay due at-
tention to the guarantee of the editorial inde-
pendence and institutional autonomy of public
service media and the particularities of their na-
tional media systems, as well as organisational
changes needed to take advantage of new produc-
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tion and distribution methods in the digital envi-
ronment. 
32. Member states should ensure that public
service media organisations have the capacity
and critical mass to operate successfully in the
new digital environment, fulfil an extended pub-
lic service remit and maintain their position in a
highly concentrated market. 
33. In organising the delivery of the public serv-
ice remit, member states should make sure that
public service media can, as necessary, engage in
co-operation with other economic actors, such
as commercial media, rights holders, producers
of audiovisual content, platform operators and
distributors of audiovisual media content.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, RECOMMENDATION 1804
(2007) ON STATE, RELIGION, SECULARITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Adopted on 29 June 2007
1. The Parliamentary Assembly notes that reli-
gion is an important feature of European society.
This is because of the historic fact that certain re-
ligions have been present for centuries and be-
cause of their influence in Europe's history. Reli-
gions are still multiplying in our continent today,
with a wide variety of churches and beliefs. 
2. Organised religions as such are part and parcel
of society and must be considered as institutions
set up by and involving citizens who have the
right to freedom of religion but also as organisa-
tions that are part of civil society, with all its
potential for providing guidance on ethical and
civic issues, which have a role to play in the
national community, be it religious or secular. 
3. The Council of Europe must recognise this
state of affairs and welcome and respect religion,
in all its plurality, as a form of ethical, moral, ide-
ological and spiritual expression on the part of
European citizens, taking account of the differ-
ences between the religions themselves and the
circumstances in the country concerned.
4. The Assembly reaffirms that one of Europe's
shared values, transcending national differences,
is the separation of church and state. This is a
generally accepted principle that prevails in poli-
tics and institutions in democratic countries. In
Recommendation 1720 (2005) on education and
religion, for instance, the Assembly noted that
"each person's religion, including the option of
having no religion, is a strictly personal matter".
5. The Assembly notes that, while protecting
freedom of expression and freedom of religion,
the European Court of Human Rights recog-
nises the right of individual countries to organ-
ise and enact legislation regarding the
relationship between the State and the church in
compliance with the provisions of the European
Convention on Human Rights, and notes that
the Council of Europe member states today
show situations with a varying degree of separa-
tion between government and religious institu-
tions in full compliance with the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms.
6. Over the last twenty years, religious worship
has declined markedly in Europe. Fewer than
one European in five attends a religious service
at least once a week, whereas twenty years ago
the figure was more than twice that. At the same
time, we are witnessing the growing strength of
the Muslim communities in virtually all the
Council of Europe member states. 
7. As a result of globalisation and the rapid devel-
opment of new information and communica-
tion technology, some groups are particularly
visible. What is undeniable, however, is that reli-
gion has, in recent years, again become a central
issue of debate in our societies. Roman Catho-
lics, members of the Orthodox Church, Evange-
lists and Muslims seem to be the most active
here. 
8. The Assembly recognises the importance of
intercultural dialogue and its religious dimen-
sion and is willing to help devise a comprehen-
sive Council of Europe strategy in this area. It
considers, however, in the light of the principle
of the separation of church and state, that inter-
religious and interdenominational dialogue is
not a matter for states or for the Council of
Europe.
9. In Recommendation 1396 (1999) on religion
and democracy, the Assembly stated that there
was "a religious aspect to many of the problems
contemporary society [faced], such as... funda-
mentalist movements and terrorist acts, racism
and xenophobia, and ethnic conflicts". This
affirmation is as relevant as ever.
10. Governance and religion should not mix.
Religion and democracy are not incompatible,
however, and sometimes religions play a highly
beneficial social role. By addressing the prob-
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lems facing society, the civil authorities can, with
the support of religions, eliminate much of what
breeds religious extremism, but not everything.
11. Governments should take account of the spe-
cial capacity of religious communities to foster
peace, co-operation, tolerance, solidarity, inter-
cultural dialogue and the dissemination of the
values upheld by the Council of Europe.
12. Education is the key to combating ignorance,
stereotypes and misunderstanding of religions
and their leaders, and plays a central role in forg-
ing a democratic society.
13. Schools are an essential forum for intercul-
tural dialogue and also lay the foundations of
tolerant behaviour; they can effectively combat
fanaticism by teaching children the history and
philosophy of the main religions with restraint
and objectivity. The media and families can also
play an important part here.
14. A knowledge of religions is an integral part of
knowledge of human history and civilisations. It
is different from belief in, and worship of, a par-
ticular religion. Even countries where one reli-
gion prevails have a duty to teach the origins of
all religions.
15. Various situations coexist in Europe. In some
countries, one religion still predominates. Reli-
gious representatives may play a political role, as
in the case of the bishops who sit in the United
Kingdom House of Lords. Some countries have
banned the wearing of religious symbols in
schools. The legislation of several Council of
Europe member states still contains anachro-
nisms dating from times when religion played a
more important part in our societies. 
16. Freedom of religion is protected by Article 9
of the European Convention on Human Rights
and Article 18 of the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights. Such freedom is not unlimited,
however: a religion whose doctrine or practice
ran counter to other fundamental rights would
be unacceptable. In any case, the restrictions that
can be placed on such freedom are those that
"are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public order, health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others" (Article 9.2 of the Conven-
tion).
17. Nor do may states allow the dissemination of
religious principles which, if put into practice,
would violate human rights. If doubts exist in
this respect, states must require religious leaders
to take an unambiguous stand in favour of the
precedence of human rights, as set forth in the
European Convention on Human Rights, over
any religious principle.
18. Freedom of expression is one of the most
important human rights, as the Assembly has
repeatedly affirmed. In Recommendation 1510
(2006) on freedom of expression and respect for
religious beliefs it expresses the view that "free-
dom of expression as protected under Article 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights
should not be further restricted to meet increas-
ing sensitivities of certain religious groups".
19. While we have an acknowledged duty to
respect others and must discourage gratuitous
insults, freedom of expression cannot, needless
to say, be restricted out of deference to certain
dogmas or the beliefs of a particular religious
community.
20. With regard to relations between the Council
of Europe and religious communities, certain
steps have been taken in order to promote a
closer relationship.
21. It will be remembered in this connection that
religious leaders have addressed the Assembly on
several occasions in the past, and that the Assem-
bly has accepted, in return, to attend major con-
ferences organised by the religious communities.
Moreover, dozens of religious and humanist
organisations are already represented at the
Council of Europe by virtue of the participatory
status of non-governmental organisations. 
22. The Assembly welcomes the Committee of
Ministers' proposal that "annual exchanges on
the religious dimension of intercultural dia-
logue" be organised on an experimental basis
with representatives of religions traditionally
present in Europe and of civil society.
23. The Assembly therefore recommends that
the Committee of Ministers:
23.1. ensure that religious communities may
exercise the fundamental right of freedom of
religion without hindrance in all Council of
Europe member states in accordance with the
provisions of Article 9 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Article 18 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights;
23.2. rule out any interference in religious
affairs, but consider religious organisations as
part of civil society and call on them to play an
active role in pursuit of peace, co-operation, tol-
erance, solidarity, intercultural dialogue and the
dissemination of the Council of Europe's values; 
23.3. reaffirm the principle of the independence
of politics and law from religion;
23.4. continue to give thought to the religious
dimension of intercultural dialogue, particularly
by organising meetings with religious leaders
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and representatives of humanist and philosophi-
cal circles; 
23.5. exclude from the consultation any group-
ing that does not clearly support the Council of
Europe's fundamental values, namely human
rights, democracy and the rule of law;
23.6. Identify and disseminate examples of good
practice in respect of dialogue with leaders of
religious communities;
23.7. Consider setting up an institute to devise
syllabuses, teaching methods and educational
material for the study of the religious heritage of
the Council of Europe member states; such sylla-
buses should be drawn up in close co-operation
with representatives of the different religions
traditionally present in Europe.
24. The Assembly further recommends that the
Committee of Ministers encourage the member
states:
24.1. to promote initial and in-service training
for teachers with a view to the objective, bal-
anced teaching of religions as they are today and
religions in history, and to require human rights
training for all religious leaders, in particular
those with an educational role who are in con-
tact with young people; 
24.2. gradually to remove from legislation, if
such is the will of the people, elements likely to
be discriminatory from the angle of democratic
religious pluralism.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, RECOMMENDATION 1805
(2007) ON BLASPHEMY, RELIGIOUS INSULTS AND HATE SPEECH AGAINST PER-
SONS ON GROUNDS OF THEIR RELIGION
Adopted 29 June 2007
1. The Parliamentary Assembly recalls its Resolu-
tion 1510 (2006) on freedom of expression and
respect for religious beliefs and reiterates its com-
mitment to the freedom of expression (Article 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights
and the freedom of thought, conscience and reli-
gion (Article 9 of the Convention), which are fun-
damental cornerstones of democracy. Freedom
of expression is not only applicable to expres-
sions that are favourably received or regarded as
inoffensive, but also to those that may shock, of-
fend or disturb the state or any sector of popula-
tion within the limits of Article 10 of the Conven-
tion. Any democratic society must permit open
debate on matters relating to religion and beliefs.
2. The Assembly acknowledges the importance
of respect for, and understanding of, cultural
and religious diversity in Europe and through-
out the world and recognises the need for ongo-
ing dialogue. Respect and understanding can
help avoid frictions within society and between
individuals. Every human being should be
respected, independently of religious beliefs. 
3. In multicultural societies it is often necessary
to reconcile freedom of expression and freedom
of thought, conscience and religion. In some
instances, it may also be necessary to place
restrictions on these freedoms. Under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, any such
restrictions must be prescribed by law, necessary
in a democratic society and proportionate to the
aims pursued. In so doing, States enjoy a margin
of appreciation as national authorities may need
to adopt different solutions taking account of
the specific features of each society; the use of
this margin is subject to the supervision of the
European Court of Human Rights.
4. With regard to blasphemy, religious insults
and hate speech against persons on the grounds
of their religion, the state is responsible for
determining what should count as criminal
offences within the limits imposed by the case-
law of the European Court of Human Rights. In
this connection, the Assembly considers that
blasphemy, as an insult to a religion, should not
be deemed a criminal offence. A distinction
should be made between matters relating to
moral conscience and those relating to what is
lawful, matters which belong to the public
domain, and those which belong to the private
sphere. Even though today prosecutions in this
respect are rare in member states, they are legion
in other countries of the world. 
5. The Assembly welcomes the preliminary
report adopted on 16-17 March 2007 by the Ven-
ice Commission on this subject and agrees with
the Venice Commission that in a democratic
society, religious groups must tolerate, as must
other groups, critical public statements and
debate about their activities, teachings and
beliefs, provided that such criticism does not
amount to intentional and gratuitous insult or
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hate speech and does not constitute incitement
to disturb the public peace or to violence and
discrimination against adherents of a particular
religion. Public debate, dialogue and improved
communication skills of religious groups and
the media should be used in order to lower sensi-
tivity when it exceeds reasonable levels. 
6. Recalling its Recommendation 1720 (2005) on
education and religion, the Assembly emphasises
the need for greater understanding and toler-
ance among individuals of different religions.
Where people with different religions know
more about the religion and religious sensitivi-
ties of each other, religious insults are less likely
to occur out of ignorance. 
7. In this context, the Assembly welcomes the ini-
tiative of the United Nations to set up a new
body under the theme "Alliance of Civilisations"
to study and support contacts between Muslim
and so-called Western societies, but feels that
such an initiative should be enlarged to other
religions and non-religious groups.
8. The Assembly recalls the relevant case-law on
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights devel-
oped by the European Court of Human Rights.
Whereas there is little scope for restrictions on
political speech or on the debate of questions of
public interest, the Court accepts a wider margin
of appreciation on the part of contracting states
when regulating freedom of expression in rela-
tion to matters liable to offend intimate per-
sonal convictions within the sphere of morals or,
especially, religion. 
9. However, the Assembly stresses that this mar-
gin of appreciation is not unlimited and that any
restrictions on the freedom of expression must
comply with the case-law of the European Court
of Human Rights. Freedom of expression – guar-
anteed under Article 10 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights – is of vital
importance for any democratic society. In
accordance with the Statute of the Council of
Europe, common recognition of democratic val-
ues is the basis for membership of the Council of
Europe. 
10. The Assembly is aware that, in the past,
national law and practice concerning blasphemy
and other religious offences often reflected the
dominant position of particular religions in
individual states. In view of the greater diversity
of religious beliefs in Europe and the democratic
principle of the separation of state and religion,
blasphemy laws should be reviewed by member
states and parliaments. 
11. The Assembly notes that under the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, signatory par-
ties are obliged to condemn discrimination and
take effective measures against it. All member
states signatory to this convention must ensure
that members of a particular religion are neither
privileged nor disadvantaged under blasphemy
laws and related offences. 
12. The Assembly reaffirms that hate speech
against persons, whether on religious grounds or
otherwise, should be penalised by law in accord-
ance with the General Policy Recommendation
No. 7 on national legislation to combat racism
and racial discrimination produced by the Euro-
pean Commission against Racism and Intoler-
ance. For speech to qualify as hate speech in this
sense, it is necessary that it is directed against a
person or a specific group of persons. National
law should penalise statements that call for a
person or a group of persons to be subjected to
hatred, discrimination or violence on grounds of
their religion. 
13. The Assembly emphasises that freedom of
religion as protected by Article 9 of the European
Convention on Human Rights also protects reli-
gions in their establishing values for their fol-
lowers. While religions are free to penalise in a
religious sense any religious offences, such pen-
alties must not threaten the life, physical integ-
rity, liberty or property of an individual or
women's civil and human rights. In this context,
the Assembly recalls its Resolution 1535 (2007)
on threats to the lives and freedom of expression
of journalists and strongly condemns the death
threats issued by Muslim leaders against journal-
ists and writers. Member states have the obliga-
tion to protect individuals against religious
penalties which threaten the right to life and the
right to liberty and security of a person under
Articles 2 and 5 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. No state has the right to impose
itself such penalties for religious offences, either.
14. The Assembly notes that member states have
the obligation under Article 9 of the European
Convention on Human Rights to protect free-
dom of religion including the freedom to mani-
fest one's religion. This requires protection
against disturbances by others of such manifes-
tation. However, these rights may sometimes be
subject to certain justified limitations. The chal-
lenge facing the authorities is how to strike a fair
balance between the interests of individuals as
members of a religious community in ensuring
respect for their right to manifest their religion
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or their right to education, and the general pub-
lic interest or the rights and interests of others.
15. The Assembly considers that, as far as it is
necessary in a democratic society in accordance
with Article 10, paragraph 2 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, national law
should only penalise expressions about religious
matters which intentionally and severely disturb
public order and call for public violence. 
16. It calls on national parliaments to initiate
legislative action and scrutiny regarding the
national implementation of this Recommenda-
tion. 
17. The Assembly recommends that the Com-
mittee of Ministers:
17.1. take note of Resolution 1510 (2006) on
freedom of expression and respect for religious
beliefs together with this Recommendation and
forward both texts to the relevant national min-
istries and authorities;
17.2. ensure that national law and practice:
17.2.1. permit open debate on matters relating to
religion and beliefs and do not privilege a partic-
ular religion in this respect, which would be
incompatible with Articles 10 and 14 of the
European Convention on Human Rights;
17.2.2. penalise statements that call for a person
or a group of persons to be subjected to hatred,
discrimination or violence on grounds of their
religion as on any other grounds; 
17.2.3. prohibit acts which intentionally and
severely disturb the public order and call for
public violence by references to religious mat-
ters, as far as it is necessary in a democratic soci-
ety in accordance with Article 10, paragraph 2 of
the European Convention on Human Rights; 
17.2.4. are reviewed in order to decriminalise
blasphemy as an insult to a religion;
17.3. encourage member states to sign and ratify
Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on
Human Rights (CETS No 177);
17.4. instruct its competent Steering Committee
to draw up practical guidelines for national min-
istries of justice intended to facilitate the imple-
mentation of the recommendations contained
in paragraph 17.2 above;
17.5. instruct its competent Steering Committee
to draw up practical guidelines for national min-
istries of education intended to raise under-
standing and tolerance among students of
different religions;
17.6. initiate through their national ministries of
foreign affairs work at the level of the United
Nations in order to ensure that:
17.6.1. national law and practice of signatory
states of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion do not privilege persons with a particular
religion;
17.6.2. the work of the Alliance of Civilizations
avoids the stereotype of a so-called "Western"
culture, widens its scope to other world religions
and promotes more open debates between differ-
ent religious groups and with non-religious
groups;
17.7. condemn on behalf of their governments
any death threats and incitements to violence by
religious leaders and groups issued against per-
sons for having exercised their right to freedom
of expression about religious matters;
17.8. invite member states to take more initia-
tives to promote tolerance, in co-operation with
the European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance (ECRI).
COUNCIL OF EUROPE – COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, DECLARATION ON THE
PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (2007)
Adopted 26 September 2007
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe,
1. Recalling Article 10 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights which guarantees the free-
dom to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and re-
gardless of frontiers;
2. Recalling also its declarations on the freedom
of expression and information of 29 April 1982
and on freedom of political debate in the media
of 12 February 2004 and reiterating the impor-
tance of free and independent media for guaran-
teeing the right of the people to be fully informed
on matters of public concern and to exercise scru-
tiny over public authorities and political affairs,
as repeatedly confirmed by the European Court
of Human Rights;
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3. Convinced that the essential function of the
media as public watchdog and as part of the sys-
tem of checks and balances in a democracy would
be severely crippled without promoting such in-
vestigative journalism, which helps to expose le-
gal or ethical wrongs that might have been delib-
erately concealed, and thus contributes to the
formation of enlightened and active citizenry, as
well as to the improvement of society at large;
4. Acknowledging, in this context, the important
work of investigative journalists who engage in
accurate, in-depth and critical reporting on mat-
ters of special public concern, work which often
requires long and difficult research, assembling
and analysing information, uncovering un-
known facts, verifying assumptions and obtain-
ing corroborative evidence;
5. Emphasising, however, that investigative jour-
nalism needs to be distinguished from journalis-
tic practices which involve probing into and ex-
posing people’s private and family lives in a way
that would be incompatible with Articles 8 and
10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights and the related case law of the European
Court of Human Rights;
6. Bearing in mind also that investigative journal-
ism could benefit from the adherence of media
professionals to voluntarily adopted self-regula-
tory instruments such as professional codes of
conduct and of ethics which take full account of
the rights of other people and the role and re-
sponsibility of the media in a democratic society;
7. Considering that, because of its very nature, in-
vestigative journalism is of particular signifi-
cance in times of crisis, a notion that includes,
but is not limited to, wars, terrorist attacks and
natural and man-made disasters, when there may
be a temptation to limit the free flow of informa-
tion for security or public safety reasons;
8. Conscious that in emerging democracies the
encouragement and development of investigative
journalism is especially important for the stimu-
lation of free public opinion and the entrench-
ment of a democratic political culture while, at
the same time, it is at a greater danger of poten-
tial abuse;
9. Bearing in mind the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe’s Recommendation
1506 (2001) on freedom of expression and infor-
mation in the media in Europe, and in particular
its concern about the continuing use of violence
as a way of intimidating investigative journalists;
10. Recalling its Recommendation No. R (2000) 7
on the right of journalists not to disclose their
sources of information;
11. Welcoming developments in certain member
states’ domestic case law tending to confirm and
uphold the right of journalists to investigate
matters of public interest and disclose facts and
express opinions in respect of such matters with-
out interference by public authorities,
I. Declares its support for investigative journal-
ism in service of democracy.
II. Calls on member states to protect and pro-
mote investigative journalism, having regard to
Article 10 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, the relevant case law of the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights and other Council of
Europe standards, and in this context:
i. to take, where necessary, suitable measures
designed to ensure the personal safety of media
professionals, especially those involved in inves-
tigative journalism, and promptly investigate all
cases of violence against or intimidation of jour-
nalists;
ii. to ensure the freedom of movement of media
professionals and their access to information in
line with Council of Europe standards and facili-
tate critical and in-depth reporting in service of
democracy;
iii. to ensure the right of journalists to protect
their sources of information in accordance with
Council of Europe standards;
iv. to ensure that deprivation of liberty, dispro-
portionate pecuniary sanctions, prohibition to
exercise the journalistic profession, seizure of
professional material or search of premises are
not misused to intimidate media professionals
and, in particular, investigative journalists;
v. to take into consideration and to incorporate
into domestic legislation where appropriate the
recent case law of the European Court of Human
Rights which has interpreted Article 10 of the
European Convention of Human Rights as
extending its protection not only to the freedom
to publish, but also to journalistic research, the
important preceding stage which is essential for
investigative journalism.
III. Draws the attention of member states to re-
cent worrying developments which might have
an adverse effect on journalistic activity and on
investigative journalism in particular and calls on
member states, if appropriate, to take remedial
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action, in line with Council of Europe standards,
when faced with the following situations:
i. an apparent trend towards increasing limita-
tions on freedom of expression and information
in the name of protecting public safety and
fighting terrorism;
ii. lawsuits brought against media professionals
for acquiring or publishing information of pub-
lic interest which the authorities sought without
good reason to keep undisclosed;
iii. cases of unjustified surveillance of journal-
ists, including the monitoring of their commu-
nications;
iv. legislative measures being taken or sought to
limit the protection granted to “whistle blow-
ers”.
IV. Invites the media, journalists and their associ-
ations to encourage and support investigative
journalism while respecting human rights and
applying high ethical standards.
V. Calls on member states to disseminate widely
this declaration, where appropriate accompanied
by a translation, and to bring it, in particular, to
the attention of relevant governmental bodies,
legislators and the judiciary as well as to make it
available to journalists, the media and their pro-
fessional organisations.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, RESOLUTION 1577
(2007) TOWARDS DECRIMINALISATION OF DEFAMATION
Adopted 4 October 2007
1. The Parliamentary Assembly, recalling its Rec-
ommendation 1589 (2003) on freedom of expres-
sion in the media in Europe and its Resolution
1535 (2007) on threats to the lives and freedom
of expression of journalists, unequivocally reiter-
ates that freedom of expression is a cornerstone
of democracy. Where there is no real freedom of
expression, there can be no real democracy.
2. The Assembly states from the outset that the
press plays a fundamental role in promoting
debates on issues of public concern; and debates
of that kind – as open as possible – are vital to
democracy.
3. The Assembly draws attention to its Resolu-
tion 1003 (1993) on the ethics of journalism and
emphasises that those who exercise the right to
freedom of expression also have duties and obli-
gations. They must act in good faith and provide
accurate, trustworthy information in compli-
ance with journalistic ethics.
4. As established in the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights (the Court), Article 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ETS No. 5) guarantees freedom of expression in
respect not only of "information" or "ideas"
that are favourably received or regarded as inof-
fensive or as a matter of indifference, but also of
those that offend, shock or disturb.
5. The Assembly notes that freedom of expres-
sion is not unlimited and that it may prove nec-
essary for the state to intervene in a democratic
society, provided that there is a solid legal basis
and that it is clearly in the public interest, in
accordance with Article 10, paragraph 2, of the
European Convention on Human Rights. 
6. Anti-defamation laws pursue the legitimate
aim of protecting the reputation and rights of
others. The Assembly nonetheless urges member
states to apply these laws with the utmost
restraint since they can seriously infringe free-
dom of expression. For this reason, the Assembly
insists that there be procedural safeguards ena-
bling anyone charged with defamation to sub-
stantiate their statements in order to absolve
themselves of possible criminal responsibility.
7. In addition, statements or allegations which
are made in the public interest, even if they prove
to be inaccurate, should not be punishable pro-
vided that they were made without knowledge of
their inaccuracy, without intention to cause
harm, and their truthfulness was checked with
proper diligence. 
8. The Assembly deplores the fact that in a
number of member states prosecution for defa-
mation is misused in what could be seen as
attempts by the authorities to silence media crit-
icism. Such abuse – leading to a genuine media
self-censorship and causing progressive shrink-
age of democratic debate and of the circulation
of general information – has been denounced by
civil society, notably in Albania, Azerbaijan and
the Russian Federation.
9. The Assembly concurs with the clear position
adopted by the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe, who has denounced threats of prose-
cution for libel as "a particularly insidious form
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of intimidation". The Assembly views such aber-
rant use of anti-defamation laws as unaccepta-
ble.
10. The Assembly also welcomes the efforts of
the Representative on Freedom of the Media of
the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) in favour of decriminalising
defamation, and his unfaltering commitment to
media freedom.
11. It notes with great concern that in many
member states the law provides for prison sen-
tences for defamation and that some still impose
them in practice – for example, Azerbaijan and
Turkey. 
12. Every case of imprisonment of a media pro-
fessional is an unacceptable hindrance to free-
dom of expression and entails that, despite the
fact that their work is in the public interest, jour-
nalists have a sword of Damocles hanging over
them. The whole of society suffers the conse-
quences when journalists are gagged by pressure
of this kind.
13. The Assembly consequently takes the view
that prison sentences for defamation should be
abolished without further delay. In particular it
exhorts states whose laws still provide for prison
sentences – although prison sentences are not
actually imposed – to abolish them without
delay so as not to give any excuse, however unjus-
tified, to those countries which continue to
impose them, thus provoking a corrosion of fun-
damental freedoms. 
14. The Assembly likewise condemns abusive
recourse to unreasonably large awards for dam-
ages and interest in defamation cases and points
out that a compensation award of a dispropor-
tionate amount may also contravene Article 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
15. The Assembly is aware that abuse of freedom
of expression can be dangerous, as history
shows. As recently acknowledged in a framework
decision applicable to member countries of the
European Union, it must be possible to prose-
cute those who incite violence, promote nega-
tionism or racial hatred, conduct inimical to the
values of pluralism, tolerance and open-minded-
ness which the Council of Europe and the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights promote.
16. Lastly, the Assembly would reaffirm that pro-
tection of journalists' sources is of paramount
public interest. Journalists prosecuted for defa-
mation must be allowed to protect their sources
or to produce a document in their own defence
without having to show that they obtained it
through lawful channels. 
17. The Assembly accordingly calls on the mem-
ber states to:
17.1. abolish prison sentences for defamation
without delay;
17.2. guarantee that there is no misuse of crimi-
nal prosecutions for defamation and safeguard
the independence of prosecutors in these cases;
17.3. define the concept of defamation more pre-
cisely in their legislation so as to avoid an arbi-
trary application of the law and to ensure that
civil law provides effective protection of the dig-
nity of persons affected by defamation;
17.4. in accordance with General Policy Recom-
mendation No. 7 of the European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), make it a
criminal offence to publicly incite to violence,
hatred or discrimination, or to threaten an indi-
vidual or group of persons, for reasons of race,
colour, language, religion, nationality or
national or ethnic origin where those acts are
deliberate;
17.5. make only incitement to violence, hate
speech and promotion of negationism punisha-
ble by imprisonment;
17.6. remove from their defamation legislation
any increased protection for public figures, in
accordance with the Court's case law, and in par-
ticular calls on:
17.6.1. Turkey to amend Article 125.3 of its
Criminal Code accordingly;
17.6.2. France to revise its law of 29 July 1881 in
the light of the Court's case law;
17.7. ensure that under their legislation persons
pursued for defamation have appropriate means
of defending themselves, in particular means
based on establishing the truth of their asser-
tions and on the general interest, and calls in
particular on France to amend or repeal Article
35 of its law of 29 July 1881 which provides for
unjustified exceptions preventing the defendant
from establishing the truth of the alleged defa-
mation;
17.8. set reasonable and proportionate maxima
for awards for damages and interest in defama-
tion cases so that the viability of a defendant
media organ is not placed at risk;
17.9. provide appropriate legal guarantees
against awards for damages and interest that are
disproportionate to the actual injury;
17.10. bring their laws into line with the case law
of the Court as regards the protection of journal-
ists' sources.
18. The Assembly calls on journalists' profes-
sional organisations to draw up codes of journal-
istic ethics if they have not already done so.
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19. Furthermore, it welcomes the moves by the
Turkish authorities to amend Article 301 of the
Turkish Criminal Code concerning "denigration
of Turkishness" and strongly encourages these
authorities to pursue that course of action with-
out delay.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RECOMMENDATION CM/
REC(2007)15 ON MEASURES CONCERNING MEDIA COVERAGE OF ELECTION
CAMPAIGNS
Adopted 7 November 2007
The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of
Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of Eu-
rope; 
Noting the important role of the media in mod-
ern societies, especially at the time of elections; 
Considering the constant development of infor-
mation and communication technology and the
evolving media landscape which necessitates the
revision of Recommendation No. R (99) 15 of
the Committee of Ministers on measures con-
cerning media coverage of election campaigns; 
Aware of the need to take account of the signifi-
cant differences which still exist between the
print and the broadcast media; 
Considering the differences between linear and
non-linear audiovisual media services, in partic-
ular as regards their reach, impact and the way in
which they are consumed; 
Stressing that the fundamental principle of edi-
torial independence of the media assumes a spe-
cial importance in election periods; 
Underlining that the coverage of elections by the
broadcast media should be fair, balanced and
impartial; 
Recalling the basic principles contained in Reso-
lution No. 2 adopted at the 4th Ministerial Con-
ference on Mass Media Policy (Prague, December
1994), and Recommendation No. R (96) 10 of
the Committee of Ministers on the guarantee of
the independence of public service broadcasting;
Noting the emergence of public service media in
the information society as elaborated in Recom-
mendation Rec(2007)3 of the Committee of
Ministers on the remit of public service media in
the information society; 
Considering that public service media are a pub-
licly accountable source of information which
have a particular responsibility in ensuring in
their programmes, a fair, balanced and thorough
coverage of elections, which may include the car-
rying of messages of political parties and candi-
dates free of charge and on an equitable basis; 
Noting that particular attention should be paid
to certain specific features of the coverage of
election campaigns, such as the dissemination of
opinion polls, paid political advertising, the
right of reply, days of reflection and provision
for pre-election time; 
Stressing the important role of self-regulatory
measures by media professionals themselves –
for example, in the form of codes of conduct –
which set out guidelines of good practice for
responsible, accurate and fair coverage of elec-
tion campaigns; 
Recognising the complementary nature of regu-
latory and self-regulatory measures in this area; 
Convinced of the usefulness of appropriate
frameworks for media coverage of elections to
contribute to free and democratic elections,
bearing in mind the different legal and practical
approaches of member states in this area and the
fact that it can be subject to different branches
of law; 
Acknowledging that any regulatory framework
on the media coverage of elections should
respect the fundamental principle of freedom of
expression protected under Article 10 of the
European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as
interpreted by the European Court of Human
Rights; 
Recalling Recommendation Rec(2004)16 of the
Committee of Ministers on the right of reply in
the new media environment which allows the
possibility for easy-to-use instant or rapid cor-
rection of contested information, 
Recommends that the governments of the mem-
ber states, if they have not already done so, exam-
ine ways of ensuring respect for the principles
stated hereinafter regarding the coverage of elec-
tion campaigns by the media, and, where neces-
sary, adopt appropriate measures to implement
these principles in their domestic law or practice
and in accordance with constitutional law. 
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Definition 
For the purposes of this recommendation: 
The term "media" refers to those responsible for
the periodic creation of information and content
and its dissemination over which there is edito-
rial responsibility, irrespective of the means and
technology used for delivery, which are intended
for reception by, and which could have a clear
impact on, a significant proportion of the gen-
eral public. This could, inter alia, include print
media (newspapers, periodicals) and media dis-
seminated over electronic communication net-
works, such as broadcast media (radio, television
and other linear audiovisual media services),
online news-services (such as online editions of
newspapers and newsletters) and non-linear
audiovisual media services (such as on-demand
television). 
Scope of the recommendation 
The principles of this recommendation apply to
all types of political elections taking place in
member states, including presidential, legislative,
regional and, where practicable, local elections
and referenda. 
These principles should also apply, where rele-
vant, to media reporting on elections taking
place abroad, especially when these media
address persons in the country where the elec-
tion is taking place. 
In member states where the notion of the "pre-
election period" is defined under domestic legis-
lation, the principles contained in this recom-
mendation should also apply. 
Principles 
I. General provisions 
1. Non-interference by public authorities 
Public authorities should refrain from interfer-
ing in the activities of journalists and other
media personnel with a view to influencing the
elections. 
2. Protection against attacks, intimidation or other types
of unlawful pressure on the media 
Public authorities should take appropriate steps
for the effective protection of journalists and
other media personnel and their premises, as
this assumes a greater significance during elec-
tions. At the same time, this protection should
not obstruct the media in carrying out their
work. 
3. Editorial independence 
Regulatory frameworks on media coverage of
elections should respect the editorial independ-
ence of the media. 
Member states should ensure that there is an
effective and manifest separation between the
exercise of control of media and decision making
as regards media content and the exercise of
political authority or influence. 
4. Ownership by public authorities 
Member states should adopt measures whereby
the media which are owned by public authori-
ties, when covering election campaigns, should
do so in a fair, balanced and impartial manner,
without discriminating against or supporting a
specific political party or candidate. 
If such media outlets accept paid political adver-
tising in their publications, they should ensure
that all political contenders and parties that
request the purchase of advertising space are
treated in an equal and non-discriminatory man-
ner. 
5. Professional and ethical standards of the media 
All media are encouraged to develop self-regula-
tory frameworks and incorporate self-regulatory
professional and ethical standards regarding
their coverage of election campaigns, including,
inter alia, respect for the principles of human dig-
nity and non-discrimination. These standards
should reflect their particular roles and respon-
sibilities in democratic processes. 
6. Transparency of, and access to, the media 
If the media accept paid political advertising,
regulatory or self-regulatory frameworks should
ensure that such advertising is readily recognisa-
ble as such. 
Where media is owned by political parties or pol-
iticians, member states should ensure that this is
made transparent to the public. 
7. The right of reply or equivalent remedies 
Given the short duration of an election cam-
paign, any candidate or political party which is
entitled to a right of reply or equivalent remedies
under national law or systems should be able to
exercise this right or equivalent remedies during
the campaign period without undue delay. 
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8. Opinion polls 
Regulatory or self-regulatory frameworks should
ensure that the media will, when disseminating
the results of opinion polls, provide the public
with sufficient information to make a judge-
ment on the value of the polls. Such information
could, in particular: 
- name the political party or other organisation
or person which commissioned and paid for the
poll; 
- identify the organisation conducting the poll
and the methodology employed; 
- indicate the sample and margin of error of the
poll; 
- indicate the date and/or period when the poll
was conducted. 
All other matters concerning the way in which
the media present the results of opinion polls
should be decided by the media themselves. 
Any restriction by member states forbidding the
publication/dissemination of opinion polls (on
voting intentions) on voting day or a number of
days before the election should comply with
Article 10 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, as interpreted by the European Court
of Human Rights. 
Similarly, in respect of exit polls, member states
may consider prohibiting reporting by the media
on the results of such polls until all polling sta-
tions in the country have closed. 
9. "Day of reflection" 
Member states may consider the merits of
including a provision in their regulatory frame-
works to prohibit the dissemination of partisan
electoral messages on the day preceding voting
or to provide for their correction. 
II. Measures concerning broadcast media 
1. General framework 
During election campaigns, regulatory frame-
works should encourage and facilitate the plu-
ralistic expression of opinions via the broadcast
media. 
With due respect for the editorial independence
of broadcasters, regulatory frameworks should
also provide for the obligation to cover election
campaigns in a fair, balanced and impartial man-
ner in the overall programme services of broad-
casters. Such an obligation should apply to both
public service media and private broadcasters in
their relevant transmission areas. 
Member states may derogate from these meas-
ures with respect to those broadcast media serv-
ices exclusively devoted to, and clearly identified
as, the self-promotion of a political party or can-
didate. 
2. News and current affairs programmes 
Where self-regulation does not provide for this,
member states should adopt measures whereby
public service media and private broadcasters,
during the election period, should in particular
be fair, balanced and impartial in their news and
current affairs programmes, including discus-
sion programmes such as interviews or debates. 
No privileged treatment should be given by
broadcasters to public authorities during such
programmes. This matter should primarily be
addressed via appropriate self-regulatory meas-
ures. In this connection, member states might
examine whether, where practicable, the relevant
authorities monitoring the coverage of elections
should be given the power to intervene in order
to remedy possible shortcomings. 
3. Non-linear audiovisual services of public service me-
dia 
Member states should apply the principles con-
tained in points 1 and 2 above or similar provi-
sions to non-linear audiovisual media services of
public service media. 
4. Free airtime and equivalent presence for political par-
ties/candidates on public service media 
Member states may examine the advisability of
including in their regulatory frameworks provi-
sions whereby public service media may make
available free airtime on their broadcast and
other linear audiovisual media services and/or
an equivalent presence on their non-linear audi-
ovisual media services to political parties/candi-
dates during the election period. 
Wherever such airtime and/or equivalent pres-
ence is granted, this should be done in a fair and
non-discriminatory manner, on the basis of
transparent and objective criteria. 
5. Paid political advertising 
In member states where political parties and can-
didates are permitted to buy advertising space
for election purposes, regulatory frameworks
should ensure that all contending parties have
the possibility of buying advertising space on
and according to equal conditions and rates of
payment. 
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Member states may consider introducing a pro-
vision in their regulatory frameworks to limit
the amount of political advertising space and
time which a given party or candidate can pur-
chase. 
Regular presenters of news and current affairs
programmes should not take part in paid politi-
cal advertising.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RECOMMENDATION REC
(2007) 16 ON MEASURES TO PROMOTE THE PUBLIC SERVICE VALUE OF THE IN-
TERNET
Adopted 7 November 2007
The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of
Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of Eu-
rope, 
Considering that the aim of the Council of
Europe is to achieve greater unity between its
members for the purpose of safeguarding and
realising the ideals and principles which are their
common heritage; 
Recalling that States Parties to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (European Convention on
Human Rights – ETS No. 5) have undertaken to
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
human rights and fundamental freedoms
defined in the Convention; 
Mindful of the particular roles and responsibili-
ties of member states in securing the protection
and promotion of these rights and freedoms; 
Noting that information and communication
technologies (ICTs) can, on the one hand, signif-
icantly enhance the exercise of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, such as the right to free-
dom of expression, information and communi-
cation, the right to education, the right to
assembly, and the right to free elections, while,
on the other hand, they may adversely affect
these and other rights, freedoms and values,
such as the respect for private life and secrecy of
correspondence, the dignity of human beings
and even the right to life; 
Concerned by the risk of harm posed by content
and communications on the Internet and other
ICTs as well as by the threats of cybercrime to the
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and recalling in this
regard the Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No.
185) and its Additional Protocol concerning the
criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenopho-
bic nature committed through computer sys-
tems (ETS No. 189) and the specific provisions
in the Council of Europe Convention on the Pro-
tection of Children against Sexual Exploitation
and Sexual Abuse (CETS No. 201); 
Aware that communication using new informa-
tion and communication technologies and serv-
ices must respect the right to privacy as
guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and by the 1981 Conven-
tion for the Protection of Individuals with regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS
No. 108), and as elaborated by Recommendation
No. R (99) 5 of the Committee of Ministers to
member states on the protection of privacy on
the Internet; 
Noting that the outcome documents of the
World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS) (Geneva 2003 – Tunis 2005) recognise
the right for everyone to benefit from the infor-
mation society and reaffirmed the desire and
commitment of participating states to build a
people-centred, inclusive and development-ori-
ented information society, respecting fully and
upholding the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, as well as the universality, indivisibility,
interdependence and interrelation of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the
right to development; 
Convinced that access to and the capacity and
ability to use the Internet should be regarded as
indispensable for the full exercise and enjoyment
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the information society; 
Recalling the 2003 UNESCO Recommendation
concerning the Promotion and Use of Multilin-
gualism and Universal Access to Cyberspace,
which calls on member states and international
organisations to promote access to the Internet
as a service of public interest; 
Recalling the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of
Cultural Expressions, which states that freedom
of thought, expression and information, as well
as diversity of the media, enable cultural expres-
sions to flourish within societies, and which calls
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on Parties to encourage individuals and social
groups to create, produce, disseminate, distrib-
ute and have access to their own cultural expres-
sions; 
Aware that the media landscape is rapidly chang-
ing and that the Internet is playing an increas-
ingly important role in providing and
promoting diverse sources of information to the
public, including user-generated content; 
Noting that our societies are rapidly moving into
a new phase of development, towards a ubiqui-
tous information society, and therefore that the
Internet constitutes a new pervasive social and
public space which should have an ethical
dimension, which should foster justice, dignity
and respect for the human being and which
should be based on respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule
of law; 
Recalling the currently accepted working defini-
tion of Internet governance, as the development
and application by governments, the private sec-
tor and civil society, in their respective roles, of
shared principles, norms, rules, decision-mak-
ing procedures and programmes that shape the
evolution and use of the Internet; 
Convinced therefore that the governance of the
Internet should be people-centred and pursue
public policy goals which protect human rights,
democracy and the rule of law on the Internet
and other ICTs; 
Aware of the public service value of the Internet,
understood as people's significant reliance on
the Internet as an essential tool for their every-
day activities (communication, information,
knowledge, commercial transactions) and the
resulting legitimate expectation that Internet
services be accessible and affordable, secure, reli-
able and ongoing; 
Firmly convinced that the Internet and other
ICT services have high public service value in
that they serve to promote the exercise and
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all who use them, and that their
protection should be a priority with regard to
the governance of the Internet, 
Recommends that, having regard to the guide-
lines in the appendix to this recommendation,
the governments of member states, in co-opera-
tion, where appropriate, with all relevant stake-
holders, take all necessary measures to promote
the public service value of the Internet by: 
- upholding human rights, democracy and the
rule of law on the Internet and promoting social
cohesion, respect for cultural diversity and trust
between individuals and between peoples in the
use of ICTs, and in particular, the Internet; 
- elaborating and delineating the boundaries of
the roles and responsibilities of all key stake-
holders within a clear legal framework, using
complementary regulatory frameworks; 
- encouraging the private sector to acknowledge
and familiarise itself with its evolving ethical
roles and responsibilities, and to co-operate in
reviewing and, where necessary, adjusting its key
actions and decisions which may impact on indi-
vidual rights and freedoms; 
- encouraging in this regard the private sector to
develop, where appropriate and in co-operation
with other stakeholders, new forms of open and
transparent self- and co-regulation on the basis
of which key actors can be held accountable; 
- encouraging the private sector to contribute to
achieving the goals set out in this recommenda-
tion and developing public policies to supple-
ment the operation of market forces where these
are insufficient; 
- bringing this recommendation to the attention
of all relevant stakeholders, in particular the pri-
vate sector and civil society, so that all necessary
measures are taken to contribute to the imple-
mentation of its objectives. 
Appendix to the recommendation 
I. Human rights and democracy 
Human rights 
Member states should adopt or develop policies
to preserve and, whenever possible, enhance the
protection of human rights and respect for the
rule of law in the information society. In this re-
gard, particular attention should be paid to: 
- the right to freedom of expression, information
and communication on the Internet and via
other ICTs promoted, inter alia, by ensuring
access to them; 
- the need to ensure that there are no restrictions
to the abovementioned right (for example in the
form of censorship) other than to the extent per-
mitted by Article 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, as interpreted by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights; 
- the right to private life and private correspond-
ence on the Internet and in the use of other ICTs,
including the respect for the will of users not to
disclose their identity, promoted by encouraging
individual users and Internet service and content
providers to share the responsibility for this; 
- the right to education, including media and
information literacy; 
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- the fundamental values of pluralism, cultural
and linguistic diversity, and non-discriminatory
access to different means of communication via
the Internet and other ICTs; 
- the dignity and integrity of the human being
with regard to the trafficking of human beings
carried out using ICTs and by signing and ratify-
ing the Council of Europe Convention on Action
against Trafficking in Human Beings (CETS No.
197); 
- the right to the presumption of innocence,
which should be respected in the digital environ-
ment, and the right to a fair trial and the princi-
ple according to which there should be no
punishment without law, which should be
upheld by developing and encouraging legal, and
also self- and co-regulatory frameworks for jour-
nalists and media service providers as concerns
the reporting on court proceedings; 
- the freedom for all groups in society to partici-
pate in ICT-assisted assemblies and other forms
of associative life, subject to no other restrictions
than those provided for by Article 11 of the
European Convention on Human Rights as
interpreted by the European Court of Human
Rights; 
- the right to property, including intellectual
property rights, subject to the right of the state
to limit the use of property in accordance with
the general interest as provided by Article 1 of
The Protocol to the European Convention on
Human Rights (ETS No. 9). 
Democracy 
Member states should develop and implement
strategies for e-democracy, e-participation and e-
government that make effective use of ICTs in
democratic process and debate, in relationships
between public authorities and civil society, and
in the provision of public services as part of an in-
tegrated approach that makes full and appropri-
ate use of a number of communication channels,
both online and offline. In particular, e-democra-
cy and e-governance should uphold human
rights, democracy and the rule of law by: 
- strengthening the participation, initiative and
involvement of citizens in national, regional and
local public life and in decision-making proc-
esses, thereby contributing to more dynamic,
inclusive and direct forms of democracy, genuine
public debate, better legislation and active scru-
tiny of the decision-making processes; 
- improving public administration and services
by making them more accessible (inter alia
through access to official documents), respon-
sive, user-oriented, transparent, efficient and
cost-effective, thus contributing to the economic
and cultural vitality of society. 
Member states should, where appropriate, con-
sider introducing only e-voting systems which
are secure, reliable, efficient, technically robust,
open to independent verification and easily
accessible to voters, in line with Recommenda-
tion Rec(2004)11 of the Committee of Ministers
to member states on legal, operational and tech-
nical standards for e-voting. 
Member states should encourage the use of ICTs
(including online forums, weblogs, political
chats, instant messaging and other forms of citi-
zen-to-citizen communication) by citizens, non-
governmental organisations and political parties
to engage in democratic deliberations, e-activism
and e-campaigning, put forward their concerns,
ideas and initiatives, promote dialogue and
deliberation with representatives and govern-
ment, and to scrutinise officials and politicians
in matters of public interest. 
Member states should use the Internet and other
ICTs in conjunction with other channels of com-
munication to formulate and implement poli-
cies for education for democratic citizenship to
enable individuals to be active and responsible
citizens throughout their lives, to respect the
rights of others and to contribute to the defence
and development of democratic societies and
cultures. 
Member states should promote public discus-
sion on the responsibilities of private actors,
such as Internet service providers, content pro-
viders and users, and encourage them – in the
interests of the democratic process and debate
and the protection of the rights of others – to
take self-regulatory and other measures to opti-
mise the quality and reliability of information
on the Internet and to promote the exercise of
professional responsibility, in particular with
regard to the establishment, compliance with,
and monitoring of the observance of codes of
conduct. 
II. Access 
Member states should develop, in co-operation
with the private sector and civil society, strategies
which promote sustainable economic growth via
competitive market structures in order to stimu-
late investment, particularly from local capital,
into critical Internet resources and ICTs, especial-
ly in areas with a low communication and infor-
mation infrastructure, with particular reference
to: 
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- developing strategies which promote affordable
access to ICT infrastructure, including the Inter-
net; 
- promoting technical interoperability, open
standards and cultural diversity in ICT policy
covering telecommunications, broadcasting and
the Internet; 
- promoting a diversity of software models,
including proprietary, free and open source soft-
ware; 
- promoting affordable access to the Internet for
individuals, irrespective of their age, gender, eth-
nic or social origin, including the following per-
sons and groups of persons: 
a. those on low incomes; 
b. those in rural and geographically remote
areas; and 
c. those with special needs (for example, disabled
persons), bearing in mind the importance of
design and application, affordability, the need to
raise awareness among these persons and
groups, the appropriateness and attractiveness
of Internet access and services as well as their
adaptability and compatibility; 
- promoting a minimum number of Internet
access points and ICT services on the premises of
public authorities and, where appropriate, in
other public places, in line with Recommenda-
tion No. R (99) 14 of the Committee of Ministers
to member states on universal community serv-
ice concerning new communication services; 
- encouraging, where practicable, public admin-
istrations, educational institutions and private
owners of access facilities to new communica-
tion and information services to enable the gen-
eral public to use these facilities; 
- promoting the integration of ICTs into educa-
tion and promoting media and information lit-
eracy and training in formal and non-formal
education sectors for children and adults in
order to: 
a. empower them to use media technologies
effectively to create, access, store, retrieve and
share content to meet their individual and com-
munity needs and interests; 
b. encourage them to exercise their democratic
rights and civic responsibilities effectively; 
c. encourage them to make informed choices
when using the Internet and other ICTs by using
and referring to diverse media forms and content
from different cultural and institutional sources;
understanding how and why media content is
produced; critically analysing the techniques,
language and conventions used by the media
and the messages they convey; and identifying
media content and services that may be unsolic-
ited, offensive or harmful. 
III. Openness 
Member states should affirm freedom of expres-
sion and the free circulation of information on
the Internet, balancing them, where necessary,
with other legitimate rights and interests, in ac-
cordance with Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights as inter-
preted by the European Court of Human Rights,
by: 
- promoting the active participation of the pub-
lic in using, and contributing content to, the
Internet and other ICTs; 
- promoting freedom of communication and cre-
ation on the Internet, regardless of frontiers, in
particular by: 
a. not subjecting individuals to any licensing or
other requirements having a similar effect, nor
any general blocking or filtering measures by
public authorities, or restrictions that go further
than those applied to other means of content
delivery; 
b. facilitating, where appropriate, "re-users",
meaning those wishing to exploit existing digital
content resources in order to create future con-
tent or services in a way that is compatible with
respect for intellectual property rights; 
c. promoting an open offer of services and acces-
sible, usable and exploitable content via the
Internet which caters to the different needs of
users and social groups, in particular by: 
- allowing service providers to operate in a regu-
latory framework which guarantees them non-
discriminatory access to national and interna-
tional telecommunication networks; 
- increasing the provision and transparency of
their online services to citizens and businesses; 
- engaging with the public, where appropriate,
through user-generated communities rather
than official websites; 
- encouraging, where appropriate, the re-use of
public data by non-commercial users, so as to
allow every individual access to public informa-
tion, facilitating their participation in public life
and democratic processes; 
- promoting public domain information accessi-
bility via the Internet which includes govern-
ment documents, allowing all persons to
participate in the process of government; infor-
mation about personal data retained by public
entities; scientific and historical data; informa-
tion on the state of technology, allowing the
public to consider how the information society
might guard against information warfare and
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other threats to human rights; creative works
that are part of a shared cultural base, allowing
persons to participate actively in their commu-
nity and cultural history; 
- adapting and extending the remit of public
service media, in line with Recommendation
Rec(2007)3 of the Committee of Ministers to
member states on the remit of public service
media in the information society, so as to cover
the Internet and other new communication serv-
ices and so that both generalist and specialised
contents and services can be offered, as well as
distinct personalised interactive and on-demand
services. 
IV. Diversity 
Member states are encouraged to ensure that In-
ternet and ICT content is contributed by all re-
gions, countries and communities so as to ensure
over time representation of all peoples, nations,
cultures and languages, in particular by: 
- encouraging and promoting the growth of
national or local cultural industries, especially in
the field of digital content production, includ-
ing that undertaken by public service media,
where necessary crossing linguistic and cultural
barriers (including all potential content creators
and other stakeholders), in order to encourage
linguistic diversity and artistic expression on the
Internet and other new communication services.
This should 
apply also to educational, cultural, scientific,
scholarly and other content which may not be
commercially viable in accordance with the 2005
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expres-
sions; 
- developing strategies and policies and creating
appropriate legal and institutional frameworks
to preserve the digital heritage of lasting cul-
tural, scientific, or other values, in co-operation
with holders of copyright and neighbouring
rights, and other legitimate stakeholders in
order, where appropriate, to set common stand-
ards and ensure compatibility and share
resources. In this regard, access to legally depos-
ited digital heritage materials, within reasonable
restrictions, should also be assured; 
- developing a culture of participation and
involvement, inter alia by providing for the crea-
tion, modification and remixing of interactive
content and the transformation of consumers
into active communicators and creators of con-
tent; 
- promoting mechanisms for the production and
distribution of user- and community-generated
content (thereby facilitating online communi-
ties), inter alia by encouraging public service
media to use such content and co-operate with
such communities;
- encouraging the creation and processing of and
access to educational, cultural and scientific con-
tent in digital form, so as to ensure that all cul-
tures can express themselves and have access to
the Internet in all languages, including indige-
nous ones; 
- encouraging capacity building for the produc-
tion of local and indigenous content on the
Internet; 
- encouraging the multilingualisation of the
Internet so that everyone can use it in their own
language. 
V. Security 
Member states should engage in international le-
gal co-operation as a means of developing and
strengthening security on the Internet and ob-
servance of international law, in particular by: 
- signing and ratifying the Convention on Cyber-
crime (ETS No. 185) and its Additional Protocol
concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist
and xenophobic nature committed through
computer systems (ETS No. 189), in order to be
able to implement a common criminal policy
aimed at the protection of society against cyber-
crime, to co-operate for the purposes of investi-
gations or proceedings concerning criminal
offences related to computer systems and data,
or for the collection of evidence in electronic
form of a criminal offence, and to resolve juris-
dictional problems in cases of crimes committed
in other states parties to the convention; 
- promoting the signature and ratification of the
Convention and Additional Protocol by non-
member states as well as their use as model
cybercrime legislation at the national level, so
that a worldwide interoperable system and
framework for global co-operation in fighting
cybercrime among interested countries emerges; 
- enhancing network and information security to
enable them to resist actions that compromise
their stability as well as the availability, authen-
ticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or
transmitted data and the related services offered
by or accessible via these networks and systems; 
- empowering stakeholders to protect network
and information security; 
- adopting legislation and establishing appropri-
ate enforcement authorities, where necessary, to
combat spam. Member states should also facili-
tate the development of appropriate technical
solutions related to combating spam, improve
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education and awareness among all stakeholders
and encourage industry-driven initiatives, as well
as engage in cross-border spam enforcement co-
operation; 
- encouraging the development of common rules
on the co-operation between providers of infor-
mation society services and law enforcement
authorities ensuring that such co-operation has
a clear legal basis and respects privacy regula-
tions; 
- protecting personal data and privacy on the
Internet and other ICTs (to protect users against
the unlawful storage of personal data, the stor-
age of inaccurate personal data, or the abuse or
unauthorised disclosure of such data, or against
the intrusion of their privacy through, for exam-
ple, unsolicited communications for direct mar-
keting purposes) and harmonising legal
frameworks in this area without unjustifiably
disrupting the free flow of information, in par-
ticular by: 
a. improving their domestic frameworks for pri-
vacy law in accordance with Article 8 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and by
signing and ratifying the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with regard to Auto-
matic Processing of Personal Data (ETS No.
108); 
b. providing appropriate safeguards for the
transfer of international personal data to states
which do not have an adequate level of data pro-
tection; 
c. facilitating cross-border co-operation in pri-
vacy law enforcement; 
- combating piracy in the field of copyright and
neighbouring rights; 
- working together with the business sector and
consumer representatives to ensure e-commerce
users are afforded transparent and effective con-
sumer protection that is not less than the level of
protection afforded in other forms of commerce.
This may include the introduction of require-
ments concerning contracts which can be con-
cluded by electronic means, in particular
requirements concerning secure electronic signa-
tures; 
- promoting the safer use of the Internet and of
ICTs, particularly for children, fighting against
illegal content and tackling harmful and, where
necessary, unwanted content through regula-
tion, the encouragement of self-regulation,
including the elaboration of codes of conduct,
and the development of adequate technical
standards and systems; 
- promoting the signature and ratification of the
Council of Europe Convention on the Protection
of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sex-
ual Abuse (CETS No. 201).
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RECOMMENDATION CM/
REC(2008)6 ON MEASURES TO PROMOTE THE RESPECT FOR FREEDOM OF EX-
PRESSION AND INFORMATION WITH REGARD TO INTERNET FILTERS
Adopted 26 March 2008
The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of
Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of Eu-
rope, 
Considering that the aim of the Council of
Europe is to achieve greater unity between its
members for the purpose of safeguarding and
realising the ideals and principles which are their
common heritage; 
Recalling that States Parties to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (European Convention on
Human Rights – ETS No. 5) have undertaken to
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
human rights and fundamental freedoms
defined in the Convention; 
Reaffirming the commitment of member states
to the fundamental right to freedom of expres-
sion and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authorities
and regardless of frontiers, as guaranteed by
Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights; 
Aware that any intervention by member states
that forbids access to specific Internet content
may constitute a restriction on freedom of
expression and access to information in the
online environment and that such a restriction
would have to fulfil the conditions in Article 10,
paragraph 2, of the European Convention on
Human Rights and the relevant case law of the
European Court of Human Rights; 
Recalling in this respect the Declaration on
human rights and the rule of law in the informa-
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tion society, adopted by the Committee of Minis-
ters on 13 May 2005, according to which
member states should maintain and enhance
legal and practical measures to prevent state and
private censorship; 
Recalling Recommendation Rec(2007)11 of the
Committee of Ministers to member states on
promoting freedom of expression and informa-
tion in the new information and communica-
tions environment, according to which member
states, the private sector and civil society are
encouraged to develop common standards and
strategies to promote transparency and the pro-
vision of information, guidance and assistance
to the individual users of technologies and serv-
ices concerning, inter alia, the blocking of access
to and filtering of content and services with
regard to the right to receive and impart infor-
mation; 
Noting that the voluntary and responsible use of
Internet filters (products, systems and measures
to block or filter Internet content) can promote
confidence and security on the Internet for
users, in particular children and young people,
while also aware that the use of such filters can
impact on the right to freedom of expression
and information, as protected by Article 10 of
the European Convention on Human Rights; 
Recalling Recommendation Rec(2006)12 of the
Committee of Ministers on empowering chil-
dren in the new information and communica-
tions environment, which underlines the
importance of information literacy and training
strategies for children to enable them to better
understand and deal with content (for example
violence and self-harm, pornography, discrimi-
nation and racism) and behaviours (such as
grooming, bullying, harassment or stalking) car-
rying a risk of harm, thereby promoting a greater
sense of confidence, well-being and respect for
others in the new information and communica-
tions environment; 
Convinced of the necessity to ensure that users
are made aware of, understand and are able to
effectively use, adjust and control filters accord-
ing to their individual needs; 
Recalling Recommendation Rec(2001)8 of the
Committee of Ministers on self-regulation con-
cerning cyber content (self-regulation and user
protection against illegal or harmful content on
new communications and information services),
which encourages the neutral labelling of con-
tent to enable users to make their own value
judgements over such content and the develop-
ment of a wide range of search tools and filtering
profiles, which provide users with the ability to
select content on the basis of content descrip-
tors; 
Aware of the public service value of the Internet,
understood as people's significant reliance on
the Internet as an essential tool for their every-
day activities (communication, information,
knowledge, commercial transactions, entertain-
ment) and the resulting legitimate expectation
that Internet services be accessible, affordable,
secure, reliable and ongoing and recalling in this
regard Recommendation Rec(2007)16 of the
Committee of Ministers on measures to promote
the public service value of the Internet; 
Recalling the Declaration of the Committee of
Ministers on freedom of communication on the
Internet of 28 May 2003, which stresses that
public authorities should not, through general
blocking or filtering measures, deny access by
the public to information and other communi-
cation on the Internet, regardless of frontiers,
but that this does not prevent the installation of
filters for the protection of minors, in particular
in places accessible to them, such as schools or
libraries; 
Reaffirming the commitment of member states
to everyone's right to private life and secrecy of
correspondence, as protected by Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, and
recalling the Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing
of Personal Data (ETS No. 108) and its Addi-
tional Protocol regarding supervisory authori-
ties and transborder data flows (ETS No. 181) as
well as Recommendation No. R (99) 5 of the
Committee of Ministers on the protection of pri-
vacy on the Internet, 
Recommends that member states adopt com-
mon standards and strategies with regard to
Internet filters to promote the full exercise and
enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression
and information and related rights and
freedoms in the European Convention on
Human Rights, in particular by: 
– taking measures with regard to Internet filters
in line with the guidelines set out in the appen-
dix to this recommendation; 
– bringing these guidelines to the attention of all
relevant private and public sector stakeholders,
in particular those who design, use (install, acti-
vate, deactivate and implement) and monitor
Internet filters, and to civil society, so that they
may contribute to their implementation. 
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Appendix to Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)6 
Guidelines 
I. Using and controlling Internet filters in or-
der to fully exercise and enjoy the right to free-
dom of expression and information 
Users' awareness, understanding of and ability to
effectively use Internet filters are key factors
which enable them to fully exercise and enjoy
their human rights and fundamental freedoms,
in particular the right to freedom of expression
and information, and to participate actively in
democratic processes. When confronted with fil-
ters, users must be informed that a filter is active
and, where appropriate, be able to identify and to
control the level of filtering the content they ac-
cess is subject to. Moreover, they should have the
possibility to challenge the blocking or filtering
of content and to seek clarifications and reme-
dies. 
In co-operation with the private sector and civil
society, member states should ensure that users
are made aware of activated filters and, where
appropriate, are able to activate and deactivate
them and be assisted in varying the level of filter-
ing in operation, in particular by: 
i. developing and promoting a minimum level of
information for users to enable them to identify
when filtering has been activated and to under-
stand how, and according to which criteria, the
filtering operates (for example, black lists, white
lists, keyword blocking, content rating, etc., or
combinations thereof); 
ii. developing minimum levels of and standards
for the information provided to the user to
explain why a specific type of content has been
filtered; 
iii. regularly reviewing and updating filters in
order to improve their effectiveness, proportion-
ality and legitimacy in relation to their intended
purpose; 
iv. providing clear and concise information and
guidance regarding the manual overriding of an
activated filter, namely whom to contact when it
appears that content has been unreasonably
blocked and the reasons which may allow a filter
to be overridden for a specific type of content or
Uniform Resource Locator (URL); 
v. ensuring that content filtered by mistake or
error can be accessed without undue difficulty
and within a reasonable time; 
vi. promoting initiatives to raise awareness of the
social and ethical responsibilities of those actors
who design, use and monitor filters with partic-
ular regard to the right to freedom of expression
and information and to the right to private life,
as well as to the active participation in public life
and democratic processes; 
vii. raising awareness of the potential limitations
to freedom of expression and information and
the right to private life resulting from the use of
filters and of the need to ensure proportionality
of such limitations; 
viii. facilitating an exchange of experiences and
best practices with regard to the design, use and
monitoring of filters; 
ix. encouraging the provision of training courses
for network administrators, parents, educators
and other people using and monitoring filters; 
x. promoting and co-operating with existing ini-
tiatives to foster responsible use of filters in
compliance with human rights, democracy and
the rule of law; 
xi. fostering filtering standards and benchmarks
to help users choose and best control filters. 
In this context, civil society should be encour-
aged to raise users' awareness of the potential
benefits and dangers of filters. This should
include promoting the importance and signifi-
cance of free and unhindered access to the Inter-
net so that every individual user may fully
exercise and enjoy their human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, in particular the right to
freedom of expression and information and the
right to private life, as well as to effectively par-
ticipate in public life and democratic processes. 
II. Appropriate filtering for children and
young people 
The Internet has significantly increased the
number and diversity of ideas, information and
opinions which people may receive and impart in
the fulfilment of their right to freedom of expres-
sion and information without interference by
public authorities and regardless of frontiers. At
the same time, it has increased the amount of
readily available content carrying a risk of harm,
particularly for children and young people. To
satisfy the legitimate desire and duty of member
states to protect children and young people from
content carrying a risk of harm, the proportion-
ate use of filters can constitute an appropriate
means of encouraging access to and confident
use of the Internet and be a complement to other
strategies on how to tackle harmful content, such
as the development and provision of information
literacy. 
In this context, member states should: 
i. facilitate the development of strategies to iden-
tify content carrying a risk of harm for children
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and young people, taking into account the diver-
sity of cultures, values and opinions; 
ii. co-operate with the private sector and civil
society to avoid over-protection of children and
young people by, inter alia, supporting research
and development for the production of "intelli-
gent" filters that take more account of the con-
text in which the information is provided (for
example by differentiating between harmful con-
tent itself and unproblematic references to it,
such as may be found on scientific websites); 
iii. facilitate and promote initiatives that assist
parents and educators in the selection and use of
developmental-age appropriate filters for chil-
dren and young people; 
iv. inform children and young people about the
benefits and dangers of Internet content and its
filtering as part of media education strategies in
formal and non-formal education. 
Furthermore, the private sector should be
encouraged to: 
i. develop "intelligent" filters offering develop-
mental-age appropriate filtering which can be
adapted to follow the child's progress and age
while, at the same time, ensuring that filtering
does not occur when the content is deemed nei-
ther harmful nor unsuitable for the group which
the filter has been activated to protect; 
ii. co-operate with self- and co-regulatory bodies
in order to develop standards for developmental-
age appropriate rating systems for content carry-
ing a risk of harm, taking into account the diver-
sity of cultures, values and opinions; 
iii. develop, in co-operation with civil society,
common labels for filters to assist parents and
educators in making informed choices when
acquiring filters and to certify that they meet cer-
tain quality requirements; 
iv. promote the interoperability of systems for
the self-classification of content by providers
and help to increase awareness about the poten-
tial benefits and dangers of such classification
models. 
Moreover, civil society should be encouraged to: 
i. debate and share their experiences and knowl-
edge when assessing and raising awareness of the
development and use of filters as a protective
measure for children and young people; 
ii regularly monitor and analyse the use and
impact of filters for children and young people,
with particular regard to their effectiveness and
their contribution to the exercise and enjoyment
of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by Article
10 and other provisions of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. 
III. Use and application of Internet filters by
the public and private sector 
Notwithstanding the importance of empowering
users to use and control filters as mentioned
above, and noting the wider public service value
of the Internet, public actors on all levels (such as
administrations, libraries and educational insti-
tutions) which introduce filters or use them
when delivering services to the public, should en-
sure full respect for all users' right to freedom of
expression and information and their right to
private life and secrecy of correspondence. 
In this context, member states should: 
i. refrain from filtering Internet content in elec-
tronic communications networks operated by
public actors for reasons other than those laid
down in Article 10, paragraph 2, of the European
Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by
the European Court of Human Rights; 
ii. guarantee that nationwide general blocking or
filtering measures are only introduced by the
state if the conditions of Article 10, paragraph 2,
of the European Convention on Human Rights
are fulfilled. Such action by the state should only
be taken if the filtering concerns specific and
clearly identifiable content, a competent
national authority has taken a decision on its
illegality and the decision can be reviewed by an
independent and impartial tribunal or regula-
tory body, in accordance with the requirements
of Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights; 
iii. introduce, where appropriate and necessary,
provisions under national law for the prevention
of intentional abuse of filters to restrict citizens'
access to lawful content; 
iv. ensure that all filters are assessed both before
and during their implementation to ensure that
the effects of the filtering are proportionate to
the purpose of the restriction and thus necessary
in a democratic society, in order to avoid unrea-
sonable blocking of content; 
v. provide for effective and readily accessible
means of recourse and remedy, including sus-
pension of filters, in cases where users and/or
authors of content claim that content has been
blocked unreasonably; 
vi. avoid the universal and general blocking of
offensive or harmful content for users who are
not part of the group which a filter has been acti-
vated to protect, and of illegal content for users
who justifiably demonstrate a legitimate interest
or need to access such content under exceptional
circumstances, particularly for research pur-
poses; 
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vii. ensure that the right to private life and
secrecy of correspondence is respected when
using and applying filters and that personal data
logged, recorded and processed via filters are
only used for legitimate and non-commercial
purposes. 
Furthermore, member states and the private sec-
tor are encouraged to: 
i. regularly assess and review the effectiveness
and proportionality regarding the introduction
of filters; 
ii. strengthen the information and guidance to
users who are subject to filters in private net-
works, including information about the exist-
ence of, and reasons for, the use of a filter and
the criteria upon which the filter operates; 
iii. co-operate with users (customers, employees,
etc.) to improve the transparency, effectiveness
and proportionality of filters. 
In this context, civil society should be encour-
aged to follow the development and deployment
of filters both by key state and private sector
actors. It should, where appropriate, call upon
member states and the private sector, respec-
tively, to ensure and to facilitate all users' right
to freedom of expression and information, in
particular as regards their freedom to receive
information without interference by public
authorities and regardless of frontiers in the new
information and communications environment.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE - COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, DECLARATION ON THE IN-
DEPENDENCE AND FUNCTIONS OF REGULATORY AUTHORITIES FOR THE
BROADCASTING SECTOR (2008)
Adopted 26 March 2008
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe, 
Considering that the aim of the Council of
Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its
members for the purpose of safeguarding and
realising the ideals and principles which are their
common heritage and facilitating their eco-
nomic and social progress; 
Bearing in mind Article 10 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5), guaran-
teeing the right to freedom of expression, which
includes the freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas with-
out interference by public authorities and
regardless of frontiers; 
Recalling the importance for democratic socie-
ties of the existence of a wide range of independ-
ent and autonomous means of communication,
making it possible to reflect the diversity of ideas
and opinions and the absence of any arbitrary
controls or constraints on participants in the
information process, on media content or on the
transmission and dissemination of information,
as set out in the Declaration on the freedom of
expression and information (29 April 1982); 
Recalling its Recommendation Rec(2000)23 to
member states on the independence and func-
tions of regulatory authorities for the broadcast-
ing sector, and its Recommendation Rec(2003)9
to member states on measures to promote the
democratic and social contribution of digital
broadcasting, as well as its Declaration on the
guarantee of the independence of public service
broadcasting in the member states (27 Septem-
ber 2006); 
Mindful of the case law of the European Court
of Human Rights and the relevant decisions of
the European Commission of Human Rights, in
particular when the latter states that a licensing
system not respecting the requirements of plu-
ralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, without
which there is no democratic society, would
infringe Article 10, paragraph 1, of the European
Convention on Human Rights and that the
rejection by a state of a licence application must
not be manifestly arbitrary or discriminatory,
and thereby contrary to the principles set out in
the preamble to the Convention and the rights
secured therein; 
Recalling the commitment made by member
states in the Political Declaration of the 7th
European Ministerial Conference on Mass
Media Policy (Kyiv, 10 and 11 March 2005) to
undertake to ensure that the regulatory meas-
ures which they may take with regard to the
media and new communication services will
respect and promote the fundamental values of
pluralism and diversity, respect for human rights
and non-discriminatory access; 
Recalling the objective of Recommendation
Rec(2000)23 that, to guarantee the existence of a
wide range of independent and autonomous
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media in the broadcasting sector, it is essential
to provide for adequate and proportionate regu-
lation of that sector, in order to guarantee the
freedom of the media whilst at the same time
ensuring a balance between that freedom and
other legitimate rights and interests; 
Underlining the important role played by the
traditional and digital broadcasting media in
modern, democratic societies in particular for
informing the public, for the free formation of
public opinion and the expression of ideas and
for scrutinising the activities of public authori-
ties as underlined in its Recommendation
Rec(2003)9 as well as in its Declaration on the
guarantee of the independence of public service
broadcasting in the member states; 
Noting the overview concerning the legislative
framework of members states and its practical
implementation, as well as legal and institu-
tional solutions developed in particular coun-
tries regarding regulatory authorities in the
broadcasting sector, and which is reproduced in
the appendix hereto; 
Welcoming, in this context, the situation in
many Council of Europe member states where,
in line with Recommendation Rec(2000)23, the
independent and efficient regulation of the
broadcasting sector in the public interest, as well
as the independence, transparency and account-
ability of regulatory authorities for the broad-
casting sector, is ensured by law and in practice; 
Concerned, however, that the guidelines of Rec-
ommendation Rec(2000)23 and the main princi-
ples underlining it are not fully respected in law
and/or in practice in other Council of Europe
member states due to a situation in which the
legal framework on broadcasting regulation is
unclear, contradictory or in conflict with the
principles of Recommendation Rec(2000)23, the
political and financial independence of regula-
tory authorities and its members is not properly
ensured, licences are allocated and monitoring
decisions are made without due regard to
national legislation or Council of Europe stand-
ards, and broadcasting regulatory decisions are
not made available to the public or are not open
to review; 
Aware that a 'culture of independence', where
members of regulatory authorities in the broad-
casting sector affirm and exercise their inde-
pendence and all members of society, public
authorities and other relevant players including
the media, respect the independence of the regu-
latory authorities, is essential to independent
broadcasting regulation; 
Aware that independent broadcasting regulatory
authorities can only function in an environment
of transparency, accountability, clear separation
of powers and due respect for the legal frame-
work in force; 
Aware of the new challenges to the regulation of
the broadcasting landscape resulting from con-
centration in the broadcasting sector and tech-
nological developments in broadcasting, in
particular digital broadcasting; 
I. Affirms that the 'culture of independence'
should be preserved and, where they are in place,
independent broadcasting regulatory authorities
in member states need to be effective, transpar-
ent and accountable and therefore; 
II. Declares its firm attachment to the objectives
of the independent functioning of broadcasting
regulatory authorities in member states; 
III. Calls on member states to: 
– implement, if they have not yet done so, Rec-
ommendation Rec(2000)23 on the independ-
ence and functions of regulatory authorities for
the broadcasting sector, with particular refer-
ence to the guidelines appended thereto, and
having regard to the opportunities and chal-
lenges brought about by political, economic and
technological changes in Europe; 
– provide the legal, political, financial, technical
and other means necessary to ensure the inde-
pendent functioning of broadcasting regulatory
authorities, so as to remove risks of political or
economic interference; 
– disseminate widely the present declaration
and, in particular, bring it to the attention of the
relevant authorities, the media and of broadcast-
ing regulatory authorities in particular, as well as
to that of other interested professional and busi-
ness players; 
IV. Invites broadcasting regulatory authorities
to: 
– be conscious of their particular role in a demo-
cratic society and their importance in creating a
diverse and pluralist broadcasting landscape; 
– ensure the independent and transparent allo-
cation of broadcasting licences and monitoring
of broadcasters in the public interest; 
– contribute to the entrenchment of a 'culture of
independence' and, in this context, develop and
respect guidelines that guarantee their own inde-
pendence and that of their members; 
– make a commitment to transparency, effective-
ness and accountability; 
V. Invites civil society and the media to contrib-
ute actively to the 'culture of independence',
which is vital for the adequate regulation of
broadcasting in the new technological environ-
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ment, by monitoring closely the independence of
these authorities, bringing to the attention of
the public good examples of independent broad-
casting regulation as well as infringements on
regulators' independence. 
Appendix to the Declaration by the Committee of
Ministers on the independence and functions of
regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector
Introduction 
At its 3rd meeting, in June 2006, the Steering
Committee on Media and New Information
Services (CDMC) discussed the implementation
of non-binding instruments in its area of compe-
tence, in particular that of Recommendation
Rec(2000)23 on the independence and functions
of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting
sector. It asked the Secretariat to collect informa-
tion with a view to assessing the situation as
regards the independence and functions of regu-
latory authorities in the broadcasting sector in
member states. 
In October 2006, the Bureau of the CDMC
examined a first draft document prepared by the
Secretariat and decided that this draft should be
reviewed with a view "to develop in greater detail
the possible deficiencies in the legislative frame-
work of member states and its practical imple-
mentation, without however naming specific
countries. The second part, which includes infor-
mation on the situation in the member states,
should be a factual overview of legal and institu-
tional solutions developed in particular coun-
tries regarding regulatory authorities in the
broadcasting sector, using as a template the
main requirements of the recommendation, pro-
viding information on whether the safeguards of
the regulatory authorities' independence and
functioning laid down in the recommendation
are observed in practice in the particular coun-
try". 
This document contains an overview on the
implementation of Recommendation
Rec(2000)23 and, more particularly, information
on the independence of regulatory authorities in
the Council of Europe member states. The docu-
ment examines the legal framework and practice
on broadcasting regulatory authorities and
broadcasting regulation in member states and
the degree of compliance with regard to the
guidelines set out in Recommendation
Rec(2000)23. 
This overview was prepared on the basis of infor-
mation provided by member states on their legal
frameworks. It also takes account of information
gathered from other sources which include
reports by the Parliamentary Assembly, the
OSCE Special Representative on Freedom of the
Media, a report by the Open Society Institute on
broadcasting in Europe, information provided
by the European Platform of Regulatory Author-
ities (EPRA), as well as information from inter-
national and national non-governmental
organisations. 
Overview of the legislative framework of
members states and its practical implementa-
tion as well as legal and institutional solu-
tions developed in particular countries
regarding regulatory authorities in the broad-
casting sector 
I. Legislative framework 
1. According to Recommendation Rec(2000)23
of the Committee of Ministers to member states
on the independence and functions of regula-
tory authorities for the broadcasting sector
(hereafter 'the recommendation'), an appropri-
ate legal framework is essential for the setting up
and proper functioning of a broadcasting regula-
tor. Laws and regulations should indicate clearly
how and by whom members are nominated, the
ways of making them accountable, how the regu-
latory authority is financed and what its compe-
tencies are in order to ensure the financial and
political independence of the authority and its
members (cf. Appendix to the recommendation,
Section I, paragraphs 1 and 2). 
2. All Council of Europe member states have at
least some basic legal provisions on broadcasting
regulation. However, not all broadcasting regula-
tors are established by law as independent
authorities, neither are all required by law to act
independently. 
3. Almost all member states have clear legal pro-
visions on the financing and competencies of the
regulator and the nomination of its members. A
number of laws, however, do not address all rele-
vant matters. For those states where the broad-
casting sector is not regulated by an independent
body but by government bodies or bodies
directly under the authority of a ministry or
minister, rules on independent financing or the
independent nomination of members can be
considered redundant. In other cases, there is no
apparent reason why the law does not provide
the details required by the recommendation. 
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4. In general, the majority of Council of Europe
member states' laws on broadcasting regulation
seem to provide an adequate protection for the
independence of regulatory authorities. How-
ever, it would appear that, in a number of mem-
ber states, the legal framework does not protect
the independence of regulatory authorities as
required by the recommendation. In particular,
the rules on the appointment of members to the
regulatory authority often do not provide mem-
bers adequate protection against political pres-
sure (see below for further details). 
It has also been reported that, in a number of
member states, public authorities have failed to
respect the legal framework or have taken advan-
tage of legal loopholes to interfere with the inde-
pendence of the regulatory authority (see below
for further details). 
5. In a number of member states, laws have been
described as too vague or contradictory, making
it difficult for regulatory authorities to reach
consistent and objective decisions. In some cases,
contradictory and seemingly arbitrary decisions
by the broadcasting regulator have been
explained by the fact that frequent changes to
the broadcasting legislation give rise to uncer-
tainty about the legal and regulatory framework
in force at a particular point in time. 
6. The quantity and detail of the regulations vary
considerably between member states. However,
there does not seem to be a clear link between
the amount of detail in a country's legislation
on broadcasting regulation and the regulatory
authority's independence. In fact, some of the
regulatory authorities that are governed by a very
limited set of rules are considered in practice to
operate relatively independently. Some impor-
tance has been attributed to a 'culture of inde-
pendence' where law makers, government and
other players, under the scrutiny of society at
large, respect the regulatory authorities' inde-
pendence without being explicitly required to do
so by law. 
II. Appointment, composition and functioning 
7. According to the recommendation (cf. the Ap-
pendix thereto, Section II, paragraph 3), the rules
governing regulatory authorities in the broad-
casting sector should secure their independence
and protect them against any interference, in par-
ticular by political and economic interests. 
8. The majority of the broadcasting regulatory
authorities in Council of Europe member states
are established by law as autonomous bodies.
However, certain of them are government bodies
or bodies directly under the authority of a minis-
try or minister. These regulators often depend
on the administrative support of the ministry to
which they are attached and seldom manage
their own budget independently. In some such
cases, the authorities concerned are said to suc-
ceed in working independently, usually due to a
long-standing practice of independence or com-
prehensive regulatory frameworks which provide
clear guidelines on the regulatory authorities'
competences. Almost all of the authorities which
are not formally established as autonomous
agencies but which are reported to work inde-
pendently in practice seem to be found in long-
standing democracies with relatively low levels of
corruption, where the transparency of public
bodies in general is ensured and where inde-
pendent media and a vibrant civil society keep
the regulatory authority's work under close scru-
tiny. 
9. To guarantee the independence of members of
regulatory authorities from political and eco-
nomic pressure, the recommendation calls on
member states to ensure that regulatory bodies
have incompatibility rules, preserving their
members from being under the influence of
political powers or prohibiting them from hold-
ing interests in enterprises of other organisa-
tions in the media or related sectors (cf.
Appendix to the Recommendation, Section II,
paragraph 4). 
10. Most Council of Europe member states have
rules that prohibit members of regulatory
authorities from holding political office; the
number of states that also ban them from having
commercial interests in the media sector is lower.
Indeed, in certain cases, the incompatibility rules
for members of regulatory authorities go beyond
the guidelines appended to the recommendation
and members of regulatory authorities are not
permitted to work in the media business or
engage in politics for several years after the
expiry of their mandate. To prevent members
from signing over their commercial interests in a
media business to a family member, the law in
some member states also requires that close rela-
tives of members give up commercial interests in
the media. This requirement extends on occa-
sion to relatives holding political office. 
However, in other member states, the framework
seeking to guarantee the independence of mem-
bers of regulatory authorities is far less satisfac-
tory and, in many cases, incompatibilities do not
extend to potentially conflicting relations with
or interests in media businesses or politics. 
11. In certain Council of Europe member states,
the members of regulatory authorities have the
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power to decide over a member's possible con-
flict of interest, or a member can choose not to
make use of his or her voting rights, should per-
sonal interests be at stake in a regulatory deci-
sion. Another practice is for the other members
to decide to exclude a member in case of proven
conflict of interest. 
12. To guarantee the integrity of the members of
regulatory authorities, the recommendation
calls for rules designed to ensure that members
of regulatory authorities are appointed in a dem-
ocratic and transparent manner (cf. Appendix to
the recommendation, Section II, paragraph 5). 
13. In most Council of Europe member states,
the members of regulatory authorities are
appointed by the parliament or by the head of
state at the proposal of parliament. In some
member states, in order to ensure that the mem-
bership of the regulatory authority reflects the
country's social and political diversity, part or all
of the members are nominated by non-govern-
mental groups which are considered to be repre-
sentative of society. Further, in a few member
states, the law provides objective selection crite-
ria for the appointment of members. 
By contrast, in a number of countries, members
are appointed by sole decision of one state
authority, e.g. the head of state or a state depart-
ment, often without clearly specified selection
criteria. The appointment of members of regula-
tory authorities by the head of state and/or par-
liament has sometimes been criticised advancing
that, in such cases, membership would represent
or reproduce political power structures. 
14. Concerns have often been raised that the
nominating or appointing bodies could exert
pressure on the members after their appoint-
ment. In fact, in some member states, the mem-
bers of regulatory authorities are frequently
accused of acting on behalf of the state body that
designated them or political formation behind
the designating or appointing authority. 
15. To avoid that dismissal be used as a means of
political pressure, the recommendation calls for
precise rules on the possibility to dismiss mem-
bers. Accordingly, dismissal should only be pos-
sible in case of non-respect of the rules of
incompatibility, duly noted incapacity to exer-
cise a member's functions and conviction (by a
court of law) for a serious criminal offence. An
appeal before the competent courts should be
possible against any dismissal (see Appendix to
the recommendation, Section II, paragraphs 6
and 7). 
16. Whereas in a majority of member states regu-
lations exist on the dismissal of members, they
are not always limited to the list of justifications
for dismissal provided for by the recommenda-
tion. In a number of member states, the law stip-
ulates that members of regulatory authorities
can be dismissed if convicted of an offence, but it
is not always specified that this has to be a seri-
ous offence as opposed to a minor or adminis-
trative offence. 
17. In some member states, to avoid dismissal
procedures being used as a means of exerting
pressure on members, members of regulatory
authorities cannot be dismissed at all. This prac-
tice has apparently given rise to concern in at
least one member state, where members could
not be held accountable and dismissed for
licensing decisions that were allegedly in viola-
tion of national law. 
III. Financial independence 
18. Another key factor for ensuring the independ-
ence of regulatory authorities is their funding ar-
rangements, which, according to the recommen-
dation, should be specified in law in accordance
with a clearly defined plan, and with reference to
the estimated cost of the regulatory authorities'
activities, so as to allow them to carry out their
functions fully and independently (cf. Appendix
to the recommendation, Section III, paragraphs 9
to 11). 
19. The majority of Council of Europe member
states have legal provisions defining the source
of funding of the regulatory body. By contrast, in
at least a quarter of member states, the legal
framework does not appear to be clear on this
subject. 
20. It is common practice amongst many regula-
tory authorities in Council of Europe member
states to receive their funding directly through
fees in order to be independent from public
authorities' decision making. Nonetheless, the
laws of a large number of member states specify
that the regulatory authority is to be financed by
the state budget. In some member states, the law
mentions clearly that public authorities must
not use their financial decision-making power to
interfere with the independence of the regula-
tory authority; however in most countries where
the regulatory authority is financed by the state
budget no such precautions are laid down in the
law. 
21. In some member states, the law stipulates
that the regulatory authority proposes its annual
budget plan which then has to be automatically
approved by a specific state body (or the
approval of such a body being a formality). How-
ever, in at least a third of all Council of Europe
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member states, no clear rules exist to ensure that
the approval for the regulatory authority's fund-
ing is not up to the discretion of such other state
bodies. 
22. It would appear that, despite the law envisag-
ing an independent funding plan for the regula-
tory authority, in certain Council of Europe
member states those authorities claim to feel
under threat of or have experienced pressure
from governments which go back on agreed
funding plans and/or use funding decisions as
leverage in political power struggles. 
Reportedly, in more than one case, broadcasting
regulatory authorities which, according to the
law should be financed independently, in prac-
tice received their revenue from the state because
of a weak broadcasting market or because the
licence fee collecting system was ineffective. In at
least two member states, the regulatory author-
ity did not publicly disclose the source of their
revenue after the licence fee system had col-
lapsed. 
23. In addition, many regulators also complain
that they are not given the means (in particular
human resources) to adequately perform their
duties (see below for further details). 
IV. Powers and competence 
24. According to the recommendation, the legis-
lator should entrust the regulatory authority
with the power to adopt regulations and guide-
lines concerning broadcasting activities as well as
internal rules (cf. Appendix to the recommenda-
tion, Section IV, paragraph 12). 
25. In a significant number of Council of Europe
member states, the law clearly stipulates that
regulatory authorities have the power to adopt
regulations and guidelines concerning broad-
casting activities and have the power to adopt
internal rules. However, in at least a quarter of
the member states, the legal framework does not
foresee such rights. In at least two member
states, these powers are in fact expressly vested
upon another body or authority. 
26. An essential task of the broadcasting regula-
tory authority should be the granting of licences.
The basic conditions and criteria governing the
granting and renewal of broadcasting licences
should be clearly defined in the law. The regula-
tions governing the broadcasting licensing pro-
cedure should be clear and precise and should be
applied in an open, transparent and impartial
manner and decisions should be made public.
Calls for tenders should also be made public,
should define a number of conditions to be met
by the applicants and specify the content of the
licence application (cf. Appendix to the recom-
mendation, Section IV, paragraph 13 to 17). 
27. The above-mentioned requirements are fully
met in some Council of Europe member states
and partially in many of them. In particular, the
majority of regulatory authorities in Council of
Europe member states are given the competence
to award broadcasting licences. However, in at
least one fifth of all member states, a body other
than a broadcasting regulator awards broadcast-
ing licences. Further, the legislation of not less
than nine member states fail to define clearly the
basic conditions and criteria for the granting
and renewal of broadcasting licences. 
28. In almost half of all Council of Europe mem-
ber states, tender procedures are insufficiently
detailed. It would appear that, in at least 18
member states, there are no legal provisions
requiring that the licence tendering process be
public. In a comparable number of member
states, the law does not specify on the selection
criteria to be met by applicants for licences.
Again, in almost one in two member states, the
legal framework is either silent or provides insuf-
ficient detail on the content of licence applica-
tions. 
29. Even though licensing decisions are often
criticised, the majority of regulatory authorities
seem to award licenses in a manner which is con-
sistent with the recommendation. Nevertheless,
in a number of Council of Europe member
states, the broadcasting licensing procedure
allegedly lacks transparency, is arbitrary or polit-
ically biased. It is claimed that, in many cases,
this is due to a lack of regulations and licence
selection criteria, and frequent revisions of the
law apparently add to the confusion. 
30. In addition, some broadcasting authorities
have not been able to enforce the law when allo-
cating licenses, because regulations were not
clear as to the distribution of competences in the
licensing process or because broadcasting regu-
lators were not given the authority and/or finan-
cial means to establish or to implement an
effective licensing system. 
31. Another essential function of regulatory
authorities should be the monitoring of broad-
casters' compliance with their commitments
and obligations. Regulatory authorities should
have the power to consider complaints and there
should be no a priori monitoring. Regulatory
authorities should have the power to impose
sanctions in cases of violations. The sanctions
have to be defined by law and should start with a
warning (cf. Appendix to the recommendation,
Section IV, paragraphs 18 to 23). 
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32. The laws in almost all Council of Europe
member states envisage an independent body to
monitor broadcasters' compliance with the law
and with licence conditions. This task is usually
entrusted to the regulatory body that awards
licenses although, in some countries, the law cre-
ates a separate independent authority for that
purpose. There are, however, some member
states where organs that are under the direct
authority of or answerable to governmental
authorities are vested with monitoring duties. 
33. Hardly any of the legislations in member
stipulate clearly that monitoring should be con-
ducted only after broadcasting, although prac-
tice is broadly in compliance with this
requirement. 
34. In most member states, regulatory authori-
ties are empowered to impose sanctions as pre-
scribed by law. However, in at least seven
member states, there are either no provisions on
the body that would enforce sanctions or this
function is carried out directly by government
bodies or authorities. 
Many member states give details on the sanc-
tions that can be handed down in cases of viola-
tions of the laws or licence requirements.
However, the lower end of the scale is not always
a warning. Further, in a small number of mem-
ber states, the law contains no details on possible
sanctions. 
It might be added that, only in about one quar-
ter of Council of Europe member states, the law
explicitly allows monitoring bodies to consider
third party complaints concerning broadcasters'
activities. 
35. Almost all regulatory authorities in Council
of Europe member states are by law required to
monitor the respect of licence conditions. Many
regulators have performed their monitoring
duties successfully for many years, interpreting
and developing licence requirements, on occa-
sion in cooperation with broadcasters, in order
to best protect the rules defined in national leg-
islation. A significant number of bodies, how-
ever, allegedly monitor insufficiently or not at all
because they do not have the necessary financial
or human resources to do so. 
36. On a number of occasions, regulators have
been accused of applying sanctions arbitrarily or
inconsistently. Further, in a few countries, com-
plaints have been made that the sanctions were
too harsh or too lax, motivated by archaic moral
ideas or that they were politically motivated.
This has apparently been due to vague licence
conditions or broadcasting requirements with
regulators being uncertain about how to inter-
pret those conditions. It has also been argued
that some regulatory authorities do not have the
political support or are not given the means to
enforce sanctions. 
V. Accountability 
37. In its final part (cf. Appendix to the recom-
mendation, Section V, paragraphs 25 to 27), the
recommendation states that regulatory authori-
ties should be accountable to the public for their
activities, for example by means of publishing an-
nual reports. The recommendation also under-
lines that regulatory authorities should make
their decisions public and should only be super-
vised in respect of the lawfulness of their activi-
ties and the correctness and transparency of their
financial activities. 
38. In many member states, regulatory authori-
ties are accountable to state bodies or authori-
ties, for example the parliament, the head of
state or the auditing authorities. By contrast,
broadcasting regulatory authorities are account-
able by law to the public in only a few cases. That
said, in at least eight Council of Europe member
states, the law clearly requires regulatory author-
ities to make their decisions public, while many
other legal frameworks are silent on these issues. 
In at least eight of the member states where the
law prescribes that regulatory authorities are
accountable to a state body or to the public, the
legal framework does not specify clearly that the
regulatory authorities can only be supervised in
respect of the lawfulness of their activities and
the correctness and transparency of their finan-
cial activities. Moreover, in a number of member
states, regulatory authorities cannot be held
accountable by law to anyone. 
39. In approximately half of the Council of
Europe member states, the law prescribes that
decisions of the broadcasting regulator are open
to review (usually by a court of justice). However,
in other member states, decisions cannot be
challenged before the courts. 
40. The majority of regulatory bodies in Council
of Europe member states publish their decisions
in annual reports. In some countries where regu-
latory bodies are accountable by law to parlia-
ment and/or the head of state, it has been
alleged that annual reports were rejected and
regulatory authorities dissolved not on objective
grounds but for political reasons.
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COUNCIL OF EUROPE – MINISTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR MEDIA AND NEW
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, POLITICAL DECLARATION AND RESOLUTION –
A NEW NOTION OF MEDIA?
Adopted on 28 and 29 May 2009, Reykjavik, Iceland
Political declaration
The ministers of states participating in the 1st
Council of Europe Conference of Ministers re-
sponsible for Media and New Communication
Services, held in Reykjavik on 28 and 29 May
2009, make the following political declaration:
1. Free, independent and diverse media are essen-
tial for a democratic society. This is why the
Council of Europe has developed a large body of
standards over the years that seek to protect the
media from interference, in compliance with Ar-
ticle 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ETS No. 5). Those standards also explore
duties and responsibilities which equally stem
from Article 10. Thanks to constant review and
updating, their relevance has persisted over the
years, even in a changing media landscape.
2. The ways in which information is gathered,
content is created and the methods by which
both are made available and sought have changed
with technological developments. Users have
ready access to, and create content for, means of
mass communication which employ diversified
communication platforms for both existing and
newly developed media or comparable media-like
mass-communication or information services.
The relations between the media or other provid-
ers of those services and users or consumers have
also evolved. It is therefore an opportune mo-
ment to review the notion of the media, under-
stood as certain forms of mass communication
that are transmitted by means of print or broad-
casting involving ethical standards and editorial
responsibility.
3. Like traditional media, new providers of me-
dia-like mass-communication services also
should strive to promote and respect certain fun-
damental values. New modes of content creation
and expression as well as seeking and imparting
information in a mass-communication setting
reinforce but may also challenge fundamental
rights and freedoms. Existing media-related
standards that were developed for traditional
forms of mass communication may well apply to
new services and service providers. However, ad-
ditional tailored guidance to member states may
be necessary. Further, new service providers
should be made aware of their rights and also
their duties and responsibilities.
4. Public service media, having genuine editorial
independence and institutional autonomy,
contribute to media diversity and help counter-
balance the risk of misuse of power in a situation
of strong concentration of the media and new
communication services. They are therefore a
fundamental component of the media landscape
in our democratic societies. However, in a chang-
ing environment, public service media face major
challenges which may threaten their very surviv-
al. Reflection on possible responses to these chal-
lenges should be pursued.
5. Growing numbers of people rely on the Inter-
net as an essential tool for everyday activities
(communication, information, knowledge, com-
mercial transactions, leisure), ultimately improv-
ing their quality of life and well-being. People
therefore expect Internet services to be accessible
and affordable, secure, reliable and ongoing. Ac-
cess to these services also concerns the enjoyment
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as
well as the exercise of democratic citizenship.
Council of Europe member states might there-
fore explore together the follow-up to be given to
the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation
CM/Rec(2007)16 on measures to promote the
public service value of the Internet.
6. Media or media-like services have growing
cross-border importance. The revision of the
European Convention on Transfrontier Televi-
sion (ETS No. 132) is a welcome Council of Eu-
rope response to the diversification of communi-
cation platforms and information services. The
revision process should be completed at the earli-
est opportunity. A broader legal response to the
need to protect the cross-border flow of media
and media-like content and, more generally, In-
ternet traffic should be explored having regard to
Article 10 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights. Steps may also be required to ensure
that critical infrastructure and resources, which
are essential for people’s access to Internet servic-
es, are preserved in the public interest.
7. The question of the dignity of persons exposed
to or affected by media or media-like services
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should be central to developing standards for
those services. In this context, particular atten-
tion should be paid to children, young people
and other groups with special needs or character-
istics.
Access by all these groups to media and media-
like services is an important matter. Gender-re-
lated issues should also be mainstreamed with re-
gard to these services. Users should be empow-
ered to participate actively in the new
communication environments, aware of their
rights and responsibilities and adequately pro-
tected from possible harm.
8. In the interest of the required protection of the
right to private life, the processing of personal
data in new communication and information en-
vironments, and more particularly on the Inter-
net, also needs to be addressed, including profil-
ing practices.
9. There is ongoing concern about the effective
implementation of Council of Europe standards
on the freedom of expression and information
and the freedom of the media. This implementa-
tion requires careful follow-up in the context of
technological developments and market condi-
tions. Threats derive also from crisis situations,
be it terrorism, war or financial turmoil, as well as
technological developments and market condi-
tions which affect the position of journalists in
information processes.
There is, in particular, growing concern about the
impact of terrorism, and of actions taken by
member states to combat it, on those freedoms.
Efforts have to be redoubled to ensure that these
freedoms, underpinned by the rule of law, do not
fall victim to these circumstances. Respect for
Council of Europe standards on freedom of ex-
pression and information as well as freedom of
the media in practice should therefore be an on-
going endeavour.
10. In light of the above, the ministers: 
Agree to pursue co-operation on media and new
communication services with a view to providing
common responses to developments regarding
the media and the provision of media-like servic-
es, in particular as regards the respect for free-
dom of expression and information, the right to
private life and the dignity of human beings;
Adopt the resolution “Towards a new notion of
media” and the corresponding action plan, and
the specific resolutions on “Internet governance
and critical Internet resources” and the ”Develop-
ments in anti-terrorism legislation in Council of
Europe member states and their impact on free-
dom of expression and information” which are
appended to this political declaration and re-
quest the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe to take steps to implement the actions
mentioned in those documents;
Ask the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe to continue to explore ways of enhancing
the respect for freedom of expression and infor-
mation and freedom of media standards in prac-
tice.
Resolution - Towards a new notion of media
1. The purpose of media or comparable media-
like mass communication services remains on
the whole unchanged, namely the provision or
dissemination of information, analysis, com-
ment, opinion and entertainment to a broad
public. The underlying objectives also remain
comparable: to provide news, information or ac-
cess to information; to set the public agenda; to
animate public debate or shape public opinion;
to contribute to development or to promote spe-
cific values; to entertain; or to generate an in-
come or, most frequently, a combination of the
above.
2. However, the content itself is evolving due to
the way in which information is gathered and
content is created, disseminated or distributed,
sought, selected and received. This is due both to
technical reasons, related to the communication
platforms used, and to the presentation of con-
tent, which offers a perception of enhanced
choice and interaction. In terms of income, new
business models have been developed for associ-
ating revenue-generating activities to the dissem-
ination of content through the means of mass
communication.
3. These developments call for an in-depth analy-
sis of our understanding of media, including the
criteria and assumptions that underlie this un-
derstanding. It would therefore be desirable to
explore the notion of media and, if necessary, re-
view the concept itself. This would permit the es-
tablishment of criteria for distinguishing media
or media-like services from new forms of person-
al communication that are not media-like mass-
communication or related business activities.
4. Fundamental rights and freedoms and other
Council of Europe values and standards, in
particular the right to freedom of expression and
information and its corollary freedom of the me-
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dia, have to be promoted and protected, regard-
less of changes in the media and media-like land-
scape. The freedom of expression and
information also carries with it certain duties, re-
sponsibilities and, in certain cases, can be subject
to restrictions which are prescribed by law and
necessary in a democratic society. Consequently,
all media and media-like service providers have to
respect certain benchmarks, and they should be
adequately informed of their responsibilities.
5. Within an intergovernmental co-operation
framework, the Council of Europe should con-
sider the extent to which requirements of media
or journalistic professionalism, editorial inde-
pendence and editorial responsibility apply or
should apply to new services or to media-like
service providers. If appropriate, it should also
provide guidance on the modalities of applica-
tion of those standards to the operators of new
services and business activities. More generally, it
should explore whether and how Council of Eu-
rope standards that were developed with tradi-
tional forms of mass communication in mind ap-
ply to the new services or service providers. Those
standards may have to be adapted, or new ones
will have to be elaborated, for the new media-like
service providers.
6. As for traditional media, self-regulation should
be a key element for ensuring compliance with
standards while respecting editorial independ-
ence; where necessary, self-regulation can be sup-
ported or underpinned by co-regulation. As a
form of interference, regulation should be sub-
ject to the limits and conditions established by
the European Convention on Human Rights and
the relevant case law of the European Court of
Human Rights and meet the tests elaborated by
the latter. Media or medialike regulatory or ac-
countability mechanisms, whether self- or co-reg-
ulatory or, if necessary, state driven, must be ef-
fective, transparent, independent and
accountable. The Council of Europe should ex-
plore how to improve the functioning of those
mechanisms, in particular how to improve the ac-
cess
to those mechanisms for persons or groups who
consider that their rights have been breached by
media or media-like service providers.
7. A people-centred approach also requires that
individuals are allowed to exercise their right to
free expression and information and use new
communication services to participate in social,
political, cultural and economic life and to do so
without infringing the human dignity or the
rights of others. The Council of Europe, in con-
sultation and co-operation with relevant stake-
holders, should provide member states with
guidance, benchmarks and tools for the media
and media-like mass communication service pro-
viders that allow individuals to seek, create and
distribute information without fearing breaches
to their own human dignity or rights. The ques-
tion of how rights and responsibilities should be
apportioned in appropriate cases between the
content creator and the distributor or service
provider should also be explored.
8. In this context, media literacy should be con-
sidered essential. It should be recognised as part
of the education for democratic citizenship. It is
a particularly important tool in optimising chil-
dren’s and young people’s comprehension, criti-
cal thinking, citizenship, creativity and critical
awareness of the media. Their sense of responsi-
bility when they create, use and distribute con-
tent is of key importance. Member states will also
have to address other threats to children’s digni-
ty, security and privacy, in particular the question
of the removal of content that children and
young people create or place on the Internet and
that challenges their dignity, security and privacy
or otherwise renders them vulnerable now or at a
later stage in their lives.
9. It is also necessary to explore whether and to
what extent data retention, the processing of per-
sonal data and profiling techniques or practices
challenge unrestricted participation and people’s
rights to freedom of expression and information
and other fundamental rights. Appropriate guid-
ance should be provided to protect users’ rights.
10. The plurality of sources of information and
media and media-like services has to be ensured.
Individuals’ right to receive information can be
challenged and democracy can be threatened by
negative and significant market distortion as a
result of media concentration; lack of diversity
and pluralism; manipulative messages; new
forms of content aggregation; the management
and prioritisation of flow of content and of ac-
cess and limited connectivity, or lack of access, to
broadband services. Measures have to be pro-
posed to address these risks. Part of the answer
lies in the recognition of the public service value
of the Internet and the resulting responsibilities
for states.
11. Another important element for ensuring ac-
cess to trustworthy sources of information is
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genuine, independent and adequately resourced
public service media. At present, not all Council
of Europe member states offer public service me-
dia that are able to attract and to serve all seg-
ments of society and contribute to people’s full
participation in political, social and cultural life.
Developing the role of public service media may
well involve public expenditure on cutting-edge
media and media-like services and technologies.
The modalities of expenditure on public media
or information services may also need to be re-
viewed. The Council of Europe could provide a
forum for discussion and, where appropriate,
propose guidance on the manner in which public
service media can discharge its duties, including
by exploring innovative governance approaches.
12. We therefore:
Affirm the relevance of Council of Europe values,
principles and standards for the media and medi-
alike actors that operate within an evolving land-
scape of media services and information and
communication technologies, and the need to ex-
plore the desirability of adapting existing and/or
developing new standards or regulatory frame-
works;
Agree to explore, in close co-operation with me-
dia professionals, in particular journalists, the
roles and responsibilities they may have in the
context of the provision of media or media-like
services in the new information and communica-
tion environments;
Reaffirm our support for technology-neutral
public service media, including public service
broadcasting, which enjoy genuine editorial inde-
pendence and institutional autonomy;
Reaffirm the importance of copyright protection
and acknowledge the need to explore further, in
close co-operation with relevant stakeholders, is-
sues deriving from the use of copyrighted materi-
al or the exploitation of user-generated content
by media-like services to protect and promote the
freedom of expression and information;
Undertake to continue to resolutely support
Council of Europe standard-setting work in the
fields of freedom of expression and information
and freedom of the media and to provide politi-
cal backing to ensure that those freedoms are up-
held as individual human rights and as essential
components of a democratic society;
Acknowledge the need to put particular empha-
sis on ensuring the rights of children, young peo-
ple and other groups with special needs or char-
acteristics in the process of developing standards
for media and media-like services;
Recognise the need to promote the implementa-
tion and respect of Council of Europe standards
on freedom of expression and information and
freedom of the media, and the positive impact
that such efforts could have in the new informa-
tion and communications environments;
Reiterate our support for action, within a Coun-
cil of Europe context, to enhance users’ media lit-
eracy so that they are able to express and inform
themselves in a manner which makes them criti-
cal, competent and responsible when using me-
dia and media-like services; 
Agree on the need to remain attentive to the risks
involved in a situation of strong concentration of
media and media-like mass-communication serv-
ices, and to the role of those services, including
public service and community media, in facilitat-
ing intercultural dialogue and promoting a cul-
ture of tolerance in multicultural societies;
Adopt the action plan set out below and request
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Eu-
rope to take all necessary steps to facilitate its im-
plementation, acknowledging that this is a con-
tinuation of work carried out from the previous
European Ministerial Conferences on Mass Me-
dia Policy.
Action Plan 
I. Towards a new notion of media and its consequences
1. Examine whether our understanding of media
and mass-communication services remains valid
in the new information and communications en-
vironment. If appropriate, elaborate a policy doc-
ument reviewing the concept of media itself to in-
clude relevant new media and media-like mass
communication services and service providers.
2. Having regard to the results from this review,
establish criteria for distinguishing media or me-
dia-like services from other forms of personal
communication.
3. Examine whether and how the requirements of
journalistic professionalism, editorial
independence and editorial responsibility apply
or should apply to operators of new media and
medialike mass-communication services and
service providers.
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4. In consultation with relevant stakeholders, ex-
amine the need for, the modalities (such as self-
regulation, co-regulation or regulation) and the
subject of regulatory activities required to ensure
respect for Council of Europe values in the frame-
work of new media and media-like mass commu-
nication services. If appropriate, provide guid-
ance as to the application of existing Council of
Europe standards to these new services.
II. Public service
5. Pursue work on the role of public service media
in a democratic society. In particular, examine
the modalities for delivery to the widest possible
public, including young audiences, of trustwor-
thy, diverse and pluralistic media and media-like
services, paying attention to the way in which in-
formation and media or media-like services are
sought and received and to the challenges of ob-
taining quality or trustworthy content.
6. In this connection, explore and, if appropriate,
elaborate a policy document containing
guidance for member states on governance ap-
proaches for public service media that will con-
tribute to achieving the above objectives. This
could extend to reflecting on other (organisa-
tional, financial and technical) features of the
public service provision of media and media-like
services.
7. Continue to develop the notion of the public
service value of the Internet. In this context,
explore the extent to which universal access to
the Internet should be developed as part of mem-
ber states’ provision of public services. This may
include policies for redressing market failure
where market forces are unable to satisfy all legit-
imate needs or aspirations, both in terms of infra-
structure and the range and quality of available
content and services.
III. The individual and the media and media-like mass-
communication services
8. Explore how newer or emerging modes of mass
dissemination of and access to content, and the
associated retention, processing and exploitation
of data, affect the rights protected under Article
10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. If necessary, give guidance on how to
strengthen the protection of those rights.
9. Examine how the status and rights of creators
or providers of content can change, in particular
when others associate that content to their own
media or media-like services or income-generat-
ing activities (for example, advertising) in a mass-
communication environment. If appropriate,
elaborate guidance on the matter, including on
the legal control of creators and providers over
their content and the attribution of responsibili-
ty (such as when legal liability arises from the
broad dissemination of such content).
10. Pursue reflection on possible means of ensur-
ing the effective, transparent, independent and
accountable operation and functioning of com-
plaints bodies and procedures for media and me-
dia-like mass-communication services.
11. In consultation with relevant stakeholders,
including education specialists, pursue work on
media literacy with the aim of making users, cre-
ators and distributors of content (in particular
children and young people) responsible, in-
formed and critical participants in the informa-
tion society. Attention should be paid, as appro-
priate, to non-formal education as well as to the
role of media themselves.
12. Continue to address other challenges to indi-
viduals’ (in particular children’s and young
people’s) rights to freedom of expression and in-
formation, privacy and other fundamental
rights, as well as to their dignity and security on
the Internet. In particular, explore possibilities
for the removal of content that children create or
place on the Internet. Pursue standard-setting
work on the processing of personal data and pro-
filing techniques or practices, explore common
standards on privacy settings and examine the
threats that could derive from systems designed
to identify and track objects. In consultation
with relevant stakeholders, develop appropriate
guidance, benchmarks and tools to protect users’
rights.
13. Explore the question of the possible use of
newer or emerging services of mass
communication to shape opinion and consump-
tion of different groups in society in a surrepti-
tious, subliminal or otherwise manipulative
manner and, with due regard to Articles 8 and 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights,
explore ways in which to protect the users or pub-
lic from such use.
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COUNCIL OF EUROPE – COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, RECOMMENDATION CM/
REC(2009)5 ON MEASURES TO PROTECT CHILDREN AGAINST HARMFUL
CONTENT AND BEHAVIOUR AND TO PROMOTE THEIR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION
IN THE NEW INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT
Adopted on 8 July 2009
1. Protecting freedom of expression and human
dignity in the information and communications
environment by ensuring a coherent level of pro-
tection for minors against harmful content and
developing children’s media literacy skills is a pri-
ority for the Council of Europe. 
2. The risk of harm may arise from content and
behaviour, such as online pornography, the de-
grading and stereotyped portrayal of women, the
portrayal and glorification of violence and self-
harm, demeaning, discriminatory or racist ex-
pressions or apologia for such conduct, solicita-
tion (grooming), the recruitment of child victims
of trafficking in human beings, bullying, stalking
and other forms of harassment, which are capa-
ble of adversely affecting the physical, emotional
and psychological well-being of children.
3. Attention should be drawn to the normative
texts adopted by the Committee of Ministers de-
signed to assist member states in dealing with
these risks and, as a corollary, in securing every-
one’s human rights and fundamental freedoms.
These texts include Recommendation CM/
Rec(2008)6 on measures to promote the respect
for freedom of expression and information with
regard to Internet filters; the 2008 Declaration
on protecting the dignity, security and privacy of
children on the Internet; Recommendation CM/
Rec(2007)11 on promoting freedom of expres-
sion and information in the new information
and communications environment; Recommen-
dation Rec(2006)12 on empowering children in
the new information and communications envi-
ronment; and Recommendation Rec(2001)8 of
the Committee of Ministers on self-regulation
concerning cyber content (self-regulation and
user protection against illegal or harmful content
on new communications and information servic-
es).
4. There is a need to provide children with the
knowledge, skills, understanding, attitudes, hu-
man rights values and behaviour necessary to
participate actively in social and public life, and
to act responsibly while respecting the rights of
others. 
5. There is also the need to encourage trust and
promote confidence on the Internet, in particular
by neutral labelling of content to enable both
children and adults to make their own value
judgments regarding Internet content.
6. The Committee of Ministers recommends that
member states, in co-operation with private sec-
tor actors and civil society, develop and promote
coherent strategies to protect children against
content and behaviour carrying a risk of harm
while advocating their active participation in and
best possible use of the new information and
communications environment, in particular by: 
– encouraging the development and use of safe
spaces (walled gardens), as well as other tools
facilitating access to websites and Internet con-
tent appropriate for children;
– promoting the further development and volun-
tary use of labels and trustmarks allowing par-
ents and children to easily distinguish non-
harmful content from content carrying a risk of
harm;
– promoting the development of skills among
children, parents and educators to understand
better and deal with content and behaviour that
carries a risk of harm;
– bringing this recommendation and its
appended guidelines to the attention of all rele-
vant private and public sector stakeholders. 
Appendix to Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)5
Guidelines
I. Providing safe and secure spaces for children on the In-
ternet
7. The development of new communication tech-
nologies and the evolution of the Internet have
led to a vacuum in appropriate measures to pro-
tect children against content carrying a risk of
harm. While the protection against content in
the offline world is, in most cases, much easier to
guarantee, it has become significantly more diffi-
cult to do so in the online world, especially con-
sidering that every action to restrict access to
content is potentially in conflict with the right to
freedom of expression and information as en-
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shrined in Article 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ETS No. 5). It should be re-
called that this fundamental right and freedom is
a primary objective of the Council of Europe and
its member states; at the same time states also
have a legitimate right, and even an obligation, to
protect children from content which is unsuita-
ble or inappropriate.
8. While parental responsibility and media educa-
tion are of primary importance in effectively pro-
tecting children, there are also tools and methods
which can assist parents and educators in their
efforts to inform and guide children about the
Internet and Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs). The provision of safe and
secure spaces (walled gardens) for children on the
Internet and the Council of Europe’s online game
“Through the Wild Web Woods” are notable ex-
amples of such tools and methods. 
9. On this basis, member states, in co-operation
with the private sector, the media and civil socie-
ty, are encouraged to develop safe and secure
spaces on the Internet for children safely to ex-
plore and participate actively in the information
society, in particular by:
– creating safe and secure websites for children,
for example by developing age-appropriate
online portals;
– developing professional standards for the
maintenance of such Internet websites and por-
tals, particularly with regard to links and refer-
ences to other sites;
– raising awareness of these safe and secure Inter-
net websites for children, in particular among
parents, educators, content developers and their
respective associations;
– considering the integration of the benefits of
these safe and secure Internet websites in school
curricula, and in educational materials such as
“The Internet literacy handbook”, a Council of
Europe publication.
II. Encouraging the development of a pan-European
trustmark and labelling systems
10. There is an increasing demand for systems
which help to protect children from content car-
rying a risk of harm. The development of Internet
content filters has provided one form of protec-
tion which subsequently led to the adoption of
Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)6 of the Com-
mittee of Ministers on measures to promote the
respect for freedom of expression and informa-
tion with regard to Internet filters.
11. Apart from automated content rating and fil-
tering, there are initiatives which exist to label on-
line content on a voluntary basis and labelling
which is performed by the content creator.
Among them, the Internet Content Rating Asso-
ciation (part of the Family Online Safety Insti-
tute (FOSI)) and PEGI Online (part of the Pan-
European Game Information (PEGI) plus sys-
tem), both of which have led to the development
of systems which promote descriptions of online
content. 
12. The labelling of online content contributes to
the development of safe and secure spaces for
children on the Internet. However, the effective-
ness and trustworthiness of labelling systems
greatly depend on the accountability of those re-
sponsible for these systems and their interopera-
bility. The development of a pan-European trust-
mark for responsible labelling systems – prepared
in full compliance with the right to freedom of
expression and information in accordance with
Article 10 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights – would enhance these systems and
initiatives, facilitate the provision of safe and se-
cure spaces for children on the Internet and avoid
and/or mitigate their exposure to content and be-
haviour carrying a risk of harm. 
13. Online content which is not labelled should
not however be considered dangerous or less val-
uable for children, parents and educators. Label-
ling has limited scope and should be seen as one
possibility, among others, to promote the demo-
cratic participation and protection of children on
the Internet in countering content and behaviour
that carry a risk of harm. 
14. On this basis, member states, in co-operation
with the private sector, the media and civil socie-
ty, are encouraged to develop and promote the re-
sponsible use of labelling systems for online con-
tent, in particular in:
– creating a pan-European trustmark for label-
ling systems of online content. Criteria for this
trustmark would include: 
- adherence to human rights principles and
standards, including the right to provide for
effective means of recourse and remedy, for
example the possibility to re-assess labelling
when users and/or creators/authors of online
content claim that content has been incorrectly
labelled;
- labelling systems are provided and used on a
voluntary basis, both by creators/authors and
users;
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- the inadmissibility of any form of censorship of
content;
- respect for the editorial independence of media
and media-like online content services;
- regular review of the labelled content, for exam-
ple by introducing a maximum length of time of
the validity of the label;
– promoting initiatives for the interoperability of
labelling systems, including the creation of a
unique pan-European logo which signals the
suitability of content for different age groups;
– developing principles for the age-appropriate
rating of content, taking into account the differ-
ent traditions of member states;
– promoting research and development, in par-
ticular as regards the possibility to label content
through metadata;
– raising awareness among parents and educa-
tors about the advantages of labelling content in
order to facilitate access to safe and secure spaces
for children on the Internet;
– assessing and evaluating labelling systems and
their effectiveness, in particular with regard to
their compliance with Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and the accessi-
bility and affordability of the services emanating
from these systems for the general public.
III. Promoting Internet skills and literacy for children,
parents and educators
15. Safe and secure spaces on the Internet and the
labelling of online content can contribute to
making the use of the Internet an enjoyable and
confidence-building experience for children. It
should, however, be accepted that it is not possi-
ble to eliminate entirely the danger of children
being exposed to content or behaviour carrying a
risk of harm, and that consequently media (infor-
mation) literacy for children, parents and educa-
tors remains a key element in providing coherent
protection for children against such risks. 
16. On this basis, member states, in co-operation
with the private sector, associations of parents,
teachers and educators, the media and civil socie-
ty, are encouraged to promote media (informa-
tion) literacy for children, young people, parents
and educators, in order to prepare them for pos-
sible encounters with content and behaviours
carrying a risk of harm, in particular by:
– raising awareness and developing critical atti-
tudes about both the benefits and risks for chil-
dren freely using the Internet and ICTs; 
– adapting school curricula to include practical
learning about how best to use the Internet and
ICTs, and encouraging teachers to analyse and
counter sexism in online content which shapes
children’s attitudes;
– informing children, parents and educators
about safe and secure spaces on the Internet and
trustworthy labels for online content; 
– fostering knowledge and practical understand-
ing of the human rights dimensions of labelling
systems and filtering mechanisms, and their
potential risks to freedom of expression and
information, inter alia by drawing the attention
of all relevant stakeholders to the Council of
Europe's standard-setting instruments and tools
in this field.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE – PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, RECOMMENDATION
1950 (2011) ON THE PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS’ SOURCES
Adopted on 25 January 2011
1. The Parliamentary Assembly recalls that the
free exercise of journalism is enshrined in the
right to freedom of expression and information,
which is guaranteed by Article 10 of the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights (“the Conven-
tion”, ETS No. 5). This right constitutes the
foundation of a democratic society and an indis-
pensable requirement for its progress and the de-
velopment of every individual. Free, independent
and pluralist media are a necessary condition of
any true democratic society. Democracy and
good governance require accountability and
transparency and, in this respect, media play an
essential role in the public’s scrutiny of public
and private sectors in society. 
2. Recalling Committee of Ministers Recommen-
dation No. R (2000) 7 on the right of journalists
not to disclose their sources of information, the
Assembly reaffirms that the protection of jour-
nalists’ sources of information is a basic condi-
tion for both the full exercise of journalistic work
and the right of the public to be informed on
matters of public concern, as expressed by the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights in its case law un-
der Article 10 of the Convention. 
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3. The Assembly notes with concern the large
number of cases in which public authorities in
Europe have forced, or attempted to force, jour-
nalists to disclose their sources, despite the clear
standards set by the European Court of Human
Rights and the Committee of Ministers. These vi-
olations are more frequent in member states
without clear legislation. In cases of investigative
journalism, the protection of sources is of even
greater importance, as stated in the Committee
of Ministers’ Declaration of 26 September 2007
on the protection and promotion of investigative
journalism.
4. Referring to the new Press and Media Law of
Hungary (Law CIV of 2010 on the freedom of the
press and the fundamental rules on media con-
tent), the Assembly expresses its concern that
limits to the exercise of media freedom fixed by
Article 4.3 and the exceptions to the right of jour-
nalists not to disclose their sources stipulated in
Article 6 of this law seem to be overly broad and
thus may have a severe chilling effect on media
freedom. This law sets forth neither the proce-
dural conditions concerning disclosures nor
guarantees for journalists requested to disclose
their sources. The Assembly calls on the Govern-
ment and Parliament of Hungary to amend this
law, ensuring that its implementation cannot
hinder the right recognised by Article 10 of the
Convention.
5. Public authorities must not demand the dis-
closure of information identifying a source un-
less the requirements of Article 10, paragraph 2,
of the Convention are met and unless it can be
convincingly established that reasonable alterna-
tive measures to disclosure do not exist or have
been exhausted, the legitimate interest in the dis-
closure clearly outweighs the public interest in
the non-disclosure, and an overriding require-
ment of the need for disclosure is proved. 
6. The disclosure of information identifying a
source should therefore be limited to exceptional
circumstances where vital public or individual in-
terests are at stake and can be convincingly estab-
lished. The competent authorities, requesting ex-
ceptionally the disclosure of a source, must
specify the reasons why such vital interest out-
weighs the interest in the non-disclosure and
whether alternative measures have been exhaust-
ed, such as other evidence. If sources are protect-
ed against any disclosure under national law,
their disclosure must not be requested. 
7. Recalling Recommendation Rec(2003)13 of
the Committee of Ministers on the provision of
information through the media in relation to
criminal proceedings, the Assembly reaffirms
that the public must be able to receive informa-
tion through the media about the activities of po-
lice services and judicial authorities, including
court proceedings of public interest, as far as this
does not prejudice the presumption of innocence
of the suspect or accused under Article 6 of the
Convention, the right to privacy under Article 8
of the Convention or the secrecy of investigations
and police inquiries. 
8. The right of journalists not to disclose their
sources applies also to sources from within the
police or judicial authorities. Where such provi-
sion of information to journalists was illegal, po-
lice and judicial authorities must pursue internal
investigations instead of asking journalists to
disclose their sources. 
9. In so far as Article 10 of the Convention pro-
tects the right of the public to be informed on
matters of public concern, anyone who has
knowledge or information about such matters
should be able to either post it confidentially on
third-party media, including Internet networks,
or submit it confidentially to journalists. 
10. With regard to the right of every person to dis-
close confidentially to the media, or by other
means, information about unlawful acts and oth-
er wrongdoings of public concern, the Assembly
recalls its Resolution 1729 (2010) and Recom-
mendation 1916 (2010) on the protection of
“whistle-blowers” and reaffirms that member
states should review legislation in this respect to
ensure consistency of domestic rules with the Eu-
ropean standards enshrined in these texts. 
11. In the same manner as the media landscape
has changed through technological convergence,
the professional profile of journalists has
changed over the last decade. Modern media rely
increasingly on mobile and Internet-based com-
munication services. They use information and
images originating from non-journalists to a
larger extent. Non-journalists also publish their
own or third-party information and images on
their own or third-party Internet media, accessi-
ble to a wide and often undefined audience. Un-
der these circumstances, it is necessary to clarify
the application of the right of journalists not to
disclose their sources of information. 
12. The Assembly reaffirms that the confidential-
ity of journalists’ sources must not be compro-
mised by the increasing technological possibili-
ties for public authorities to control the use by
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journalists of mobile telecommunication and In-
ternet media. The interception of correspond-
ence, surveillance of journalists or search and sei-
zure of information must not circumvent the
protection of journalists’ sources. Internet serv-
ice providers and telecommunication companies
should not be obliged to disclose information
which may lead to the identification of journal-
ists’ sources in violation of Article 10 of the Con-
vention. 
13. Referring to the European Union’s Directive
2006/24/EC of 15 March 2006 on the retention
of data generated or processed in connection
with the provision of publicly available electronic
communications services or of public communi-
cations networks, the Assembly insists on the
need to ensure that legal provisions enacted by
member states when transposing this directive
are consistent with the right of journalists not to
disclose their sources under Article 10 of the
Convention and with the right to privacy under
Article 8 of the Convention. The Assembly also
stresses the importance of ensuring coherence of
domestic legislation with Articles 16 and 17 of
the Convention on Cybercrime (“the Budapest
Convention”, ETS No. 185). 
14. The Assembly welcomes the fact that journal-
ists have expressed in professional codes of con-
duct their obligation not to disclose their sources
of information when they receive information
confidentially. This professional ethical standard
ensures that sources may rely on confidentiality
and decide to provide journalists with informa-
tion which may be of public concern. The Assem-
bly invites journalists and their organisations to
ensure, through self-regulation, that sources are
not disclosed. 
15. The right of journalists not to disclose their
sources of information is a professional privilege,
intended to encourage sources to provide jour-
nalists with important information which they
would not give without a commitment to confi-
dentiality. The same relationship of trust does
not exist with regard to non-journalists, such as
individuals with their own website or web blog.
Therefore, non-journalists cannot benefit from
the right of journalists not to reveal their sources.
16. The Assembly welcomes the work on media
freedom of the Council of Europe Commissioner
for Human Rights and asks the Commissioner to
pay particular attention, when visiting member
states and meeting media ombudspersons, to the
protection of the confidentiality of journalists’
sources.
17. The Assembly recommends that the Commit-
tee of Ministers: 
17.1. call on those member states which do not
have legislation specifying the right of journalists
not to disclose their sources of information, to
pass such legislation in accordance with the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights and
Committee of Ministers Recommendation No.
R (2000) 7; 
17.2. assist member states in analysing and im-
proving their legislation on the protection of the
confidentiality of journalists’ sources, in particu-
lar by supporting the review of their national laws
on surveillance, anti-terrorism, data retention
and access to telecommunications records; 
17.3. ask its competent steering committee to
draw up, in co-operation with journalists’ and
media freedom organisations, guidelines for
prosecutors and the police, as well as training ma-
terial for judges, on the right of journalists not to
disclose their sources of information, in accord-
ance with Committee of Ministers Recommenda-
tions Nos. R (2000) 7 and Rec(2003)13 and the
case law of the European Court of Human
Rights; 
17.4. ask its competent steering committee to
draw up guidelines for public authorities and pri-
vate service providers concerning the protection
of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources in
the context of the interception or disclosure of
computer data and traffic data of computer net-
works in accordance with Articles 16 and 17 of
the Convention on Cybercrime and Articles 8 and
10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.
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DIRECTIVE 2010/13/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL OF 10 MARCH 2010 ON THE COORDINATION OF CERTAIN
PROVISIONS LAID DOWN BY LAW, REGULATION OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
IN MEMBER STATES CONCERNING THE PROVISION OF AUDIOVISUAL MEDIA
SERVICES 
(Audiovisual Media Services Directive)
(codified version) - (Text with EEA relevance)
Official Journal L 095 , 15 April 2010
(...)
Whereas:
(1) Directive 89/552/EEC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 3 October 1989 on
the coordination of certain provisions laid down
by law, regulation or administrative action in
Member States concerning the provision of audi-
ovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Serv-
ices Directive) [2] has been substantially
amended several times [3]. In the interests of
clarity and rationality the said Directive should
be codified.
(2) Audiovisual media services provided across
frontiers by means of various technologies are
one of the ways of pursuing the objectives of the
Union. Certain measures are necessary to permit
and ensure the transition from national markets
to a common programme production and distri-
bution market, and to guarantee conditions of
fair competition without prejudice to the public
interest role to be discharged by the audiovisual
media services.
(3) The Council of Europe has adopted the Euro-
pean Convention on Transfrontier Television.
(4) In the light of new technologies in the trans-
mission of audiovisual media services, a regula-
tory framework concerning the pursuit of
broadcasting activities should take account of
the impact of structural change, the spread of
information and communication technologies
(ICT) and technological developments on busi-
ness models, especially the financing of commer-
cial broadcasting, and should ensure optimal
conditions of competitiveness and legal cer-
tainty for Europe’s information technologies
and its media industries and services, as well as
respect for cultural and linguistic diversity.
(5) Audiovisual media services are as much cul-
tural services as they are economic services. Their
growing importance for societies, democracy —
in particular by ensuring freedom of informa-
tion, diversity of opinion and media pluralism —
education and culture justifies the application of
specific rules to these services.
(6) Article 167(4) of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union requires the Union to
take cultural aspects into account in its action
under other provisions of that Treaty, in particu-
lar in order to respect and to promote the diver-
sity of its cultures.
(7) In its resolutions of 1 December 2005 [4] and
4 April 2006 [5] on the Doha Round and on the
WTO Ministerial Conferences, the European
Parliament called for basic public services, such
as audiovisual services, to be excluded from lib-
eralisation under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) negotiations. In its res-
olution of 27 April 2006 [6], the European Par-
liament supported the Unesco Convention on
the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of
Cultural Expressions, which states in particular
that "cultural activities, goods and services have
both an economic and a cultural nature, because
they convey identities, values and meanings, and
must therefore not be treated as solely having
commercial value". Council Decision 2006/515/
EC of 18 May 2006 on the conclusion of the
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of
the Diversity of Cultural Expressions [7]
approved the Unesco Convention on behalf of
the Community. The Convention entered into
force on 18 March 2007. This Directive respects
the principles of that Convention.
(8) It is essential for the Member States to ensure
the prevention of any acts which may prove det-
rimental to freedom of movement and trade in
television programmes or which may promote
the creation of dominant positions which would
lead to restrictions on pluralism and freedom of
televised information and of the information
sector as a whole.
(9) This Directive is without prejudice to existing
or future Union acts of harmonisation, in partic-
ular to satisfy mandatory requirements concern-
ing the protection of consumers and the fairness
of commercial transactions and competition.
(10) Traditional audiovisual media services —
such as television — and emerging on-demand
audiovisual media services offer significant
employment opportunities in the Union, partic-
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ularly in small and medium-sized enterprises,
and stimulate economic growth and investment.
Bearing in mind the importance of a level play-
ing-field and a true European market for audio-
visual media services, the basic principles of the
internal market, such as free competition and
equal treatment, should be respected in order to
ensure transparency and predictability in mar-
kets for audiovisual media services and to
achieve low barriers to entry.
(11) It is necessary, in order to avoid distortions
of competition, improve legal certainty, help
complete the internal market and facilitate the
emergence of a single information area, that at
least a basic tier of coordinated rules apply to all
audiovisual media services, both television
broadcasting (i.e. linear audiovisual media serv-
ices) and on-demand audiovisual media services
(i.e. non-linear audiovisual media services).
(12) On 15 December 2003 the Commission
adopted a Communication on the future of
European regulatory audiovisual policy, in
which it stressed that regulatory policy in that
sector has to safeguard certain public interests,
such as cultural diversity, the right to informa-
tion, media pluralism, the protection of minors
and consumer protection, and to enhance public
awareness and media literacy, now and in the
future.
(13) The resolution of the Council and of the
Representatives of the Governments of the
Member States, meeting within the Council of
25 January 1999 concerning public service
broadcasting [8], reaffirmed that the fulfilment
of the mission of public service broadcasting
requires that it continue to benefit from techno-
logical progress. The co-existence of private and
public audiovisual media service providers is a
feature which distinguishes the European audio-
visual media market.
(14) The Commission has adopted the initiative
"i2010: European Information Society" to foster
growth and jobs in the information society and
media industries. This is a comprehensive strat-
egy designed to encourage the production of
European content, the development of the dig-
ital economy and the uptake of ICT, against the
background of the convergence of information
society services and media services, networks and
devices, by modernising and deploying all EU
policy instruments: regulatory instruments,
research and partnerships with industry. The
Commission has committed itself to creating a
consistent internal market framework for infor-
mation society services and media services by
modernising the legal framework for audiovisual
services. The goal of the i2010 initiative will in
principle be achieved by allowing industries to
grow with only the necessary regulation, as well
as allowing small start-up businesses, which are
the wealth and job creators of the future, to
flourish, innovate and create employment in a
free market.
(15) The European Parliament adopted on 4 Sep-
tember 2003 [9], 22 April 2004 [10] and 6 Sep-
tember 2005 [11] resolutions which in principle
supported the general approach of basic rules
for all audiovisual media services and additional
rules for television broadcasting.
(16) This Directive enhances compliance with
fundamental rights and is fully in line with the
principles recognised by the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union [12], in
particular Article 11 thereof. In this regard, this
Directive should not in any way prevent Member
States from applying their constitutional rules
relating to freedom of the press and freedom of
expression in the media.
(17) This Directive should not affect the obliga-
tions on Member States arising from the appli-
cation of Directive 98/34/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998
laying down a procedure for the provision of
information in the field of technical standards
and regulations and of rules on Information
Society services [13]. Accordingly, draft national
measures applicable to on-demand audiovisual
media services of a stricter or more detailed
nature than those which are required to simply
transpose Directive 2007/65/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 11 December
2007 amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC
on the coordination of certain provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action
in Member States concerning the pursuit of tele-
vision broadcasting activities [14] should be sub-
ject to the procedural obligations established
pursuant to Article 8 of Directive 98/34/EC.
(18) Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a
common regulatory framework for electronic
communications networks and services (Frame-
work Directive) [15] according to its Article 1(3)
is without prejudice to measures taken at Union
or national level to pursue general interest objec-
tives, in particular relating to content regulation
and audiovisual policy.
(19) This Directive does not affect the responsi-
bility of the Member States and their authorities
with regard to the organisation — including the
systems of licensing, administrative authorisa-
tion or taxation — the financing and the content
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of programmes. The independence of cultural
developments in the Member States and the
preservation of cultural diversity in the Union
therefore remain unaffected.
(20) No provision of this Directive should
require or encourage Member States to impose
new systems of licensing or administrative
authorisation on any type of audiovisual media
service.
(21) For the purposes of this Directive, the defi-
nition of an audiovisual media service should
cover only audiovisual media services, whether
television broadcasting or on-demand, which are
mass media, that is, which are intended for
reception by, and which could have a clear
impact on, a significant proportion of the gen-
eral public. Its scope should be limited to serv-
ices as defined by the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union and therefore should
cover any form of economic activity, including
that of public service enterprises, but should not
cover activities which are primarily non-eco-
nomic and which are not in competition with
television broadcasting, such as private websites
and services consisting of the provision or distri-
bution of audiovisual content generated by pri-
vate users for the purposes of sharing and
exchange within communities of interest.
(22) For the purposes of this Directive, the defi-
nition of an audiovisual media service should
cover mass media in their function to inform,
entertain and educate the general public, and
should include audiovisual commercial commu-
nication but should exclude any form of private
correspondence, such as e-mails sent to a limited
number of recipients. That definition should
exclude all services the principal purpose of
which is not the provision of programmes, i.e.
where any audiovisual content is merely inciden-
tal to the service and not its principal purpose.
Examples include websites that contain audio-
visual elements only in an ancillary manner,
such as animated graphical elements, short
advertising spots or information related to a
product or non-audiovisual service. For these
reasons, games of chance involving a stake repre-
senting a sum of money, including lotteries, bet-
ting and other forms of gambling services, as
well as on-line games and search engines, but not
broadcasts devoted to gambling or games of
chance, should also be excluded from the scope
of this Directive.
(23) For the purposes of this Directive, the term
"audiovisual" should refer to moving images
with or without sound, thus including silent
films but not covering audio transmission or
radio services. While the principal purpose of an
audiovisual media service is the provision of pro-
grammes, the definition of such a service should
also cover text-based content which accompanies
programmes, such as subtitling services and elec-
tronic programme guides. Stand-alone text-
based services should not fall within the scope of
this Directive, which should not affect the free-
dom of the Member States to regulate such serv-
ices at national level in accordance with the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.
(24) It is characteristic of on-demand audiovis-
ual media services that they are "television-like",
i.e. that they compete for the same audience as
television broadcasts, and the nature and the
means of access to the service would lead the
user reasonably to expect regulatory protection
within the scope of this Directive. In the light of
this and in order to prevent disparities as regards
free movement and competition, the concept of
"programme" should be interpreted in a
dynamic way taking into account developments
in television broadcasting.
(25) The concept of editorial responsibility is
essential for defining the role of the media serv-
ice provider and therefore for the definition of
audiovisual media services. Member States may
further specify aspects of the definition of edito-
rial responsibility, notably the concept of "effec-
tive control", when adopting measures to
implement this Directive. This Directive should
be without prejudice to the exemptions from lia-
bility established in Directive 2000/31/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of informa-
tion society services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on
electronic commerce) [16].
(26) For the purposes of this Directive, the defi-
nition of media service provider should exclude
natural or legal persons who merely transmit
programmes for which the editorial responsibil-
ity lies with third parties.
(27) Television broadcasting currently includes,
in particular, analogue and digital television, live
streaming, webcasting and near-video-on-
demand, whereas video-on-demand, for example,
is an on-demand audiovisual media service. In
general, for television broadcasting or television
programmes which are also offered as on-
demand audiovisual media services by the same
media service provider, the requirements of this
Directive should be deemed to be met by the ful-
filment of the requirements applicable to the tel-
evision broadcast, i.e. linear transmission.
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However, where different kinds of services are
offered in parallel, but are clearly separate serv-
ices, this Directive should apply to each of the
services concerned.
(28) The scope of this Directive should not cover
electronic versions of newspapers and maga-
zines.
(29) All the characteristics of an audiovisual
media service set out in its definition and
explained in recitals 21 to 28 should be present
at the same time.
(30) In the context of television broadcasting,
the concept of simultaneous viewing should also
cover quasi-simultaneous viewing because of the
variations in the short time lag which occurs
between the transmission and the reception of
the broadcast due to technical reasons inherent
in the transmission process.
(31) A wide definition of audiovisual commercial
communication should be laid down in this
Directive, which should not however include
public service announcements and charity
appeals broadcast free of charge.
(32) For the purposes of this Directive, "Euro-
pean works" should be defined without preju-
dice to the possibility of Member States laying
down a more detailed definition as regards
media service providers under their jurisdiction,
in compliance with Union law and account
being taken of the objectives of this Directive.
(33) The country of origin principle should be
regarded as the core of this Directive, as it is
essential for the creation of an internal market.
This principle should be applied to all audiovis-
ual media services in order to ensure legal cer-
tainty for media service providers as the
necessary basis for new business models and the
deployment of such services. It is also essential in
order to ensure the free flow of information and
audiovisual programmes in the internal market.
(34) In order to promote a strong, competitive
and integrated European audiovisual industry
and enhance media pluralism throughout the
Union, only one Member State should have juris-
diction over an audiovisual media service pro-
vider and pluralism of information should be a
fundamental principle of the Union.
(35) The fixing of a series of practical criteria is
designed to determine by an exhaustive proce-
dure that only one Member State has jurisdic-
tion over a media service provider in connection
with the provision of the services which this
Directive addresses. Nevertheless, taking into
account the case-law of the Court of Justice of
the European Union and so as to avoid cases
where there is a vacuum of jurisdiction, it is
appropriate to refer to the criterion of establish-
ment within the meaning of Articles 49 to 55 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union as the final criterion determining the
jurisdiction of a Member State.
(36) The requirement that the originating Mem-
ber State should verify that broadcasts comply
with national law as coordinated by this Direc-
tive is sufficient under Union law to ensure free
movement of broadcasts without secondary con-
trol on the same grounds in the receiving Mem-
ber States. However, the receiving Member State
may, exceptionally and under specific condi-
tions, provisionally suspend the retransmission
of televised broadcasts.
(37) Restrictions on the free provision of on-
demand audiovisual media services should only
be possible in accordance with conditions and
procedures replicating those already established
by Article 3(4), (5) and (6) of Directive 2000/31/
EC.
(38) Technological developments, especially with
regard to digital satellite programmes, mean
that subsidiary criteria should be adapted in
order to ensure suitable regulation and its effec-
tive implementation and to give players genuine
power over the content of an audiovisual media
service.
(39) As this Directive concerns services offered to
the general public in the Union, it should apply
only to audiovisual media services that can be
received directly or indirectly by the public in
one or more Member States with standard con-
sumer equipment. The definition of "standard
consumer equipment" should be left to the com-
petent national authorities.
(40) Articles 49 to 55 of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union lay down the
fundamental right to freedom of establishment.
Therefore, media service providers should in
general be free to choose the Member States in
which they establish themselves. The Court of
Justice has also emphasised that "the Treaty does
not prohibit an undertaking from exercising the
freedom to provide services if it does not offer
services in the Member State in which it is estab-
lished" [17].
(41) Member States should be able to apply more
detailed or stricter rules in the fields coordinated
by this Directive to media service providers
under their jurisdiction, while ensuring that
those rules are consistent with general principles
of Union law. In order to deal with situations
where a broadcaster under the jurisdiction of
one Member State provides a television broad-
cast which is wholly or mostly directed towards
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the territory of another Member State, a require-
ment for Member States to cooperate with one
another and, in cases of circumvention, the codi-
fication of the case-law of the Court of Justice
[18], combined with a more efficient procedure,
would be an appropriate solution that takes
account of Member State concerns without call-
ing into question the proper application of the
country of origin principle. The concept of rules
of general public interest has been developed by
the Court of Justice in its case-law in relation to
Articles 43 and 49 of the EC Treaty (now Articles
49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union) and includes, inter alia,
rules on the protection of consumers, the protec-
tion of minors and cultural policy. The Member
State requesting cooperation should ensure that
the specific national rules in question are objec-
tively necessary, applied in a non-discriminatory
manner and proportionate.
(42) A Member State, when assessing on a case-
by-case basis whether a broadcast by a media
service provider established in another Member
State is wholly or mostly directed towards its ter-
ritory, may refer to indicators such as the origin
of the television advertising and/or subscription
revenues, the main language of the service or the
existence of programmes or commercial commu-
nications targeted specifically at the public in
the Member State where they are received.
(43) Under this Directive, notwithstanding the
application of the country of origin principle,
Member States may still take measures that
restrict freedom of movement of television
broadcasting, but only under the conditions and
following the procedure laid down in this Direc-
tive. However, the Court of Justice has consist-
ently held that any restriction on the freedom to
provide services, such as any derogation from a
fundamental principle of the Treaty, must be
interpreted restrictively [19].
(44) In its Communication to the European Par-
liament and to the Council on Better Regulation
for Growth and Jobs in the European Union, the
Commission stressed that a careful analysis of
the appropriate regulatory approach is neces-
sary, in particular, in order to establish whether
legislation is preferable for the relevant sector
and problem, or whether alternatives such as co-
regulation or self-regulation should be consid-
ered. Furthermore, experience has shown that
both co-regulation and self-regulation instru-
ments, implemented in accordance with the dif-
ferent legal traditions of the Member States, can
play an important role in delivering a high level
of consumer protection. Measures aimed at
achieving public interest objectives in the emerg-
ing audiovisual media services sector are more
effective if they are taken with the active support
of the service providers themselves. Thus self-
regulation constitutes a type of voluntary initia-
tive which enables economic operators, social
partners, non-governmental organisations or
associations to adopt common guidelines
amongst themselves and for themselves.
Member States should, in accordance with their
different legal traditions, recognise the role
which effective self-regulation can play as a com-
plement to the legislative and judicial and/or
administrative mechanisms in place and its use-
ful contribution to the achievement of the objec-
tives of this Directive. However, while self-
regulation might be a complementary method of
implementing certain provisions of this Direc-
tive, it should not constitute a substitute for the
obligations of the national legislator. Co-regula-
tion gives, in its minimal form, a legal link
between self-regulation and the national legisla-
tor in accordance with the legal traditions of the
Member States. Co-regulation should allow for
the possibility of State intervention in the event
of its objectives not being met. Without preju-
dice to formal obligations of the Member States
regarding transposition, this Directive encour-
ages the use of co-regulation and self-regulation.
This should neither oblige Member States to set
up co-regulation and/or self-regulatory regimes
nor disrupt or jeopardise current co-regulation
or self-regulatory initiatives which are already in
place within Member States and which are work-
ing effectively.
(45) Because of the specific nature of audiovisual
media services, especially the impact of these
services on the way people form their opinions, it
is essential for users to know exactly who is
responsible for the content of these services. It is
therefore important for Member States to ensure
that users have easy and direct access at any time
to information about the media service provider.
It is for each Member State to decide the practi-
cal details as to how this objective can be
achieved without prejudice to any other relevant
provisions of Union law.
(46) The right of persons with a disability and of
the elderly to participate and be integrated in the
social and cultural life of the Union is inextrica-
bly linked to the provision of accessible audiovis-
ual media services. The means to achieve
accessibility should include, but need not be lim-
ited to, sign language, subtitling, audio-descrip-
tion and easily understandable menu navigation.
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(47) "Media literacy" refers to skills, knowledge
and understanding that allow consumers to use
media effectively and safely. Media-literate peo-
ple are able to exercise informed choices, under-
stand the nature of content and services and
take advantage of the full range of opportunities
offered by new communications technologies.
They are better able to protect themselves and
their families from harmful or offensive mate-
rial. Therefore the development of media literacy
in all sections of society should be promoted and
its progress followed closely. The Recommenda-
tion of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 20 December 2006 on the protection
of minors and human dignity and on the right of
reply in relation to the competitiveness of the
European audiovisual and on-line information
services industry [20] already contains a series of
possible measures for promoting media literacy
such as, for example, continuing education of
teachers and trainers, specific Internet training
aimed at children from a very early age, includ-
ing sessions open to parents, or organisation of
national campaigns aimed at citizens, involving
all communications media, to provide informa-
tion on using the Internet responsibly.
(48) Television broadcasting rights for events of
high interest to the public may be acquired by
broadcasters on an exclusive basis. However, it is
essential to promote pluralism through the
diversity of news production and programming
across the Union and to respect the principles
recognised by Article 11 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union.
(49) It is essential that Member States should be
able to take measures to protect the right to
information and to ensure wide access by the
public to television coverage of national or non-
national events of major importance for society,
such as the Olympic Games, the football World
Cup and the European football championship.
To this end, Member States retain the right to
take measures compatible with Union law aimed
at regulating the exercise by broadcasters under
their jurisdiction of exclusive broadcasting
rights to such events.
(50) It is necessary to make arrangements within
a Union framework, in order to avoid potential
legal uncertainty and market distortions and to
reconcile the free circulation of television serv-
ices with the need to prevent the possibility of
circumvention of national measures protecting a
legitimate general interest.
(51) In particular, it is appropriate to lay down
provisions concerning the exercise by broadcast-
ers of exclusive broadcasting rights that they
may have purchased to events considered to be
of major importance for society in a Member
State other than that having jurisdiction over
the broadcasters. In order to avoid speculative
rights purchases with a view to circumvention of
national measures, it is necessary to apply those
provisions to contracts entered into after the
publication of Directive 97/36/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council [21] and
concerning events which take place after the date
of implementation. When contracts that predate
the publication of that Directive are renewed,
they are considered to be new contracts.
(52) Events of major importance for society
should, for the purposes of this Directive, meet
certain criteria, that is to say be outstanding
events which are of interest to the general public
in the Union or in a given Member State or in an
important component part of a given Member
State and are organised in advance by an event
organiser who is legally entitled to sell the rights
pertaining to those events.
(53) For the purposes of this Directive, "free tele-
vision" means broadcasting on a channel, either
public or commercial, of programmes which are
accessible to the public without payment in
addition to the modes of funding of broadcast-
ing that are widely prevailing in each Member
State (such as licence fee and/or the basic tier
subscription fee to a cable network).
(54) Member States are free to take whatever
measures they deem appropriate with regard to
audiovisual media services which come from
third countries and which do not satisfy the con-
ditions laid down in Article 2, provided they
comply with Union law and the international
obligations of the Union.
(55) In order to safeguard the fundamental free-
dom to receive information and to ensure that
the interests of viewers in the Union are fully and
properly protected, those exercising exclusive tel-
evision broadcasting rights to an event of high
interest to the public should grant other broad-
casters the right to use short extracts for the pur-
poses of general news programmes on fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms taking
due account of exclusive rights. Such terms
should be communicated in a timely manner
before the event of high interest to the public
takes place to give others sufficient time to exer-
cise such a right. A broadcaster should be able to
exercise this right through an intermediary act-
ing specifically on its behalf on a case-by-case
basis. Such short extracts may be used for EU-
wide broadcasts by any channel including dedi-
cated sports channels and should not exceed 90
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seconds. The right of access to short extracts
should apply on a trans-frontier basis only where
it is necessary. Therefore a broadcaster should
first seek access from a broadcaster established
in the same Member State having exclusive
rights to the event of high interest to the public.
The concept of general news programmes
should not cover the compilation of short
extracts into programmes serving entertainment
purposes. The country of origin principle should
apply to both the access to, and the transmission
of, the short extracts. In a trans-frontier case,
this means that the different laws should be
applied sequentially. Firstly, for access to the
short extracts the law of the Member State where
the broadcaster supplying the initial signal (i.e.
giving access) is established should apply. This is
usually the Member State in which the event
concerned takes place. Where a Member State
has established an equivalent system of access to
the event concerned, the law of that Member
State should apply in any case. Secondly, for
transmission of the short extracts, the law of the
Member State where the broadcaster transmit-
ting the short extracts is established should
apply.
(56) The requirements of this Directive regard-
ing access to events of high interest to the public
for the purpose of short news reports should be
without prejudice to Directive 2001/29/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain
aspects of copyright and related rights in the
information society [22] and the relevant inter-
national conventions in the field of copyright
and neighbouring rights. Member States should
facilitate access to events of high interest to the
public by granting access to the broadcaster’s
signal within the meaning of this Directive.
However, they may choose other equivalent
means within the meaning of this Directive.
Such means include, inter alia, granting access to
the venue of these events prior to granting access
to the signal. Broadcasters should not be pre-
vented from concluding more detailed contracts.
(57) It should be ensured that the practice of
media service providers of providing their live
television broadcast news programmes in the on-
demand mode after live transmission is possible
without having to tailor the individual pro-
gramme by omitting the short extracts. This pos-
sibility should be restricted to the on-demand
supply of the identical television broadcast pro-
gramme by the same media service provider, so it
may not be used to create new on-demand busi-
ness models based on short extracts.
(58) On-demand audiovisual media services are
different from television broadcasting with
regard to the choice and control the user can
exercise, and with regard to the impact they have
on society [23]. This justifies imposing lighter
regulation on on-demand audiovisual media
services, which should comply only with the
basic rules provided for in this Directive.
(59) The availability of harmful content in audi-
ovisual media services is a concern for legislators,
the media industry and parents. There will also
be new challenges, especially in connection with
new platforms and new products. Rules protect-
ing the physical, mental and moral development
of minors as well as human dignity in all audio-
visual media services, including audiovisual
commercial communications, are therefore nec-
essary.
(60) Measures taken to protect the physical,
mental and moral development of minors and
human dignity should be carefully balanced with
the fundamental right to freedom of expression
as laid down in the Charter on Fundamental
Rights of the European Union. The aim of those
measures, such as the use of personal identifica-
tion numbers (PIN codes), filtering systems or
labelling, should thus be to ensure an adequate
level of protection of the physical, mental and
moral development of minors and human dig-
nity, especially with regard to on-demand audio-
visual media services. The Recommendation on
the protection of minors and human dignity and
on the right of reply already recognised the
importance of filtering systems and labelling
and included a number of possible measures for
the benefit of minors, such as systematically sup-
plying users with an effective, updatable and
easy-to-use filtering system when they subscribe
to an access provider or equipping the access to
services specifically intended for children with
automatic filtering systems.
(61) Media service providers under the jurisdic-
tion of the Member States should in any case be
subject to a ban on the dissemination of child
pornography in accordance with the provisions
of Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA of
22 December 2003 on combating the sexual
exploitation of children and child pornography
[24].
(62) None of the provisions of this Directive that
concern the protection of the physical, mental
and moral development of minors and human
dignity necessarily requires that the measures
taken to protect those interests should be imple-
mented through the prior verification of audio-
visual media services by public bodies.
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(63) Coordination is needed to make it easier for
persons and industries producing programmes
having a cultural objective to take up and pursue
their activities.
(64) Minimum requirements in respect of all
public or private Union television broadcasts for
European audiovisual productions have been a
means of promoting production, independent
production and distribution in the abovemen-
tioned industries and are complementary to
other instruments which are already or will be
proposed to favour the same objective.
(65) It is therefore necessary to promote markets
of sufficient size for television productions in
the Member States to recover necessary invest-
ments not only by establishing common rules
opening up national markets but also by envis-
aging for European productions, where practica-
ble and by appropriate means, a majority
proportion in television broadcasts of all Mem-
ber States. In order to allow the monitoring of
the application of those rules and the pursuit of
the objectives, Member States should provide
the Commission with a report on the applica-
tion of the proportions reserved for European
works and independent productions in this
Directive. For the calculation of such propor-
tions, account should be taken of the specific sit-
uation of Greece and Portugal. The Commission
should inform the other Member States of these
reports accompanied, where appropriate, by an
opinion taking account of, in particular,
progress achieved in relation to previous years,
the share of first broadcasts in the program-
ming, the particular circumstances of new televi-
sion broadcasters and the specific situation of
countries with a low audiovisual production
capacity or restricted language area.
(66) It is important to seek appropriate instru-
ments and procedures in accordance with Union
law in order to promote the implementation of
the objectives of this Directive with a view to
adopting suitable measures to encourage the
activity and development of European audiovis-
ual production and distribution, particularly in
countries with a low production capacity or a
restricted language area.
(67) The proportions of European works must
be achieved taking economic realities into
account. Therefore, a progressive system for
achieving this objective is required.
(68) A commitment, where practicable, to a cer-
tain proportion of broadcasts for independent
productions, created by producers who are inde-
pendent of broadcasters, will stimulate new
sources of television production, especially the
creation of small and medium-sized enterprises.
It will offer new opportunities and marketing
outlets to creative talents, to cultural professions
and to employees in the cultural field.
(69) On-demand audiovisual media services have
the potential to partially replace television
broadcasting. Accordingly, they should, where
practicable, promote the production and distri-
bution of European works and thus contribute
actively to the promotion of cultural diversity.
Such support for European works might, for
example, take the form of financial contribu-
tions by such services to the production of and
acquisition of rights in European works, a mini-
mum share of European works in video-on-
demand catalogues, or the attractive presenta-
tion of European works in electronic programme
guides. It is important to re-examine regularly
the application of the provisions relating to the
promotion of European works by audiovisual
media services. Within the framework of the
reports provided for under this Directive, Mem-
ber States should also take into account, in par-
ticular, the financial contribution by such
services to the production and rights acquisition
of European works, the share of European works
in the catalogue of audiovisual media services,
and the actual consumption of European works
offered by such services.
(70) When implementing Article 16, Member
States should encourage broadcasters to include
an adequate share of co-produced European
works or of European works of non-domestic
origin.
(71) When defining "producers who are inde-
pendent of broadcasters" as referred to in Article
17, Member States should take appropriate
account notably of criteria such as the owner-
ship of the production company, the amount of
programmes supplied to the same broadcaster
and the ownership of secondary rights.
(72) Channels broadcasting entirely in a lan-
guage other than those of the Member States
should not be covered by Articles 16 and 17 of
this Directive. Nevertheless, where such a lan-
guage or languages represent a substantial part
but not all of the channel’s transmission time,
Articles 16 and 17 should not apply to that part
of transmission time.
(73) National support schemes for the develop-
ment of European production may be applied in
so far as they comply with Union law.
(74) The objective of supporting audiovisual
production in Europe can be pursued within the
Member States in the framework of the organi-
sation of their audiovisual media services, inter
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alia, through the definition of a public interest
mission for certain media service providers,
including the obligation to contribute substan-
tially to investment in European production.
(75) Media service providers, programme mak-
ers, producers, authors and other experts should
be encouraged to develop more detailed con-
cepts and strategies aimed at developing Euro-
pean audiovisual fiction films that are addressed
to an international audience.
(76) It is important to ensure that cinemato-
graphic works are transmitted within periods
agreed between right holders and media service
providers.
(77) The question of specific time scales for each
type of showing of cinematographic works is pri-
marily a matter to be settled by means of agree-
ments between the interested parties or
professionals concerned.
(78) In order to allow for an active policy in
favour of a specific language, Member States
remain free to lay down more detailed or stricter
rules in particular on the basis of language crite-
ria, as long as those rules are in conformity with
Union law, and in particular are not applicable
to the retransmission of broadcasts originating
in other Member States.
(79) The availability of on-demand audiovisual
media services increases consumer choice.
Detailed rules governing audiovisual commer-
cial communication for on-demand audiovisual
media services thus appear neither to be justified
nor to make sense from a technical point of view.
Nevertheless, all audiovisual commercial com-
munication should respect not only the identifi-
cation rules but also a basic tier of qualitative
rules in order to meet clear public policy objec-
tives.
(80) As has been recognised by the Commission
in its interpretative communication on certain
aspects of the provisions on televised advertising
in the "Television without frontiers" Directive
[25], the development of new advertising tech-
niques and marketing innovations has created
new effective opportunities for audiovisual com-
mercial communications in traditional broad-
casting services, potentially enabling them to
compete better on a level playing-field with on-
demand innovations.
(81) Commercial and technological develop-
ments give users increased choice and responsi-
bility in their use of audiovisual media services.
In order to remain proportionate with the goals
of general interest, regulation should allow a cer-
tain degree of flexibility with regard to television
broadcasting. The principle of separation should
be limited to television advertising and teleshop-
ping, and product placement should be allowed
under certain circumstances, unless a Member
State decides otherwise. However, where product
placement is surreptitious, it should be prohib-
ited. The principle of separation should not pre-
vent the use of new advertising techniques.
(82) Apart from the practices that are covered by
this Directive, Directive 2005/29/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 11
May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-con-
sumer commercial practices in the internal mar-
ket [26] applies to unfair commercial practices,
such as misleading and aggressive practices
occurring in audiovisual media services. In addi-
tion, Directive 2003/33/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on
the approximation of the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions of the Member States
relating to the advertising and sponsorship of
tobacco products [27], which prohibits advertis-
ing and sponsorship for cigarettes and other
tobacco products in printed media, information
society services and radio broadcasting, should
be without prejudice to this Directive, in view of
the special characteristics of audiovisual media
services. Article 88(1) of Directive 2001/83/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 6
November 2001 on the Community code relat-
ing to medicinal products for human use [28],
which prohibits advertising to the general public
of certain medicinal products, applies, as pro-
vided in paragraph 5 of that Article and without
prejudice to Article 21 of this Directive. Further-
more, this Directive should be without prejudice
to Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 20
December 2006 on nutrition and health claims
made on foods [29].
(83) In order to ensure that the interests of con-
sumers as television viewers are fully and prop-
erly protected, it is essential for television
advertising to be subject to a certain number of
minimum rules and standards and that the
Member States must maintain the right to set
more detailed or stricter rules and in certain cir-
cumstances to lay down different conditions for
television broadcasters under their jurisdiction.
(84) Member States, with due regard to Union
law and in relation to broadcasts intended solely
for the national territory which may not be
received, directly or indirectly, in one or more
Member States, should be able to lay down dif-
ferent conditions for the insertion of advertising
and different limits for the volume of advertising
in order to facilitate these particular broadcasts.
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(85) Given the increased possibilities for viewers
to avoid advertising through the use of new tech-
nologies such as digital personal video recorders
and increased choice of channels, detailed regu-
lation with regard to the insertion of spot adver-
tising with the aim of protecting viewers is not
justified. While the hourly amount of admissible
advertising should not be increased, this Direc-
tive should give flexibility to broadcasters with
regard to its insertion where this does not
unduly impair the integrity of programmes.
(86) This Directive is intended to safeguard the
specific character of European television, where
advertising is preferably inserted between pro-
grammes, and therefore limits possible interrup-
tions to cinematographic works and films made
for television as well as interruptions to some
categories of programmes that need specific pro-
tection.
(87) A limit of 20 % of television advertising
spots and teleshopping spots per clock hour,
also applying during "prime time", should be
laid down. The concept of a television advertis-
ing spot should be understood as television
advertising in the sense of point (i) of Article 1(1)
having a duration of not more than 12 minutes.
(88) It is necessary to prohibit all audiovisual
commercial communication promoting ciga-
rettes and other tobacco products including
indirect forms of audiovisual commercial com-
munication which, whilst not directly mention-
ing the tobacco product, seek to circumvent the
ban on audiovisual commercial communication
for cigarettes and other tobacco products by
using brand names, symbols or other distinctive
features of tobacco products or of undertakings
whose known or main activities include the pro-
duction or sale of such products.
(89) It is also necessary to prohibit all audiovis-
ual commercial communication for medicinal
products and medical treatment available only
on prescription in the Member State within
whose jurisdiction the media service provider
falls and to lay down strict criteria relating to the
television advertising of alcoholic products.
(90) Surreptitious audiovisual commercial com-
munication is a practice prohibited by this
Directive because of its negative effect on con-
sumers. The prohibition of surreptitious audio-
visual commercial communication should not
cover legitimate product placement within the
framework of this Directive, where the viewer is
adequately informed of the existence of product
placement. This can be done by signalling the
fact that product placement is taking place in a
given programme, for example by means of a
neutral logo.
(91) Product placement is a reality in cinemato-
graphic works and in audiovisual works made
for television. In order to ensure a level playing-
field, and thus enhance the competitiveness of
the European media industry, rules for product
placement are necessary. The definition of prod-
uct placement laid down in this Directive should
cover any form of audiovisual commercial com-
munication consisting of the inclusion of or ref-
erence to a product, a service or the trade mark
thereof so that it is featured within a pro-
gramme, in return for payment or for similar
consideration. The provision of goods or services
free of charge, such as production props or
prizes, should only be considered to be product
placement if the goods or services involved are of
significant value. Product placement should be
subject to the same qualitative rules and restric-
tions applying to audiovisual commercial com-
munication. The decisive criterion
distinguishing sponsorship from product place-
ment is the fact that in product placement the
reference to a product is built into the action of a
programme, which is why the definition in point
(m) of Article 1(1) contains the word "within".
In contrast, sponsor references may be shown
during a programme but are not part of the plot.
(92) Product placement should, in principle, be
prohibited. However, derogations are appropri-
ate for some kinds of programme, on the basis of
a positive list. A Member State should be able to
opt out of these derogations, totally or partially,
for example by permitting product placement
only in programmes which have not been pro-
duced exclusively in that Member State.
(93) Furthermore, sponsorship and product
placement should be prohibited where they
influence the content of programmes in such a
way as to affect the responsibility and the edito-
rial independence of the media service provider.
This is the case with regard to thematic place-
ment.
(94) In accordance with the duties imposed on
Member States by the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union, they are responsible for
the effective implementation of this Directive.
They are free to choose the appropriate instru-
ments according to their legal traditions and
established structures, and, in particular, the
form of their competent independent regulatory
bodies, in order to be able to carry out their work
in implementing this Directive impartially and
transparently. More specifically, the instruments
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chosen by Member States should contribute to
the promotion of media pluralism.
(95) Close cooperation between competent regu-
latory bodies of the Member States and the
Commission is necessary to ensure the correct
application of this Directive. Similarly close
cooperation between Member States and
between their regulatory bodies is particularly
important with regard to the impact which
broadcasters established in one Member State
might have on another Member State. Where
licensing procedures are provided for in national
law and if more than one Member State is con-
cerned, it is desirable that contacts between the
respective bodies take place before such licences
are granted. This cooperation should cover all
fields coordinated by this Directive.
(96) It is necessary to make clear that self-promo-
tional activities are a particular form of advertis-
ing in which the broadcaster promotes its own
products, services, programmes or channels. In
particular, trailers consisting of extracts from
programmes should be treated as programmes.
(97) Daily transmission time allotted to
announcements made by the broadcaster in con-
nection with its own programmes and ancillary
products directly derived from these, or to public
service announcements and charity appeals
broadcast free of charge, should not be included
in the maximum amounts of daily or hourly
transmission time that may be allotted to adver-
tising and teleshopping.
(98) In order to avoid distortions of competition,
this derogation should be limited to announce-
ments concerning products that fulfil the dual
condition of being both ancillary to and directly
derived from the programmes concerned. The
term "ancillary" refers to products intended spe-
cifically to allow the viewing public to benefit
fully from, or to interact with, these pro-
grammes.
(99) In view of the development of teleshopping,
an economically important activity for operators
as a whole and a genuine outlet for goods and
services within the Union, it is essential to ensure
a high level of consumer protection by putting in
place appropriate standards regulating the form
and content of such broadcasts.
(100) It is important for the competent national
authorities, in monitoring the implementation
of the relevant provisions, to be able to distin-
guish, as regards channels not exclusively
devoted to teleshopping, between transmission
time devoted to teleshopping spots, advertising
spots and other forms of advertising on the one
hand and, on the other, transmission time
devoted to teleshopping windows. It is therefore
necessary and sufficient that each window be
clearly identified by optical and acoustic means
at least at the beginning and the end of the win-
dow.
(101) This Directive should apply to channels
exclusively devoted to teleshopping or self-pro-
motion, without conventional programme ele-
ments such as news, sports, films,
documentaries and drama, solely for the pur-
poses of this Directive and without prejudice to
the inclusion of such channels in the scope of
other Union instruments.
(102) Although television broadcasters are nor-
mally bound to ensure that programmes present
facts and events fairly, it is nevertheless impor-
tant that they should be subject to specific obli-
gations with respect to the right of reply or
equivalent remedies so that any person whose
legitimate interests have been damaged by an
assertion made in the course of a broadcast tele-
vision programme may effectively exercise such
right or remedy.
(103) The right of reply is an appropriate legal
remedy for television broadcasting and could
also be applied in the on-line environment. The
Recommendation on the protection of minors
and human dignity and on the right of reply
already includes appropriate guidelines for the
implementation of measures in national law or
practice so as to ensure sufficiently the right of
reply or equivalent remedies in relation to on-
line media.
(104) Since the objectives of this Directive,
namely the creation of an area without internal
frontiers for audiovisual media services whilst
ensuring at the same time a high level of protec-
tion of objectives of general interest, in particu-
lar the protection of minors and human dignity
as well as promoting the rights of persons with
disabilities, cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States and can therefore, by reason
of the scale and effects of this Directive, be better
achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt
measures in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty
on European Union. In accordance with the
principle of proportionality, as set out in that
Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is
necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
(105) This Directive is without prejudice to the
obligations of the Member States relating to the
time limits for transposition into national law of
the Directives set out in Annex I, Part B,
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HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
CHAPTER I
DEFINITIONS
Article 1
1. For the purposes of this Directive, the follow-
ing definitions shall apply:
(a) "audiovisual media service" means:
(i) a service as defined by Articles 56 and 57 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union which is under the editorial responsibility
of a media service provider and the principal
purpose of which is the provision of pro-
grammes, in order to inform, entertain or edu-
cate, to the general public by electronic
communications networks within the meaning
of point (a) of Article 2 of Directive 2002/21/EC.
Such an audiovisual media service is either a tele-
vision broadcast as defined in point (e) of this
paragraph or an on-demand audiovisual media
service as defined in point (g) of this paragraph;
(ii) audiovisual commercial communication;
(b) "programme" means a set of moving images
with or without sound constituting an individ-
ual item within a schedule or a catalogue estab-
lished by a media service provider and the form
and content of which are comparable to the
form and content of television broadcasting.
Examples of programmes include feature-length
films, sports events, situation comedies, docu-
mentaries, children’s programmes and original
drama;
(c) "editorial responsibility" means the exercise
of effective control both over the selection of the
programmes and over their organisation either
in a chronological schedule, in the case of televi-
sion broadcasts, or in a catalogue, in the case of
on-demand audiovisual media services. Editorial
responsibility does not necessarily imply any
legal liability under national law for the content
or the services provided;
(d) "media service provider" means the natural
or legal person who has editorial responsibility
for the choice of the audiovisual content of the
audiovisual media service and determines the
manner in which it is organised;
(e) "television broadcasting" or "television
broadcast" (i.e. a linear audiovisual media serv-
ice) means an audiovisual media service provided
by a media service provider for simultaneous
viewing of programmes on the basis of a pro-
gramme schedule;
(f) "broadcaster" means a media service provider
of television broadcasts;
(g) "on-demand audiovisual media service" (i.e. a
non-linear audiovisual media service) means an
audiovisual media service provided by a media
service provider for the viewing of programmes
at the moment chosen by the user and at his
individual request on the basis of a catalogue of
programmes selected by the media service pro-
vider;
(h) "audiovisual commercial communication"
means images with or without sound which are
designed to promote, directly or indirectly, the
goods, services or image of a natural or legal
entity pursuing an economic activity. Such
images accompany or are included in a pro-
gramme in return for payment or for similar
consideration or for self-promotional purposes.
Forms of audiovisual commercial communica-
tion include, inter alia, television advertising,
sponsorship, teleshopping and product place-
ment;
(i) "television advertising" means any form of
announcement broadcast whether in return for
payment or for similar consideration or broad-
cast for self-promotional purposes by a public or
private undertaking or natural person in connec-
tion with a trade, business, craft or profession in
order to promote the supply of goods or services,
including immovable property, rights and obli-
gations, in return for payment;
(j) "surreptitious audiovisual commercial com-
munication" means the representation in words
or pictures of goods, services, the name, the
trade mark or the activities of a producer of
goods or a provider of services in programmes
when such representation is intended by the
media service provider to serve as advertising
and might mislead the public as to its nature.
Such representation shall, in particular, be con-
sidered as intentional if it is done in return for
payment or for similar consideration;
(k) "sponsorship" means any contribution made
by public or private undertakings or natural per-
sons not engaged in providing audiovisual
media services or in the production of audiovis-
ual works, to the financing of audiovisual media
services or programmes with a view to promot-
ing their name, trade mark, image, activities or
products;
(l) "teleshopping" means direct offers broadcast
to the public with a view to the supply of goods
or services, including immovable property, rights
and obligations, in return for payment;
(m) "product placement" means any form of
audiovisual commercial communication consist-
ing of the inclusion of or reference to a product,
a service or the trade mark thereof so that it is
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featured within a programme, in return for pay-
ment or for similar consideration;
(n) "European works" means the following:
(i) works originating in Member States;
(ii) works originating in European third States
party to the European Convention on Transfron-
tier Television of the Council of Europe and ful-
filling the conditions of paragraph 3;
(iii) works co-produced within the framework of
agreements related to the audiovisual sector con-
cluded between the Union and third countries
and fulfilling the conditions defined in each of
those agreements.
2. The application of the provisions of points
(n)(ii) and (iii) of paragraph 1 shall be condi-
tional on works originating in Member States
not being the subject of discriminatory measures
in the third country concerned.
3. The works referred to in points (n)(i) and (ii)
of paragraph 1 are works mainly made with
authors and workers residing in one or more of
the States referred to in those provisions pro-
vided that they comply with one of the following
three conditions:
(i) they are made by one or more producers
established in one or more of those States;
(ii) the production of the works is supervised
and actually controlled by one or more produc-
ers established in one or more of those States;
(iii) the contribution of co-producers of those
States to the total co-production costs is prepon-
derant and the co-production is not controlled
by one or more producers established outside
those States.
4. Works that are not European works within the
meaning of point (n) of paragraph 1 but that are
produced within the framework of bilateral co-
production agreements concluded between
Member States and third countries shall be
deemed to be European works provided that the
co-producers from the Union supply a majority
share of the total cost of production and that the
production is not controlled by one or more pro-
ducers established outside the territory of the
Member States.
CHAPTER II
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 2
1. Each Member State shall ensure that all audio-
visual media services transmitted by media serv-
ice providers under its jurisdiction comply with
the rules of the system of law applicable to audi-
ovisual media services intended for the public in
that Member State.
2. For the purposes of this Directive, the media
service providers under the jurisdiction of a
Member State are any of the following:
(a) those established in that Member State in
accordance with paragraph 3;
(b) those to whom paragraph 4 applies.
3. For the purposes of this Directive, a media
service provider shall be deemed to be estab-
lished in a Member State in the following cases:
(a) the media service provider has its head office
in that Member State and the editorial decisions
about the audiovisual media service are taken in
that Member State;
(b) if a media service provider has its head office
in one Member State but editorial decisions on
the audiovisual media service are taken in
another Member State, it shall be deemed to be
established in the Member State where a signifi-
cant part of the workforce involved in the pur-
suit of the audiovisual media service activity
operates. If a significant part of the workforce
involved in the pursuit of the audiovisual media
service activity operates in each of those Member
States, the media service provider shall be
deemed to be established in the Member State
where it has its head office. If a significant part
of the workforce involved in the pursuit of the
audiovisual media service activity operates in
neither of those Member States, the media serv-
ice provider shall be deemed to be established in
the Member State where it first began its activity
in accordance with the law of that Member State,
provided that it maintains a stable and effective
link with the economy of that Member State;
(c) if a media service provider has its head office
in a Member State but decisions on the audiovis-
ual media service are taken in a third country, or
vice versa, it shall be deemed to be established in
the Member State concerned, provided that a
significant part of the workforce involved in the
pursuit of the audiovisual media service activity
operates in that Member State.
4. Media service providers to whom the provi-
sions of paragraph 3 are not applicable shall be
deemed to be under the jurisdiction of a Member
State in the following cases:
(a) they use a satellite up-link situated in that
Member State;
(b) although they do not use a satellite up-link
situated in that Member State, they use satellite
capacity appertaining to that Member State.
5. If the question as to which Member State has
jurisdiction cannot be determined in accordance
with paragraphs 3 and 4, the competent Member
State shall be that in which the media service
provider is established within the meaning of
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Articles 49 to 55 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union.
6. This Directive does not apply to audiovisual
media services intended exclusively for reception
in third countries and which are not received
with standard consumer equipment directly or
indirectly by the public in one or more Member
States.
Article 3
1. Member States shall ensure freedom of recep-
tion and shall not restrict retransmissions on
their territory of audiovisual media services from
other Member States for reasons which fall
within the fields coordinated by this Directive.
2. In respect of television broadcasting, Member
States may provisionally derogate from para-
graph 1 if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a) a television broadcast coming from another
Member State manifestly, seriously and gravely
infringes Article 27(1) or (2) and/or Article 6;
(b) during the previous 12 months, the broad-
caster has infringed the provision(s) referred to
in point (a) on at least two prior occasions;
(c) the Member State concerned has notified the
broadcaster and the Commission in writing of
the alleged infringements and of the measures it
intends to take should any such infringement
occur again;
(d) consultations with the transmitting Member
State and the Commission have not produced an
amicable settlement within 15 days of the notifi-
cation provided for in point (c), and the alleged
infringement persists.
The Commission shall, within 2 months follow-
ing notification of the measures taken by the
Member State, take a decision on whether the
measures are compatible with Union law. If it
decides that they are not, the Member State will
be required to put an end to the measures in
question as a matter of urgency.
3. Paragraph 2 shall be without prejudice to the
application of any procedure, remedy or sanc-
tion to the infringements in question in the
Member State which has jurisdiction over the
broadcaster concerned.
4. In respect of on-demand audiovisual media
services, Member States may take measures to
derogate from paragraph 1 in respect of a given
service if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a) the measures are:
(i) necessary for one of the following reasons:
- public policy, in particular the prevention,
investigation, detection and prosecution of crim-
inal offences, including the protection of minors
and the fight against any incitement to hatred
on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality,
and violations of human dignity concerning
individual persons,
- the protection of public health,
- public security, including the safeguarding of
national security and defence,
- the protection of consumers, including inves-
tors;
(ii) taken against an on-demand audiovisual
media service which prejudices the objectives
referred to in point (i) or which presents a seri-
ous and grave risk of prejudice to those objec-
tives;
(iii) proportionate to those objectives;
(b) before taking the measures in question and
without prejudice to court proceedings, includ-
ing preliminary proceedings and acts carried out
in the framework of a criminal investigation, the
Member State has:
(i) asked the Member State under whose jurisdic-
tion the media service provider falls to take
measures and the latter did not take such meas-
ures, or they were inadequate;
(ii) notified the Commission and the Member
State under whose jurisdiction the media service
provider falls of its intention to take such meas-
ures.
5. Member States may, in urgent cases, derogate
from the conditions laid down in point (b) of
paragraph 4. Where this is the case, the measures
shall be notified in the shortest possible time to
the Commission and to the Member State under
whose jurisdiction the media service provider
falls, indicating the reasons for which the Mem-
ber State considers that there is urgency.
6. Without prejudice to the Member State’s pos-
sibility of proceeding with the measures referred
to in paragraphs 4 and 5, the Commission shall
examine the compatibility of the notified meas-
ures with Union law in the shortest possible
time. Where it comes to the conclusion that the
measures are incompatible with Union law, the
Commission shall ask the Member State in ques-
tion to refrain from taking any proposed meas-
ures or urgently to put an end to the measures in
question.
Article 4
1. Member States shall remain free to require
media service providers under their jurisdiction
to comply with more detailed or stricter rules in
the fields coordinated by this Directive provided
that such rules are in compliance with Union
law.
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2. In cases where a Member State:
(a) has exercised its freedom under paragraph 1
to adopt more detailed or stricter rules of general
public interest; and
(b) assesses that a broadcaster under the jurisdic-
tion of another Member State provides a televi-
sion broadcast which is wholly or mostly
directed towards its territory;
it may contact the Member State having jurisdic-
tion with a view to achieving a mutually satisfac-
tory solution to any problems posed. On receipt
of a substantiated request by the first Member
State, the Member State having jurisdiction shall
request the broadcaster to comply with the rules
of general public interest in question. The Mem-
ber State having jurisdiction shall inform the
first Member State of the results obtained fol-
lowing this request within 2 months. Either
Member State may invite the contact committee
established pursuant to Article 29 to examine
the case.
3. The first Member State may adopt appropri-
ate measures against the broadcaster concerned
where it assesses that:
(a) the results achieved through the application
of paragraph 2 are not satisfactory; and
(b) the broadcaster in question has established
itself in the Member State having jurisdiction in
order to circumvent the stricter rules, in the
fields coordinated by this Directive, which would
be applicable to it if it were established in the
first Member State.
Such measures shall be objectively necessary,
applied in a non-discriminatory manner and
proportionate to the objectives which they pur-
sue.
4. A Member State may take measures pursuant
to paragraph 3 only if the following conditions
are met:
(a) it has notified the Commission and the Mem-
ber State in which the broadcaster is established
of its intention to take such measures while sub-
stantiating the grounds on which it bases its
assessment; and
(b) the Commission has decided that the meas-
ures are compatible with Union law, and in par-
ticular that assessments made by the Member
State taking those measures under paragraphs 2
and 3 are correctly founded.
5. The Commission shall decide within 3
months following the notification provided for
in point (a) of paragraph 4. If the Commission
decides that the measures are incompatible with
Union law, the Member State in question shall
refrain from taking the proposed measures.
6. Member States shall, by appropriate means,
ensure, within the framework of their legislation,
that media service providers under their jurisdic-
tion effectively comply with the provisions of
this Directive.
7. Member States shall encourage co-regulation
and/or self-regulatory regimes at national level
in the fields coordinated by this Directive to the
extent permitted by their legal systems. These
regimes shall be such that they are broadly
accepted by the main stakeholders in the Mem-
ber States concerned and provide for effective
enforcement.
8. Directive 2000/31/EC shall apply unless oth-
erwise provided for in this Directive. In the event
of a conflict between a provision of Directive
2000/31/EC and a provision of this Directive,
the provisions of this Directive shall prevail,
unless otherwise provided for in this Directive.
CHAPTER III
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL 
AUDIOVISUAL MEDIA SERVICES
Article 5
Member States shall ensure that audiovisual
media service providers under their jurisdiction
shall make easily, directly and permanently
accessible to the recipients of a service at least
the following information:
(a) the name of the media service provider;
(b) the geographical address at which the media
service provider is established;
(c) the details of the media service provider,
including its electronic mail address or website,
which allow it to be contacted rapidly in a direct
and effective manner;
(d) where applicable, the competent regulatory
or supervisory bodies.
Article 6
Member States shall ensure by appropriate
means that audiovisual media services provided
by media service providers under their jurisdic-
tion do not contain any incitement to hatred
based on race, sex, religion or nationality.
Article 7
Member States shall encourage media service
providers under their jurisdiction to ensure that
their services are gradually made accessible to
people with a visual or hearing disability.
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Article 8
Member States shall ensure that media service
providers under their jurisdiction do not trans-
mit cinematographic works outside periods
agreed with the rights holders.
Article 9
1. Member States shall ensure that audiovisual
commercial communications provided by media
service providers under their jurisdiction comply
with the following requirements:
(a) audiovisual commercial communications
shall be readily recognisable as such. Surrepti-
tious audiovisual commercial communication
shall be prohibited;
(b) audiovisual commercial communications
shall not use subliminal techniques;
(c) audiovisual commercial communications
shall not:
(i) prejudice respect for human dignity;
(ii) include or promote any discrimination based
on sex, racial or ethnic origin, nationality, reli-
gion or belief, disability, age or sexual orienta-
tion;
(iii) encourage behaviour prejudicial to health or
safety;
(iv) encourage behaviour grossly prejudicial to
the protection of the environment;
(d) all forms of audiovisual commercial commu-
nications for cigarettes and other tobacco prod-
ucts shall be prohibited;
(e) audiovisual commercial communications for
alcoholic beverages shall not be aimed specifi-
cally at minors and shall not encourage immod-
erate consumption of such beverages;
(f) audiovisual commercial communication for
medicinal products and medical treatment avail-
able only on prescription in the Member State
within whose jurisdiction the media service pro-
vider falls shall be prohibited;
(g) audiovisual commercial communications
shall not cause physical or moral detriment to
minors. Therefore they shall not directly exhort
minors to buy or hire a product or service by
exploiting their inexperience or credulity,
directly encourage them to persuade their par-
ents or others to purchase the goods or services
being advertised, exploit the special trust minors
place in parents, teachers or other persons, or
unreasonably show minors in dangerous situa-
tions.
2. Member States and the Commission shall
encourage media service providers to develop
codes of conduct regarding inappropriate audio-
visual commercial communications, accompany-
ing or included in children’s programmes, of
foods and beverages containing nutrients and
substances with a nutritional or physiological
effect, in particular those such as fat, trans-fatty
acids, salt/sodium and sugars, excessive intakes
of which in the overall diet are not recom-
mended.
Article 10
1. Audiovisual media services or programmes
that are sponsored shall meet the following
requirements:
(a) their content and, in the case of television
broadcasting, their scheduling shall in no cir-
cumstances be influenced in such a way as to
affect the responsibility and editorial independ-
ence of the media service provider;
(b) they shall not directly encourage the pur-
chase or rental of goods or services, in particular
by making special promotional references to
those goods or services;
(c) viewers shall be clearly informed of the exist-
ence of a sponsorship agreement. Sponsored
programmes shall be clearly identified as such by
the name, logo and/or any other symbol of the
sponsor such as a reference to its product(s) or
service(s) or a distinctive sign thereof in an
appropriate way for programmes at the begin-
ning, during and/or at the end of the pro-
grammes.
2. Audiovisual media services or programmes
shall not be sponsored by undertakings whose
principal activity is the manufacture or sale of
cigarettes and other tobacco products.
3. The sponsorship of audiovisual media services
or programmes by undertakings whose activities
include the manufacture or sale of medicinal
products and medical treatment may promote
the name or the image of the undertaking, but
shall not promote specific medicinal products or
medical treatments available only on prescrip-
tion in the Member State within whose jurisdic-
tion the media service provider falls.
4. News and current affairs programmes shall
not be sponsored. Member States may choose to
prohibit the showing of a sponsorship logo dur-
ing children’s programmes, documentaries and
religious programmes.
Article 11
1. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 shall apply only to pro-
grammes produced after 19 December 2009.
2. Product placement shall be prohibited.
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, prod-
uct placement shall be admissible in the follow-
ing cases unless a Member State decides
otherwise:
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(a) in cinematographic works, films and series
made for audiovisual media services, sports pro-
grammes and light entertainment programmes;
(b) where there is no payment but only the provi-
sion of certain goods or services free of charge,
such as production props and prizes, with a view
to their inclusion in a programme.
The derogation provided for in point (a) shall
not apply to children’s programmes.
Programmes that contain product placement
shall meet at least all of the following require-
ments:
(a) their content and, in the case of television
broadcasting, their scheduling shall in no cir-
cumstances be influenced in such a way as to
affect the responsibility and editorial independ-
ence of the media service provider;
(b) they shall not directly encourage the pur-
chase or rental of goods or services, in particular
by making special promotional references to
those goods or services;
(c) they shall not give undue prominence to the
product in question;
(d) viewers shall be clearly informed of the exist-
ence of product placement. Programmes con-
taining product placement shall be
appropriately identified at the start and the end
of the programme, and when a programme
resumes after an advertising break, in order to
avoid any confusion on the part of the viewer.
By way of exception, Member States may choose
to waive the requirements set out in point (d)
provided that the programme in question has
neither been produced nor commissioned by the
media service provider itself or a company affili-
ated to the media service provider.
4. In any event programmes shall not contain
product placement of:
(a) tobacco products or cigarettes or product
placement from undertakings whose principal
activity is the manufacture or sale of cigarettes
and other tobacco products;
(b) specific medicinal products or medical treat-
ments available only on prescription in the
Member State under whose jurisdiction the
media service provider falls.
CHAPTER IV
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE ONLY TO 
ON-DEMAND AUDIOVISUAL MEDIA 
SERVICES
Article 12
Member States shall take appropriate measures
to ensure that on-demand audiovisual media
services provided by media service providers
under their jurisdiction which might seriously
impair the physical, mental or moral develop-
ment of minors are only made available in such a
way as to ensure that minors will not normally
hear or see such on-demand audiovisual media
services.
Article 13
1. Member States shall ensure that on-demand
audiovisual media services provided by media
service providers under their jurisdiction pro-
mote, where practicable and by appropriate
means, the production of and access to Euro-
pean works. Such promotion could relate, inter
alia, to the financial contribution made by such
services to the production and rights acquisition
of European works or to the share and/or promi-
nence of European works in the catalogue of
programmes offered by the on-demand audiovis-
ual media service.
2. Member States shall report to the Commis-
sion no later than 19 December 2011 and every 4
years thereafter on the implementation of para-
graph 1.
3. The Commission shall, on the basis of the
information provided by Member States and of
an independent study, report to the European
Parliament and to the Council on the applica-
tion of paragraph 1, taking into account the
market and technological developments and the
objective of cultural diversity.
CHAPTER V
PROVISIONS CONCERNING 
EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS AND SHORT 
NEWS REPORTS IN TELEVISION 
BROADCASTING
Article 14
1. Each Member State may take measures in
accordance with Union law to ensure that broad-
casters under its jurisdiction do not broadcast
on an exclusive basis events which are regarded
by that Member State as being of major impor-
tance for society in such a way as to deprive a
substantial proportion of the public in that
Member State of the possibility of following
such events by live coverage or deferred coverage
on free television. If it does so, the Member State
concerned shall draw up a list of designated
events, national or non-national, which it con-
siders to be of major importance for society. It
shall do so in a clear and transparent manner in
due time. In so doing the Member State con-
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cerned shall also determine whether these events
should be available by whole or partial live cover-
age or, where necessary or appropriate for objec-
tive reasons in the public interest, whole or
partial deferred coverage.
2. Member States shall immediately notify to the
Commission any measures taken or to be taken
pursuant to paragraph 1. Within a period of 3
months from the notification, the Commission
shall verify that such measures are compatible
with Union law and communicate them to the
other Member States. It shall seek the opinion of
the contact committee established pursuant to
Article 29. It shall forthwith publish the meas-
ures taken in the Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Union and at least once a year the
consolidated list of the measures taken by Mem-
ber States.
3. Member States shall ensure, by appropriate
means within the framework of their legislation,
that broadcasters under their jurisdiction do not
exercise the exclusive rights purchased by those
broadcasters after 18 December 2007 in such a
way that a substantial proportion of the public
in another Member State is deprived of the pos-
sibility of following events which are designated
by that other Member State in accordance with
paragraphs 1 and 2 by whole or partial live cover-
age or, where necessary or appropriate for objec-
tive reasons in the public interest, whole or
partial deferred coverage on free television as
determined by that other Member State in
accordance with paragraph 1.
Article 15
1. Member States shall ensure that for the pur-
pose of short news reports, any broadcaster
established in the Union has access on a fair, rea-
sonable and non-discriminatory basis to events
of high interest to the public which are transmit-
ted on an exclusive basis by a broadcaster under
their jurisdiction.
2. If another broadcaster established in the same
Member State as the broadcaster seeking access
has acquired exclusive rights to the event of high
interest to the public, access shall be sought
from that broadcaster.
3. Member States shall ensure that such access is
guaranteed by allowing broadcasters to freely
choose short extracts from the transmitting
broadcaster’s signal with, unless impossible for
reasons of practicality, at least the identification
of their source.
4. As an alternative to paragraph 3, Member
States may establish an equivalent system which
achieves access on a fair, reasonable and non-dis-
criminatory basis through other means.
5. Short extracts shall be used solely for general
news programmes and may be used in on-
demand audiovisual media services only if the
same programme is offered on a deferred basis
by the same media service provider.
6. Without prejudice to paragraphs 1 to 5, Mem-
ber States shall ensure, in accordance with their
legal systems and practices, that the modalities
and conditions regarding the provision of such
short extracts are defined, in particular, with
respect to any compensation arrangements, the
maximum length of short extracts and time lim-
its regarding their transmission. Where compen-
sation is provided for, it shall not exceed the
additional costs directly incurred in providing
access.
CHAPTER VI
PROMOTION OF DISTRIBUTION 
AND PRODUCTION OF TELEVISION 
PROGRAMMES
Article 16
1. Member States shall ensure, where practicable
and by appropriate means, that broadcasters
reserve for European works a majority propor-
tion of their transmission time, excluding the
time allotted to news, sports events, games,
advertising, teletext services and teleshopping.
This proportion, having regard to the broad-
caster’s informational, educational, cultural and
entertainment responsibilities to its viewing
public, should be achieved progressively, on the
basis of suitable criteria.
2. Where the proportion laid down in paragraph
1 cannot be attained, it must not be lower than
the average for 1988 in the Member State con-
cerned.
However, in respect of Greece and Portugal, the
year 1988 shall be replaced by the year 1990.
3. Member States shall provide the Commission
every 2 years, starting from 3 October 1991, with
a report on the application of this Article and
Article 17.
That report shall in particular include a statisti-
cal statement on the achievement of the propor-
tion referred to in this Article and Article 17 for
each of the television programmes falling within
the jurisdiction of the Member State concerned,
the reasons, in each case, for the failure to attain
that proportion and the measures adopted or
envisaged in order to achieve it.
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The Commission shall inform the other Member
States and the European Parliament of the
reports, which shall be accompanied, where
appropriate, by an opinion. The Commission
shall ensure the application of this Article and
Article 17 in accordance with the provisions of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union. The Commission may take account in its
opinion, in particular, of progress achieved in
relation to previous years, the share of first
broadcast works in the programming, the partic-
ular circumstances of new television broadcast-
ers and the specific situation of countries with a
low audiovisual production capacity or
restricted language area.
Article 17
Member States shall ensure, where practicable
and by appropriate means, that broadcasters
reserve at least 10 % of their transmission time,
excluding the time allotted to news, sports
events, games, advertising, teletext services and
teleshopping, or alternately, at the discretion of
the Member State, at least 10 % of their program-
ming budget, for European works created by
producers who are independent of broadcasters.
This proportion, having regard to the broad-
caster’s informational, educational, cultural and
entertainment responsibilities to its viewing
public, should be achieved progressively, on the
basis of suitable criteria. It must be achieved by
earmarking an adequate proportion for recent
works, that is to say works transmitted within 5
years of their production.
Article 18
This Chapter shall not apply to television broad-
casts that are intended for local audiences and
do not form part of a national network.
CHAPTER VII
TELEVISION ADVERTISING AND 
TELESHOPPING
Article 19
1. Television advertising and teleshopping shall
be readily recognisable and distinguishable from
editorial content. Without prejudice to the use
of new advertising techniques, television adver-
tising and teleshopping shall be kept quite dis-
tinct from other parts of the programme by
optical and/or acoustic and/or spatial means.
2. Isolated advertising and teleshopping spots,
other than in transmissions of sports events,
shall remain the exception.
Article 20
1. Member States shall ensure, where television
advertising or teleshopping is inserted during
programmes, that the integrity of the pro-
grammes, taking into account natural breaks in
and the duration and the nature of the pro-
gramme concerned, and the rights of the right
holders are not prejudiced.
2. The transmission of films made for television
(excluding series, serials and documentaries),
cinematographic works and news programmes
may be interrupted by television advertising
and/or teleshopping once for each scheduled
period of at least 30 minutes. The transmission
of children’s programmes may be interrupted by
television advertising and/or teleshopping once
for each scheduled period of at least 30 minutes,
provided that the scheduled duration of the pro-
gramme is greater than 30 minutes. No televi-
sion advertising or teleshopping shall be inserted
during religious services.
Article 21
Teleshopping for medicinal products which are
subject to a marketing authorisation within the
meaning of Directive 2001/83/EC, as well as tele-
shopping for medical treatment, shall be prohib-
ited.
Article 22
Television advertising and teleshopping for alco-
holic beverages shall comply with the following
criteria:
(a) it may not be aimed specifically at minors or,
in particular, depict minors consuming these
beverages;
(b) it shall not link the consumption of alcohol
to enhanced physical performance or to driving;
(c) it shall not create the impression that the
consumption of alcohol contributes towards
social or sexual success;
(d) it shall not claim that alcohol has therapeutic
qualities or that it is a stimulant, a sedative or a
means of resolving personal conflicts;
(e) it shall not encourage immoderate consump-
tion of alcohol or present abstinence or modera-
tion in a negative light;
(f) it shall not place emphasis on high alcoholic
content as being a positive quality of the bever-
ages.
Article 23
1. The proportion of television advertising spots
and teleshopping spots within a given clock
hour shall not exceed 20 %.
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2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to announce-
ments made by the broadcaster in connection
with its own programmes and ancillary products
directly derived from those programmes, spon-
sorship announcements and product place-
ments.
Article 24
Teleshopping windows shall be clearly identified
as such by optical and acoustic means and shall
be of a minimum uninterrupted duration of 15
minutes.
Article 25
This Directive shall apply mutatis mutandis to
television channels exclusively devoted to adver-
tising and teleshopping as well as to television
channels exclusively devoted to self-promotion.
However, Chapter VI as well as Articles 20 and 23
shall not apply to these channels.
Article 26
Without prejudice to Article 4, Member States
may, with due regard for Union law, lay down
conditions other than those laid down in Article
20(2) and Article 23 in respect of television
broadcasts intended solely for the national terri-
tory which cannot be received directly or indi-
rectly by the public in one or more other
Member States.
CHAPTER VIII
PROTECTION OF MINORS IN 
TELEVISION BROADCASTING
Article 27
1. Member States shall take appropriate meas-
ures to ensure that television broadcasts by
broadcasters under their jurisdiction do not
include any programmes which might seriously
impair the physical, mental or moral develop-
ment of minors, in particular programmes that
involve pornography or gratuitous violence.
2. The measures provided for in paragraph 1
shall also extend to other programmes which are
likely to impair the physical, mental or moral
development of minors, except where it is
ensured, by selecting the time of the broadcast or
by any technical measure, that minors in the area
of transmission will not normally hear or see
such broadcasts.
3. In addition, when such programmes are
broadcast in unencoded form Member States
shall ensure that they are preceded by an acous-
tic warning or are identified by the presence of a
visual symbol throughout their duration.
CHAPTER IX
RIGHT OF REPLY IN TELEVISION 
BROADCASTING
Article 28
1. Without prejudice to other provisions
adopted by the Member States under civil,
administrative or criminal law, any natural or
legal person, regardless of nationality, whose
legitimate interests, in particular reputation and
good name, have been damaged by an assertion
of incorrect facts in a television programme
must have a right of reply or equivalent reme-
dies. Member States shall ensure that the actual
exercise of the right of reply or equivalent reme-
dies is not hindered by the imposition of unrea-
sonable terms or conditions. The reply shall be
transmitted within a reasonable time subse-
quent to the request being substantiated and at a
time and in a manner appropriate to the broad-
cast to which the request refers.
2. A right of reply or equivalent remedies shall
exist in relation to all broadcasters under the
jurisdiction of a Member State.
3. Member States shall adopt the measures
needed to establish the right of reply or the
equivalent remedies and shall determine the pro-
cedure to be followed for the exercise thereof. In
particular, they shall ensure that a sufficient
time span is allowed and that the procedures are
such that the right or equivalent remedies can be
exercised appropriately by natural or legal per-
sons resident or established in other Member
States.
4. An application for exercise of the right of reply
or the equivalent remedies may be rejected if
such a reply is not justified according to the con-
ditions laid down in paragraph 1, would involve
a punishable act, would render the broadcaster
liable to civil-law proceedings or would trans-
gress standards of public decency.
5. Provision shall be made for procedures
whereby disputes as to the exercise of the right of
reply or the equivalent remedies can be subject to
judicial review.
CHAPTER X
CONTACT COMMITTEE
Article 29
1. A contact committee is established under the
aegis of the Commission. It shall be composed of
representatives of the competent authorities of
the Member States. It shall be chaired by a repre-
sentative of the Commission and meet either on
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his initiative or at the request of the delegation
of a Member State.
2. The tasks of the contact committee shall be:
(a) to facilitate effective implementation of this
Directive through regular consultation on any
practical problems arising from its application,
and particularly from the application of Article
2, as well as on any other matters on which
exchanges of views are deemed useful;
(b) to deliver own-initiative opinions or opinions
requested by the Commission on the application
by the Member States of this Directive;
(c) to be the forum for an exchange of views on
what matters should be dealt with in the reports
which Member States must submit pursuant to
Article 16(3) and on their methodology;
(d) to discuss the outcome of regular consulta-
tions which the Commission holds with repre-
sentatives of broadcasting organisations,
producers, consumers, manufacturers, service
providers and trade unions and the creative com-
munity;
(e) to facilitate the exchange of information
between the Member States and the Commis-
sion on the situation and the development of
regulatory activities regarding audiovisual media
services, taking account of the Union’s audiovis-
ual policy, as well as relevant developments in
the technical field;
(f) to examine any development arising in the
sector on which an exchange of views appears
useful.
CHAPTER XI
COOPERATION BETWEEN 
REGULATORY BODIES OF THE 
MEMBER STATES
Article 30
Member States shall take appropriate measures
to provide each other and the Commission with
the information necessary for the application of
this Directive, in particular Articles 2, 3 and 4, in
particular through their competent independent
regulatory bodies.
CHAPTER XII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 31
In fields which this Directive does not coordi-
nate, it shall not affect the rights and obligations
of Member States resulting from existing con-
ventions dealing with telecommunications or
broadcasting.
Article 32
Member States shall communicate to the Com-
mission the text of the main provisions of
national law which they adopt in the field cov-
ered by this Directive.
Article 33
Not later than 19 December 2011, and every 3
years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to
the European Parliament, to the Council and to
the European Economic and Social Committee a
report on the application of this Directive and, if
necessary, make further proposals to adapt it to
developments in the field of audiovisual media
services, in particular in the light of recent tech-
nological developments, the competitiveness of
the sector and levels of media literacy in all
Member States.
That report shall also assess the issue of televi-
sion advertising accompanying or included in
children’s programmes, and in particular
whether the quantitative and qualitative rules
contained in this Directive have afforded the
level of protection required.
Article 34
Directive 89/552/EEC, as amended by the Direc-
tives listed in Annex I, Part A, is repealed, with-
out prejudice to the obligations of the Member
States relating to the time limits for transposi-
tion into national law of the Directives set out in
Annex I, Part B.
References to the repealed Directive shall be con-
strued as references to this Directive and shall be
read in accordance with the correlation table in
Annex II.
Article 35
This Directive shall enter into force on the 20th
day following its publication in the Official Jour-
nal of the European Union.
Article 36
This Directive is addressed to the Member
States.
Done at Strasbourg, 10 March 2010.
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(referred to in Article 34)
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cil (OJ L 202, 30.7.1997, p. 60) | |
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ANNEX II
CORRELATION TABLE
Directive 89/552/EEC | This Directive |
Article 1, introductory wording | Article 1(1), introductory
wording |
Article 1(a), introductory wording | Article 1(1)(a), introduc-
tory wording |
Article 1(a), first indent | Article 1(1)(a)(i) |
Article 1(a), second indent | Article 1(1)(a)(ii) |
Article 1(b) to (m) | Article 1(1)(b) to (m) |
Article 1(n)(i), introductory wording | Article 1(1)(n), introduc-
tory wording |
Article 1(n)(i), first indent | Article 1(1)(n)(i) |
Article 1(n)(i), second indent | Article 1(1)(n)(ii) |
Article 1(n)(i), third indent | Article 1(1)(n)(iii) |
Article 1(n)(i), fourth indent | Article 1(2) |
Article 1(n)(ii), introductory wording | Article 1(3), introduc-
tory wording |
Article 1(n)(ii), first indent | Article 1(3)(i) |
Article 1(n)(ii), second indent | Article 1(3)(ii) |
Article 1(n)(ii), third indent | Article 1(3)(iii) |
Article 1(n)(iii) | Article 1(4) |
Article 2 | Article 2 |
Article 2a(1), (2) and (3) | Article 3(1), (2) and (3) |
Article 2a(4), introductory wording | Article 3(4), introductory
wording |
Article 2a(4)(a) | Article 3(4)(a) |
Article 2a(4)(b), introductory wording | Article 3(4)(b), intro-
ductory wording |
Article 2a(4)(b), first indent | Article 3(4)(b)(i) |
Article 2a(4)(b), second indent | Article 3(4)(b)(ii) |
Article 2a(5) and (6) | Article 3(5) and (6) |
Article 3 | Article 4 |
Article 3a | Article 5 |
Article 3b | Article 6 |
Article 3c | Article 7 |
Article 3d | Article 8 |
Article 3e | Article 9 |
Article 3f | Article 10 |
Article 3g(1) | Article 11(2) |
Article 3g(2), first subparagraph, introductory wording | Article
11(3), first subparagraph, introductory wording |
Article 3g(2), first subparagraph, first indent | Article 11(3), first
subparagraph, point (a) |
Article 3g(2), first subparagraph, second indent | Article 11(3),
first subparagraph, point (b) |
Article 3g(2), second, third and fourth subparagraphs | Article
11(3), second, third and fourth subparagraphs |
Article 3g(3) | Article 11(4) |
Article 3g(4) | Article 11(1) |
Article 3h | Article 12 |
Article 3i | Article 13 |
Article 3j | Article 14 |
Article 3k | Article 15 |
Article 4(1), (2) and (3) | Article 16(1), (2) and (3) |
Article 4(4) | — |
Article 5 | Article 17 |
Article 9 | Article 18 |
Article 10 | Article 19 |
Article 11 | Article 20 |
Article 14 | Article 21 |
Article 15 | Article 22 |
Article 18 | Article 23 |
Article 18a | Article 24 |
Article 19 | Article 25 |
Article 20 | Article 26 |
Article 22 | Article 27 |
Article 23 | Article 28 |
Article 23a | Article 29 |
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Article 23b | Article 30 |
Article 24 | Article 31 |
— | Article 32 |
Article 26 | Article 33 |
— | Article 34 |
— | Article 35 |
Article 27 | Article 36 |
— | Annex I |
— | Annex II |
DIRECTIVE 2000/31/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUN-
CIL OF 8 JUNE 2000 ON CERTAIN LEGAL ASPECTS OF INFORMATION SOCIETY
SERVICES, IN PARTICULAR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, IN THE INTERNAL MAR-
KET
(Directive on electronic commerce)
Official Journal L 178, 17July 2000
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Community, and in particular Articles
47(2), 55 and 95 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commis-
sion(1),
(1) OJ C 30, 5.2.1999, p. 4 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic
and Social Committee(2),
(2) OJ C 169, 16.6.1999, p. 36.
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid
down in Article 251 of the Treaty(3),
(3) Opinion of the European Parliament of 6 May 1999 (OJ C
279, 1.10.1999, p. 389), Council common position of 28 February
2000 (OJ C 128, 8.5.2000, p. 32) and Decision of the European
Parliament of 4 May 2000 (not yet published in the Official Jour-
nal).
Whereas:
(1) The European Union is seeking to forge ever
closer links between the States and peoples of Eu-
rope, to ensure economic and social progress; in
accordance with Article 14(2) of the Treaty, the
internal market comprises an area without inter-
nal frontiers in which the free movements of
goods, services and the freedom of establishment
are ensured; the development of information so-
ciety services within the area without internal
frontiers is vital to eliminating the barriers which
divide the European peoples.
(2) The development of electronic commerce
within the information society offers significant
employment opportunities in the Community,
particularly in small and medium-sized enter-
prises, and will stimulate economic growth and
investment in innovation by European compa-
nies, and can also enhance the competitiveness
of European industry, provided that everyone
has access to the Internet.
(3) Community law and the characteristics of the
Community legal order are a vital asset to enable
European citizens and operators to take full
advantage, without consideration of borders, of
the opportunities afforded by electronic com-
merce; this Directive therefore has the purpose
of ensuring a high level of Community legal inte-
gration in order to establish a real area without
internal borders for information society services.
(4) It is important to ensure that electronic com-
merce could fully benefit from the internal mar-
ket and therefore that, as with Council Directive
89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordina-
tion of certain provisions laid down by law, regu-
lation or administrative action in Member States
concerning the pursuit of television broadcast-
ing activities(4), a high level of Community inte-
gration is achieved.
(4) OJ L 298, 17.10.1989, p. 23. Directive as amended by Direc-
tive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ
L 202, 30.7.1997, p. 60).
(5) The development of information society serv-
ices within the Community is hampered by a
number of legal obstacles to the proper func-
tioning of the internal market which make less
attractive the exercise of the freedom of estab-
lishment and the freedom to provide services;
these obstacles arise from divergences in legisla-
tion and from the legal uncertainty as to which
national rules apply to such services; in the
absence of coordination and adjustment of legis-
lation in the relevant areas, obstacles might be
justified in the light of the case-law of the Court
of Justice of the European Communities; legal
uncertainty exists with regard to the extent to
which Member States may control services origi-
nating from another Member State.
(6) In the light of Community objectives, of Arti-
cles 43 and 49 of the Treaty and of secondary
Community law, these obstacles should be elimi-
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nated by coordinating certain national laws and
by clarifying certain legal concepts at Commu-
nity level to the extent necessary for the proper
functioning of the internal market; by dealing
only with certain specific matters which give rise
to problems for the internal market, this Direc-
tive is fully consistent with the need to respect
the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article
5 of the Treaty.
(7) In order to ensure legal certainty and con-
sumer confidence, this Directive must lay down
a clear and general framework to cover certain
legal aspects of electronic commerce in the inter-
nal market.
(8) The objective of this Directive is to create a
legal framework to ensure the free movement of
information society services between Member
States and not to harmonise the field of criminal
law as such.
(9) The free movement of information society
services can in many cases be a specific reflection
in Community law of a more general principle,
namely freedom of expression as enshrined in
Article 10(1) of the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, which has been ratified by all the
Member States; for this reason, directives cover-
ing the supply of information society services
must ensure that this activity may be engaged in
freely in the light of that Article, subject only to
the restrictions laid down in paragraph 2 of that
Article and in Article 46(1) of the Treaty; this
Directive is not intended to affect national fun-
damental rules and principles relating to free-
dom of expression.
(10) In accordance with the principle of propor-
tionality, the measures provided for in this
Directive are strictly limited to the minimum
needed to achieve the objective of the proper
functioning of the internal market; where action
at Community level is necessary, and in order to
guarantee an area which is truly without internal
frontiers as far as electronic commerce is con-
cerned, the Directive must ensure a high level of
protection of objectives of general interest, in
particular the protection of minors and human
dignity, consumer protection and the protection
of public health; according to Article 152 of the
Treaty, the protection of public health is an
essential component of other Community poli-
cies.
(11) This Directive is without prejudice to the
level of protection for, in particular, public
health and consumer interests, as established by
Community acts; amongst others, Council
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair
terms in consumer contracts(5) and Directive
97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of
consumers in respect of distance contracts(6)
form a vital element for protecting consumers in
contractual matters; those Directives also apply
in their entirety to information society services;
that same Community acquis, which is fully
applicable to information society services, also
embraces in particular Council Directive 84/
450/EEC of 10 September 1984 concerning mis-
leading and comparative advertising(7), Council
Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for
the approximation of the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions of the Member States
concerning consumer credit(8), Council Direc-
tive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment
services in the securities field(9), Council Direc-
tive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package
travel, package holidays and package tours(10),
Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 16 February 1998 on con-
sumer production in the indication of prices of
products offered to consumers(11), Council
Directive 92/59/EEC of 29 June 1992 on general
product safety(12), Directive 94/47/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 26
October 1994 on the protection of purchasers in
respect of certain aspects on contracts relating to
the purchase of the right to use immovable prop-
erties on a timeshare basis(13), Directive 98/27/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protec-
tion of consumers' interests(14), Council
Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the
approximation of the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions concerning liability
for defective products(15), Directive 1999/44/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of
consumer goods and associated guarantees(16),
the future Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council concerning the distance mar-
keting of consumer financial services and Coun-
cil Directive 92/28/EEC of 31 March 1992 on the
advertising of medicinal products(17); this
Directive should be without prejudice to Direc-
tive 98/43/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the approxima-
tion of the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States relating to the
advertising and sponsorship of tobacco prod-
ucts(18) adopted within the framework of the
internal market, or to directives on the protec-
tion of public health; this Directive comple-
ments information requirements established by
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the abovementioned Directives and in particular
Directive 97/7/EC.
(5) OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29.
(6) OJ L 144, 4.6.1999, p. 19.
(7) OJ L 250, 19.9.1984, p. 17. Directive as amended by Directive
97/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L
290, 23.10.1997, p. 18).
(8) OJ L 42, 12.2.1987, p. 48. Directive as last amended by Direc-
tive 98/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ
L 101, 1.4.1998, p. 17).
(9) OJ L 141, 11.6.1993, p. 27. Directive as last amended by Di-
rective 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
(OJ L 84, 26.3.1997, p. 22).
(10) OJ L 158, 23.6.1990, p. 59.
(11) OJ L 80, 18.3.1998, p. 27.
(12) OJ L 228, 11.8.1992, p. 24.
(13) OJ L 280, 29.10.1994, p. 83.
(14) OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 51. Directive as amended by Direc-
tive 1999/44/EC (OJ L 171, 7.7.1999, p. 12).
(15) OJ L 210, 7.8.1985, p. 29. Directive as amended by Directive
1999/34/EC (OJ L 141, 4.6.1999, p. 20).
(16) OJ L 171, 7.7.1999, p. 12.
(17) OJ L 113, 30.4.1992, p. 13.
(18) OJ L 213, 30.7.1998, p. 9. 
(12) It is necessary to exclude certain activities
from the scope of this Directive, on the grounds
that the freedom to provide services in these
fields cannot, at this stage, be guaranteed under
the Treaty or existing secondary legislation; ex-
cluding these activities does not preclude any in-
struments which might prove necessary for the
proper functioning of the internal market; taxa-
tion, particularly value added tax imposed on a
large number of the services covered by this Di-
rective, must be excluded form the scope of this
Directive.
(13) This Directive does not aim to establish
rules on fiscal obligations nor does it pre-empt
the drawing up of Community instruments con-
cerning fiscal aspects of electronic commerce.
(14) The protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data is solely gov-
erned by Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data(19) and Direc-
tive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 15 December 1997 concerning
the processing of personal data and the protec-
tion of privacy in the telecommunications sec-
tor(20) which are fully applicable to information
society services; these Directives already establish
a Community legal framework in the field of
personal data and therefore it is not necessary to
cover this issue in this Directive in order to
ensure the smooth functioning of the internal
market, in particular the free movement of per-
sonal data between Member States; the imple-
mentation and application of this Directive
should be made in full compliance with the prin-
ciples relating to the protection of personal data,
in particular as regards unsolicited commercial
communication and the liability of intermediar-
ies; this Directive cannot prevent the anonymous
use of open networks such as the Internet.
(19) OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.
(20) OJ L 24, 30.1.1998, p. 1. 
(15) The confidentiality of communications is
guaranteed by Article 5 Directive 97/66/EC; in ac-
cordance with that Directive, Member States
must prohibit any kind of interception or surveil-
lance of such communications by others than the
senders and receivers, except when legally author-
ised.
(16) The exclusion of gambling activities from
the scope of application of this Directive covers
only games of chance, lotteries and betting
transactions, which involve wagering a stake
with monetary value; this does not cover promo-
tional competitions or games where the purpose
is to encourage the sale of goods or services and
where payments, if they arise, serve only to
acquire the promoted goods or services.
(17) The definition of information society serv-
ices already exists in Community law in Directive
98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a proce-
dure for the provision of information in the field
of technical standards and regulations and of
rules on information society services(21) and in
Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 20 November 1998 on the
legal protection of services based on, or consist-
ing of, conditional access(22); this definition
covers any service normally provided for remu-
neration, at a distance, by means of electronic
equipment for the processing (including digital
compression) and storage of data, and at the
individual request of a recipient of a service;
those services referred to in the indicative list in
Annex V to Directive 98/34/EC which do not
imply data processing and storage are not cov-
ered by this definition.
(21) OJ L 204, 21.7.1998, p. 37. Directive as amended by Direc-
tive 98/48/EC (OJ L 217, 5.8.1998, p. 18).
(22) OJ L 320, 28.11.1998, p. 54.
(18) Information society services span a wide
range of economic activities which take place on-
line; these activities can, in particular, consist of
selling goods on-line; activities such as the deliv-
ery of goods as such or the provision of services
off-line are not covered; information society serv-
ices are not solely restricted to services giving rise
to on-line contracting but also, in so far as they
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represent an economic activity, extend to services
which are not remunerated by those who receive
them, such as those offering on-line information
or commercial communications, or those provid-
ing tools allowing for search, access and retrieval
of data; information society services also include
services consisting of the transmission of infor-
mation via a communication network, in provid-
ing access to a communication network or in
hosting information provided by a recipient of
the service; television broadcasting within the
meaning of Directive EEC/89/552 and radio
broadcasting are not information society services
because they are not provided at individual re-
quest; by contrast, services which are transmitted
point to point, such as video-on-demand or the
provision of commercial communications by
electronic mail are information society services;
the use of electronic mail or equivalent individual
communications for instance by natural persons
acting outside their trade, business or profession
including their use for the conclusion of con-
tracts between such persons is not an informa-
tion society service; the contractual relationship
between an employee and his employer is not an
information society service; activities which by
their very nature cannot be carried out at a dis-
tance and by electronic means, such as the statu-
tory auditing of company accounts or medical
advice requiring the physical examination of a
patient are not information society services.
(19) The place at which a service provider is
established should be determined in conformity
with the case-law of the Court of Justice accord-
ing to which the concept of establishment
involves the actual pursuit of an economic activ-
ity through a fixed establishment for an indefi-
nite period; this requirement is also fulfilled
where a company is constituted for a given
period; the place of establishment of a company
providing services via an Internet website is not
the place at which the technology supporting its
website is located or the place at which its web-
site is accessible but the place where it pursues
its economic activity; in cases where a provider
has several places of establishment it is impor-
tant to determine from which place of establish-
ment the service concerned is provided; in cases
where it is difficult to determine from which of
several places of establishment a given service is
provided, this is the place where the provider has
the centre of his activities relating to this partic-
ular service.
(20) The definition of "recipient of a service"
covers all types of usage of information society
services, both by persons who provide informa-
tion on open networks such as the Internet and
by persons who seek information on the Internet
for private or professional reasons.
(21) The scope of the coordinated field is with-
out prejudice to future Community harmonisa-
tion relating to information society services and
to future legislation adopted at national level in
accordance with Community law; the coordi-
nated field covers only requirements relating to
on-line activities such as on-line information,
on-line advertising, on-line shopping, on-line
contracting and does not concern Member
States' legal requirements relating to goods such
as safety standards, labelling obligations, or lia-
bility for goods, or Member States' requirements
relating to the delivery or the transport of goods,
including the distribution of medicinal prod-
ucts; the coordinated field does not cover the
exercise of rights of pre-emption by public
authorities concerning certain goods such as
works of art.
(22) Information society services should be
supervised at the source of the activity, in order
to ensure an effective protection of public inter-
est objectives; to that end, it is necessary to
ensure that the competent authority provides
such protection not only for the citizens of its
own country but for all Community citizens; in
order to improve mutual trust between Member
States, it is essential to state clearly this responsi-
bility on the part of the Member State where the
services originate; moreover, in order to effec-
tively guarantee freedom to provide services and
legal certainty for suppliers and recipients of
services, such information society services
should in principle be subject to the law of the
Member State in which the service provider is
established.
(23) This Directive neither aims to establish
additional rules on private international law
relating to conflicts of law nor does it deal with
the jurisdiction of Courts; provisions of the
applicable law designated by rules of private
international law must not restrict the freedom
to provide information society services as estab-
lished in this Directive.
(24) In the context of this Directive, notwith-
standing the rule on the control at source of
information society services, it is legitimate
under the conditions established in this Direc-
tive for Member States to take measures to
restrict the free movement of information soci-
ety services.
(25) National courts, including civil courts, deal-
ing with private law disputes can take measures
to derogate from the freedom to provide infor-
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mation society services in conformity with con-
ditions established in this Directive.
(26) Member States, in conformity with condi-
tions established in this Directive, may apply
their national rules on criminal law and criminal
proceedings with a view to taking all investiga-
tive and other measures necessary for the detec-
tion and prosecution of criminal offences,
without there being a need to notify such meas-
ures to the Commission.
(27) This Directive, together with the future
Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council concerning the distance marketing of
consumer financial services, contributes to the
creating of a legal framework for the on-line pro-
vision of financial services; this Directive does
not pre-empt future initiatives in the area of
financial services in particular with regard to the
harmonisation of rules of conduct in this field;
the possibility for Member States, established in
this Directive, under certain circumstances of
restricting the freedom to provide information
society services in order to protect consumers
also covers measures in the area of financial serv-
ices in particular measures aiming at protecting
investors.
(28) The Member States' obligation not to sub-
ject access to the activity of an information soci-
ety service provider to prior authorisation does
not concern postal services covered by Directive
97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules
for the development of the internal market of
Community postal services and the improve-
ment of quality of service(23) consisting of the
physical delivery of a printed electronic mail
message and does not affect voluntary accredita-
tion systems, in particular for providers of elec-
tronic signature certification service.
(23) OJ L 15, 21.1.1998, p. 14.
(29) Commercial communications are essential
for the financing of information society services
and for developing a wide variety of new, charge-
free services; in the interests of consumer protec-
tion and fair trading, commercial communica-
tions, including discounts, promotional offers
and promotional competitions or games, must
meet a number of transparency requirements;
these requirements are without prejudice to Di-
rective 97/7/EC; this Directive should not affect
existing Directives on commercial communica-
tions, in particular Directive 98/43/EC.
(30) The sending of unsolicited commercial
communications by electronic mail may be
undesirable for consumers and information
society service providers and may disrupt the
smooth functioning of interactive networks; the
question of consent by recipient of certain forms
of unsolicited commercial communications is
not addressed by this Directive, but has already
been addressed, in particular, by Directive 97/7/
EC and by Directive 97/66/EC; in Member States
which authorise unsolicited commercial com-
munications by electronic mail, the setting up of
appropriate industry filtering initiatives should
be encouraged and facilitated; in addition it is
necessary that in any event unsolicited commer-
cial communities are clearly identifiable as such
in order to improve transparency and to facili-
tate the functioning of such industry initiatives;
unsolicited commercial communications by
electronic mail should not result in additional
communication costs for the recipient.
(31) Member States which allow the sending of
unsolicited commercial communications by
electronic mail without prior consent of the
recipient by service providers established in their
territory have to ensure that the service providers
consult regularly and respect the opt-out regis-
ters in which natural persons not wishing to
receive such commercial communications can
register themselves.
(32) In order to remove barriers to the develop-
ment of cross-border services within the Com-
munity which members of the regulated
professions might offer on the Internet, it is nec-
essary that compliance be guaranteed at Com-
munity level with professional rules aiming, in
particular, to protect consumers or public
health; codes of conduct at Community level
would be the best means of determining the
rules on professional ethics applicable to com-
mercial communication; the drawing-up or,
where appropriate, the adaptation of such rules
should be encouraged without prejudice to the
autonomy of professional bodies and associa-
tions.
(33) This Directive complements Community
law and national law relating to regulated pro-
fessions maintaining a coherent set of applicable
rules in this field.
(34) Each Member State is to amend its legisla-
tion containing requirements, and in particular
requirements as to form, which are likely to curb
the use of contracts by electronic means; the
examination of the legislation requiring such
adjustment should be systematic and should
cover all the necessary stages and acts of the con-
tractual process, including the filing of the con-
tract; the result of this amendment should be to
make contracts concluded electronically worka-
ble; the legal effect of electronic signatures is
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dealt with by Directive 1999/93/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 1999 on a Community framework for
electronic signatures(24); the acknowledgement
of receipt by a service provider may take the form
of the on-line provision of the service paid for.
(24) OJ L 13, 19.1.2000, p. 12.
(35) This Directive does not affect Member
States' possibility of maintaining or establishing
general or specific legal requirements for con-
tracts which can be fulfilled by electronic means,
in particular requirements concerning secure
electronic signatures.
(36) Member States may maintain restrictions
for the use of electronic contracts with regard to
contracts requiring by law the involvement of
courts, public authorities, or professions exercis-
ing public authority; this possibility also covers
contracts which require the involvement of
courts, public authorities, or professions exercis-
ing public authority in order to have an effect
with regard to third parties as well as contracts
requiring by law certification or attestation by a
notary.
(37) Member States' obligation to remove obsta-
cles to the use of electronic contracts concerns
only obstacles resulting from legal requirements
and not practical obstacles resulting from the
impossibility of using electronic means in cer-
tain cases.
(38) Member States' obligation to remove obsta-
cles to the use of electronic contracts is to be
implemented in conformity with legal require-
ments for contracts enshrined in Community
law.
(39) The exceptions to the provisions concerning
the contracts concluded exclusively by electronic
mail or by equivalent individual communica-
tions provided for by this Directive, in relation to
information to be provided and the placing of
orders, should not enable, as a result, the by-
passing of those provisions by providers of infor-
mation society services.
(40) Both existing and emerging disparities in
Member States' legislation and case-law con-
cerning liability of service providers acting as
intermediaries prevent the smooth functioning
of the internal market, in particular by impairing
the development of cross-border services and
producing distortions of competition; service
providers have a duty to act, under certain cir-
cumstances, with a view to preventing or stop-
ping illegal activities; this Directive should
constitute the appropriate basis for the develop-
ment of rapid and reliable procedures for remov-
ing and disabling access to illegal information;
such mechanisms could be developed on the
basis of voluntary agreements between all parties
concerned and should be encouraged by Mem-
ber States; it is in the interest of all parties
involved in the provision of information society
services to adopt and implement such proce-
dures; the provisions of this Directive relating to
liability should not preclude the development
and effective operation, by the different inter-
ested parties, of technical systems of protection
and identification and of technical surveillance
instruments made possible by digital technology
within the limits laid down by Directives 95/46/
EC and 97/66/EC.
(41) This Directive strikes a balance between the
different interests at stake and establishes princi-
ples upon which industry agreements and stand-
ards can be based.
(42) The exemptions from liability established in
this Directive cover only cases where the activity
of the information society service provider is
limited to the technical process of operating and
giving access to a communication network over
which information made available by third par-
ties is transmitted or temporarily stored, for the
sole purpose of making the transmission more
efficient; this activity is of a mere technical, auto-
matic and passive nature, which implies that the
information society service provider has neither
knowledge of nor control over the information
which is transmitted or stored.
(43) A service provider can benefit from the
exemptions for "mere conduit" and for "cach-
ing" when he is in no way involved with the
information transmitted; this requires among
other things that he does not modify the infor-
mation that he transmits; this requirement does
not cover manipulations of a technical nature
which take place in the course of the transmis-
sion as they do not alter the integrity of the
information contained in the transmission.
(44) A service provider who deliberately collabo-
rates with one of the recipients of his service in
order to undertake illegal acts goes beyond the
activities of "mere conduit" or "caching" and as
a result cannot benefit from the liability exemp-
tions established for these activities.
(45) The limitations of the liability of intermedi-
ary service providers established in this Directive
do not affect the possibility of injunctions of dif-
ferent kinds; such injunctions can in particular
consist of orders by courts or administrative
authorities requiring the termination or preven-
tion of any infringement, including the removal
of illegal information or the disabling of access
to it.
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(46) In order to benefit from a limitation of lia-
bility, the provider of an information society
service, consisting of the storage of information,
upon obtaining actual knowledge or awareness
of illegal activities has to act expeditiously to
remove or to disable access to the information
concerned; the removal or disabling of access has
to be undertaken in the observance of the princi-
ple of freedom of expression and of procedures
established for this purpose at national level;
this Directive does not affect Member States'
possibility of establishing specific requirements
which must be fulfilled expeditiously prior to
the removal or disabling of information.
(47) Member States are prevented from impos-
ing a monitoring obligation on service providers
only with respect to obligations of a general
nature; this does not concern monitoring obliga-
tions in a specific case and, in particular, does
not affect orders by national authorities in
accordance with national legislation.
(48) This Directive does not affect the possibility
for Member States of requiring service providers,
who host information provided by recipients of
their service, to apply duties of care, which can
reasonably be expected from them and which are
specified by national law, in order to detect and
prevent certain types of illegal activities.
(49) Member States and the Commission are to
encourage the drawing-up of codes of conduct;
this is not to impair the voluntary nature of such
codes and the possibility for interested parties of
deciding freely whether to adhere to such codes.
(50) It is important that the proposed directive
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copy-
right and related rights in the information soci-
ety and this Directive come into force within a
similar time scale with a view to establishing a
clear framework of rules relevant to the issue of
liability of intermediaries for copyright and
relating rights infringements at Community
level.
(51) Each Member State should be required,
where necessary, to amend any legislation which
is liable to hamper the use of schemes for the
out-of-court settlement of disputes through
electronic channels; the result of this amend-
ment must be to make the functioning of such
schemes genuinely and effectively possible in law
and in practice, even across borders.
(52) The effective exercise of the freedoms of the
internal market makes it necessary to guarantee
victims effective access to means of settling dis-
putes; damage which may arise in connection
with information society services is characterised
both by its rapidity and by its geographical
extent; in view of this specific character and the
need to ensure that national authorities do not
endanger the mutual confidence which they
should have in one another, this Directive
requests Member States to ensure that appropri-
ate court actions are available; Member States
should examine the need to provide access to
judicial procedures by appropriate electronic
means.
(53) Directive 98/27/EC, which is applicable to
information society services, provides a mecha-
nism relating to actions for an injunction aimed
at the protection of the collective interests of
consumers; this mechanism will contribute to
the free movement of information society serv-
ices by ensuring a high level of consumer protec-
tion.
(54) The sanctions provided for under this
Directive are without prejudice to any other
sanction or remedy provided under national law;
Member States are not obliged to provide crimi-
nal sanctions for infringement of national provi-
sions adopted pursuant to this Directive.
(55) This Directive does not affect the law appli-
cable to contractual obligations relating to con-
sumer contracts; accordingly, this Directive
cannot have the result of depriving the con-
sumer of the protection afforded to him by the
mandatory rules relating to contractual obliga-
tions of the law of the Member State in which he
has his habitual residence.
(56) As regards the derogation contained in this
Directive regarding contractual obligations con-
cerning contracts concluded by consumers,
those obligations should be interpreted as
including information on the essential elements
of the content of the contract, including con-
sumer rights, which have a determining influ-
ence on the decision to contract.
(57) The Court of Justice has consistently held
that a Member State retains the right to take
measures against a service provider that is estab-
lished in another Member State but directs all or
most of his activity to the territory of the first
Member State if the choice of establishment was
made with a view to evading the legislation that
would have applied to the provider had he been
established on the territory of the first Member
State.
(58) This Directive should not apply to services
supplied by service providers established in a
third country; in view of the global dimension of
electronic commerce, it is, however, appropriate
to ensure that the Community rules are consist-
ent with international rules; this Directive is
without prejudice to the results of discussions
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within international organisations (amongst
others WTO, OECD, Uncitral) on legal issues.
(59) Despite the global nature of electronic com-
munications, coordination of national regula-
tory measures at European Union level is
necessary in order to avoid fragmentation of the
internal market, and for the establishment of an
appropriate European regulatory framework;
such coordination should also contribute to the
establishment of a common and strong negoti-
ating position in international forums.
(60) In order to allow the unhampered develop-
ment of electronic commerce, the legal frame-
work must be clear and simple, predictable and
consistent with the rules applicable at interna-
tional level so that it does not adversely affect the
competitiveness of European industry or impede
innovation in that sector.
(61) If the market is actually to operate by elec-
tronic means in the context of globalisation, the
European Union and the major non-European
areas need to consult each other with a view to
making laws and procedures compatible.
(62) Cooperation with third countries should be
strengthened in the area of electronic commerce,
in particular with applicant countries, the devel-
oping countries and the European Union's other
trading partners.
(63) The adoption of this Directive will not pre-
vent the Member States from taking into
account the various social, societal and cultural
implications which are inherent in the advent of
the information society; in particular it should
not hinder measures which Member States
might adopt in conformity with Community law
to achieve social, cultural and democratic goals
taking into account their linguistic diversity,
national and regional specificities as well as their
cultural heritage, and to ensure and maintain
public access to the widest possible range of
information society services; in any case, the
development of the information society is to
ensure that Community citizens can have access
to the cultural European heritage provided in
the digital environment.
(64) Electronic communication offers the Mem-
ber States an excellent means of providing public
services in the cultural, educational and linguis-
tic fields.
(65) The Council, in its resolution of 19 January
1999 on the consumer dimension of the infor-
mation society(25), stressed that the protection
of consumers deserved special attention in this
field; the Commission will examine the degree to
which existing consumer protection rules pro-
vide insufficient protection in the context of the
information society and will identify, where nec-
essary, the deficiencies of this legislation and
those issues which could require additional
measures; if need be, the Commission should
make specific additional proposals to resolve
such deficiencies that will thereby have been
identified,
(25) OJ C 23, 28.1.1999, p. 1.
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
CHAPTER I. 
General provisions
Article 1. Objective and scope
1. This Directive seeks to contribute to the proper
functioning of the internal market by ensuring
the free movement of information society servic-
es between the Member States.
2. This Directive approximates, to the extent nec-
essary for the achievement of the objective set out
in paragraph 1, certain national provisions on in-
formation society services relating to the internal
market, the establishment of service providers,
commercial communications, electronic con-
tracts, the liability of intermediaries, codes of
conduct, out-of-court dispute settlements, court
actions and cooperation between Member States.
3. This Directive complements Community law
applicable to information society services with-
out prejudice to the level of protection for, in par-
ticular, public health and consumer interests, as
established by Community acts and national leg-
islation implementing them in so far as this does
not restrict the freedom to provide information
society services.
4. This Directive does not establish additional
rules on private international law nor does it deal
with the jurisdiction of Courts.
5. This Directive shall not apply to:
(a) the field of taxation; 
(b) questions relating to information society
services covered by Directives 95/46/EC and 97/
66/EC; 
(c) questions relating to agreements or practices
governed by cartel law; 
(d) the following activities of information society
services:
- the activities of notaries or equivalent profes-
sions to the extent that they involve a direct and
specific connection with the exercise of public
authority,
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- the representation of a client and defence of his
interests before the courts,
- gambling activities which involve wagering a
stake with monetary value in games of chance,
including lotteries and betting transactions.
6. This Directive does not affect measures taken
at Community or national level, in the respect of
Community law, in order to promote cultural
and linguistic diversity and to ensure the defence
of pluralism.
Article 2. Definitions
For the purpose of this Directive, the following
terms shall bear the following meanings:
(a) "information society services": services
within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive
98/34/EC as amended by Directive 98/48/EC; 
(b) "service provider": any natural or legal per-
son providing an information society service; 
(c) "established service provider": a service pro-
vider who effectively pursues an economic activ-
ity using a fixed establishment for an indefinite
period. The presence and use of the technical
means and technologies required to provide the
service do not, in themselves, constitute an
establishment of the provider; 
(d) "recipient of the service": any natural or legal
person who, for professional ends or otherwise,
uses an information society service, in particular
for the purposes of seeking information or mak-
ing it accessible; 
(e) "consumer": any natural person who is acting
for purposes which are outside his or her trade,
business or profession; 
(f) "commercial communication": any form of
communication designed to promote, directly or
indirectly, the goods, services or image of a com-
pany, organisation or person pursuing a com-
mercial, industrial or craft activity or exercising a
regulated profession. The following do not in
themselves constitute commercial communica-
tions:
- information allowing direct access to the activ-
ity of the company, organisation or person, in
particular a domain name or an electronic-mail
address,
- communications relating to the goods, services
or image of the company, organisation or person
compiled in an independent manner, particu-
larly when this is without financial considera-
tion; 
(g) "regulated profession": any profession within
the meaning of either Article 1(d) of Council
Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 on a
general system for the recognition of higher-edu-
cation diplomas awarded on completion of pro-
fessional education and training of at least three-
years' duration(26) or of Article 1(f) of Council
Directive 92/51/EEC of 18 June 1992 on a sec-
ond general system for the recognition of profes-
sional education and training to supplement
Directive 89/48/EEC(27); 
(h) "coordinated field": requirements laid down
in Member States' legal systems applicable to
information society service providers or informa-
tion society services, regardless of whether they
are of a general nature or specifically designed
for them.
(i) The coordinated field concerns requirements
with which the service provider has to comply in
respect of:
- the taking up of the activity of an information
society service, such as requirements concerning
qualifications, authorisation or notification,
- the pursuit of the activity of an information
society service, such as requirements concerning
the behaviour of the service provider, require-
ments regarding the quality or content of the
service including those applicable to advertising
and contracts, or requirements concerning the
liability of the service provider; 
(ii) The coordinated field does not cover require-
ments such as:
- requirements applicable to goods as such,
- requirements applicable to the delivery of
goods,
- requirements applicable to services not pro-
vided by electronic means.
(26) OJ L 19, 24.1.1989, p. 16.
(27) OJ L 209, 24.7.1992, p. 25. Directive as last amended by
Commission Directive 97/38/EC (OJ L 184, 12.7.1997, p. 31).
Article 3. Internal market
1. Each Member State shall ensure that the infor-
mation society services provided by a service pro-
vider established on its territory comply with the
national provisions applicable in the Member
State in question which fall within the coordinat-
ed field.
2. Member States may not, for reasons falling
within the coordinated field, restrict the freedom
to provide information society services from an-
other Member State.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the fields
referred to in the Annex.
4. Member States may take measures to derogate
from paragraph 2 in respect of a given informa-
tion society service if the following conditions are
fulfilled:
(a) the measures shall be:
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(i) necessary for one of the following reasons:
- public policy, in particular the prevention,
investigation, detection and prosecution of crim-
inal offences, including the protection of minors
and the fight against any incitement to hatred
on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality,
and violations of human dignity concerning
individual persons,
- the protection of public health,
- public security, including the safeguarding of
national security and defence,
- the protection of consumers, including inves-
tors; 
(ii) taken against a given information society
service which prejudices the objectives referred
to in point (i) or which presents a serious and
grave risk of prejudice to those objectives; 
(iii) proportionate to those objectives; 
(b) before taking the measures in question and
without prejudice to court proceedings, includ-
ing preliminary proceedings and acts carried out
in the framework of a criminal investigation, the
Member State has:
- asked the Member State referred to in para-
graph 1 to take measures and the latter did not
take such measures, or they were inadequate,
- notified the Commission and the Member
State referred to in paragraph 1 of its intention
to take such measures.
5. Member States may, in the case of urgency, der-
ogate from the conditions stipulated in para-
graph 4(b). Where this is the case, the measures
shall be notified in the shortest possible time to
the Commission and to the Member State re-
ferred to in paragraph 1, indicating the reasons
for which the Member State considers that there
is urgency.
6. Without prejudice to the Member State's pos-
sibility of proceeding with the measures in ques-
tion, the Commission shall examine the compat-
ibility of the notified measures with Community
law in the shortest possible time; where it comes
to the conclusion that the measure is incompati-
ble with Community law, the Commission shall
ask the Member State in question to refrain from
taking any proposed measures or urgently to put
an end to the measures in question.
CHAPTER II. 
Principles
Section 1. 
Establishment and information requirements
Article 4. Principle excluding prior authorisa-
tion
1. Member States shall ensure that the taking up
and pursuit of the activity of an information so-
ciety service provider may not be made subject to
prior authorisation or any other requirement
having equivalent effect.
2. Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to au-
thorisation schemes which are not specifically
and exclusively targeted at information society
services, or which are covered by Directive 97/13/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 10 April 1997 on a common framework for
general authorisations and individual licences in
the field of telecommunications services(28).
(28) OJ L 117, 7.5.1997, p. 15.
Article 5. General information to be provided
1. In addition to other information requirements
established by Community law, Member States
shall ensure that the service provider shall render
easily, directly and permanently accessible to the
recipients of the service and competent authori-
ties, at least the following information:
(a) the name of the service provider; 
(b) the geographic address at which the service
provider is established; 
(c) the details of the service provider, including
his electronic mail address, which allow him to
be contacted rapidly and communicated with in
a direct and effective manner; 
(d) where the service provider is registered in a
trade or similar public register, the trade register
in which the service provider is entered and his
registration number, or equivalent means of
identification in that register; 
(e) where the activity is subject to an authorisa-
tion scheme, the particulars of the relevant
supervisory authority; 
(f) as concerns the regulated professions:
- any professional body or similar institution
with which the service provider is registered,
- the professional title and the Member State
where it has been granted,
- a reference to the applicable professional rules
in the Member State of establishment and the
means to access them; 
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(g) where the service provider undertakes an
activity that is subject to VAT, the identification
number referred to in Article 22(1) of the sixth
Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977
on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member
States relating to turnover taxes - Common sys-
tem of value added tax: uniform basis of assess-
ment(29).
2. In addition to other information requirements
established by Community law, Member States
shall at least ensure that, where information soci-
ety services refer to prices, these are to be indicat-
ed clearly and unambiguously and, in particular,
must indicate whether they are inclusive of tax
and delivery costs.
(29) OJ L 145, 13.6.1977, p. 1. Directive as last amended by Di-
rective 1999/85/EC (OJ L 277, 28.10.1999, p. 34).
Section 2. 
Commercial communications
Article 6. Information to be provided
In addition to other information requirements
established by Community law, Member States
shall ensure that commercial communications
which are part of, or constitute, an information
society service comply at least with the following
conditions:
(a) the commercial communication shall be
clearly identifiable as such; 
(b) the natural or legal person on whose behalf
the commercial communication is made shall be
clearly identifiable; 
(c) promotional offers, such as discounts, premi-
ums and gifts, where permitted in the Member
State where the service provider is established,
shall be clearly identifiable as such, and the con-
ditions which are to be met to qualify for them
shall be easily accessible and be presented clearly
and unambiguously; 
(d) promotional competitions or games, where
permitted in the Member State where the service
provider is established, shall be clearly identifia-
ble as such, and the conditions for participation
shall be easily accessible and be presented clearly
and unambiguously.
Article 7. Unsolicited commercial communi-
cation
1. In addition to other requirements established
by Community law, Member States which permit
unsolicited commercial communication by elec-
tronic mail shall ensure that such commercial
communication by a service provider established
in their territory shall be identifiable clearly and
unambiguously as such as soon as it is received by
the recipient.
2. Without prejudice to Directive 97/7/EC and
Directive 97/66/EC, Member States shall take
measures to ensure that service providers under-
taking unsolicited commercial communications
by electronic mail consult regularly and respect
the opt-out registers in which natural persons
not wishing to receive such commercial commu-
nications can register themselves.
Article 8. Regulated professions
1. Member States shall ensure that the use of
commercial communications which are part of,
or constitute, an information society service pro-
vided by a member of a regulated profession is
permitted subject to compliance with the profes-
sional rules regarding, in particular, the inde-
pendence, dignity and honour of the profession,
professional secrecy and fairness towards clients
and other members of the profession.
2. Without prejudice to the autonomy of profes-
sional bodies and associations, Member States
and the Commission shall encourage profession-
al associations and bodies to establish codes of
conduct at Community level in order to deter-
mine the types of information that can be given
for the purposes of commercial communication
in conformity with the rules referred to in para-
graph 1.
3. When drawing up proposals for Community
initiatives which may become necessary to ensure
the proper functioning of the Internal Market
with regard to the information referred to in par-
agraph 2, the Commission shall take due account
of codes of conduct applicable at Community
level and shall act in close cooperation with the
relevant professional associations and bodies.
4. This Directive shall apply in addition to Com-
munity Directives concerning access to, and the
exercise of, activities of the regulated professions.
Section 3. 
Contracts concluded by electronic means
Article 9. Treatment of contracts
1. Member States shall ensure that their legal sys-
tem allows contracts to be concluded by electron-
ic means. Member States shall in particular en-
sure that the legal requirements applicable to the
contractual process neither create obstacles for
the use of electronic contracts nor result in such
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contracts being deprived of legal effectiveness
and validity on account of their having been
made by electronic means.
2. Member States may lay down that paragraph 1
shall not apply to all or certain contracts falling
into one of the following categories:
(a) contracts that create or transfer rights in real
estate, except for rental rights; 
(b) contracts requiring by law the involvement of
courts, public authorities or professions exercis-
ing public authority; 
(c) contracts of suretyship granted and on collat-
eral securities furnished by persons acting for
purposes outside their trade, business or profes-
sion; 
(d) contracts governed by family law or by the
law of succession.
3. Member States shall indicate to the Commis-
sion the categories referred to in paragraph 2 to
which they do not apply paragraph 1. Member
States shall submit to the Commission every five
years a report on the application of paragraph 2
explaining the reasons why they consider it neces-
sary to maintain the category referred to in para-
graph 2(b) to which they do not apply paragraph
1.
Article 10. Information to be provided
1. In addition to other information requirements
established by Community law, Member States
shall ensure, except when otherwise agreed by
parties who are not consumers, that at least the
following information is given by the service pro-
vider clearly, comprehensibly and unambiguous-
ly and prior to the order being placed by the recip-
ient of the service:
(a) the different technical steps to follow to con-
clude the contract; 
(b) whether or not the concluded contract will be
filed by the service provider and whether it will
be accessible; 
(c) the technical means for identifying and cor-
recting input errors prior to the placing of the
order; 
(d) the languages offered for the conclusion of
the contract.
2. Member States shall ensure that, except when
otherwise agreed by parties who are not consum-
ers, the service provider indicates any relevant
codes of conduct to which he subscribes and in-
formation on how those codes can be consulted
electronically.
3. Contract terms and general conditions provid-
ed to the recipient must be made available in a
way that allows him to store and reproduce them.
4. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to contracts
concluded exclusively by exchange of electronic
mail or by equivalent individual communica-
tions.
Article 11. Placing of the order
1. Member States shall ensure, except when oth-
erwise agreed by parties who are not consumers,
that in cases where the recipient of the service
places his order through technological means,
the following principles apply:
- the service provider has to acknowledge the
receipt of the recipient's order without undue
delay and by electronic means,
- the order and the acknowledgement of receipt
are deemed to be received when the parties to
whom they are addressed are able to access them.
2. Member States shall ensure that, except when
otherwise agreed by parties who are not consum-
ers, the service provider makes available to the re-
cipient of the service appropriate, effective and
accessible technical means allowing him to iden-
tify and correct input errors, prior to the placing
of the order.
3. Paragraph 1, first indent, and paragraph 2 shall
not apply to contracts concluded exclusively by
exchange of electronic mail or by equivalent indi-
vidual communications.
Section 4. 
Liability of intermediary service providers
Article 12. "Mere conduit"
1. Where an information society service is provid-
ed that consists of the transmission in a commu-
nication network of information provided by a
recipient of the service, or the provision of access
to a communication network, Member States
shall ensure that the service provider is not liable
for the information transmitted, on condition
that the provider:
(a) does not initiate the transmission; 
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmis-
sion; and
(c) does not select or modify the information
contained in the transmission.
2. The acts of transmission and of provision of ac-
cess referred to in paragraph 1 include the auto-
matic, intermediate and transient storage of the
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information transmitted in so far as this takes
place for the sole purpose of carrying out the
transmission in the communication network,
and provided that the information is not stored
for any period longer than is reasonably neces-
sary for the transmission.
3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a
court or administrative authority, in accordance
with Member States' legal systems, of requiring
the service provider to terminate or prevent an in-
fringement.
Article 13. "Caching"
1. Where an information society service is provid-
ed that consists of the transmission in a commu-
nication network of information provided by a
recipient of the service, Member States shall en-
sure that the service provider is not liable for the
automatic, intermediate and temporary storage
of that information, performed for the sole pur-
pose of making more efficient the information's
onward transmission to other recipients of the
service upon their request, on condition that:
(a) the provider does not modify the informa-
tion; 
(b) the provider complies with conditions on
access to the information; 
(c) the provider complies with rules regarding
the updating of the information, specified in a
manner widely recognised and used by industry; 
(d) the provider does not interfere with the law-
ful use of technology, widely recognised and
used by industry, to obtain data on the use of the
information; and
(e) the provider acts expeditiously to remove or
to disable access to the information it has stored
upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact
that the information at the initial source of the
transmission has been removed from the net-
work, or access to it has been disabled, or that a
court or an administrative authority has ordered
such removal or disablement.
2. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a
court or administrative authority, in accordance
with Member States' legal systems, of requiring
the service provider to terminate or prevent an in-
fringement.
Article 14. Hosting
1. Where an information society service is provid-
ed that consists of the storage of information
provided by a recipient of the service, Member
States shall ensure that the service provider is not
liable for the information stored at the request of
a recipient of the service, on condition that:
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge
of illegal activity or information and, as regards
claims for damages, is not aware of facts or cir-
cumstances from which the illegal activity or
information is apparent; or
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge
or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to
disable access to the information.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient
of the service is acting under the authority or the
control of the provider.
3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a
court or administrative authority, in accordance
with Member States' legal systems, of requiring
the service provider to terminate or prevent an in-
fringement, nor does it affect the possibility for
Member States of establishing procedures gov-
erning the removal or disabling of access to infor-
mation.
Article 15. No general obligation to monitor
1. Member States shall not impose a general obli-
gation on providers, when providing the services
covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the
information which they transmit or store, nor a
general obligation actively to seek facts or cir-
cumstances indicating illegal activity.
2. Member States may establish obligations for
information society service providers promptly
to inform the competent public authorities of al-
leged illegal activities undertaken or information
provided by recipients of their service or obliga-
tions to communicate to the competent authori-
ties, at their request, information enabling the
identification of recipients of their service with
whom they have storage agreements.
CHAPTER III. 
Implementation
Article 16. Codes of conduct
1. Member States and the Commission shall en-
courage:
(a) the drawing up of codes of conduct at Com-
munity level, by trade, professional and con-
sumer associations or organisations, designed to
contribute to the proper implementation of Arti-
cles 5 to 15; 
(b) the voluntary transmission of draft codes of
conduct at national or Community level to the
Commission; 
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(c) the accessibility of these codes of conduct in
the Community languages by electronic means; 
(d) the communication to the Member States
and the Commission, by trade, professional and
consumer associations or organisations, of their
assessment of the application of their codes of
conduct and their impact upon practices, habits
or customs relating to electronic commerce; 
(e) the drawing up of codes of conduct regarding
the protection of minors and human dignity.
2. Member States and the Commission shall en-
courage the involvement of associations or or-
ganisations representing consumers in the draft-
ing and implementation of codes of conduct
affecting their interests and drawn up in accord-
ance with paragraph 1(a). Where appropriate, to
take account of their specific needs, associations
representing the visually impaired and disabled
should be consulted.
Article 17. Out-of-court dispute settlement
1. Member States shall ensure that, in the event of
disagreement between an information society
service provider and the recipient of the service,
their legislation does not hamper the use of out-
of-court schemes, available under national law,
for dispute settlement, including appropriate
electronic means.
2. Member States shall encourage bodies respon-
sible for the out-of-court settlement of, in partic-
ular, consumer disputes to operate in a way
which provides adequate procedural guarantees
for the parties concerned.
3. Member States shall encourage bodies respon-
sible for out-of-court dispute settlement to in-
form the Commission of the significant deci-
sions they take regarding information society
services and to transmit any other information
on the practices, usages or customs relating to
electronic commerce.
Article 18. Court actions
1. Member States shall ensure that court actions
available under national law concerning informa-
tion society services' activities allow for the rapid
adoption of measures, including interim meas-
ures, designed to terminate any alleged infringe-
ment and to prevent any further impairment of
the interests involved.
2. The Annex to Directive 98/27/EC shall be sup-
plemented as follows:
"11. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on
certain legal aspects on information society serv-
ices, in particular electronic commerce, in the
internal market (Directive on electronic com-
merce) (OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1)."
Article 19. Cooperation
1. Member States shall have adequate means of
supervision and investigation necessary to imple-
ment this Directive effectively and shall ensure
that service providers supply them with the req-
uisite information.
2. Member States shall cooperate with other
Member States; they shall, to that end, appoint
one or several contact points, whose details they
shall communicate to the other Member States
and to the Commission.
3. Member States shall, as quickly as possible,
and in conformity with national law, provide the
assistance and information requested by other
Member States or by the Commission, including
by appropriate electronic means.
4. Member States shall establish contact points
which shall be accessible at least by electronic
means and from which recipients and service
providers may:
(a) obtain general information on contractual
rights and obligations as well as on the com-
plaint and redress mechanisms available in the
event of disputes, including practical aspects
involved in the use of such mechanisms; 
(b) obtain the details of authorities, associations
or organisations from which they may obtain
further information or practical assistance.
5. Member States shall encourage the communi-
cation to the Commission of any significant ad-
ministrative or judicial decisions taken in their
territory regarding disputes relating to informa-
tion society services and practices, usages and
customs relating to electronic commerce. The
Commission shall communicate these decisions
to the other Member States.
Article 20. Sanctions
Member States shall determine the sanctions ap-
plicable to infringements of national provisions
adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take
all measures necessary to ensure that they are en-
forced. The sanctions they provide for shall be ef-
fective, proportionate and dissuasive.
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CHAPTER IV. 
Final provisions
Article 21. Re-examination
1. Before 17 July 2003, and thereafter every two
years, the Commission shall submit to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council and the Economic
and Social Committee a report on the applica-
tion of this Directive, accompanied, where neces-
sary, by proposals for adapting it to legal, techni-
cal and economic developments in the field of
information society services, in particular with
respect to crime prevention, the protection of mi-
nors, consumer protection and to the proper
functioning of the internal market.
2. In examining the need for an adaptation of this
Directive, the report shall in particular analyse
the need for proposals concerning the liability of
providers of hyperlinks and location tool servic-
es, "notice and take down" procedures and the
attribution of liability following the taking down
of content. The report shall also analyse the need
for additional conditions for the exemption from
liability, provided for in Articles 12 and 13, in the
light of technical developments, and the possibil-
ity of applying the internal market principles to
unsolicited commercial communications by elec-
tronic mail.
Article 22. Transposition
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions neces-
sary to comply with this Directive before 17 Janu-
ary 2002. They shall forthwith inform the Com-
mission thereof.
2. When Member States adopt the measures re-
ferred to in paragraph 1, these shall contain a ref-
erence to this Directive or shall be accompanied
by such reference at the time of their official pub-
lication. The methods of making such reference
shall be laid down by Member States.
Article 23. Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of
its publication in the Official Journal of the Eu-
ropean Communities.
Article 24. Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Luxemburg, 8 June 2000.
ANNEX. 
Derogations from article 3
As provided for in Article 3(3), Article 3(1) and
(2) do not apply to:
- copyright, neighbouring rights, rights referred
to in Directive 87/54/EEC(1) and Directive 96/9/
EC(2) as well as industrial property rights,
- the emission of electronic money by institu-
tions in respect of which Member States have
applied one of the derogations provided for in
Article 8(1) of Directive 2000/46/EC(3),
- Article 44(2) of Directive 85/611/EEC(4),
- Article 30 and Title IV of Directive 92/49/
EEC(5), Title IV of Directive 92/96/EEC(6), Arti-
cles 7 and 8 of Directive 88/357/EEC(7) and
Article 4 of Directive 90/619/EEC(8),
- the freedom of the parties to choose the law
applicable to their contract,
- contractual obligations concerning consumer
contacts,
- formal validity of contracts creating or transfer-
ring rights in real estate where such contracts are
subject to mandatory formal requirements of
the law of the Member State where the real estate
is situated,
- the permissibility of unsolicited commercial
communications by electronic mail.
(1) OJ L 24, 27.1.1987, p. 36.
(2) OJ L 77, 27.3.1996, p. 20.
(3) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
(4) OJ L 375, 31.12.1985, p. 3. Directive as last amended by Di-
rective 95/26/EC (OJ L 168, 18.7.1995, p. 7).
(5) OJ L 228, 11.8.1992, p. 1. Directive as last amended by Direc-
tive 95/26/EC.
(6) OJ L 360, 9.12.1992, p. 2. Directive as last amended by Direc-
tive 95/26/EC.
(7) OJ L 172, 4.7.1988, p. 1. Directive as last amended by Direc-
tive 92/49/EC.
(8) OJ L 330, 29.11.1990, p. 50. Directive as last amended by Di-
rective 92/96/EC.
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DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUN-
CIL OF 22 MAY 2001 ON THE HARMONISATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF COPY-
RIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
(Directive Copyright Information Society)
Official Journal L 167, 22 June 2001
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Community, and in particular Articles
47(2), 55 and 95 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Com-
mission,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic
and Social Committee,
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid
down in Article 251 of the Treaty,
Whereas:
(1) The Treaty provides for the establishment of
an internal market and the institution of a sys-
tem ensuring that competition in the internal
market is not distorted. Harmonisation of the
laws of the Member States on copyright and re-
lated rights contributes to the achievement of
these objectives.
(2) The European Council, meeting at Corfu on
24 and 25 June 1994, stressed the need to create a
general and flexible legal framework at Commu-
nity level in order to foster the development of
the information society in Europe. This requires,
inter alia, the existence of an internal market for
new products and services. Important Communi-
ty legislation to ensure such a regulatory frame-
work is already in place or its adoption is well un-
der way. Copyright and related rights play an
important role in this context as they protect and
stimulate the development and marketing of new
products and services and the creation and ex-
ploitation of their creative content.
(3) The proposed harmonisation will help to im-
plement the four freedoms of the internal market
and relates to compliance with the fundamental
principles of law and especially of property, in-
cluding intellectual property, and freedom of ex-
pression and the public interest.
(4) A harmonised legal framework on copyright
and related rights, through increased legal cer-
tainty and while providing for a high level of pro-
tection of intellectual property, will foster sub-
stantial investment in creativity and innovation,
including network infrastructure, and lead in
turn to growth and increased competitiveness of
European industry, both in the area of content
provision and information technology and more
generally across a wide range of industrial and
cultural sectors. This will safeguard employment
and encourage new job creation.
(5) Technological development has multiplied
and diversified the vectors for creation, produc-
tion and exploitation. While no new concepts for
the protection of intellectual property are need-
ed, the current law on copyright and related
rights should be adapted and supplemented to
respond adequately to economic realities such as
new forms of exploitation.
(6) Without harmonisation at Community level,
legislative activities at national level which have
already been initiated in a number of Member
States in order to respond to the technological
challenges might result in significant differences
in protection and thereby in restrictions on the
free movement of services and products incorpo-
rating, or based on, intellectual property, leading
to a refragmentation of the internal market and
legislative inconsistency. The impact of such leg-
islative differences and uncertainties will become
more significant with the further development of
the information society, which has already great-
ly increased transborder exploitation of intellec-
tual property. This development will and should
further increase. Significant legal differences and
uncertainties in protection may hinder econo-
mies of scale for new products and services con-
taining copyright and related rights.
(7) The Community legal framework for the pro-
tection of copyright and related rights must,
therefore, also be adapted and supplemented as
far as is necessary for the smooth functioning of
the internal market. To that end, those national
provisions on copyright and related rights which
vary considerably from one Member State to an-
other or which cause legal uncertainties hinder-
ing the smooth functioning of the internal mar-
ket and the proper development of the
information society in Europe should be adjust-
ed, and inconsistent national responses to the
technological developments should be avoided,
whilst differences not adversely affecting the
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functioning of the internal market need not be
removed or prevented.
(8) The various social, societal and cultural impli-
cations of the information society require that ac-
count be taken of the specific features of the con-
tent of products and services.
(9) Any harmonisation of copyright and related
rights must take as a basis a high level of protec-
tion, since such rights are crucial to intellectual
creation. Their protection helps to ensure the
maintenance and development of creativity in
the interests of authors, performers, producers,
consumers, culture, industry and the public at
large. Intellectual property has therefore been
recognised as an integral part of property.
(10) If authors or performers are to continue
their creative and artistic work, they have to re-
ceive an appropriate reward for the use of their
work, as must producers in order to be able to fi-
nance this work. The investment required to pro-
duce products such as phonograms, films or
multimedia products, and services such as "on-
demand" services, is considerable. Adequate legal
protection of intellectual property rights is neces-
sary in order to guarantee the availability of such
a reward and provide the opportunity for satis-
factory returns on this investment.
(11) A rigorous, effective system for the protec-
tion of copyright and related rights is one of the
main ways of ensuring that European cultural
creativity and production receive the necessary
resources and of safeguarding the independence
and dignity of artistic creators and performers.
(12) Adequate protection of copyright works and
subject-matter of related rights is also of great
importance from a cultural standpoint. Article
151 of the Treaty requires the Community to take
cultural aspects into account in its action.
(13) A common search for, and consistent appli-
cation at European level of, technical measures to
protect works and other subject-matter and to
provide the necessary information on rights are
essential insofar as the ultimate aim of these
measures is to give effect to the principles and
guarantees laid down in law.
(14) This Directive should seek to promote learn-
ing and culture by protecting works and other
subject-matter while permitting exceptions or
limitations in the public interest for the purpose
of education and teaching.
(15) The Diplomatic Conference held under the
auspices of the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganisation (WIPO) in December 1996 led to the
adoption of two new Treaties, the "WIPO Copy-
right Treaty" and the "WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty", dealing respectively with
the protection of authors and the protection of
performers and phonogram producers. Those
Treaties update the international protection for
copyright and related rights significantly, not
least with regard to the so-called "digital agen-
da", and improve the means to fight piracy
world-wide. The Community and a majority of
Member States have already signed the Treaties
and the process of making arrangements for the
ratification of the Treaties by the Community
and the Member States is under way. This Direc-
tive also serves to implement a number of the
new international obligations.
(16) Liability for activities in the network envi-
ronment concerns not only copyright and related
rights but also other areas, such as defamation,
misleading advertising, or infringement of trade-
marks, and is addressed horizontally in Directive
2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal as-
pects of information society services, in particu-
lar electronic commerce, in the internal market
("Directive on electronic commerce"), which
clarifies and harmonises various legal issues re-
lating to information society services including
electronic commerce. This Directive should be
implemented within a timescale similar to that
for the implementation of the Directive on elec-
tronic commerce, since that Directive provides a
harmonised framework of principles and provi-
sions relevant inter alia to important parts of this
Directive. This Directive is without prejudice to
provisions relating to liability in that Directive.
(17) It is necessary, especially in the light of the re-
quirements arising out of the digital environ-
ment, to ensure that collecting societies achieve a
higher level of rationalisation and transparency
with regard to compliance with competition
rules.
(18) This Directive is without prejudice to the ar-
rangements in the Member States concerning the
management of rights such as extended collective
licences.
(19) The moral rights of rightholders should be
exercised according to the legislation of the
Member States and the provisions of the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Ar-
tistic Works, of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and
mwb-3164-european.media.law.book  Page 253  Wednesday, August 17, 2011  2:33 PM
254
EU-Directives and other EU-instruments
of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty. Such moral rights remain outside the
scope of this Directive.
(20) This Directive is based on principles and
rules already laid down in the Directives current-
ly in force in this area, in particular Directives 91/
250/EEC, 92/100/EEC, 93/83/EEC, 93/98/EEC
and 96/9/EC, and it develops those principles
and rules and places them in the context of the
information society. The provisions of this Direc-
tive should be without prejudice to the provi-
sions of those Directives, unless otherwise pro-
vided in this Directive.
(21) This Directive should define the scope of the
acts covered by the reproduction right with re-
gard to the different beneficiaries. This should be
done in conformity with the acquis communau-
taire. A broad definition of these acts is needed to
ensure legal certainty within the internal market.
(22) The objective of proper support for the dis-
semination of culture must not be achieved by
sacrificing strict protection of rights or by toler-
ating illegal forms of distribution of counterfeit-
ed or pirated works.
(23) This Directive should harmonise further the
author's right of communication to the public.
This right should be understood in a broad sense
covering all communication to the public not
present at the place where the communication
originates. This right should cover any such
transmission or retransmission of a work to the
public by wire or wireless means, including
broadcasting. This right should not cover any
other acts.
(24) The right to make available to the public
subject-matter referred to in Article 3(2) should
be understood as covering all acts of making
available such subject-matter to members of the
public not present at the place where the act of
making available originates, and as not covering
any other acts.
(25) The legal uncertainty regarding the nature
and the level of protection of acts of on-demand
transmission of copyright works and subject-
matter protected by related rights over networks
should be overcome by providing for harmonised
protection at Community level. It should be
made clear that all right holders recognised by
this Directive should have an exclusive right to
make available to the public copyright works or
any other subject-matter by way of interactive on-
demand transmissions. Such interactive on-de-
mand transmissions are characterised by the fact
that members of the public may access them
from a place and at a time individually chosen by
them.
(26) With regard to the making available in on-
demand services by broadcasters of their radio or
television productions incorporating music from
commercial phonograms as an integral part
thereof, collective licensing arrangements are to
be encouraged in order to facilitate the clearance
of the rights concerned.
(27) The mere provision of physical facilities for
enabling or making a communication does not
in itself amount to communication within the
meaning of this Directive.
(28) Copyright protection under this Directive
includes the exclusive right to control distribu-
tion of the work incorporated in a tangible arti-
cle. The first sale in the Community of the origi-
nal of a work or copies thereof by the rightholder
or with his consent exhausts the right to control
resale of that object in the Community. This
right should not be exhausted in respect of the
original or of copies thereof sold by the right-
holder or with his consent outside the Commu-
nity. Rental and lending rights for authors have
been established in Directive 92/100/EEC. The
distribution right provided for in this Directive is
without prejudice to the provisions relating to
the rental and lending rights contained in Chap-
ter I of that Directive.
(29) The question of exhaustion does not arise in
the case of services and on-line services in partic-
ular. This also applies with regard to a material
copy of a work or other subject-matter made by a
user of such a service with the consent of the
rightholder. Therefore, the same applies to rental
and lending of the original and copies of works or
other subject-matter which are services by nature.
Unlike CD-ROM or CD-I, where the intellectual
property is incorporated in a material medium,
namely an item of goods, every on-line service is
in fact an act which should be subject to authori-
sation where the copyright or related right so
provides.
(30) The rights referred to in this Directive may
be transferred, assigned or subject to the granting
of contractual licences, without prejudice to the
relevant national legislation on copyright and re-
lated rights.
(31) A fair balance of rights and interests between
the different categories of rightholders, as well as
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between the different categories of rightholders
and users of protected subject-matter must be
safeguarded. The existing exceptions and limita-
tions to the rights as set out by the Member
States have to be reassessed in the light of the new
electronic environment. Existing differences in
the exceptions and limitations to certain restrict-
ed acts have direct negative effects on the func-
tioning of the internal market of copyright and
related rights. Such differences could well be-
come more pronounced in view of the further de-
velopment of transborder exploitation of works
and cross-border activities. In order to ensure the
proper functioning of the internal market, such
exceptions and limitations should be defined
more harmoniously. The degree of their harmo-
nisation should be based on their impact on the
smooth functioning of the internal market.
(32) This Directive provides for an exhaustive
enumeration of exceptions and limitations to the
reproduction right and the right of communica-
tion to the public. Some exceptions or limita-
tions only apply to the reproduction right, where
appropriate. This list takes due account of the
different legal traditions in Member States,
while, at the same time, aiming to ensure a func-
tioning internal market. Member States should
arrive at a coherent application of these excep-
tions and limitations, which will be assessed
when reviewing implementing legislation in the
future.
(33) The exclusive right of reproduction should
be subject to an exception to allow certain acts of
temporary reproduction, which are transient or
incidental reproductions, forming an integral
and essential part of a technological process and
carried out for the sole purpose of enabling either
efficient transmission in a network between third
parties by an intermediary, or a lawful use of a
work or other subject-matter to be made. The
acts of reproduction concerned should have no
separate economic value on their own. To the ex-
tent that they meet these conditions, this excep-
tion should include acts which enable browsing
as well as acts of caching to take place, including
those which enable transmission systems to
function efficiently, provided that the intermedi-
ary does not modify the information and does
not interfere with the lawful use of technology,
widely recognised and used by industry, to obtain
data on the use of the information. A use should
be considered lawful where it is authorised by the
rightholder or not restricted by law.
(34) Member States should be given the option of
providing for certain exceptions or limitations
for cases such as educational and scientific pur-
poses, for the benefit of public institutions such
as libraries and archives, for purposes of news re-
porting, for quotations, for use by people with
disabilities, for public security uses and for uses
in administrative and judicial proceedings.
(35) In certain cases of exceptions or limitations,
rightholders should receive fair compensation to
compensate them adequately for the use made of
their protected works or other subject-matter.
When determining the form, detailed arrange-
ments and possible level of such fair compensa-
tion, account should be taken of the particular
circumstances of each case. When evaluating
these circumstances, a valuable criterion would
be the possible harm to the rightholders result-
ing from the act in question. In cases where right-
holders have already received payment in some
other form, for instance as part of a licence fee, no
specific or separate payment may be due. The lev-
el of fair compensation should take full account
of the degree of use of technological protection
measures referred to in this Directive. In certain
situations where the prejudice to the rightholder
would be minimal, no obligation for payment
may arise.
(36) The Member States may provide for fair
compensation for rightholders also when apply-
ing the optional provisions on exceptions or lim-
itations which do not require such compensa-
tion.
(37) Existing national schemes on reprography,
where they exist, do not create major barriers to
the internal market. Member States should be al-
lowed to provide for an exception or limitation in
respect of reprography.
(38) Member States should be allowed to provide
for an exception or limitation to the reproduc-
tion right for certain types of reproduction of au-
dio, visual and audio-visual material for private
use, accompanied by fair compensation. This
may include the introduction or continuation of
remuneration schemes to compensate for the
prejudice to rightholders. Although differences
between those remuneration schemes affect the
functioning of the internal market, those differ-
ences, with respect to analogue private reproduc-
tion, should not have a significant impact on the
development of the information society. Digital
private copying is likely to be more widespread
and have a greater economic impact. Due ac-
count should therefore be taken of the differenc-
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es between digital and analogue private copying
and a distinction should be made in certain re-
spects between them.
(39) When applying the exception or limitation
on private copying, Member States should take
due account of technological and economic de-
velopments, in particular with respect to digital
private copying and remuneration schemes,
when effective technological protection meas-
ures are available. Such exceptions or limitations
should not inhibit the use of technological meas-
ures or their enforcement against circumvention.
(40) Member States may provide for an exception
or limitation for the benefit of certain non-profit
making establishments, such as publicly accessi-
ble libraries and equivalent institutions, as well as
archives. However, this should be limited to cer-
tain special cases covered by the reproduction
right. Such an exception or limitation should not
cover uses made in the context of on-line delivery
of protected works or other subject-matter. This
Directive should be without prejudice to the
Member States' option to derogate from the ex-
clusive public lending right in accordance with
Article 5 of Directive 92/100/EEC. Therefore,
specific contracts or licences should be promoted
which, without creating imbalances, favour such
establishments and the disseminative purposes
they serve.
(41) When applying the exception or limitation
in respect of ephemeral recordings made by
broadcasting organisations it is understood that
a broadcaster's own facilities include those of a
person acting on behalf of and under the respon-
sibility of the broadcasting organisation.
(42) When applying the exception or limitation
for non-commercial educational and scientific
research purposes, including distance learning,
the non-commercial nature of the activity in
question should be determined by that activity as
such. The organisational structure and the
means of funding of the establishment con-
cerned are not the decisive factors in this respect.
(43) It is in any case important for the Member
States to adopt all necessary measures to facili-
tate access to works by persons suffering from a
disability which constitutes an obstacle to the use
of the works themselves, and to pay particular at-
tention to accessible formats.
(44) When applying the exceptions and limita-
tions provided for in this Directive, they should
be exercised in accordance with international ob-
ligations. Such exceptions and limitations may
not be applied in a way which prejudices the legit-
imate interests of the rightholder or which con-
flicts with the normal exploitation of his work or
other subject-matter. The provision of such ex-
ceptions or limitations by Member States should,
in particular, duly reflect the increased economic
impact that such exceptions or limitations may
have in the context of the new electronic environ-
ment. Therefore, the scope of certain exceptions
or limitations may have to be even more limited
when it comes to certain new uses of copyright
works and other subject-matter.
(45) The exceptions and limitations referred to in
Article 5(2), (3) and (4) should not, however, pre-
vent the definition of contractual relations de-
signed to ensure fair compensation for the right-
holders insofar as permitted by national law.
(46) Recourse to mediation could help users and
rightholders to settle disputes. The Commission,
in cooperation with the Member States within
the Contact Committee, should undertake a
study to consider new legal ways of settling dis-
putes concerning copyright and related rights.
(47) Technological development will allow right-
holders to make use of technological measures
designed to prevent or restrict acts not author-
ised by the rightholders of any copyright, rights
related to copyright or the sui generis right in da-
tabases. The danger, however, exists that illegal
activities might be carried out in order to enable
or facilitate the circumvention of the technical
protection provided by these measures. In order
to avoid fragmented legal approaches that could
potentially hinder the functioning of the internal
market, there is a need to provide for harmonised
legal protection against circumvention of effec-
tive technological measures and against provi-
sion of devices and products or services to this ef-
fect.
(48) Such legal protection should be provided in
respect of technological measures that effectively
restrict acts not authorised by the rightholders of
any copyright, rights related to copyright or the
sui generis right in databases without, however,
preventing the normal operation of electronic
equipment and its technological development.
Such legal protection implies no obligation to de-
sign devices, products, components or services to
correspond to technological measures, so long as
such device, product, component or service does
not otherwise fall under the prohibition of Arti-
cle 6. Such legal protection should respect pro-
portionality and should not prohibit those devic-
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es or activities which have a commercially
significant purpose or use other than to circum-
vent the technical protection. In particular, this
protection should not hinder research into cryp-
tography.
(49) The legal protection of technological meas-
ures is without prejudice to the application of
any national provisions which may prohibit the
private possession of devices, products or compo-
nents for the circumvention of technological
measures.
(50) Such a harmonised legal protection does not
affect the specific provisions on protection pro-
vided for by Directive 91/250/EEC. In particular,
it should not apply to the protection of techno-
logical measures used in connection with compu-
ter programs, which is exclusively addressed in
that Directive. It should neither inhibit nor pre-
vent the development or use of any means of cir-
cumventing a technological measure that is nec-
essary to enable acts to be undertaken in
accordance with the terms of Article 5(3) or Arti-
cle 6 of Directive 91/250/EEC. Articles 5 and 6 of
that Directive exclusively determine exceptions
to the exclusive rights applicable to computer
programs.
(51) The legal protection of technological meas-
ures applies without prejudice to public policy, as
reflected in Article 5, or public security. Member
States should promote voluntary measures taken
by rightholders, including the conclusion and
implementation of agreements between right-
holders and other parties concerned, to accom-
modate achieving the objectives of certain excep-
tions or limitations provided for in national law
in accordance with this Directive. In the absence
of such voluntary measures or agreements within
a reasonable period of time, Member States
should take appropriate measures to ensure that
rightholders provide beneficiaries of such excep-
tions or limitations with appropriate means of
benefiting from them, by modifying an imple-
mented technological measure or by other
means. However, in order to prevent abuse of
such measures taken by rightholders, including
within the framework of agreements, or taken by
a Member State, any technological measures ap-
plied in implementation of such measures
should enjoy legal protection.
(52) When implementing an exception or limita-
tion for private copying in accordance with Arti-
cle 5(2)(b), Member States should likewise pro-
mote the use of voluntary measures to
accommodate achieving the objectives of such ex-
ception or limitation. If, within a reasonable peri-
od of time, no such voluntary measures to make
reproduction for private use possible have been
taken, Member States may take measures to ena-
ble beneficiaries of the exception or limitation
concerned to benefit from it. Voluntary measures
taken by rightholders, including agreements be-
tween rightholders and other parties concerned,
as well as measures taken by Member States, do
not prevent rightholders from using technologi-
cal measures which are consistent with the excep-
tions or limitations on private copying in nation-
al law in accordance with Article 5(2)(b), taking
account of the condition of fair compensation
under that provision and the possible differenti-
ation between various conditions of use in ac-
cordance with Article 5(5), such as controlling
the number of reproductions. In order to prevent
abuse of such measures, any technological meas-
ures applied in their implementation should en-
joy legal protection.
(53) The protection of technological measures
should ensure a secure environment for the pro-
vision of interactive on-demand services, in such
a way that members of the public may access
works or other subject-matter from a place and at
a time individually chosen by them. Where such
services are governed by contractual arrange-
ments, the first and second subparagraphs of Ar-
ticle 6(4) should not apply. Non-interactive
forms of online use should remain subject to
those provisions.
(54) Important progress has been made in the in-
ternational standardisation of technical systems
of identification of works and protected subject-
matter in digital format. In an increasingly net-
worked environment, differences between tech-
nological measures could lead to an incompati-
bility of systems within the Community.
Compatibility and interoperability of the differ-
ent systems should be encouraged. It would be
highly desirable to encourage the development of
global systems.
(55) Technological development will facilitate
the distribution of works, notably on networks,
and this will entail the need for rightholders to
identify better the work or other subject-matter,
the author or any other rightholder, and to pro-
vide information about the terms and conditions
of use of the work or other subject-matter in or-
der to render easier the management of rights at-
tached to them. Rightholders should be encour-
aged to use markings indicating, in addition to
the information referred to above, inter alia their
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authorisation when putting works or other sub-
ject-matter on networks.
(56) There is, however, the danger that illegal ac-
tivities might be carried out in order to remove or
alter the electronic copyright-management infor-
mation attached to it, or otherwise to distribute,
import for distribution, broadcast, communicate
to the public or make available to the public
works or other protected subject-matter from
which such information has been removed with-
out authority. In order to avoid fragmented legal
approaches that could potentially hinder the
functioning of the internal market, there is a
need to provide for harmonised legal protection
against any of these activities.
(57) Any such rights-management information
systems referred to above may, depending on
their design, at the same time process personal
data about the consumption patterns of protect-
ed subject-matter by individuals and allow for
tracing of on-line behaviour. These technical
means, in their technical functions, should incor-
porate privacy safeguards in accordance with Di-
rective 95/46/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and the free move-
ment of such data.
(58) Member States should provide for effective
sanctions and remedies for infringements of
rights and obligations as set out in this Directive.
They should take all the measures necessary to
ensure that those sanctions and remedies are ap-
plied. The sanctions thus provided for should be
effective, proportionate and dissuasive and
should include the possibility of seeking damag-
es and/or injunctive relief and, where appropri-
ate, of applying for seizure of infringing material.
(59) In the digital environment, in particular, the
services of intermediaries may increasingly be
used by third parties for infringing activities. In
many cases such intermediaries are best placed to
bring such infringing activities to an end. There-
fore, without prejudice to any other sanctions
and remedies available, rightholders should have
the possibility of applying for an injunction
against an intermediary who carries a third par-
ty's infringement of a protected work or other
subject-matter in a network. This possibility
should be available even where the acts carried
out by the intermediary are exempted under Arti-
cle 5. The conditions and modalities relating to
such injunctions should be left to the national
law of the Member States.
(60) The protection provided under this Directive
should be without prejudice to national or Com-
munity legal provisions in other areas, such as in-
dustrial property, data protection, conditional
access, access to public documents, and the rule
of media exploitation chronology, which may af-
fect the protection of copyright or related rights.
(61) In order to comply with the WIPO Perform-
ances and Phonograms Treaty, Directives 92/
100/EEC and 93/98/EEC should be amended,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
CHAPTER I. 
Objective and scope
Article 1. Scope
1. This Directive concerns the legal protection of
copyright and related rights in the framework of
the internal market, with particular emphasis on
the information society.
2. Except in the cases referred to in Article 11, this
Directive shall leave intact and shall in no way af-
fect existing Community provisions relating to:
(a) the legal protection of computer programs; 
(b) rental right, lending right and certain rights
related to copyright in the field of intellectual
property; 
(c) copyright and related rights applicable to
broadcasting of programmes by satellite and
cable retransmission; 
(d) the term of protection of copyright and cer-
tain related rights; 
(e) the legal protection of databases.
CHAPTER II. 
Rights and exceptions
Article 2. Reproduction right
Member States shall provide for the exclusive
right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect,
temporary or permanent reproduction by any
means and in any form, in whole or in part:
(a) for authors, of their works; 
(b) for performers, of fixations of their perform-
ances; 
(c) for phonogram producers, of their phono-
grams; 
(d) for the producers of the first fixations of
films, in respect of the original and copies of
their films; 
(e) for broadcasting organisations, of fixations
of their broadcasts, whether those broadcasts are
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transmitted by wire or over the air, including by
cable or satellite.
Article 3. Right of communication to the pub-
lic of works and right of making available to
the public other subject-matter
1. Member States shall provide authors with the
exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any com-
munication to the public of their works, by wire
or wireless means, including the making available
to the public of their works in such a way that
members of the public may access them from a
place and at a time individually chosen by them.
2. Member States shall provide for the exclusive
right to authorise or prohibit the making availa-
ble to the public, by wire or wireless means, in
such a way that members of the public may access
them from a place and at a time individually cho-
sen by them:
(a) for performers, of fixations of their perform-
ances; 
(b) for phonogram producers, of their phono-
grams; 
(c) for the producers of the first fixations of
films, of the original and copies of their films; 
(d) for broadcasting organisations, of fixations
of their broadcasts, whether these broadcasts are
transmitted by wire or over the air, including by
cable or satellite.
3. The rights referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2
shall not be exhausted by any act of communica-
tion to the public or making available to the pub-
lic as set out in this Article.
Article 4. Distribution right
1. Member States shall provide for authors, in re-
spect of the original of their works or of copies
thereof, the exclusive right to authorise or pro-
hibit any form of distribution to the public by
sale or otherwise.
2. The distribution right shall not be exhausted
within the Community in respect of the original
or copies of the work, except where the first sale
or other transfer of ownership in the Community
of that object is made by the rightholder or with
his consent.
Article 5. Exceptions and limitations
1. Temporary acts of reproduction referred to in
Article 2, which are transient or incidental [and]
an integral and essential part of a technological
process and whose sole purpose is to enable:
(a) a transmission in a network between third
parties by an intermediary, or
(b) a lawful use
of a work or other subject-matter to be made,
and which have no independent economic sig-
nificance, shall be exempted from the reproduc-
tion right provided for in Article 2.
2. Member States may provide for exceptions or
limitations to the reproduction right provided
for in Article 2 in the following cases:
(a) in respect of reproductions on paper or any
similar medium, effected by the use of any kind
of photographic technique or by some other
process having similar effects, with the exception
of sheet music, provided that the rightholders
receive fair compensation; 
(b) in respect of reproductions on any medium
made by a natural person for private use and for
ends that are neither directly nor indirectly com-
mercial, on condition that the rightholders
receive fair compensation which takes account
of the application or non-application of techno-
logical measures referred to in Article 6 to the
work or subject-matter concerned; 
(c) in respect of specific acts of reproduction
made by publicly accessible libraries, educational
establishments or museums, or by archives,
which are not for direct or indirect economic or
commercial advantage; 
(d) in respect of ephemeral recordings of works
made by broadcasting organisations by means of
their own facilities and for their own broadcasts;
the preservation of these recordings in official
archives may, on the grounds of their excep-
tional documentary character, be permitted; 
(e) in respect of reproductions of broadcasts
made by social institutions pursuing non-com-
mercial purposes, such as hospitals or prisons,
on condition that the rightholders receive fair
compensation.
3. Member States may provide for exceptions or
limitations to the rights provided for in Articles 2
and 3 in the following cases:
(a) use for the sole purpose of illustration for
teaching or scientific research, as long as the
source, including the author's name, is indi-
cated, unless this turns out to be impossible and
to the extent justified by the non-commercial
purpose to be achieved; 
(b) uses, for the benefit of people with a disabil-
ity, which are directly related to the disability
and of a non-commercial nature, to the extent
required by the specific disability; 
(c) reproduction by the press, communication to
the public or making available of published arti-
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cles on current economic, political or religious
topics or of broadcast works or other subject-
matter of the same character, in cases where such
use is not expressly reserved, and as long as the
source, including the author's name, is indi-
cated, or use of works or other subject-matter in
connection with the reporting of current events,
to the extent justified by the informatory pur-
pose and as long as the source, including the
author's name, is indicated, unless this turns out
to be impossible; 
(d) quotations for purposes such as criticism or
review, provided that they relate to a work or
other subject-matter which has already been law-
fully made available to the public, that, unless
this turns out to be impossible, the source,
including the author's name, is indicated, and
that their use is in accordance with fair practice,
and to the extent required by the specific pur-
pose; 
(e) use for the purposes of public security or to
ensure the proper performance or reporting of
administrative, parliamentary or judicial pro-
ceedings; 
(f) use of political speeches as well as extracts of
public lectures or similar works or subject-mat-
ter to the extent justified by the informatory
purpose and provided that the source, including
the author's name, is indicated, except where
this turns out to be impossible; 
(g) use during religious celebrations or official
celebrations organised by a public authority; 
(h) use of works, such as works of architecture or
sculpture, made to be located permanently in
public places; 
(i) incidental inclusion of a work or other sub-
ject-matter in other material; 
(j) use for the purpose of advertising the public
exhibition or sale of artistic works, to the extent
necessary to promote the event, excluding any
other commercial use; 
(k) use for the purpose of caricature, parody or
pastiche; 
(l) use in connection with the demonstration or
repair of equipment; 
(m) use of an artistic work in the form of a build-
ing or a drawing or plan of a building for the
purposes of reconstructing the building; 
(n) use by communication or making available,
for the purpose of research or private study, to
individual members of the public by dedicated
terminals on the premises of establishments
referred to in paragraph 2(c) of works and other
subject-matter not subject to purchase or licens-
ing terms which are contained in their collec-
tions; 
(o) use in certain other cases of minor impor-
tance where exceptions or limitations already
exist under national law, provided that they only
concern analogue uses and do not affect the free
circulation of goods and services within the
Community, without prejudice to the other
exceptions and limitations contained in this
Article.
4. Where the Member States may provide for an
exception or limitation to the right of reproduc-
tion pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3, they may
provide similarly for an exception or limitation
to the right of distribution as referred to in Arti-
cle 4 to the extent justified by the purpose of the
authorised act of reproduction.
5. The exceptions and limitations provided for in
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only be applied in
certain special cases which do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work or other subject-
matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the le-
gitimate interests of the rightholder.
CHAPTER III. 
Protection of technological measures 
and rights-management information
Article 6. Obligations as to technological
measures
1. Member States shall provide adequate legal
protection against the circumvention of any ef-
fective technological measures, which the person
concerned carries out in the knowledge, or with
reasonable grounds to know, that he or she is
pursuing that objective.
2. Member States shall provide adequate legal
protection against the manufacture, import, dis-
tribution, sale, rental, advertisement for sale or
rental, or possession for commercial purposes of
devices, products or components or the provision
of services which:
(a) are promoted, advertised or marketed for the
purpose of circumvention of, or
(b) have only a limited commercially significant
purpose or use other than to circumvent, or
(c) are primarily designed, produced, adapted or
performed for the purpose of enabling or facili-
tating the circumvention of,
any effective technological measures.
3. For the purposes of this Directive, the expres-
sion "technological measures" means any tech-
nology, device or component that, in the normal
course of its operation, is designed to prevent or
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restrict acts, in respect of works or other subject-
matter, which are not authorised by the right-
holder of any copyright or any right related to
copyright as provided for by law or the sui generis
right provided for in Chapter III of Directive 96/
9/EC. Technological measures shall be deemed
"effective" where the use of a protected work or
other subject-matter is controlled by the right-
holders through application of an access control
or protection process, such as encryption, scram-
bling or other transformation of the work or oth-
er subject-matter or a copy control mechanism,
which achieves the protection objective.
4. Notwithstanding the legal protection provided
for in paragraph 1, in the absence of voluntary
measures taken by rightholders, including agree-
ments between rightholders and other parties
concerned, Member States shall take appropriate
measures to ensure that rightholders make avail-
able to the beneficiary of an exception or limita-
tion provided for in national law in accordance
with Article 5(2)(a), (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e), (3)(a),
(3)(b) or (3)(e) the means of benefiting from that
exception or limitation, to the extent necessary to
benefit from that exception or limitation and
where that beneficiary has legal access to the pro-
tected work or subject-matter concerned.
A Member State may also take such measures in
respect of a beneficiary of an exception or limita-
tion provided for in accordance with Article
5(2)(b), unless reproduction for private use has
already been made possible by rightholders to
the extent necessary to benefit from the excep-
tion or limitation concerned and in accordance
with the provisions of Article 5(2)(b) and (5),
without preventing rightholders from adopting
adequate measures regarding the number of
reproductions in accordance with these provi-
sions.
The technological measures applied voluntarily
by rightholders, including those applied in
implementation of voluntary agreements, and
technological measures applied in implementa-
tion of the measures taken by Member States,
shall enjoy the legal protection provided for in
paragraph 1.
The provisions of the first and second subpara-
graphs shall not apply to works or other subject-
matter made available to the public on agreed
contractual terms in such a way that members of
the public may access them from a place and at a
time individually chosen by them.
When this Article is applied in the context of Di-
rectives 92/100/EEC and 96/9/EC, this para-
graph shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Article 7. Obligations concerning rights-man-
agement information
1. Member States shall provide for adequate legal
protection against any person knowingly per-
forming without authority any of the following
acts:
(a) the removal or alteration of any electronic
rights-management information; 
(b) the distribution, importation for distribu-
tion, broadcasting, communication or making
available to the public of works or other subject-
matter protected under this Directive or under
Chapter III of Directive 96/9/EC from which
electronic rights-management information has
been removed or altered without authority,
if such person knows, or has reasonable grounds
to know, that by so doing he is inducing, ena-
bling, facilitating or concealing an infringement
of any copyright or any rights related to copy-
right as provided by law, or of the sui generis
right provided for in Chapter III of Directive 96/
9/EC.
2. For the purposes of this Directive, the expres-
sion "rights-management information" means
any information provided by rightholders which
identifies the work or other subject-matter re-
ferred to in this Directive or covered by the sui
generis right provided for in Chapter III of Direc-
tive 96/9/EC, the author or any other righthold-
er, or information about the terms and condi-
tions of use of the work or other subject-matter,
and any numbers or codes that represent such in-
formation.
The first subparagraph shall apply when any of
these items of information is associated with a
copy of, or appears in connection with the com-
munication to the public of, a work or other sub-
jectmatter referred to in this Directive or covered
by the sui generis right provided for in Chapter
III of Directive 96/9/EC.
CHAPTER IV. 
Common provisions
Article 8. Sanctions and remedies
1. Member States shall provide appropriate sanc-
tions and remedies in respect of infringements of
the rights and obligations set out in this Direc-
tive and shall take all the measures necessary to
ensure that those sanctions and remedies are ap-
plied. The sanctions thus provided for shall be ef-
fective, proportionate and dissuasive.
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2. Each Member State shall take the measures
necessary to ensure that rightholders whose in-
terests are affected by an infringing activity car-
ried out on its territory can bring an action for
damages and/or apply for an injunction and,
where appropriate, for the seizure of infringing
material as well as of devices, products or compo-
nents referred to in Article 6(2).
3. Member States shall ensure that rightholders
are in a position to apply for an injunction
against intermediaries whose services are used by
a third party to infringe a copyright or related
right.
Article 9. Continued application of other legal
provisions
This Directive shall be without prejudice to pro-
visions concerning in particular patent rights,
trade marks, design rights, utility models, topog-
raphies of semi-conductor products, type faces,
conditional access, access to cable of broadcast-
ing services, protection of national treasures, le-
gal deposit requirements, laws on restrictive prac-
tices and unfair competition, trade secrets,
security, confidentiality, data protection and pri-
vacy, access to public documents, the law of con-
tract.
Article 10. Application over time
1. The provisions of this Directive shall apply in
respect of all works and other subject-matter re-
ferred to in this Directive which are, on 22 De-
cember 2002, protected by the Member States'
legislation in the field of copyright and related
rights, or which meet the criteria for protection
under the provisions of this Directive or the pro-
visions referred to in Article 1(2).
2. This Directive shall apply without prejudice to
any acts concluded and rights acquired before 22
December 2002.
Article 11. Technical adaptations
1. Directive 92/100/EEC is hereby amended as
follows:
(a) Article 7 shall be deleted; 
(b) Article 10(3) shall be replaced by the follow-
ing: "3. The limitations shall only be applied in
certain special cases which do not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the subject-matter and
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the rightholder."
2. Article 3(2) of Directive 93/98/EEC shall be re-
placed by the following: "2. The rights of produc-
ers of phonograms shall expire 50 years after the
fixation is made. However, if the phonogram has
been lawfully published within this period, the
said rights shall expire 50 years from the date of
the first lawful publication. If no lawful publica-
tion has taken place within the period mentioned
in the first sentence, and if the phonogram has
been lawfully communicated to the public within
this period, the said rights shall expire 50 years
from the date of the first lawful communication
to the public.
However, where through the expiry of the term
of protection granted pursuant to this para-
graph in its version before amendment by Direc-
tive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the har-
monisation of certain aspects of copyright and
related rights in the information society(11) the
rights of producers of phonograms are no longer
protected on 22 December 2002, this paragraph
shall not have the effect of protecting those
rights anew."
Article 12. Final provisions
1. Not later than 22 December 2004 and every
three years thereafter, the Commission shall sub-
mit to the European Parliament, the Council and
the Economic and Social Committee a report on
the application of this Directive, in which, inter
alia, on the basis of specific information supplied
by the Member States, it shall examine in partic-
ular the application of Articles 5, 6 and 8 in the
light of the development of the digital market. In
the case of Article 6, it shall examine in particular
whether that Article confers a sufficient level of
protection and whether acts which are permitted
by law are being adversely affected by the use of
effective technological measures. Where neces-
sary, in particular to ensure the functioning of
the internal market pursuant to Article 14 of the
Treaty, it shall submit proposals for amendments
to this Directive.
2. Protection of rights related to copyright under
this Directive shall leave intact and shall in no
way affect the protection of copyright.
3. A contact committee is hereby established. It
shall be composed of representatives of the com-
petent authorities of the Member States. It shall
be chaired by a representative of the Commission
and shall meet either on the initiative of the
chairman or at the request of the delegation of a
Member State.
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4. The tasks of the committee shall be as follows:
(a) to examine the impact of this Directive on the
functioning of the internal market, and to high-
light any difficulties; 
(b) to organise consultations on all questions
deriving from the application of this Directive; 
(c) to facilitate the exchange of information on
relevant developments in legislation and case-
law, as well as relevant economic, social, cultural
and technological developments; 
(d) to act as a forum for the assessment of the
digital market in works and other items, includ-
ing private copying and the use of technological
measures.
Article 13. Implementation
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions neces-
sary to comply with this Directive before 22 De-
cember 2002. They shall forthwith inform the
Commission thereof.
When Member States adopt these measures, they
shall contain a reference to this Directive or shall
be accompanied by such reference on the occa-
sion of their official publication. The methods of
making such reference shall be laid down by
Member States.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Com-
mission the text of the provisions of domestic law
which they adopt in the field governed by this Di-
rective.
Article 14. Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of
its publication in the Official Journal of the Eu-
ropean Communities.
Article 15. Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
PROTOCOL ON THE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN THE MEMBER
STATES  (1997)
Origin: Treaty of Amsterdam.
Protocol annexed to the Treaty establishing the
European Community (1997)
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
CONSIDERING that the system of public broad-
casting in the Member States is directly related to
the democratic, social and cultural needs of each
society and to the need to preserve media plural-
ism;
HAVE AGREED UPON the following interpreta-
tive provisions, which shall be annexed to the
Treaty establishing the European Community,
The provisions of the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Community shall be without prejudice to
the competence of Member States to provide for
the funding of public service broadcasting inso-
far as such funding is granted to broadcasting or-
ganisations for the fulfilment of the public serv-
ice remit as conferred, defined and organised by
each Member State, and insofar as such funding
does not affect trading conditions and competi-
tion in the Community to an extent which would
be contrary to the common interest, while the re-
alisation of the remit of that public service shall
be taken into account.
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RECOMMENDATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF
20 DECEMBER 2006 ON THE PROTECTION OF MINORS AND HUMAN DIGNITY
AND ON THE RIGHT OF REPLY IN RELATION TO THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE
EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL AND ON-LINE INFORMATION SERVICES INDUSTRY
(2006/952/EC)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Community, and in particular Article 157
thereof,
(...) 
Whereas:
(1) The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union [3] ("the Charter") declares in
Article 1 the inviolability of human dignity, pro-
viding that it must be respected and protected.
Article 24 of the Charter provides that children
have the right to such protection and care as is
necessary for their well-being and that in all ac-
tions relating to children, whether taken by pub-
lic authorities or private institutions, the child's
best interests must be a primary consideration.
[3] OJ C 364, 18.12.2000, p. 1.
(2) The European Union should gear its political
action to preventing any form of violation of the
principle of respect for human dignity.
(3) Legislative measures need to be enacted at Un-
ion level on the protection of the physical, mental
and moral development of minors in relation to
the content of all audiovisual and information
services and the protection of minors from access
to inappropriate adult programmes or services.
(4) The constant development of new informa-
tion and communication technologies makes it
urgent for the Community to ensure full and ad-
equate protection for citizens' interests in this
field on the one hand, by guaranteeing the free
delivery and free provision of information servic-
es and, on the other hand, by ensuring that their
content is legal, respects the principle of human
dignity and does not impair the overall develop-
ment of minors.
(5) The Community has already intervened in the
field of audiovisual and information services in
order to create the necessary conditions to ensure
the free movement of television broadcasts and
other information services, in compliance with
the principles of free competition and freedom of
expression and information, but it should act
with greater determination in this area with the
aim of adopting measures to protect consumers
from incitement to discrimination based on sex,
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disabili-
ty, age or sexual orientation and of combating
any such discrimination. Such action should
strike a balance between the protection of indi-
vidual rights on the one hand and freedom of ex-
pression on the other, in particular with respect
to Member States' responsibility for defining the
notion of incitement to hatred or discrimination
in accordance with their national legislation and
moral values.
(6) Council Recommendation 98/560/EC of 24
September 1998 on the development of the com-
petitiveness of the European audiovisual and in-
formation services industry by promoting na-
tional frameworks aimed at achieving a
comparable and effective level of protection of
minors and human dignity [4] is the first legal in-
strument at Community level which in its recital
(5) addresses issues of the protection of minors
and of human dignity in relation to audiovisual
and information services made available to the
public, whatever the means of conveyance. Article
22 of Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October
1989 on the coordination of certain provisions
laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative
Action in Member States concerning the pursuit
of television broadcasting activities [5] ("Televi-
sion without Frontiers Directive") has already
specifically addressed the question of the protec-
tion of minors and human dignity in television
broadcasting activities.
[4] OJ L 270, 7.10.1998, p. 48.
[5] OJ L 298, 17.10.1989, p. 23. Directive as amended by Direc-
tive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ
L 202, 30.7.1997, p. 60).
(7) It is suggested that the Council and the Com-
mission should pay special attention to the im-
plementation of this Recommendation when re-
vising, negotiating or concluding new
partnership agreements or new cooperation pro-
grammes with third countries, bearing in mind
the global character of producers, distributors or
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providers of audiovisual content and Internet ac-
cess.
(8) By Decision No 276/1999/EC [6], the Europe-
an Parliament and the Council adopted a multi-
annual Community Action plan on promoting
safer use of the Internet by combating illegal and
harmful content on global networks (the "Safer
Internet Action Plan").
[6] Decision No 276/1999/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 25 January 1999 adopting a multiannual Commu-
nity action plan on promoting safer use of the Internet by combat-
ing illegal and harmful content on global networks (OJ L 33,
6.2.1999, p. 1). Decision as last amended by Decision No 787/
2004/EC (OJ L 138, 30.4.2004, p. 12).
(9) Decision No 1151/2003/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council [7] extended the
Safer Internet Action Plan for two years and
amended its scope to include measures to en-
courage exchange of information and coordina-
tion with the relevant actors at national level as
well as special provisions for the accession coun-
tries.
[7] Decision No 1151/2003/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 16 June 2003 amending Decision No 276/1999/
EC adopting a multiannual Community action plan on promot-
ing safer use of the Internet by combating illegal and harmful con-
tent on global networks (OJ L 162, 1.7.2003, p. 1).
(10) Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on cer-
tain legal aspects of information society services,
in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal
Market [8] clarifies some legal concepts and har-
monises certain aspects in order to enable infor-
mation society services to fully benefit from the
internal market principles. A number of the pro-
visions of Directive 2000/31/EC are also relevant
to the protection of minors and human dignity,
in particular Article 16(1)(e), according to which
Member States and the Commission are to en-
courage the drawing up of codes of conduct re-
garding the protection of minors and human dig-
nity.
[8] OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1.
(11) The changing media landscape, resulting
from new technologies and media innovation,
makes it necessary to teach children, and also
parents, teachers and trainers to use audiovisual
and on-line information services effectively.
(12) On the whole, self-regulation of the audio-
visual sector is proving an effective additional
measure, but it is not sufficient to protect minors
from messages with harmful content. The devel-
opment of a European audiovisual area based on
freedom of expression and respect for citizens'
rights should be based on continuous dialogue
between national and European legislators, regu-
latory authorities, industries, associations, citi-
zens and civil society.
(13) In the public consultation concerning Direc-
tive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 30 June 1997 amending Council
Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of
certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States concern-
ing the pursuit of television broadcasting activi-
ties [9], it was suggested that the need to adopt
measures in relation to media literacy be includ-
ed among the subjects covered by Recommenda-
tion 98/560/EC.
[9] OJ L 202, 30.7.1997, p. 60.
(14) The Commission encourages cooperation
and the sharing of experience and best practices
between existing self- and co-regulatory bodies,
which deal with the rating or classification of au-
diovisual content, regardless of the means by
which it is delivered, with a view to enabling all
users, but especially parents, teachers and train-
ers, to report illegal content and assess the con-
tent of audiovisual and on-line information serv-
ices, as well as any legal content which could
harm the physical, mental or moral development
of minors.
(15) As suggested during the public consultation
concerning Directive 97/36/EC, it is appropriate
for the right of reply or equivalent remedies to ap-
ply to on-line media, and to take into account the
specific features of the medium and service con-
cerned.
(16) The Council Resolution of 5 October 1995
on the image of women and men portrayed in ad-
vertising and the media [10] invites the Member
States and the Commission to take adequate
measures to promote a diversified and realistic
picture of the skills and potential of women and
men in society.
[10] OJ C 296, 10.11.1995, p. 15. 
(17) When tabling its proposal for a Council Di-
rective implementing the principle of equal treat-
ment between men and women in the access to
and supply of goods and services, the Commis-
sion noted that the portrayal of the sexes in the
media and in advertising raises important ques-
tions about the protection of the dignity of men
and women, but concluded that, in the light of
other fundamental rights, including the freedom
and pluralism of the media, it would not be ap-
propriate to address these questions in that pro-
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posal but that it should take stock of these ques-
tions.
(18) The audiovisual and on-line information
services industry should be encouraged at Mem-
ber State level to avoid and to combat any type of
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic ori-
gin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual ori-
entation in such media and all advertising, in-
cluding new advertising techniques, without
infringing freedom of expression or of the press.
(19) This Recommendation covers new techno-
logical developments and complements Recom-
mendation 98/560/EC. Its scope, on account of
technological advances, includes audiovisual and
on-line information services made available to
the public via fixed or mobile electronic net-
works.
(20) Nothing in this Recommendation prevents
Member States from applying their constitution-
al provisions and other legislation and legal prac-
tices regarding freedom of expression,
HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT:
I. The Member States, in the interests of promot-
ing the development of the audiovisual and on-
line information services industry, take the neces-
sary measures to ensure the protection of minors
and human dignity in all audiovisual and on-line
information services by:
1. considering the introduction of measures into
their domestic law or practice regarding the right
of reply or equivalent remedies in relation to on-
line media, with due regard for their domestic
and constitutional legislative provisions, and
without prejudice to the possibility of adapting
the manner in which it is exercised to take into
account the particularities of each type of medi-
um;
2. promoting, in order to encourage the take-up
of technological developments, in addition to
and consistently with existing legal and other
measures regarding broadcasting services, and in
close cooperation with the parties concerned:
(a) action to enable minors to make responsible
use of audiovisual and on-line information serv-
ices, notably by improving the level of awareness
among parents, teachers and trainers of the
potential of the new services and of the means
whereby they may be made safe for minors, in
particular through media literacy or media edu-
cation programmes and, for instance, by contin-
uous training within school education,
(b) action to facilitate, where appropriate and
necessary, the identification of, and access to,
quality content and services for minors, includ-
ing through the provision of means of access in
educational establishments and public places,
(c) action to inform citizens more about the pos-
sibilities offered by the Internet;
examples of possible actions concerning media
literacy are outlined in Annex II;
3. promoting a responsible attitude on the part of
professionals, intermediaries and users of new
communication media such as the Internet by:
(a) encouraging the audiovisual and on-line
information services industry, without infring-
ing freedom of expression or of the press, to
avoid all discrimination based on sex, racial or
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or
sexual orientation, in all audiovisual and on-line
information services, and to combat such dis-
crimination,
(b) encouraging vigilance and the reporting of
pages considered illegal, without prejudice to
Directive 2000/31/EC,
(c) drawing up a code of conduct in cooperation
with professionals and regulatory authorities at
national and Community level;
4. promoting measures to combat all illegal activ-
ities harmful to minors on the Internet and make
the Internet a much more secure medium; con-
sideration could be given inter alia to the follow-
ing measures:
(a) adopting a quality label for service providers,
so that users can easily check whether or not a
given provider subscribes to a code of conduct,
(b) establishing appropriate means for the
reporting of illegal and/or suspicious activities
on the Internet.
II. The audiovisual and on-line information
services industry and other parties concerned:
1. develop positive measures for the benefit of mi-
nors, including initiatives to facilitate their wider
access to audiovisual and on-line information
services, while avoiding potentially harmful con-
tent, for instance by means of filtering systems.
Such measures could include harmonisation
through cooperation between the regulatory,
self-regulatory and co-regulatory bodies of the
Member States, and through the exchange of best
practices concerning such issues as a system of
common descriptive symbols or warning messag-
es indicating the age category and/or which as-
pects of the content have led to a certain age rec-
ommendation, which would help users to assess
the content of audiovisual and on-line informa-
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tion services. This could take place, for instance,
through the actions outlined in Annex III;
2. examine the possibility of creating filters
which would prevent information offending
against human dignity from passing through the
Internet;
3. develop measures to increase the use of content
labelling systems for material distributed over
the Internet;
4. consider effective means of avoiding and com-
bating discrimination based on sex, racial or eth-
nic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sex-
ual orientation in audiovisual and on-line
information services and of promoting a diversi-
fied and realistic picture of the skills and poten-
tial of men and women in society.
TAKE NOTE THAT THE COMMISSION:
1. Intends to promote, in connection with the
2005-2008 multiannual Community programme
on promoting safer use of the Internet and new
on-line technologies, information actions aimed
at citizens Europe-wide using all communica-
tions media, to inform the public about the ben-
efits and possible risks of the Internet, how to use
it responsibly and safely, how to make com-
plaints and how to activate parental control. Spe-
cific campaigns could be aimed at target groups
such as schools, parents' associations and users;
2. intends to explore the possibility of introduc-
ing a European freephone number or of extend-
ing an existing service to assist Internet users by
directing them to available complaint mecha-
nisms and information resources and providing
information for parents about the effectiveness
of filtering software;
3. intends to explore the possibility of supporting
the establishment of a generic second level do-
main name reserved for monitored sites commit-
ted to respecting minors and their rights, such
as.KID.eu;
4. continues to maintain a constructive and on-
going dialogue with content providers' organisa-
tions, consumer organisations and all parties
concerned;
5. intends to facilitate and support the formation
of networks by self-regulatory bodies and the ex-
changing of experience among them, so as to as-
sess the effectiveness of codes of conduct and ap-
proaches based on self-regulation in order to
ensure the highest possible standards of protec-
tion for minors;
6. intends to submit to the European Parliament
and the Council, on the basis of information sup-
plied by the Member States, a report on the im-
plementation and effectiveness of the measures
specified in this Recommendation, and to review
this Recommendation if and when the need aris-
es.
(...)
ANNEX I. Indicative guidelines for the imple-
mentation, at national level, of measures in do-
mestic law or practice so as to ensure the right of
reply or equivalent remedies in relation to on-
line media
Objective: introducing measures in the domestic
law or practice of the Member States in order to
ensure the right of reply or equivalent remedies
in relation to on-line media, with due regard for
their domestic and constitutional provisions
and without prejudice to the possibility of
adjusting its exercise to the particularities of
each type of medium.
The term "medium" refers to any means of com-
munication for dissemination to the public of
edited information on-line such as newspapers,
periodicals, radio, television and Internet-based
news services.
Without prejudice to other provisions adopted
by the Member States under civil, administrative
or criminal law, any natural or legal person,
regardless of nationality, whose legitimate inter-
ests, in particular, but not limited to, reputation
and good name, have been affected by an asser-
tion of facts in a publication or transmission
should have the right of reply or equivalent rem-
edies. Member States should ensure that the
actual exercise of the right of reply or equivalent
remedies is not hindered by the imposition of
unreasonable terms or conditions.
The right of reply or equivalent remedies should
exist in relation to on-line media under the juris-
diction of a Member State.
Member States should adopt the measures
needed to establish the right of reply or equiva-
lent remedies and should determine the proce-
dure to be followed for the exercise thereof. In
particular, they should ensure that a sufficient
time span is allowed and that the procedures are
such that the right of reply or equivalent reme-
dies can be exercised appropriately by natural or
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legal persons resident or established in other
Member States.
The right of reply can be ensured not only
through legislation, but also through co-regula-
tory or self-regulatory measures.
The right of reply is a particularly appropriate
remedy in the on-line environment because it
allows for an instant response to contested infor-
mation and it is technically easy to attach the
replies from the persons affected. However, the
reply should be within a reasonable time after
the request has been substantiated and at a time
and in a manner appropriate to the publication
or transmission to which the request refers.
Provision should be made for procedures
whereby disputes as to the exercise of the right of
reply or the equivalent remedies could be subject
to review by the courts or similar independent
bodies.
An application for exercise of right of reply or
the equivalent remedies may be rejected if the
claimant does not have a legitimate interest in
the publication of such a reply, or if the reply
would involve a punishable act, would render the
content provider liable to civil law proceedings
or would transgress standards of public decency.
The right of reply is without prejudice to other
remedies available to persons whose right to dig-
nity, honour, reputation or privacy have been
breached by the media.
ANNEX II. Examples of possible actions concer-
ing media literacy
(a) continuing education of teachers and train-
ers, in liaison with child protection associations,
on using the Internet in the context of school
education so as to maintain awareness of the
possible risks of the Internet with particular
regard to chatrooms and fora;
(b) introduction of specific Internet training
aimed at children from a very early age, includ-
ing sessions open to parents;
(c) an integrated educational approach forming
part of school curricula and media literacy pro-
grammes, so as to provide information on using
the Internet responsibly;
(d) organisation of national campaigns aimed at
citizens, involving all communications media, to
provide information on using the Internet
responsibly;
(e) distribution of information packs on possible
risks of the Internet ("how to surf the Internet
safely", "how to filter unwanted messages") and
the setting up of hotlines to which reports or
complaints concerning harmful or illegal con-
tent could be addressed;
(f) adequate measures to establish or improve
the performance of telephone hotlines, so as to
make it easier to lodge complaints and to make
it possible to report harmful or illegal content.
ANNEX III. Examples of possible actions by the
industries and the parties concerned for the ben-
efit of minors
(a) systematically providing users with an effec-
tive, updatable and easy-to-use filtering system
when they subscribe to an access provider;
(b) offering access to services specifically
intended for children which are equipped with
automatic filtering systems operated by access
providers and mobile telephone operators;
(c) introducing incentives to provide a regularly
updated description of the sites available, mak-
ing it easier to classify sites and assess their con-
tent;
(d) posting banners on search engines drawing
attention to the availability both of information
about responsible use of the Internet and of tele-
phone hotlines.
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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION ON THE APPLICATION OF STATE
AID RULES TO PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING (2 JULY 2009)
(Text with EEA relevance)
Official Journal C 257, 27 October 2009
1. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF THE
COMMUNICATION
1. Over the last three decades, broadcasting has
undergone important changes. The abolition of
monopolies, the emergence of new players and
rapid technological developments have funda-
mentally altered the competitive environment.
Television broadcasting was traditionally a re-
served activity. Since its inception, it has mostly
been provided by public undertakings under a
monopoly regime, mainly as a consequence of the
limited availability of broadcasting frequencies
and the high barriers to entry.
2. In the 1970s, however, economic and techno-
logical developments made it increasingly possi-
ble for Member States to allow other operators to
broadcast. Member States have therefore decided
to introduce competition in the market. This has
led to a wider choice for consumers, as many ad-
ditional channels and new services became avail-
able; it has also favoured the emergence and
growth of strong European operators, the devel-
opment of new technologies, and a larger degree
of pluralism in the sector, which means more
than a simple availability of additional channels
and services. Whilst opening the market to com-
petition, Member States considered that public
service broadcasting ought to be maintained, as a
way to ensure the coverage of a number of areas
and the satisfaction of needs and public policy
objectives that would otherwise not necessarily
be fulfilled to the optimal extent. This was con-
firmed in the interpretative protocol on the sys-
tem of public broadcasting in the Member States,
annexed to the EC Treaty (hereinafter referred to
as the Amsterdam Protocol).
3. At the same time, the increased competition,
together with the presence of State-funded oper-
ators, has also led to growing concerns for a level
playing field, which have been brought to the
Commission's attention by private operators.
The complaints allege infringements of Articles
86 and 87 of the EC Treaty in relation to public
funding of public service broadcasters.
4. The 2001 Communication from the Commis-
sion on the application of State aid rules to pub-
lic service broadcasting [1] has first set out the
framework governing State funding of public
service broadcasting. The 2001 Communication
has served as a good basis for the Commission to
develop significant decision-making practice in
the field. Since 2001, more than 20 decisions have
been adopted concerning the financing of public
service broadcasters.
5. In the meantime, technological changes have
fundamentally altered the broadcasting and au-
diovisual markets. There has been a multiplica-
tion of distribution platforms and technologies,
such as digital television, IPTV, mobile TV and
video on demand. This has led to an increase in
competition with new players, such as network
operators and Internet companies, entering the
market. Technological developments have also
allowed the emergence of new media services
such as online information services and non-lin-
ear or on-demand services. The provision of audi-
ovisual services is converging, with consumers
being increasingly able to obtain multiple servic-
es on a single platform or device or to obtain any
given service on multiple platforms or devices.
The increasing variety of options for consumers
to access media content has led to the multiplica-
tion of audiovisual services offered and the frag-
mentation of audiences. New technologies have
enabled improved consumer participation. The
traditional passive consumption model has been
gradually turning into active participation and
control over content by consumers. In order to
keep up with the new challenges, both public and
private broadcasters have been diversifying their
activities, moving to new distribution platforms
and expanding the range of their services. Most
recently, this diversification of the publicly fund-
ed activities of public service broadcasters (such
as online content, special interest channels)
prompted a number of complaints by other mar-
ket players also including publishers.
6. Since 2001, important legal developments have
also taken place, which have an impact on the
broadcasting field. In the 2003 Altmark judg-
ment [2], the European Court of Justice defined
the conditions under which public service com-
pensation does not constitute State aid. In 2005,
the Commission adopted a new decision [3] and
framework [4] on State aid in the form of public
service compensation. In 2007, the Commission
adopted a Communication accompanying the
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Communication on "A single market for 21st
century Europe" — Services of general interest,
including social services of general interest: a new
European Commitment [5]. Furthermore, in De-
cember 2007, the Audiovisual Media Services Di-
rective [6] entered into force, extending the scope
of the EU audiovisual regulation to emerging me-
dia services.
7. These changes in the market and in the legal
environment have called for an update to the
2001 Communication on State aid for public
broadcasting. The Commission's 2005 State Aid
Action Plan [7] announced that the Commission
would "revisit its Communication on the appli-
cation of State aid rules to public service broad-
casting. Notably with the development of new
digital technologies and of Internet-based servic-
es, new issues have arisen regarding the scope of
public service activities".
8. In the course of 2008 and 2009, the Commis-
sion held several public consultations on the re-
view of the 2001 Broadcasting Communication.
The present Communication consolidates the
Commission's case practice in the field of State
aid in a future-orientated manner based on the
comments received in the public consultations. It
clarifies the principles followed by the Commis-
sion in the application of Articles 87 and 86(2) of
the EC Treaty to the public funding of audiovisu-
al services in the broadcasting sector [8], taking
into account recent market and legal develop-
ments. The present Communication is without
prejudice to the application of the internal mar-
ket rules and fundamental freedoms in the field
of broadcasting.
2. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SERVICE BROAD-
CASTING
9. Public service broadcasting, although having a
clear economic relevance, is not comparable to a
public service in any other economic sector.
There is no other service that at the same time has
access to such a wide sector of the population,
provides it with so much information and con-
tent, and by doing so conveys and influences
both individual and public opinion.
10. Furthermore, broadcasting is generally per-
ceived as a very reliable source of information and
represents, for a not inconsiderable proportion
of the population, the main source of informa-
tion. It thus enriches public debate and ultimate-
ly can ensure that all citizens participate to a fair
degree in public life. In this connection, safe-
guards for the independence of broadcasting are
of key importance, in line with the general princi-
ple of freedom of expression as embodied in Arti-
cle 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union [9] and Article 10 of the Eu-
ropean Convention of Human Rights, a general
principle of law the respect of which is ensured by
the European Courts [10].
11. The role of the public service [11] in general is
recognised by the Treaty, in particular Articles 16
and 86(2). The interpretation of these provisions
in the light of the particular nature of the broad-
casting sector is outlined in the Amsterdam Pro-
tocol, which, after considering "that the system
of public broadcasting in the Member States is
directly related to the democratic, social and cul-
tural needs of each society and to the need to pre-
serve media pluralism", states that "the provi-
sions of the Treaty establishing the European
Community shall be without prejudice to the
competence of Member States to provide for the
funding of public service broadcasting insofar as
such funding is granted to broadcasting organi-
sations for the fulfilment of the public service re-
mit as conferred, defined and organised by each
Member State, and insofar as such funding does
not affect trading conditions and competition in
the Community to an extent which would be con-
trary to the common interest, while the realisa-
tion of the remit of that public service shall be
taken into account".
12. The importance of public service broadcast-
ing for social, democratic and cultural life in the
Union was reaffirmed in the Council Resolution
concerning public service broadcasting. As un-
derlined by the Resolution "broad public access,
without discrimination and on the basis of equal
opportunities, to various channels and services is
a necessary precondition for fulfilling the special
obligation of public service broadcasting". More-
over, public service broadcasting needs to "bene-
fit from technological progress", bring "the pub-
lic the benefits of the new audiovisual and
information services and the new technologies"
and to undertake "the development and diversi-
fication of activities in the digital age". Finally,
"public service broadcasting must be able to con-
tinue to provide a wide range of programming in
accordance with its remit as defined by the Mem-
ber States in order to address society as a whole;
in this context it is legitimate for public service
broadcasting to seek to reach wide audiences"
[12].
13. The role of public service broadcasting in pro-
moting cultural diversity was also recognised by
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the 2005 Unesco Convention on the Protection
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Ex-
pressions, which was approved by the Council on
behalf of the Community and thus forms part of
EC law [13]. The Convention states that each par-
ty may adopt "measures aimed at protecting and
promoting the diversity of cultural expressions
within its territory". Such measures may include,
among others, "measures aimed at enhancing di-
versity of the media, including through public
service broadcasting" [14].
14. These values of public broadcasting are equal-
ly important in the rapidly changing new media
environment. This has also been highlighted in
the recommendations of the Council of Europe
concerning media pluralism and diversity of me-
dia content [15], and the remit of public service
media in the information society [16]. The latter
recommendation calls upon the members of the
Council of Europe to "guarantee public service
media (…) in a transparent and accountable man-
ner" and to "enable public service media to re-
spond fully and effectively to the challenges of
the information society, respecting the public/
private dual structure of the European electronic
media landscape and paying attention to market
and competition questions"
15. In its Resolution on concentration and plu-
ralism in the media in the European Union, the
European Parliament has recommended that
"regulations governing State aid are devised and
implemented in a way which allow the public
service and community media to fulfil their func-
tion in a dynamic environment, while ensuring
that public service media carry out the function
entrusted to them by Member States in a trans-
parent and accountable manner, avoiding the
abuse of public funding for reasons of political or
economic expediency" [17].
16. At the same time and notwithstanding the
above, it must be noted that commercial broad-
casters, of whom a number are subject to public
service requirements, also play a significant role
in achieving the objectives of the Amsterdam Pro-
tocol to the extent that they contribute to plural-
ism, enrich cultural and political debate and wid-
en the choice of programmes. Moreover,
newspaper publishers and other print media are
also important guarantors of an objectively in-
formed public and of democracy. Given that
these operators are now competing with broad-
casters on the Internet, all these commercial me-
dia providers are concerned by the potential neg-
ative effects that State aid to public service
broadcasters could have on the development of
new business models. As recalled by the Audiovis-
ual Media Services Directive [18], "the coexist-
ence of private and public audiovisual media
service providers is a feature which distinguishes
the European audiovisual media market." In-
deed, it is in the common interest to maintain a
plurality of balanced public and private media of-
fer also in the current dynamic media environ-
ment.
3. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
17. The application of State aid rules to public
service broadcasting has to take into account a
wide number of different elements. The State aid
assessment is based on Articles 87 and 88 on
State aid and Article 86(2) on the application of
the rules of the Treaty and the competition rules,
in particular, to services of general economic in-
terest. The Treaty of Maastricht introduced Arti-
cle 151 concerning culture and Article 87(3)(d)
on aid to promote culture. The Treaty of Amster-
dam introduced a specific provision (Article 16)
on services of general economic interest and the
Amsterdam Protocol on the system of public
broadcasting in the Member States.
18. The regulatory framework concerning "audi-
ovisual media services" is coordinated at Europe-
an level by the Audiovisual Media Services Direc-
tive. The financial transparency requirements
concerning public undertakings are regulated by
the Transparency Directive [19].
19. These rules are interpreted by the Court of
Justice and the Court of First Instance. The Com-
mission has also adopted several communica-
tions on the application of the State aid rules. In
particular, in 2005, the Commission adopted the
Services of General Economic Interest Frame-
work [20] and Decision [21] clarifying the re-
quirements of Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty. The
latter is also applicable in the field of broadcast-
ing, to the extent that the conditions provided in
Article 2(1)(a) of the Decision are met [22].
4. APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 87(1)
4.1. The State aid character of State financing of public
service broadcasters
20. In line with Article 87(1), the concept of State
aid includes the following conditions: (a) there
must be an intervention by the State or by means
of State resources; (b) the intervention must be li-
able to affect trade between Member States; (c) it
must confer an advantage of the beneficiary; (d)
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it must distort or threaten to distort competition
[23]. The existence of State aid has to be assessed
on an objective basis, taking into account the ju-
risprudence of the Community Courts.
21. The effect of State intervention, not its pur-
pose, is the decisive element in any assessment of
its State aid content under Article 87(1). Public
service broadcasters are normally financed out of
the State budget or through a levy on broadcast-
ing equipment holders. In certain specific cir-
cumstances, the State makes capital injections or
debt cancellations in favour of public service
broadcasters. These financial measures are nor-
mally attributable to the public authorities and
involve the transfer of State resources [24].
22. State financing of public service broadcasters
can also be generally considered to affect trade
between Member States. As the Court of Justice
has observed, "when aid granted by the State or
through State resources strengthens the position
of an undertaking compared with other under-
takings competing in intra-Community trade the
latter must be regarded as affected by that aid"
[25]. This is clearly the position as regards the ac-
quisition and sale of programme rights, which of-
ten takes place at an international level. Advertis-
ing, too, in the case of public service broadcasters
who are allowed to sell advertising space, has a
cross-border effect, especially for homogeneous
linguistic areas across national boundaries.
Moreover, the ownership structure of commer-
cial broadcasters may extend to more than one
Member State. Furthermore, services provided
on the internet normally have a global reach.
23. Regarding the existence of an advantage, the
Court of justice clarified in the Altmark case [26]
that public service compensation does not con-
stitute State aid provided that four cumulative
conditions are met. First, the recipient undertak-
ing must actually have public service obligations
to discharge, and the obligations must be clearly
defined. Second, the parameters on the basis of
which the compensation is calculated must be es-
tablished in advance in an objective and transpar-
ent manner. Third, the compensation cannot ex-
ceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the
costs incurred in the discharge of the public serv-
ice obligations, taking into account the relevant
receipts and a reasonable profit. Finally, where
the undertaking which is to discharge public
service obligations, in a specific case, is not cho-
sen pursuant to a public procurement procedure
which would allow for the selection of the bidder
capable of providing those services at the least
cost to the community, the level of compensation
must be determined on the basis of an analysis of
the costs which a typical undertaking, well run
and adequately equipped so as to be able to meet
the necessary public service requirements, would
have incurred in discharging those obligations.
24. To the extent that the funding fails to satisfy
the above conditions, it would be considered as
selectively favouring only certain broadcasters
and thereby distorting or threatening to distort
competition.
4.2. Nature of the aid: existing aid as opposed to new aid
25. The funding schemes currently in place in
most of the Member States were introduced a
long time ago. As a first step, therefore, the Com-
mission must determine whether these schemes
may be regarded as "existing aid" within the
meaning of Article 88(1). In line with this provi-
sion, "the Commission shall, in cooperation with
Member States, keep under constant review all
systems of aid existing in those States. It shall
propose to the latter any appropriate measures
required by the progressive development or by
the functioning of the common market".
26. Pursuant to Article 1(b)(i) of the Procedural
Regulation [27], existing aid includes "… all aid
which existed prior to the entry into force of the
Treaty in the respective Member States, that is to
say, aid schemes and individual aid which were
put into effect before, and are still applicable af-
ter, the entry into force of the Treaty".
27. In the cases of Austria, Finland and Sweden,
State aid measures introduced before the entry
into force of the EEA Agreement on 1 January
1994 in these countries is regarded as existing
aid. Regarding the 10 Member States which ac-
ceded in 2004 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cy-
prus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland,
Slovenia and Slovakia) and Bulgaria and Roma-
nia which acceded in 2007, measures put into ef-
fect before 10 December 1994, those included in
the list annexed to the Treaty of Accession and
those approved under the so-called "interim pro-
cedure" are considered as existing aid.
28. Pursuant to Article 1(b)(v) of the Procedural
Regulation, existing aid also includes "aid which
is deemed to be an existing aid because it can be
established that at the time it was put into effect
it did not constitute an aid, and subsequently be-
came an aid due to the evolution of the common
market and without having been altered by the
Member State".
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29. In accordance with the case law of the Court
[28], the Commission must verify whether or not
the legal framework under which the aid is grant-
ed has changed since its introduction. The Com-
mission believes that a case by case approach is
the most appropriate [29], taking into account all
the elements related to the broadcasting system
of a given Member State.
30. According to the case law in Gibraltar [30],
not every alteration to existing aid should be re-
garded as changing the existing aid into new aid.
According to the Court of First Instance, "it is
only where the alteration affects the actual sub-
stance of the original scheme that the latter is
transformed into a new aid scheme. There can be
no question of such a substantive alteration
where the new element is clearly severable from
the initial scheme."
31. In light of the above considerations, in its de-
cision-making practice the Commission has gen-
erally examined: (a) whether the original financ-
ing regime for public service broadcasters is
existing aid in line with the rules indicated in par-
agraphs 26 and 27 above; (b) whether subsequent
modifications affect the actual substance of the
original measure (i.e. the nature of the advantage
or the source of financing, the purpose of the aid,
the beneficiaries or the scope of activities of the
beneficiaries) or whether these modifications are
rather of a purely formal or administrative na-
ture; and (c) in case subsequent modifications are
substantial, whether they are severable from the
original measure, in which case they can be as-
sessed separately, or whether they are not severa-
ble from the original measure so that the original
measure is as a whole transformed into a new aid.
5. ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPATIBILITY
OF STATE AID UNDER ARTICLE 87(3)
32. Although compensation for public service
broadcasting is typically assessed under Article
86(2) of the Treaty, the derogations listed in Arti-
cle 87(3) may in principle also apply in the field of
broadcasting, provided that the relevant condi-
tions are met.
33. In accordance with Article 151(4) of the Trea-
ty, the Community is to take cultural aspects into
account in its action under other provisions of
the Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to
promote the diversity of its cultures. Article
87(3)(d) of the Treaty allows the Commission to
regard aid to promote culture as compatible with
the common market where such aid does not af-
fect trading conditions and competition in the
Community to an extent that is contrary to the
common interest.
34. It is the Commission's task to decide on the
actual application of that provision in the same
way as for the other exemption clauses in Article
87(3). It should be recalled that the provisions
granting exemption from the prohibition of
State aid have to be applied strictly. Accordingly,
the Commission considers that the cultural der-
ogation may be applied in those cases where the
cultural product is clearly identified or identifia-
ble [31]. Moreover, the Commission takes the
view that the notion of culture must be applied to
the content and nature of the product in ques-
tion, and not to the medium or its distribution
per se [32]. Furthermore, the educational and
democratic needs of a Member State have to be
regarded as distinct from the promotion of cul-
ture under Article 87(3)(d) [33].
35. State aid to public service broadcasters usual-
ly does not differentiate between cultural, demo-
cratic and educational needs of society. Unless a
funding measure is specifically aimed at promot-
ing cultural objectives, Article 87(3)(d) would
generally not be relevant. State aid to public serv-
ice broadcasters is generally provided in the form
of compensation for the fulfilment of the public
service mandate and is assessed under Article
86(2), on the basis of the criteria set out in the
present Communication.
6. ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPATIBILITY
OF STATE AID UNDER ARTICLE 86(2)
36. In accordance with Article 86(2), "undertak-
ings entrusted with the operation of services of
general economic interest or having the character
of revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject
to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular
to the rules on competition, in so far as the appli-
cation of such rules does not obstruct the per-
formance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks
assigned to them. The development of trade
must not be affected to such an extent as would
be contrary to the interests of the Community."
37. The Court has consistently held that Article
86 provides for a derogation and must therefore
be interpreted restrictively. The Court has clari-
fied that in order for a measure to benefit from
such a derogation, it is necessary that all the fol-
lowing conditions be fulfilled:
(i) the service in question must be a service of gen-
eral economic interest and clearly defined as such
by the Member State (definition) [34];
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(ii) the undertaking in question must be explicit-
ly entrusted by the Member State with the provi-
sion of that service (entrustment) [35];
(iii) the application of the competition rules of
the Treaty (in this case, the ban on State aid)
must obstruct the performance of the particular
tasks assigned to the undertaking and the ex-
emption from such rules must not affect the de-
velopment of trade to an extent that would be
contrary to the interests of the Community (pro-
portionality test) [36].
38. In the specific case of public broadcasting the
above approach has to be adapted in the light of
the interpretative provisions of the Amsterdam
Protocol, which refers to the "public service remit
as conferred, defined and organised by each
Member State" (definition and entrustment) and
provides for a derogation from the Treaty rules in
the case of the funding of public service broad-
casting "insofar as such funding is granted to
broadcasting organisations for the fulfilment of
the public service remit (…) and (…) does not af-
fect trading conditions and competition in the
Community to an extent which would be contra-
ry to the common interest, while the realisation
of the remit of that public service shall be taken
into account" (proportionality).
39. It is for the Commission, as guardian of the
Treaty, to assess, on the basis of evidence provid-
ed by the Member States, whether these criteria
are satisfied. As regards the definition of the pub-
lic service remit, the role of the Commission is to
check for manifest errors (see Section 6.1). The
Commission further verifies whether there is an
explicit entrustment and effective supervision of
the fulfilment of the public service obligations
(see Section 6.2).
40. In carrying out the proportionality test, the
Commission considers whether or not any dis-
tortion of competition arising from the public
service compensation can be justified in terms of
the need to perform the public service and to pro-
vide for its funding. The Commission assesses, in
particular on the basis of the evidence that Mem-
ber States are bound to provide whether there are
sufficient guarantees to avoid disproportionate
effects of public funding, overcompensation and
cross-subsidisation, and to ensure that public
service broadcasters respect market conditions in
their commercial activities (see Section 6.3 and
following).
41. The analysis of the compliance with the State
aid requirements must be based on the specific
characteristics of each national system. The
Commission is aware of the differences in the na-
tional broadcasting systems and in the other
characteristics of the Member States’ media mar-
kets. Therefore, the assessment of the compatibil-
ity of State aid to public service broadcasters un-
der Article 86(2) is made on a case-by-case basis,
according to Commission practice [37], in line
with the basic principles set out in the following
sections.
42. The Commission will also take into account
the difficulty some smaller Member States may
have to collect the necessary funds, if costs per in-
habitant of the public service are, ceteris paribus,
higher [38] while equally considering potential
concerns of other media in these Member States.
6.1. Definition of public service remit
43. In order to meet the condition mentioned in
point 37(i) for application of Article 86(2), it is
necessary to establish an official definition of the
public service mandate. Only then can the Com-
mission assess with sufficient legal certainty
whether the derogation under Article 86(2) is ap-
plicable.
44. Definition of the public service mandate falls
within the competence of the Member States,
which can decide at national, regional or local
level, in accordance with their national legal or-
der. Generally speaking, in exercising that compe-
tence, account must be taken of the Community
concept of "services of general economic inter-
est".
45. The definition of the public service mandate
by the Member States should be as precise as pos-
sible. It should leave no doubt as to whether a cer-
tain activity performed by the entrusted operator
is intended by the Member State to be included in
the public service remit or not. Without a clear
and precise definition of the obligations imposed
upon the public service broadcaster, the Com-
mission would not be able to carry out its tasks
under Article 86(2) and, therefore, could not
grant any exemption under that provision.
46. Clear identification of the activities covered
by the public service remit is also important for
non-public service operators, so that they can
plan their activities. Moreover, the terms of the
public service remit should be sufficiently pre-
cise, so that Member States’ authorities can effec-
tively monitor compliance, as described in the
following chapter.
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47. At the same time, given the specific nature of
the broadcasting sector, and the need to safe-
guard the editorial independence of the public
service broadcasters, a qualitative definition en-
trusting a given broadcaster with the obligation
to provide a wide range of programming and a
balanced and varied broadcasting offer is gener-
ally considered, in view of the interpretative pro-
visions of the Amsterdam Protocol, legitimate
under Article 86(2) [39]. Such a definition is gen-
erally considered consistent with the objective of
fulfilling the democratic, social and cultural
needs of a particular society and guaranteeing
pluralism, including cultural and linguistic di-
versity. As expressed by the Court of First In-
stance, the legitimacy of such a widely defined
public service remit rests upon the qualitative re-
quirements for the services offered by a public
service broadcaster [40]. The definition of the
public service remit may also reflect the develop-
ment and diversification of activities in the digit-
al age and include audiovisual services on all dis-
tribution platforms.
48. As regards the definition of the public service
in the broadcasting sector, the role of the Com-
mission is limited to checking for manifest error.
It is not for the Commission to decide which pro-
grammes are to be provided and financed as a
service of general economic interest, nor to ques-
tion the nature or the quality of a certain prod-
uct. The definition of the public service remit
would, however, be in manifest error if it included
activities that could not reasonably be considered
to meet — in the wording of the Amsterdam Pro-
tocol — the "democratic, social and cultural
needs of each society". That would normally be
the position in the case of advertising, e-com-
merce, teleshopping, the use of premium rate
numbers in prize games [41], sponsoring or mer-
chandising, for example. Moreover, a manifest er-
ror could occur where State aid is used to finance
activities which do not bring added value in
terms of serving the social, democratic and cul-
tural needs of society.
49. In this context, it must be recalled that the
public service remit describes the services offered
to the public in the general interest. The question
of the definition of the public service remit must
not be confused with the question of the financ-
ing mechanism chosen to provide these services.
Therefore, whilst public service broadcasters may
perform commercial activities such as the sale of
advertising space in order to obtain revenue, such
activities cannot be viewed as part of the public
service remit [42].
6.2. Entrustment and supervision
50. In order to benefit from the exemption under
Article 86(2), the public service remit should be
entrusted to one or more undertakings by means
of an official act (for example, by legislation, con-
tract or binding terms of reference).
51. The entrustment act(s) shall specify the pre-
cise nature of the public service obligations in
line with Section 6.1 above, and shall set out the
conditions for providing the compensation, as
well as the arrangements for avoiding and repay-
ing any overcompensation.
52. Whenever the scope of the public service re-
mit is extended to cover new services, the defini-
tion and entrustment Act(s) should be modified
accordingly, within the limits of Article 86(2). In
the interest of allowing public service broadcast-
ers to react swiftly to new technological develop-
ments, Member States may also foresee that the
entrustment with a new service is provided fol-
lowing the assessment outlined in Part 6.7 below,
before the original entrustment Act is formally
consolidated.
53. It is not sufficient, however, that the public
service broadcaster be formally entrusted with
the provision of a well-defined public service. It is
also necessary that the public service be actually
supplied as provided for in the formal agreement
between the State and the entrusted undertak-
ing. It is therefore desirable that an appropriate
authority or appointed body monitors its appli-
cation in a transparent and effective manner. The
need for such an appropriate authority or body in
charge of supervision is apparent in the case of
quality standards imposed on the entrusted oper-
ator. In accordance with the Commission com-
munication on the principles and guidelines for
the Community's audiovisual policy in the digit-
al era [43] , it is not for the Commission to judge
on the fulfilment of quality standards: it must be
able to rely on appropriate supervision by the
Member States of compliance by the broadcaster
with its public service remit including the quali-
tative standards set out in that remit [44].
54. In line with the Amsterdam Protocol, it is
within the competence of the Member State to
choose the mechanism to ensure effective super-
vision of the fulfilment of the public service obli-
gations, therefore enabling the Commission to
carry out its tasks under Article 86(2). Such su-
pervision would only seem effective if carried out
by a body effectively independent from the man-
agement of the public service broadcaster, which
mwb-3164-european.media.law.book  Page 275  Wednesday, August 17, 2011  2:33 PM
276
EU-Directives and other EU-instruments
has the powers and the necessary capacity and re-
sources to carry out supervision regularly, and
which leads to the imposition of appropriate
remedies insofar it is necessary to ensure respect
of the public service obligations.
55. In the absence of sufficient and reliable indi-
cations that the public service is actually supplied
as mandated, the Commission would not be able
to carry out its tasks under Article 86(2) and,
therefore, could not grant any exemption under
that provision.
6.3. Choice of funding of public service broadcasting
56. Public service duties may be either quantita-
tive or qualitative or both. Whatever their form,
they could justify compensation, as long as they
entail supplementary costs that the broadcaster
would normally not have incurred.
57. Funding schemes can be divided into two
broad categories "single-funding" and "dual-
funding". The "single-funding" category com-
prises those systems in which public service
broadcasting is financed only through public
funds, in whatever form. "Dual-funding" sys-
tems comprise a wide range of schemes, where
public service broadcasting is financed by differ-
ent combinations of State funds and revenues
from commercial or public service activities, such
as the sale of advertising space or programmes
and the offering of services against payment.
58. As stated in the Amsterdam Protocol: "The
provisions of the Treaty establishing the Europe-
an Community shall be without prejudice to the
competence of Member States to provide for the
funding of public service broadcasting (…)". The
Commission has therefore no objection in princi-
ple to the choice of a dual financing scheme rath-
er than a single funding scheme.
59. While Member States are free to choose the
means of financing public service broadcasting,
the Commission has to verify, under Article
86(2), that the State funding does not affect com-
petition in the common market in a dispropor-
tionate manner, as referred to in paragraph 38
above.
6.4. Transparency requirements for the State aid assess-
ment
60. The State aid assessment by the Commission
requires a clear and precise definition of the pub-
lic service remit and a clear and appropriate sepa-
ration between public service activities and non-
public service activities including a clear separa-
tion of accounts.
61. Separation of accounts between public service
activities and non-public service activities is nor-
mally already required at national level as it is es-
sential to ensure transparency and accountability
when using public funds. A separation of ac-
counts provides a tool for examining alleged
cross-subsidisation and for defending justified
compensation payments for general economic
interest tasks. Only on the basis of proper cost
and revenue allocation can it be determined
whether the public financing is actually limited
to the net costs of the public service remit and
thus acceptable under Article 86(2) and the Am-
sterdam Protocol.
62. Member States are required by Directive
2006/111/EC to take transparency measures in
the case of any undertaking granted special or ex-
clusive rights or entrusted with the operation of
a service of general economic interest and receiv-
ing public service compensation in any form
whatsoever in relation to such service and which
carries out other activities, that is to say, non-
public service activities. These transparency re-
quirements are: (a) the internal accounts corre-
sponding to different activities, i.e. public service
and non-public service activities must be sepa-
rate; (b) all costs and revenues must be correctly
assigned or allocated on the basis of consistently
applied and objectively justifiable cost account-
ing principles; and (c) the cost-accounting princi-
ples according to which separate accounts are
maintained must be clearly established [45].
63. These general transparency requirements ap-
ply also to broadcasters, insofar as they are en-
trusted with the operation of a service of general
economic interest, receive public compensation
in relation to such service, and also carry out oth-
er, non-public-service activities.
64. In the broadcasting sector, separation of ac-
counts poses no particular problem on the reve-
nue side. For this reason, the Commission con-
siders that, on the revenue side, broadcasting
operators should give detailed account of the
sources and amount of all income accruing from
the performance of public and non-public service
activities.
65. On the cost side, all the expenses incurred in
the operation of the public service may be taken
into consideration. Where the undertaking car-
ries out activities falling outside the scope of the
public service, only the costs associated with the
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public service may be taken into consideration.
The Commission recognises that, in the public
broadcasting sector, separation of accounts may
be more difficult on the cost side. This is because,
in particular in the field of traditional broadcast-
ing, Member States may consider the whole pro-
gramming of a broadcaster covered by the public
service remit, while at the same time allowing for
its commercial exploitation. In other words, pub-
lic service and non-public service activities may
share the same inputs to a large extent and the
costs may not always be severable in a propor-
tionate manner.
66. Costs specific to non-public service activities
(e.g. the marketing cost of advertising) should al-
ways be clearly identified and separately account-
ed. In addition, input costs which are intended to
serve the development of activities in the field of
public and non-public services simultaneously
should be allocated proportionately to public
service and non-public service activities respec-
tively, whenever it is possible in a meaningful
way.
67. In other cases, whenever the same resources
are used to perform public service and non-pub-
lic service tasks, the common input costs should
be allocated on the basis of the difference in the
firm's total costs with and without non-public
service activities [46]. In such cases, costs that are
entirely attributable to public service activities,
while benefiting also non-public service activi-
ties, need not be apportioned between the two
and can be entirely allocated to the public service
activity. This difference to the approach generally
followed in other utilities sectors is explained by
the specificities of the public broadcasting sector.
In the field of public broadcasting, the net bene-
fits of commercial activities related to the public
service activities have to be taken into account for
the purpose of calculating the net public service
costs and therefore to reduce the public service
compensation level. This reduces the risk of
cross-subsidisation by means of accounting com-
mon costs to public service activities.
68. The main example for the situation described
in the preceding paragraph would be the cost of
producing programmes in the framework of the
public service mission of the broadcaster. These
programmes serve both to fulfil the public serv-
ice remit and to generate audience for selling ad-
vertising space. However, it is virtually impossible
to quantify with a sufficient degree of precision
how much of the program viewing fulfils the
public service remit and how much generates ad-
vertising revenue. For this reason, the distribu-
tion of the cost of programming between the two
activities risks being arbitrary and not meaning-
ful.
69. The Commission considers that financial
transparency can be further enhanced by an ade-
quate separation between public service and non-
public service activities at the level of the organi-
sation of the public service broadcaster. Func-
tional or structural separation normally makes it
easier to avoid cross-subsidisation of commercial
activities from the outset and to ensure transfer
pricing and the respect of the arm’s length prin-
ciple. Therefore, the Commission invites Member
States to consider functional or structural sepa-
ration of significant and severable commercial
activities, as a form of best practice.
6.5. Net cost principle and overcompensation
70. As a matter of principle, since overcompensa-
tion is not necessary for the operation of the serv-
ice of general economic interest, it constitutes in-
compatible State aid that must be repaid to the
State subject to the clarifications provided in the
present chapter with regard to public service
broadcasting.
71. The Commission starts from the considera-
tion that the State funding is normally necessary
for the undertaking to carry out its public service
tasks. However, in order to satisfy the propor-
tionality test, it is as a general rule necessary that
the amount of public compensation does not ex-
ceed the net costs of the public service mission,
taking also into account other direct or indirect
revenues derived from the public service mission.
For this reason, the net benefit of all commercial
activities related to the public service activity will
be taken into account in determining the net
public service costs.
72. Undertakings receiving compensation for the
performance of a public service task may, in gen-
eral, enjoy a reasonable profit. This profit con-
sists of a rate of return on own capital that takes
account of the risk, or absence of risk, incurred by
the undertaking. In the broadcasting sector the
public service mission is often carried out by
broadcasters that are not profit oriented or that
do not have to remunerate the capital employed
and do not perform any other activity than the
provision of the public service. The Commission
considers that in these situations, it is not reason-
able to include a profit element in the amount of
compensation for the fulfilment of the public
service mission [47]. However, in other cases, for
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example where specific public service obligations
are entrusted to commercially run undertakings
which need to remunerate the capital invested in
them, a profit element which represents the fair
remuneration of capital taking into account risk
may be considered reasonable, if duly justified
and provided that it is necessary for the fulfil-
ment of the public service obligations.
73. Public service broadcasters may retain yearly
overcompensation above the net costs of the pub-
lic service (as public service reserves) to the extent
that this is necessary for securing the financing of
their public service obligations. In general, the
Commission considers that an amount of up to
10 % of the annual budgeted expenses of the pub-
lic service mission may be deemed necessary to
withstand cost and revenue fluctuations. As a
rule, overcompensation above this limit must be
recovered without undue delay.
74. By way of exception, public service broadcast-
ers may be allowed to keep an amount in excess of
10 % of the annual budgeted expenses of their
public service mission in duly justified cases. This
is only acceptable provided that this overcom-
pensation is specifically earmarked in advance of
and in a binding way for the purpose of a non-re-
curring, major expense necessary for the fulfil-
ment of the public service mission [48]. The use
of such clearly earmarked overcompensation
should also be limited in time depending on its
dedication.
75. In order to allow the Commission to exercise
its duties, Member States shall lay down the con-
ditions under which the above overcompensation
may be used by the public service broadcasters.
76. The overcompensation mentioned above
shall be used for the purpose of financing public
service activities, only. Cross-subsidisation of
commercial activities is not justified and consti-
tutes incompatible State aid.
6.6. Financial control mechanisms
77. Member States shall provide for appropriate
mechanisms to ensure that there is no overcom-
pensation, subject to the provisions of para-
graphs 72 to 76. They shall ensure regular and ef-
fective control of the use of public funding, to
prevent overcompensation and cross-subsidisa-
tion, and to scrutinise the level and the use of
"public service reserves". It is within the compe-
tence of Member States to choose the most ap-
propriate and effective control mechanisms in
their national broadcasting systems, taking also
into account the need to ensure coherence with
the mechanisms in place for the supervision of
the fulfilment of the public service remit.
78. Such control mechanisms would only seem
effective if carried out by an external body inde-
pendent from the public service broadcaster at
regular intervals, preferably on a yearly basis.
Member States shall make sure that effective
measures can be put in place to recover overcom-
pensation going beyond the provisions of the
previous Chapter 6.5 and cross-subsidisation.
79. The financial situation of the public service
broadcasters should be subject to an in-depth re-
view at the end of each financing period as pro-
vided for in the national broadcasting systems of
the Member States, or in the absence thereof, a
time period which normally should not exceed
four years. Any "public service reserves" existing
at the end of the financing period, or of an equiv-
alent period as provided above, shall be taken
into account for the calculation of the financial
needs of the public service broadcaster for the
next period. In case of "public service reserves"
exceeding 10 % of the annual public service costs
on a recurring basis, Member States shall review
whether the level of funding is adjusted to the
public service broadcasters’ actual financial
needs.
6.7. Diversification of public broadcasting services
80. In recent years, audiovisual markets have un-
dergone important changes, which have led to
the ongoing development and diversification of
the broadcasting offer. This has raised new ques-
tions concerning the application of the State aid
rules to audiovisual services which go beyond
broadcasting activities in the traditional sense.
81. In this respect, the Commission considers
that public service broadcasters should be able to
use the opportunities offered by digitisation and
the diversification of distribution platforms on a
technology neutral basis, to the benefit of society.
In order to guarantee the fundamental role of
public service broadcasters in the new digital en-
vironment, public service broadcasters may use
State aid to provide audiovisual services over new
distribution platforms, catering for the general
public as well as for special interests, provided
that they are addressing the same democratic, so-
cial and cultural needs of the society in question,
and do not entail disproportionate effects on the
market, which are not necessary for the fulfil-
ment of the public service remit.
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82. In parallel with the rapid evolution of the
broadcasting markets, the business models of
broadcasters are also undergoing changes. In ful-
filling their public service remit, broadcasters are
increasingly turning to new sources of financing,
such as online advertising or the provision of
services against payment (so-called pay-services,
like access to archives for a fee, special interest TV
channels on a pay-per-view basis, access to mobile
services for a lump sum payment, deferred access
to TV programmes for a fee, paid online content
downloads, etc.). The remuneration element in
pay services can be related, for example, to the
payment of network distribution fees or copy-
rights by broadcasters (for example if services
over mobile platforms are provided against pay-
ment of a mobile distribution fee).
83. Although public broadcasting services have
traditionally been free-to-air, the Commission
considers that a direct remuneration element in
such services — while having an impact on access
by viewers [49] — does not necessarily mean that
these services are manifestly not part of the pub-
lic service remit provided that the pay element
does not compromise the distinctive character of
the public service in terms of serving the social,
democratic and cultural needs of citizens, which
distinguishes public services from purely com-
mercial activities [50]. The element of remunera-
tion is one of the aspects to be taken into account
when deciding on the inclusion of such services
in the public service remit, as it may affect the
universality and the overall design of the service
provided as well as its impact on the market. Pro-
vided that the given service with a pay element
satisfies specific social, democratic and cultural
needs of society without leading to dispropor-
tionate effects on competition and cross-border
trade, Member States may entrust public service
broadcasters with such a service as part of their
public service remit.
84. As set out above, State aid to public service
broadcasters may be used for distributing audio-
visual services on all platforms provided that the
material requirements of the Amsterdam Proto-
col are met. To this end, Member States shall con-
sider, by means of a prior evaluation procedure
based on an open public consultation, whether
significant new audiovisual services envisaged by
public service broadcasters meet the require-
ments of the Amsterdam Protocol, i.e. whether
they serve the democratic, social and cultural
needs of the society, while duly taking into ac-
count its potential effects on trading conditions
and competition.
85. It is up to the Member States to determine,
taking into account the characteristics and the
evolution of the broadcasting market, as well as
the range of services already offered by the public
service broadcaster, what shall qualify as "signif-
icant new service". The "new" nature of an activ-
ity may depend among others on its content as
well as on the modalities of consumption [51].
The "significance" of the service may take into
account for instance the financial resources re-
quired for its development and the expected im-
pact on demand. Significant modifications to ex-
isting services shall be subject to the same
assessment as significant new services.
86. It is within the competence of the Member
States to choose the most appropriate mecha-
nism to ensure the consistency of audiovisual
services with the material conditions of the Am-
sterdam Protocol, taking into account the specif-
icities of their national broadcasting systems,
and the need to safeguard editorial independence
of public service broadcasters.
87. In the interest of transparency and of obtain-
ing all relevant information necessary to arrive at
a balanced decision, interested stakeholders shall
have the opportunity to give their views on the
envisaged significant new service in the context
of an open consultation. The outcome of the con-
sultation, its assessment as well as the grounds
for the decision shall be made publicly available.
88. In order to ensure that the public funding of
significant new audiovisual services does not dis-
tort trade and competition to an extent contrary
to the common interest, Member States shall as-
sess, based on the outcome of the open consulta-
tion, the overall impact of a new service on the
market by comparing the situation in the pres-
ence and in the absence of the planned new serv-
ice. In assessing the impact on the market, rele-
vant aspects include, for example, the existence of
similar or substitutable offers, editorial competi-
tion, market structure, market position of the
public service broadcaster, level of competition
and potential impact on private initiatives. This
impact needs to be balanced with the value of the
services in question for society. In the case of pre-
dominantly negative effects on the market, State
funding for audiovisual services would appear
proportionate only if it is justified by the added
value in terms of serving the social, democratic
and cultural needs of society [52], taking also
into account the existing overall public service of-
fer.
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89. Such an assessment would only be objective if
carried out by a body which is effectively inde-
pendent from the management of the public
service broadcaster, also with regard to the ap-
pointment and removal of its members, and has
sufficient capacity and resources to exercise its
duties. Member States shall be able to design a
procedure which is proportionate to the size of
the market and the market position of the public
service broadcaster.
90. The considerations outlined above shall not
prevent public service broadcasters from testing
innovative new services (e.g. in the form of pilot
projects) on a limited scale (e.g. in terms of time
and audience) and for the purpose of gathering
information on the feasibility of and the value
added by the foreseen service, insofar as such test
phase does not amount to the introduction of a
fully-fledged, significant new audiovisual service.
91. The Commission considers that the above as-
sessment at the national level will contribute to
ensuring compliance with the EC State aid rules.
This is without prejudice to the competences of
the Commission to verify that Member States re-
spect the Treaty provisions, and to its right to act,
whenever necessary, also on the basis of com-
plaints or on its own initiative.
6.8. Proportionality and market behaviour
92. In accordance with the Amsterdam Protocol,
public service broadcasters shall not engage in ac-
tivities which would result in disproportionate
distortions of competition that are not necessary
for fulfilling the public service mission. For ex-
ample, the acquisition of premium content as
part of the overall public service mission of pub-
lic service broadcasters is generally considered le-
gitimate. However, disproportionate market dis-
tortions would arise in the event that public
service broadcasters were to maintain exclusive
premium rights unused without offering to sub-
license them in a transparent and timely manner.
Therefore, the Commission invites Member
States to ensure that public service broadcasters
respect the principle of proportionality also with
regard to the acquisition of premium rights, and
to provide rules for the sub-licensing of unused
exclusive premium rights by public service broad-
casters.
93. When carrying out commercial activities,
public service broadcasters shall be bound to re-
spect market principles and, when they act
through commercial subsidiaries, they shall keep
arm's length relations with these subsidiaries.
Member States shall ensure that public service
broadcasters respect the arm's length principle,
undertake their commercial investments in line
with the market economy investor principle, and
do not engage in anti-competitive practices with
regard to their competitors, based on their public
funding.
94. An example of anti-competitive practice may
be price undercutting. A public service broadcast-
er might be tempted to depress the prices of ad-
vertising or other non-public service activities
(such as commercial pay services) below what can
reasonably be considered to be market-conform,
so as to reduce the revenue of competitors, inso-
far as the resulting lower revenues are covered by
the public compensation. Such conduct cannot
be considered as intrinsic to the public service
mission attributed to the broadcaster and would
in any event "affect trading conditions and com-
petition in the Community to an extent which
would be contrary to the common interest" and
thus infringe the Amsterdam Protocol.
95. In view of the differences between the market
situations, the respect of the market principles by
public service broadcasters, in particular the
questions whether public service broadcasters are
undercutting prices in their commercial offer, or
whether they are respecting the principle of pro-
portionality with regard to the acquisition of pre-
mium rights [53] , shall be assessed on a case-by-
case basis, taking into account the specificities of
the market and of the service concerned.
96. The Commission considers that it is, in the
first place, up to the national authorities to en-
sure that public service broadcasters respect mar-
ket principles. To this end, Member States shall
have appropriate mechanisms in place which al-
low assessing any potential complaint in an effec-
tive way at the national level.
97. Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph,
where necessary, the Commission may take ac-
tion on the basis of Articles 81, 82, 86 and 87 of
the EC Treaty.
7. TEMPORAL APPLICATION
98. This Communication will be applied from
the first day following its publication in the Offi-
cial Journal of the European Union. It will replace
the 2001 Communication from the Commission
on the application of State aid rules to public
service broadcasting.
99. The Commission will apply this Communica-
tion to all notified aid measures in respect of
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which it is called upon to take a decision after the
Communication is published in the Official
Journal, even where the projects were notified pri-
or to that date.
100. In accordance with the Commission notice
on the determination of the applicable rules for
the assessment of unlawful State aid [54], the
Commission will apply, in the case of non-noti-
fied aid,
(a) this Communication, if the aid was granted
after its publication;
(b) the 2001 Communication in all other cases.
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THE PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTIC SOURCES UNDER FIRE?
Dirk VOORHOOF, updated version July 2011.1
"The duty to give evidence is a normal civic duty in
a democratic society. (..) That duty will suffice to
justify an interference created by an obligation to
testify on the ground that it is necessary for the
maintenance of the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary. (..) The Commission recalls that in a
criminal trial, it is for the judge to consider the evi-
dences before the court, and to assess its relevance
and admissibility. The judge can only perform this
function if he has powers to require the production
of evidence before the court in the first place (..).
The full picture should be before the criminal
court" (European Commission of Human Rights
18 January 1996, BBC v. the United Kingdom,
Appl. 25798/94, Decisions & Reports, 1994 - 84 A,
129)
"Having regard to the importance of the protection
of journalistic sources for press freedom in a demo-
cratic society and the potentially chilling effect an
order of source disclosure has on the exercise of that
freedom, such a measure cannot be compatible with
Article 10 of the Convention, unless it is justifiable
by an overriding requirement in the public inter-
est" (European Court of Human Rights 27 March
1996, Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, § 39).
1. The protection of journalistic sources and
the freedom of expression and information
One of the most fundamental rules of journalis-
tic ethics, recognised in national and internation-
al codes, is that a journalist shall protect confi-
dential sources of information. The obligation of
journalists to maintain the confidentiality of
their sources may come into conflict with the re-
quest of a litigant, a prosecutor, a judge, a court
or any other investigative authority to ascertain
the identity of a source for the purposes of proof,
taking further action against the source or con-
ducting further information. As a witness, jour-
nalists can be required to answer all relevant
questions put to them and to provide the relevant
documents in order to facilitate the due adminis-
tration of justice. Consequently, the administra-
tion of justice is denied by a journalist refusing to
identify a source and refusing to help to bring all
the relevant information before the court.
Within the journalistic profession however it is
considered as a "sacrosanct" obligation never to
reveal the identity of a (confidential) source, even
if the journalist risks to be prosecuted or convict-
ed because of a refusal of a disclosure order.
The reasons behind this principle are obvious.
Journalists often receive leaked documents or in-
formation from sources who wish to remain
anonymous, for instance because the informa-
tion was intended to remain secret or confiden-
tial within a certain (private or public) organisa-
tion. Leaked information is an important source
of journalistic input and it is only when journal-
ists can guarantee the confidentiality and the an-
onymity of their sources that this crucial aspect
of the news flow is protected. The idea is that
journalists' sources are to be protected, otherwise
sources of information may dry up. Journalists
cultivate sources by promising them confidenti-
ality.
As G. Robertson and A. Nicol point out in their
handbook on media law:
"The cultivation of sources is thus professionally essen-
tial for journalists. It is a basic tool of their trade, the
means by which newsworthy information is extracted,
other than from those paid to give it a particular spin.
Were it not for "unofficial sources" obligingly talking
"off the record" to journalists, there would simply be
much less news in the newspapers. There would be fewer
facts and less information for discussion, for dispute and
sometimes for retraction, in democratic society (..). If
sources, frightened of exposure and reprisal, decide not
to talk, there will not only be less news, but the news
1 This paper was in a draft version presented at the conference organised by the Council of Europe "The media in a
democratic society. Reconciling freedom of expression with the protection of human rights", Luxembourg 30 Septem-
ber - 1 October 2002, was published in Auteurs & Media 2003/1, 9-23 and was in a later version presented at the EFJ-
conference on protection of journalistic sources, Prague, 23 May 2003. With thanks to Andrew Nicol, Martine Simo-
nis, Anne Louise Schelin, Tyge Trier, Inger Høedt-Rasmussen, Michèle Bram, Tarlach Mc Gonagle and Marie Mc
Gonagle for supplying information and/or giving feedback. Version 2005 at http://www.ifj-europe.org/docs/POS-
Voorhoof2005.doc. This version is an adaptation of the article published in Auteurs & Media (Larcier) and has been
actualized until 11 July 2011.
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which is published, will be less reliable. It will not be
checked for spin"2.
As the input of information coming from per-
sons who want to remain anonymous is extreme-
ly important for investigative journalists, and as
this kind of journalism due to economic and
commercial developments in the media sector by
itself already has problems to develop, or even to
survive, at least the legal protection of journalis-
tic sources should be guaranteed. An ultimate
goal and important perspective of the freedom of
expression is the right of the public to be properly
informed on matters of public interest. From this
perspective proactive and investigative journal-
ism is a crucial approach in order not to report
only official sources or to rely solely on data and
information the journalist has (passively) re-
ceived on the news desk.
The crucial reason for not compelling journalists
to reveal their sources of information or not com-
pelling them to produce documents, files, pic-
tures or film on demand of the police or the judi-
ciary is that it would be a very negative evolution
if the people in general, and (potential) sources
specifically, would have the impression that the
press and journalists can be easily incorporated
in the work of police and the judiciary. It is im-
portant in other words to avoid, to prevent that
the impression would grow that the press is a
kind of an extension piece or an instrument of
the institutionalised powers in society. The press
and journalists should not be considered as virtu-
al collaborators, neither as tools for police inves-
tigation, judicial prosecution or other law en-
forcement bodies.
This reasoning is not only developed by the jour-
nalistic sector itself, in ethical codes of journalis-
tic practice, in media sociology or in journalism
studies. 
Within the Council of Europe the importance of
the protection of journalistic sources is empha-
sized in the light of Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Resolution No.
2 of the Prague Ministerial Conference on
Mass Media Policy (1994) refers to the protec-
tion of journalistic sources as a prerequisite for
the freedom of expression and information in or-
der to "enable journalism to contribute to the mainte-
nance and development of genuine democracy"3. 
The protection of journalistic sources on the
basis of Article 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights is recognised by the European
Court of Human Rights in the case of Goodwin
versus the United Kingdom (27 March 1996), a
landmark judgment on the issue of protection of
journalistic sources:
"Without such protection, sources may be deterred from
assisting the press in informing the public on matters of
public interest. As a result the vital public watchdog role
of the press may be undermined and the ability of the
press to provide accurate and reliable information may
be adversely affected".
The Court also decided:
"Having regard to the importance of the protection of
journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic so-
ciety and the potentially chilling effect an order of source
disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom, such a
measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the
Convention, unless it is justifiable by an overriding re-
quirement in the public interest".
2. The protection of journalists’ sources, the
European Convention (Art. 10) and the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights
The quotation of the European Court's judg-
ment in Goodwin v. the United Kingdom makes clear
that the protection of journalistic sources is not
absolute. As this right is rooted in Article 10 of
the European Convention, there might be rea-
sons, responsibilities, duties that can restrict in
one way or another the right of a journalist to
keep his sources protected. An interference in the
journalist's right to freedom of expression and
information is not to be considered as a breach of
Article 10 of the Convention if such interference
is prescribed by law and is necessary in a demo-
cratic society for the legitimate aim pursued,
such as the protection of the rights of other, the
authority or the impartiality of the judiciary or
the prevention of disorder or crime. Article 10 § 2
of the Convention shapes the framework for the
2 G. ROBERTSON and A. NICOL, Robertson & Nicol on media law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th Edition, 2002, 254-255.
See also D. VOORHOOF, "Guaranteeing the freedom and independence of the media", in X. Media and democracy,
Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 1998, 49 and D. VOORHOOF, "Vrijheid van meningsuiting", in J. VANDE-
LANOTTE en Y. HAECK (eds.), Handboek EVRM, Antwerpen-Oxford, Intersentia, 2004, 837-1061. See also http://
europe.ifj.org/en/pages/protection-of-sources.
3 Resolution No. 2 "Journalistic Freedoms and Human Rights", 4th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy,
The Media in a Democratic Society, Prague, 7-8 December 1994, DH-MM (2000) 4, 39-42.
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balancing of the freedom of expression as a fun-
damental human right in a democracy with other
human rights and freedoms4.
The European Court indeed has explicitly decid-
ed that an order of source disclosure is possible in
certain circumstances, that is if interests are in-
volved that are more imperative and more impor-
tant than freedom of expression. According to
the European Court it is however only when it is
"justifiable by an overriding requirement in the public
interest" that a disclosure order can be assumed to
be in accordance with Article 10 § 2 of the Con-
vention. It is also underlined by the Court that
limitations on the confidentiality of journalistic
sources "call for the most careful scrutiny by the
Court".
Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (violation Article
10)
In the Goodwin case the European Court came to
the conclusion that the order compelling the
journalist William Goodwin to reveal his sources
was a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The
case concerned a young journalist in 1989 work-
ing for an economic magazine The Engineer.
Goodwin was given information by a source
about a commercial company, Tetra. This infor-
mation was derived from an internal and strictly
confidential corporate plan. The document indi-
cated that the company was experiencing finan-
cial difficulties. After Goodwin contacted the
company in order to check the facts and seek its
comments on the information, the company
started a procedure in order to find out who of its
employees leaked the sensitive and confidential
information. Goodwin was ordered by the judge
to disclose his notes on the grounds that it was
necessary in the interests of justice within the
meaning of Section 10 of the Contempt of Court
Act of 1981, for the source's identity to be dis-
closed in order to enable Tetra to bring proceed-
ings against the source and to recover the docu-
ment, obtain an injunction preventing further
publication or seek damages for the expenses to
which it had been put. The Court of Appeal final-
ly gave order to Goodwin either to disclose his
notes to Tetra or to deliver them to the Court in
a sealed envelope with accompanying affidavit.
This order was upheld by the House of Lords in
1990. Goodwin however did not comply with this
order, which led to a judgment of the High Court
who fined the applicant £ 5.000 for contempt of
court5. 
In its judgment of 27 March 1996 the European
Court concluded that both the order requiring
Goodwin to reveal his source and the fine im-
posed on him for having refused to do so gave rise
to a violation of his right to freedom of expres-
sion under Article 10 of the Convention. In the
Court's view there was no reasonable relation-
ship of proportionality between the legitimate
aim pursued by the disclosure order and the
means deployed to achieve them. The restriction
which the disclosure order entailed on Goodwin
could not be regarded as having been necessary in
a democratic society.
De Haes en Gijsels v. Belgium (violation Article 10)
The protection of journalistic sources may also
be applicable in cases where the journalist is not
a witness, but a person accused or held liable for
defamatory statements. Such cases can be con-
sidered from the scope of Article 6 of the Conven-
tion (right to a fair trial). In its judgment in the case
of De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium the European
Court of Human Rights applied the right of jour-
nalists not to disclose their source to a specific
defamation case. An editor and a journalist had
been convicted of defamation by the Brussels'
civil Court of first instance, a judgment which
was confirmed later by the Court of Appeal and
the Supreme Court (Court of Cassation). De
Haes and Gijsels were held liable for defamation
in criticising some members of the judiciary. Ac-
cording to the Belgian courts, during the proce-
dure the journalist and the editor did not suffi-
ciently proof the truth of their allegations, as
they had refused to prove the truth of the defam-
ing information by disclosing their source. Their
allegations however had been based on state-
ments by court experts in other prior cases. For
that reason De Haes and Gijsels had invited the
Court of first instance and the Court of Appeal to
order that these documents, already in the pos-
session of other Belgian courts, would be submit-
ted as evidence before the courts dealing with the
defamation case in which the journalist and the
editor were the defendants. The Belgian courts
however were of the opinion that the request for
production of documents demonstrated the lack
4 The title of the COE-conference where this paper was presented (see footnote 1) would have been more correctly if it
had been formulated as: "The media in a democratic society. Reconciling freedom of expression with the protection of
other human rights".
5 ECtHR 27 March 1996, Goodwin v. the United Kingdom.
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of care with which De Haes and Gijsels had writ-
ten their articles. 
In its judgment of 24 February 1997 the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights held that under Arti-
cle 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, national courts may not reject an applica-
tion from an accused journalist to consider alter-
native evidence beside the disclosure of the
source of information by this journalist, if such
alternative evidence for the proof of the journal-
ist's statements is available to the judiciary. The
Court was of the opinion that the journalist's
and the editor's concern not to risk compromis-
ing their sources of information by lodging the
documents in question themselves, was legiti-
mate. The outright rejection by the Belgian
courts to study at least the opinion of the three
experts whose reports had prompted De Haes
and Gijsels to write their articles was considered
as a breach of Article 6 of the Convention, as this
rejection was to be regarded as a substantial dis-
advantage vis-à-vis the plaintiffs in the defama-
tion case. There was therefore a breach of the
principle of equality of arms. And hence a viola-
tion of Article 6 of the Convention, with reference
to the protection of journalistic sources as pro-
tected by Article 10 of the Convention6.
In other judgments the Court has reiterated that
journalist have an obligation to rely on a suffi-
cient solid, factual basis for the publication of
critical remarks or defamatory allegations but
that such an obligation does not imply that they
have to reveal the identity of the persons who
have provided them the information they have re-
lied on7. 
Fressoz and Roire v. France (violation Article 10)
In the judgment in the case Fressoz and Roire v.
France the Court was of the opinion that "jour-
nalists cannot, in principle, be released from their
duty to obey the ordinary criminal law on the ba-
sis that Article 10 affords them protection", in
casu in the light of the question if journalists were
allowed to use, publish or refer to leaked, confi-
dential documents falling under the protection
of professional secrecy of others. The case con-
cerned the conviction of Fressoz and Roire, the
publishing director and a journalist of Le Canard
Enchaîné, because of the publication of confiden-
tial tax files of the chief executive officer of Peu-
geot. According to the Court journalists however
can invoke the protection of Article 10 of the
Convention, as it falls to be decided whether "in
particular circumstances of the case, the interest
in the public's being informed outweighed the
"duties and responsibilities" the applicants had
as a result of the suspect origin of the documents
that were sent to them". In the judgment of 21
January 1999 the Court reached the conclusion
that the conviction of Fressoz and Roire because
of the publication of confidential tax files violat-
ed Article 10 of the Convention8. The judgment
gives additional protection to journalists using
information or documents from confidential
sources who themselves have breached a duty of
confidentiality.
Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg (violation Arti-
cle 10)
In the case of Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg the
European Court of Human Rights again recog-
nised the importance of the protection of jour-
nalistic sources. At the origin of this case lies an
article in the Lëtzëbuerger Journal in which Robert
Roemen reported that a Minister was convicted
of tax evasion, commenting that such conduct
was all the more shameful coming from a public
person who should set an example. The article re-
ported that the Minister had been ordered to pay
a tax fine of LUF 100.000 (nearly EUR 2.500).
This information was based on an internal docu-
ment that was leaked from the Land Registry and
Land Property Office. The Minister lodged a
criminal complaint and an investigation was
opened in order to identify the civil servant(s)
who had handled the file under a breach of pro-
fessional confidence. On instructions of the in-
vestigative judge searches were carried out at the
journalist's home and place of work and at his
lawyer's office. Both lodged several applications
to set aside the investigating judge's instructions
and the investigative measure undertaken on the
strength of them, particularly the searches. All of
these applications were dismissed by the Luxem-
bourg domestic courts. Roemen and Schmit ap-
plied before the European Court in Strasbourg,
alleging a breach of Article 6, 8 and 10 of the Con-
vention. In its judgment of 25 February 2003 the
Court came to the conclusion that the searching
of the journalist's home and office was to be con-
6 ECtHR 24 February 1997, De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium.
7 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 17 December, Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre,v. Romania (§ 106) and ECtHR 31 January 2006, Stân-
gu and Scutelnicu v. Romania (§ 52).
8 ECtHR 21 January 1999, Fressoz and Roire v. France. See also ECtHR 19 December 2006, Radio Twist v. Slovakia and
ECtHR 6 June 2007, Dupuis v. France.
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sidered as a violation of Article 10 of the Conven-
tion9. Confirming its case law the Court consid-
ered that "having regard to the importance of the
protection of journalistic sources for press free-
dom in a democratic society and the potentially
chilling effect an order of source disclosure has
on the exercise of that freedom, such a measure
cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Con-
vention, unless it is justifiable by an overriding re-
quirement in the public interest". The Court rec-
ognised that the searches carried out in the
journalist's home and place of work were pre-
scribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of
maintaining the public order and preventing
crime. However, because the article had discussed
a matter of general interest, the search interfer-
ences could not be compatible with Article 10 of
the Convention unless they were justified by an
"overriding requirement in the public interest".
The Court was of the opinion that the Luxem-
bourg authorities had not shown that the bal-
ance between the interests at stake had been pre-
served. The Court underlined that the search
warrant gave the investigate officers very wide
powers to burst in on a journalist at his place of
work and gave them access to all the documents
in his possession. The reasons adduced by the
Luxembourg authorities could not be regarded as
sufficient to justify the searches of the journal-
ist's home and place of work. Therefore the
Court comes to the conclusion that the investiga-
tive measures in issue had been disproportionate
and had infringed Roemen’s right to freedom of
expression. The judgment also confirms the
Court's case law that in principle the secrecy of
communication between a lawyer and his or her
client falls under the protection of privacy as
guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The
Court considered that the search carried out by
the Luxembourg judicial authorities at the law-
yer's office and the seizure of a document had
amounted to an unacceptable interference with
her right to respect for her private life, and hence
amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Con-
vention. The Court emphasized that the search
carried out at the lawyer's office clearly amount-
ed to a breach of the journalist's source through
the intermediary of his lawyer. The Court held
that the search had therefore been disproportion-
ate to the legitimate aims pursued, particularly in
view of the rapidity with which the search order
had been carried out. 
It is to be underlined that the Court clearly ex-
pressed the opinion that the searches carried out
in the journalist's home and place of work and at
his lawyer's office are even a greater treath to free-
dom of expression of journalists than a (court)
order to reveal their sources. According to the
Court a search is "un acte plus grave", as it gives
access to all documents which a journalist has in
his possession: "La Cour juge que des perquisi-
tions ayant pour but de découvrir la source du
journaliste - même si elles restent sans résultat -
constituent un acte plus grave qu'une somma-
tion de divulgation de l'identité de la source".
The Court emphasises that the searches at Roe-
men's home and place of work "avaient un effet
encore plus conséquent sur la protection des
sources que dans l'affaire Goodwin".
Ernst and others v. Belgium (violation Article 10)
Also in the case of Ernst and others v. Belgium  the
Court found a violation of the rights of journal-
ists to have their sources protected10. In 1995,
searches took place in offices of Belgian media on
the instructions of the investigative judge in
charge of the case on the murder of André Cools,
Minister of State and former head of the Socialist
Party who was killed in Liège in 1991. The search-
es were carried out at the news desks of some
newspapers (Le Soir, Le Soir Illustré and De Morgen),
in the head office of the RTBF, the public broad-
casting company of the French Community.
Searches were also carried out in the homes of
five journalists. Files, diskettes and hard disks of
computers belonging to the journalists were tak-
en for investigation. The background to these
measures was that leaks in this and other very
sensitive criminal cases had prompted proceed-
ings against members of the judiciary on a charge
of breach of professional confidence.
Some of the newspapers, four journalists, the so-
ciety of professional journalists of Le Soir and the
Belgian association of professional journalists
(AGJPB/AVBB) applied before the European
Court, alleging a violation of Article 6, 8, 10, 1311
and 1412 of the Convention. Relying on Article 10
of the Convention they asserted that the searches
and the seizures carried out on their premises
constituted an interference with the exercise of
their freedom of expression. The applicants ar-
gued that "les perquisitions massives et les saisies
constitueraient une ingérence inqualifiable des autorités
9 ECtHR 25 February 2003, Robert Roemen and Anne-Marie Schmit v. Luxembourg.
10 ECtHR 15 July 2003, Ernst and others v. Belgium
11 Right to an effective remedy.
12 Prohibition of discrimination.
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belges dans l'exercice de la liberté d'expression. Cette in-
gérence ne saurait être considéré comme une restriction
prévue par la loi, poursuivant un but légitime et néces-
saire dans une société démocratique", and that "les per-
quisitions et saisies qui ont eu lieu à leur domicile et dans
certains rédactions sont constitutives d'une violation du
secret des sources du journaliste".
In a decision of 25 June 2002 the Strasbourg
Court declared the application of the news media
and the journalists admissible. The Court was of
the opinion that the case raised important ques-
tions of fact and law, which cannot be resolved at
the stage of the admissibility but require an ex-
amination on the merits13. The application by Le
Soir Professional Journalists Society and the General
Association of Professional Journalists in Belgium how-
ever was dismissed as both organisations were
not be considered as a "victim" in the sense of Ar-
ticle 34 of the Convention.
The European Court in its judgment of 15 July
2003 has come to the conclusion that the search-
es and seizures were neglecting the protection of
journalistic sources protected by the right of free-
dom of expression and the right of privacy. The
Court agreed that the interferences by the Bel-
gian judicial authorities were prescribed by law
and intended to prevent the disclosure of infor-
mation received in confidence and to maintain
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
The Court considered that the searches and sei-
zures which were intended to assemble informa-
tion that could lead to the identification of police
officers or members of the judiciary leaking con-
fidential information came within the sphere of
protection of journalistic sources, an issue which
called for the most careful scrutiny by the Court.
The Court emphasised the large scale of the
searches that had been performed, while at no
stage it had been alleged that the applicants had
written articles containing secret information
about the cases. The Court questioned also
whether other means could not have been em-
ployed to identify those responsible for the
breaches of confidence and especially took in
consideration that the police officers involved in
the operation of the searches had very wide inves-
tigative powers. The Court found that the Bel-
gian authorities had not shown that the searches
and seizures on such a large scale had been rea-
sonably proportionate to the legitimate aims
pursued and therefore came to the conclusion
that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention. The Court, for analogue reasons,
also found a violation of the right of privacy pro-
tected under Article 8 of the Convention.
Nordisk Film & TV v. Denmark (no violation
of Article 10)
In August 2002, by judgment of the Danish Su-
preme Court (Højesteret) Nordisk Film & TV, was
compelled to hand over limited specified unedit-
ed footage and notes of a broadcasted television
programme investigating paedophilia in Den-
mark. For making the programme, a journalist
went undercover. He participated in meetings of
"The Paedophile Association" and interviewed
with hidden camera two members of the associa-
tion who made incriminating statements regard-
ing the realities of paedophilia in both Denmark
and India, including advice on how to induce a
child to chat over the internet and how easy it was
to procure children in India. In the documentary
broadcasted on national television false names
were used and all persons' faces and voices were
blurred. The day after the broadcast of the pro-
gramme one of the interviewed persons, called
"Mogens", was arrested and charged with sexual
offences. For further investigation the Copenha-
gen Police requested that the un-shown portions
of the recordings made by the journalist be dis-
closed. The journalist and the editor of the appli-
cant company's documentary unit refused the re-
quest. Also the Copenhagen City Court and the
High Court refused to grant the requested court
order having regard to the need of the media to
be able to protect their sources. The Supreme
Court however found against the applicant com-
pany, so that the latter was compelled to hand
over some parts of the unedited footage which
solely related to "Mogens". The court order ex-
plicitly exempted the recordings and notes that
would entail a risk of revealing the identity of
some persons (a victim, a police officer and the
mother of a hotel manager), who were inter-
viewed while they were promised by the journalist
that they could participate without the possibili-
ty of being identified. In November 2002 Nordisk
Film & TV complained in Strasbourg that the Su-
preme Court's judgment breached its rights un-
der Article 10 of the Convention, referring to the
European Court's case law affording a high level
of protection of journalistic sources.
13 ECtHR 25 June 2002, Martine Ernst and others v. Belgium, Appl. No. 33400/96, www.echr.coe.int. See also M. Simonis,
"Perquisitions: L’AGJBP à Strasbourg", Journalistes, 2002/28, 1-3 and -, "Strasbourg. L’action des journalistes est rece-
vable", Journalistes 2002/29, 1-3.
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In its decision of 8 December 2005 the Stras-
bourg Court has come to the conclusion that the
judgment of the Danish Supreme Court did not
violate Article 10 of the Convention. The Stras-
bourg Court is of the opinion that the applicant
company was not ordered to disclose its journal-
istic sources of information, but that it was rath-
er ordered to hand over part of its own-research
material. The Court is not convinced that the de-
gree of protection applied in this case can reach
the same level as that afforded to journalists
when it becomes to their right to keep their
sources confidential under Article 10 of the Con-
vention. The Court is also of the opinion that it is
the state's duty to take measures designed to en-
sure that individuals within their jurisdiction are
not subjected to inhuman or degrading treat-
ment, including such ill-treatment administered
by private individuals. These measures should
provide effective protection, in particular, of chil-
dren and other vulnerable persons and include
reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment or sexu-
al abuse of children of which the authorities had
or ought to have knowledge. The European
Court supports the opinion of the Danish Su-
preme Court that the non-edited recordings and
the notes made by the journalist could assist the
investigation and production of evidence in the
case against "Mogens" and that it concerned the
investigation of alleged serious criminal offences.
Of particular importance is that the Supreme
Court's judgment explicitly guaranteed that ma-
terial which entailed the risk of revealing the
identity of the journalist's sources was exempted
from the court order and that the order only con-
cerned the handover of a limited part of the
unedited footage as opposed to more drastic
measures such as for example a search of the jour-
nalist's home and workplace. In these circum-
stances the Strasbourg Court is satisfied that the
order was not disproportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued and that the reasons given by the
Danish Supreme Court in justification of those
measures were relevant and sufficient. Hence Ar-
ticle 10 of the Convention has not been violated.
The application is manifestly ill-founded and is
declared inadmissible.
The decision of the European Court makes clear
that the Danish Supreme Court's order to com-
pel the applicant to hand over the unedited foot-
age is to be considered as an interference in the
applicant's freedom of expression within the
meaning of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention. In
casu the interference however meets all the condi-
tions of Article 10 § 2, including the justification
as being "necessary in a democratic society". The
Strasbourg Court is also of the opinion that the
Supreme Court and the Danish legislation (Art.
172 and 804-805 of the Administration of Justice
Act) clearly acknowledge that an interference
with the protection of journalistic sources can-
not be compatible with Article 10 of the Conven-
tion unless it is justified by an overriding require-
ment in the public interest, hence reflecting the
approach developed in the Strasbourg Court's
jurisprudence in the case of Goodwin v. the United
Kingdom (1996), Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg
(2003) and Ernst and others v. Belgium (2003)14.
Voskuil v. the Netherlands (violation of Article 10)
This case concerns the complaint of a journalist,
Mr. Voskuil, having been denied the right not to
disclose the source he had relied on for writing
two articles in the newspaper Sp!ts. As he had re-
fused to reveal his source to the authorities,
Voskuil was detained for more than two weeks, in
an attempt to compel him to reveal the identity
of his source. 
In essence the Court was struck by the lengths to
which the Netherlands authorities had been pre-
pared to go to learn the source's identity. Such
far-reaching measures could but discourage
those who had true and accurate information re-
lating to wrongdoing from coming forward in
the future and sharing their knowledge with the
press. The Court found that the Government's
interest in knowing the identity of the journal-
ist's source had not been sufficient to override
the journalist's interest in concealing it. There
had therefore been a violation of Article 1015.
14 Decision as to the admissibility by the European Court of Human Rights (First Section), case of Nordisk Film & TV A/
S v. Denmark, Application no. 40485/02 of 8 December 2005, available at http://www.echr.coe.int (Hudoc), see also D.
VOORHOOF, "Rechter kan niet-uitgezonden televisiebeelden van interview met pedofiel opeisen", Mediaforum 2006/
3, 65-67. See also European Commission of Human Rights 18 January 1996, BBC v. the United Kingdom, Appl. 25798/94,
Decisions & Reports, 1994-84, 129. Also in the case of Še?i? v. Croatia (31 May 2007), the Court took into consideration
that in some circumstances an action of the police or the Public Prosecutor’s Office in requesting a competent court
to order a journalist to reveal his source of information would not a priori  be incompatible with Article 10 of the Con-
vention. The case concerned an investigation related to ill-treatment of Roma in the meaning of Article 3 of the Con-
vention.
15 ECtHR 22 November 2007, Voskuil v. the Netherlands.
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Tillack v. Belgium (violation of Article 10) 
In another case the journalist H.M. Tillack ap-
plied for a violation by the Belgian authorities of
this right of protection of sources. Tillack has
been suspected of having bribed a civil servant by
paying him EUR 8,000 in exchange for confiden-
tial information concerning investigations in
progress in the European institutions. Tillack's
home and workplace were searched and almost
all his working papers and tools were seized and
placed under seal (16 crates of papers, two boxes
of files, two computers, four mobile phones and
a metal cabinet). The European Court empha-
sized that a journalist's right not to reveal her or
his sources could not be considered a mere privi-
lege to be granted or taken away depending on
the lawfulness or unlawfulness of their sources,
but was part and parcel of the right to informa-
tion, to be treated with the utmost caution, even
more so in the applicant's case, where he had
been under suspicion because of vague, uncor-
roborated rumours, as subsequently confirmed
by the fact that he had not been charged. The
Court also took into account the amount of
property seized and considered that although the
reasons given by the Belgian courts were "rele-
vant", they could not be considered "sufficient"
to justify the impugned searches. The European
Court accordingly found that there had been a vi-
olation of Article 10 of the Convention16.
Financial Times Ltd. v. the United Kingdom (viola-
tion of Article 10)
In 2002 British courts decided in favour of a dis-
closure order in the case of Interbrew SA v. Finan-
cial Times and others. The case concerns the order
against four newspapers (FT, The Times, The
Guardian and The Independent) and the news
agency Reuters to deliver up their original copies
of a leaked and (apparently) partially forged doc-
ument about a contemplated takeover by Inter-
brew (now: Anheuser Busch InBev NV) of SAB
(South African Breweries). In a judgment of 15
December 2009 the European Court of Human
Rights (Fourth Section) has come to the conclu-
sion that this disclosure order was a violation of
the right of freedom of expression and informa-
tion, which includes press freedom and the right
of protection of journalistic sources as protected
by Article 10 of the European Convention of Hu-
man Rights.
The European Court of Human Rights has come
to the conclusion that the British judicial author-
ities in the Interbrew case have neglected the in-
terests related to the protection of journalistic
sources, by overemphasizing the interests and ar-
guments in favour of source disclosure. The
Court accepts that the disclosure order in the In-
terbrew case was prescribed by law (Norwich Phar-
macal and Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act
1981) and was intended to protect the rights of
others and to prevent the disclosure of informa-
tion received in confidence, both of which are le-
gitimate aims. The Court however does not con-
sider the disclosure order necessary in a
democratic society. Disclosure orders of journal-
istic sources have a detrimental impact not only
on the source in question, whose identity may be
revealed, but also on the newspaper against
which the order is directed, whose reputation
may be negatively affected in the eyes of future
potential sources by the disclosure, and on the
members of the public, who have an interest in re-
ceiving information imparted through anony-
mous sources and who are also potential sources
themselves. The Courts accepts that it may be
true that the public perception of the principle of
non-disclosure of sources would suffer no real
damage where it was overridden in circumstances
where a source was clearly acting in bad faith with
a harmful purpose and disclosed intentionally
falsified information. The Court makes clear
however that domestic courts should be slow to
assume, in the absence of compelling evidence,
that these factors are present in any particular
case. The Court emphasizes most importantly
that “the conduct of the source can never be decisive in
determining whether a disclosure order ought to be
made but will merely operate as one, albeit important,
factor to be taken into consideration in carrying out the
balancing exercise required under Article 10 § 2” (§
63).
The European Court of Human Rights comes to
the conclusion that the British Courts have given
too much weight to the alleged bogus character
of the leaked document and to the assumption
that the source had acted mala fide.  While the
Court considers that there may be circumstances
in which the source's harmful purpose would in
itself constitute a relevant and sufficient reason
to make a disclosure order, the legal proceedings
against the four newspapers and Reuters did not
allow X's purpose to be ascertained with the nec-
essary degree of certainty. The Court therefore
16 ECtHR 27 November 2007, Tillack v. Belgium.
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does not place significant weight on X's alleged
purpose in the present case, but does clearly em-
phasize the public interest in the protection of
journalistic sources. The Court accordingly, finds
that Interbrew's interests in eliminating, by pro-
ceedings against X, the threat of damage through
future dissemination of confidential informa-
tion and in obtaining damages for past breaches
of confidence were, even if considered cumula-
tively, insufficient to outweigh the public interest
in the protection of journalists' sources. The ju-
dicial order to deliver up the report at issue is
considered a violation of Article 10 of the Con-
vention17.
Sanoma Uitgevers BV v. the Netherlands (violation
of Article 10)
On 31 March 2009 the Chamber of the Third Sec-
tion of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) delivered a highly controversial judg-
ment in the case of Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the
Netherlands. With a 4/3 decision the Court was of
the opinion that the order to hand over a CD-
ROM with photographs in the possession of the
editor-in-chief of a weekly magazine claiming
protection of journalistic sources, did not
amount to a violation of Article 10 of the Europe-
an Convention of Human Rights. The finding
and motivation of the majority of the Chamber
was not only strongly disapproved in the world of
media and journalism, but was also firmly criti-
cised by the dissenting judges. Sanoma Uitgevers
B.V. requested for a referral to the Grand Cham-
ber, this request being supported by a large num-
ber of media, NGOs advocating media freedom
and professional organisations of journalists. On
14 September 2009 the panel of five Judges decid-
ed to refer the case to the Grand Chamber in ap-
plication of Article 43 of the Convention. By re-
ferring the case to the Grand Chamber the panel
accepted that the case raised a serious question
affecting the interpretation or application of Ar-
ticle 10 of the Convention and/or concerned a se-
rious issue of general importance.
On 14 September 2010, the 17 judges of the
Grand Chamber unanimously reached the con-
clusion that the order to hand over the CD-ROM
to the public prosecutor was a violation of the
journalists’ rights to protect their sources. It not-
ed that orders to disclose sources potentially had
a detrimental impact, not only on the source,
whose identity might be revealed, but also on the
newspaper or publication against which the or-
der was directed, whose reputation might be neg-
atively affected in the eyes of future potential
sources by the disclosure, and on members of the
public, who had an interest in receiving informa-
tion imparted through anonymous sources. Pro-
tection of journalists’ sources is indeed to be con-
sidered “a cornerstone of freedom of the press,
without which sources may be deterred from as-
sisting the press in informing the public on mat-
ters of public interest. As a result the vital public-
watchdog role of the press may be undermined
and the ability of the press to provide accurate
and reliable information to the public may be ad-
versely affected”. In essence the Grand Chamber
is of the opinion that the right to protect journal-
istic sources should be safeguarded by sufficient
procedural guarantees, including the guarantee
of prior review by a judge or an independent and
impartial decision-making body, before the po-
lice or the public prosecutor have access to infor-
mation capable of revealing such sources. Al-
though the public prosecutor, like any public
official, is bound by requirements of basic integ-
rity, in terms of procedure he or she is a “party”
defending interests potentially incompatible
with journalistic source protection and can hard-
ly be seen as objective and impartial so as to make
the necessary assessment of the various compet-
ing interests. As in the case of Sanoma Uitgevers
B.V. v. the Netherlands an ex ante guarantee of a re-
view by a judge or independent and impartial
body was not existing, the Grand Chamber is of
the opinion that “the quality of the law was defi-
cient in that there was no procedure attended by
adequate legal safeguards for the applicant com-
pany in order to enable an independent assess-
ment as to whether the interest of the criminal in-
vestigation overrode the public interest in the
protection of journalistic sources”. Emphasizing
the importance of the protection of journalistic
sources for press freedom in a democratic society
the Grand Chamber of the European Court finds
a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The
judgment implies that member states of the Con-
vention shall build in procedural safeguards in
their national law in terms of a judicial review or
other impartial assessment by an independent
body based on clear criteria of subsidiarity and
proportionality and prior to any disclosure of in-
17 ECtHR 15 December 2009, Financial Times Ltd. a.o. v. the United Kingdom. The Court has also recognized the right
of whistle blowers, under certain circumstances, to be guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention: ECtHR (Grand
Chamber) 12 February 2008, Guja v. Moldova.
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formation capable of revealing the identity or the
origin of journalists’ sources18.
3. Recommendation (2000) 7 “on the right of
journalists not to disclose their sources of in-
formation”
The references just mentioned make clear that in
the countries referred to (Luxembourg, Belgium,
The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Den-
mark) the level and the characteristics of the pro-
tection of journalistic sources are or were rather
uncertain and unclear and are subject to very dif-
ferent approaches by the police, the public prose-
cutors and the courts. Over the years also in many
other countries of the Council of Europe cases
have been reported of actions by police or judicial
authorities not sufficiently respecting the protec-
tion of journalistic sources as guaranteed by Arti-
cle 10 of the European Convention, in line with
the Court’s case law since 1996. It is also to be un-
derlined that the Strasbourg Court left open a
margin of appreciation by introducing the no-
tion of "an overriding requirement in the public inter-
est" that can legitimise a disclosure order.
In order to work out some more practical guide-
lines and to guarantee an effective protection of
journalistic sources in the member states, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
adopted Recommendation (2000) 7 "on the right of
journalists not to disclose their sources of information"
(8 March 2000) 19.
Principle 1 of the Recommendation stipulates
that "domestic law and practice in member states
should provide for explicit and clear protection of the
right of journalists not to disclose information identify-
ing a source in accordance with Article 10 of the Conven-
tion (..) and the principles established herein, which are
to be considered as minimum standards for the respect of
this right". The right of journalists not to disclose
their sources is to be recognised and organised
for "any natural or legal person who is regularly or pro-
fessionally engaged in the collection and dissemination
of information to the public via any means of communi-
cation".
Principle 2 of the Recommendation broadens the
scope of application of the protection of sources
to all persons "who, by their professional relations
with journalist, acquire knowledge of information iden-
tifying a source through the collection, editorial process-
ing or dissemination of this information".
According to the Recommendation the protec-
tion of journalistic sources should have a broad
field of application: "Journalists may receive their in-
formation from all kinds of sources. Therefore, a wide
interpretation of this term is necessary. The actual pro-
vision of information to journalists can constitute an ac-
tion on the side of the source, for example when a source
calls or writes to a journalist or sends to him or her re-
corded information or pictures. Information shall also
be regarded as being "provided" when a source remains
passive and consents to the journalist taking the infor-
mation, such as the filming or recording of information
with the consent of the source".
The notion of "information identifying a source"
must be broadly interpreted, because it is neces-
sary to protect all kinds of information which are
likely to lead to the identification of a source. As
far as its disclosure may lead to an identification
of a source, the following information is to be
protected according to the Recommendation:
i. the name of a source and his or her address, tel-
ephone and telefax number, employer's name
and other personal data as well as the voice of the
source and pictures showing a source;
ii. "the factual circumstances of acquiring this in-
formation", for example the time and place of a
meeting with a source, the means of correspond-
ence used or the particularities agreed between a
source and a journalist;
iii. "the unpublished content of the information
provided by a source to a journalist", for example
other facts, data, sounds or pictures which may
indicate a source's identity and which have not
yet been published by the journalist;
iv. personal data of journalists and their employers relat-
ed to their professional work", i.e. personal data pro-
duced by the work of journalists, which could be found,
for example, in address lists, lists of telephone calls, regis-
trations of computer-based communications, travel ar-
rangements or bank statements20.
The nature of the information is not relevant and
can include oral or written statements, sounds or
pictures. 
18 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 14 September 2010, Sanoma Uitgevers BV v. the Netherlands.
19 Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information, 8
March 2000, DH-MM (2000) 2, 125-128 (Explanatory Memorandum). See also www.humanrights.coe.int/media/
20 See also the Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation (2000)7.
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According to principle 3 of the Recommendation
a compelling order to reveal a source is only legit-
imate when it can be convincingly established
that: i. reasonable alternative measures to the disclosure
do not exist or have been exhausted by the persons or
public authorities that seek the disclosure, and ii. the le-
gitimate interest in the disclosure clearly outweighs the
public interest in the non-disclosure, bearing in mind
that:  - an overriding requirement of the need for disclo-
sure is proved, - the circumstances are of a sufficiently vi-
tal and serious nature, - the necessity of the disclosure is
identified as responding to a pressing social need, and, -
member states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in
assessing this need, but this margin goes hand in hand
with the supervision by the European Court of Human
Rights.
The first condition refers to the subsidiarity
principle: the persons or public authorities seek-
ing a disclosure should primarily search for and
apply proportionate alternative measures, which
adequately protect their respective rights and in-
terests and at the same time are less intrusive
with regard to the protection of the right of jour-
nalists not to disclose their source. The existence
of reasonable alternative measures for the protec-
tion of a legitimate interest excludes the necessity
of disclosing the source by the journalist and the
parties seeking the disclosure have to exhaust
these alternatives at first.
The second condition refers to the proportion-
ality principle. The public interest in the non-dis-
closure could, according to the Explanatory
Memorandum be outweighed where the disclo-
sure is necessary for "the protection of human
life" and "the prevention of major crime". In the
latter category are typically activities which may
contribute to or result in such crimes as murder,
manslaughter, severe bodily injury, crimes
against national security, or serious organised
crime. The prevention of such crimes can possibly
justify the disclosure of a journalist's source.
It is also recognised that a disclosure order can be
legitimate for "the defence in the course of legal
proceedings of a person who is accused or con-
victed of having committed a serious crime". In
the Explanatory Memorandum it is explicitly
mentioned that the right of defence of a person,
who is accused or convicted of having committed
a major crime may possibly justify the disclosure
of a journalist's source.
The disclosure order must also be "prescribed by
law" and it must be pertinently argued in every
case why the disclosure order in casu is necessary
in a democratic society, with a clear motivation
why the conditions of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality are fulfilled. Only where and as far as an
overriding requirement in the public interest ex-
ists and if the circumstances are of a sufficiently
vital and serious nature, a disclosure might be
considered necessary in a democratic society in
accordance with Article 10 § 2 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Principle 3 of the
Recommendation stipulates the requirements
for the evaluation of such necessity.
Principle 4 of the Recommendation stipulates, in
line with the judgment in the case De Haes and
Gijsels v. Belgium, that in legal proceedings
against a journalist on grounds of an alleged in-
fringement of the honour or reputation of a per-
son, authorities should consider, for the purpose
of establishing the truth or otherwise of the alle-
gation, all evidence which is available to them un-
der national procedural law and may not require
for that purpose the disclosure of information
identifying a source by the journalist. If in a defa-
mation case alternative evidence for the proof of
the journalist's statements is available to the ju-
diciary, respect should be demonstrated towards
the protection of journalistic sources.
Principle 5 refers to some procedural conditions
which must be fulfilled for initiating any action
against a journalist aimed at the disclosure of
sources. One of the recommendations is that
journalists should be informed by the competent
authorities of their right not to disclose informa-
tion identifying a source as well as of the limits of
this right before disclosure is requested (cfr. prin-
ciple 3). Sanctions against journalists for not dis-
closing information identifying a source should
only be imposed by judicial authorities during
court proceedings which allow for a hearing of
the journalists concerned in accordance with Ar-
ticle 6 of the European Convention ("fair trial").
Principle 6 provides that the following measures
should not be applied if their purpose is to cir-
cumvent the right of journalists not to disclose
information identifying a source: 
i. interception orders or actions concerning com-
munication or correspondence of journalists or
their employers,
ii. surveillance orders or actions concerning jour-
nalists, their contacts or their employers, or
iii. search or seizure orders or actions concerning
the private or business premises, belongings or
correspondence of journalists or their employers
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or personal data related to their professional
work.
The Explanatory Memorandum of Recommen-
dation (2000) 7 considers that "journalist's private
or business premises, belongings or correspondence or
personal data related to their work may contain infor-
mation which could lead to the disclosure of a source. The
same situation exists with respect to the business premis-
es, belongings, archives or personal data of the journal-
ist's employer. Any search or seizure action might reveal
information identifying a source." Judicial authori-
ties ordering such search or seizure therefore
should limit their search and seizure order with
respect to the protection of a journalist's source.
Principle 7 finally refers to the protection against
self-incrimination. 
It is to be underlined that the circumstance that
information was gathered in an illegal way or
that the source disclosed the information to the
journalist in breach of his or her own obligation
of professional confidentiality, may not deprive a
journalist of his right of protection of sources.
Action is to be undertaken to make that these ba-
sic principles of the Recommendation (2000) 7
are better implemented in the law and the juris-
prudence of the Council of Europe Member
States. The Committee of Ministers recommend-
ed the member states to "implement in their domes-
tic law and practice the principles appended to this rec-
ommendation" and "to disseminate widely this
recommendation and its appended principles, where ap-
propriate accompanied by a translation, and to bring
them in particular to the attention of public authorities,
police authorities and the judiciary as well as to make
them available to journalists, the media and their profes-
sional organisations".
4. The PACE-Recommendation Rec. 1950
(2011) on the protection of journalists’
sources21.
In a Recommendation of 25 January 2011 the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope again has insisted that the member states
should take appropriate and effective measures
in order to protect the right of journalists not to
reveal the identity or origin of their sources: “The
Assembly notes with concern the large number of
cases in which public authorities in Europe have
forced, or attempted to force, journalists to dis-
close their sources, despite the clear standards set
by the European Court of Human Rights and the
Committee of Ministers. These violations are
more frequent in member states without clear
legislation. In cases of investigative journalism,
the protection of sources is of even greater impor-
tance, as stated in the Committee of Ministers’
Declaration of 26 September 2007 on the protec-
tion and promotion of investigative journalism”.
The Assembly also refers to the right of every per-
son to disclose confidentially to the media, or by
other means, information about unlawful acts
and other wrongdoings of public concern, recall-
ing its Resolution 1729 (2010) and Recommen-
dation 1916 (2010) on the protection of “whistle-
blowers”. It  reaffirms that member states should
review legislation in this respect to ensure con-
sistency of domestic rules with the European
standards enshrined in these texts. It is also em-
phasized that “Internet service providers and tel-
ecommunication companies should not be
obliged to disclose information which may lead
to the identification of journalists’ sources in vi-
olation of Article 10 of the Convention”. The As-
sembly furthermore insists on the need to ensure
that legal provisions enacted by member states
when transposing the Union’s Directive 2006/
24/EC of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data
generated or processed in connection with the
provision of publicly available electronic commu-
nications are consistent with the right of journal-
ists not to disclose their sources under Article 10
of the Convention and with the right to privacy
under Article 8 of the Convention.
In sum, the Assembly recommends that the Com-
mittee of Ministers: 
“17.1. call on those member states which do not
have legislation specifying the right of journalists
not to disclose their sources of information, to
pass such legislation in accordance with the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights and
21 http://assembly.coe.int/mainf.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta11/erec1950.htm. In contrast with the 2000/7
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers the Assembly  under section 15 of the Recommendation 1950 (2011)
suggested to reduce the right of protection of journalists’ sources ‘ratione personae’. It is also remarkable, and in con-
trast with the case of the European Court, that the Recommendation refers to this right as ‘a privilege’. The Assembly
indeed considers that “the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information is a professional privilege,
intended to encourage sources to provide journalists with important information which they would not give without
a commitment to confidentiality. The same relationship of trust does not exist with regard to non-journalists, such as
individuals with their own website or web blog. Therefore, non-journalists cannot benefit from the right of journalists
not to reveal their sources”. 
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Committee of Ministers Recommendation No.
R (2000) 7; 
17.2. assist member states in analysing and im-
proving their legislation on the protection of the
confidentiality of journalists’ sources, in particu-
lar by supporting the review of their national laws
on surveillance, anti-terrorism, data retention
and access to telecommunications records; 
17.3. ask its competent steering committee to
draw up, in co-operation with journalists’ and
media freedom organisations, guidelines for
prosecutors and the police, as well as training ma-
terial for judges, on the right of journalists not to
disclose their sources of information, in accord-
ance with Committee of Ministers Recommenda-
tions Nos. R (2000) 7 and Rec(2003)13 and the
case law of the European Court of Human
Rights; 
17.4. ask its competent steering committee to
draw up guidelines for public authorities and pri-
vate service providers concerning the protection
of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources in
the context of the interception or disclosure of
computer data and traffic data of computer net-
works in accordance with Articles 16 and 17 of
the Convention on Cybercrime and Articles 8 and
10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights”.
In some countries Recommendation (2000)7 of
the Council of Europe has been an incentive to
start to develop at national level the protection of
journalistic sources. In the Netherlands a circular
letter ("Aanwijzing") of the college of attorneys-
general contains the crucial guidelines for the po-
lice and the public prosecutor's office in order to
respect the protection of journalistic sources22.
Although these guidelines had no status of for-
mal law, they were intended to reflect a clear op-
tion to protect journalistic sources in a confron-
tation with the police and the public
prosecutor23. The Grand Chamber judgment of
14 September 2010 in the case of Sanoma Uitgevers
B.V. v. the Netherlands has made clear however that
these guidelines did not guarantee sufficient pro-
tection for the protection of journalistic sources
in the Netherlands. A law proposal and a modifi-
cation of the guidelines has been announced in
2011.
Since 2010 in France the law on protection of
journalistic sources had been modified substan-
tially in order to meet the standards of the Euro-
pean Human Rights system (Law of 4 January
2010), although the new law is still considered in-
sufficiently protective for the journalists’ sourc-
es24.
Both in Luxembourg and Belgium steps have
been taken earlier to implement the European
Court's case law and the principles of the Recom-
mendation of the Council of Europe on the pro-
tection of journalistic sources, especially after the
judgments of 2003 in the cases Roemen and
Schmit v. Luxembourg and Ernst and others v.
Belgium (cfr. supra). 
In Luxembourg the Law of 8 June 2004 ("Law on
the freedom of expression in the media") explic-
itly recognises the protection of sources of jour-
nalists. The Articles 7 and 8 of the Law, under sec-
tion "De la protection des sources" guarantee
this right in line with the Recommendation
(2000)7 of the Council of Europe. 
In Belgium, a law proposal on the protection of
journalistic sources has been introduced before
parliament in October 2002, referring also to
Recommendation (2002)7 of the Council of Eu-
rope. On 15 May 2003 the Minister of Justice
published a circular letter ("Omzendbrief/circu-
laire") on the protection of sources. This circular
letter, aimed to inform the public prosecutors,
however only contained a short summary of the
relevant case law of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights on the issue, without taking any fur-
ther steps to develop the principles contained in
this jurisprudence. In spring 2005 the Belgian
Parliament finally approved the law on the pro-
tection of journalistic sources. 
22 Openbaar Ministerie, Aanwijzing toepassing dwangmiddelen bij journalisten, Stcrt. 2002, 46 (Policy guidelines),
www.openbaarministerie.nl/beleidsregels/docs/2002a003.htm. For a critical analysis, see C. BRANTS, "Grenzen van de jour-
nalistiek: vrije nieuwsgaring en de aanwijzing toepassing dwangmiddelen bij journalisten", N.J.C.M.-Bulletin 2002/7,
864-881.
23 C. BRANTS, "Grenzen van de journalistiek: vrije nieuwsgaring en de aanwijzing toepassing dwangmiddelen bij jour-
nalisten", l.c., 880. See also T. PRAKKEN, "Justitiële versus journalistieke waarheidsvinding",  NJB 2004/12, 620-626.
24 See 
www.lemonde.fr/societe/video/2010/09/13/il-y-a-une-loi-sur-la-protection-des-sources-il-faut-la-
respecter_1410689_3224.html; 
www.slate.fr/story/27665/journalistes-protection-sources-affaires and http://europe.ifj.org/en/articles/efj-condemns-
actions-by-french-government-against-journalists-rights.
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5. The protection of journalists’ sources and
the Luxembourg Media Law of 8 June 2004
In 2004 Luxembourg has taken an important in-
itiative in order to integrate the principles of the
European Court's case law and of the Recom-
mendation (2000) 7 into the law on freedom of
expression in the media (Media Law)25.
The Media Law of 8 June 2004 in its Article 7
guarantees that journalists heard as a witness by
an administrative or judicial authority in the
course of administrative or judicial proceedings
shall be entitled to refuse to disclose information
identifying a source, or the content of informa-
tion that he has obtained or collected.
The positive evaluation made by P. Wachsmann
in his report "Analyse écrite du project de loi Luxem-
bourgeois sur la liberté d'expression dans les médias" is
pertinent, especially with regard to the broad
scope of application of Article 7 of the Luxem-
bourg media law, an approach that is coherently
in line with the Recommendation of the Council
of Europe26. The Media Law not only protects
journalists: also publishers and anyone who in
course of their professional relations with a jour-
nalist have obtained knowledge of information
identifying a source, can invoke the right to
refuse disclosure of information.
The possibility of circumventing measures by the
police or judicial authorities, such as searches,
seizures and telephone tapping, in order to un-
mask the identity of a journalist's sources, is also
explicitly restricted (Article 7, 3°). Judicial action
and police authorities must refrain from order-
ing action or taking measures with the intention
or effect (!) of circumventing this right. The Law
explicitly refers to searches or seizures at the
home or work place of journalists or the persons
who are in a professional relation with them. Ad-
ditionaly Article 7, 4° of the Media Law considers
as illegal evidence any information identifying a
source, if this information is obtained by way of a
legal judicial search or seizure which was not
aimed at the disclosing the identity of a source.
The balance in respecting other human rights
and the functioning of the judiciary is to be
found in Article 8 of the media law, which stipu-
lates that where the action of the administrative,
judicial or police authorities concerns the preven-
tion, prosecution or punishment of serious
crimes against the person, drug-trafficking, mon-
ey-laundering, terrorism or offences against the
security of the State, journalists may not invoke
the right of the protection of sources as it men-
tioned in Article 7. Article 8 clarifies to some ex-
tend what is meant by the European Court as "an
overriding requirement in the public interest". This
provision enumerates in other words the cases in
which the protection of other interests prevails
over the interest of not disclosing sources. The
reference to serious crimes and some other of-
fences refer to situations that are generally con-
sidered to be sufficiently serious to justify a re-
striction on the protection of sources. In these
cases, the pre-eminence of a public interest to
suppress and punish one of the behaviours cov-
ered is presumed and justifies exemption from
the principle of protection of sources. The ap-
proach or Article 8 of the Luxembourg media law
however is not fully in line with the European
Court's case law and Recommendation (2000) 7.
As Article 8 is formulated, it might open the door
for a too wide application of disclosure orders, as
both the aspect of subsidiarity and proportional-
ity are not incorporated in this provision. It
should indeed not be sufficient as such if an in-
vestigation deals with serious crimes against the
person or some other offences. As Wachsman ob-
served correctly in his written analysis of the
Luxembourg draft law "la définition des cas dans les-
quels est supprimé le bénéfice du droit de refuser la divul-
gation des informations identifiant une source et le
contenu des informations obtenues ou collectées appa-
raît trop extensive, en contradiction avec ce que préconi-
se la recommendation du Comité des Ministres et avec ce
que suggère l'exposé des motifs lui-même". The way
Article 8 is formulated, a journalist may not in-
voke his right of protection of sources from the
moment an action, investigation or court case
concerns a serious crime or an explicitly men-
tioned offence. It is obvious that this provision
not only omitted to refer to the subsidiarity prin-
ciple ("it must be convincingly established that reason-
able alternative measures to the disclosure do not exist or
have been exhausted by the persons or public authorities
that seek the disclosure"). It is also necessary to in-
corporate as a basic condition in Article 8 that
any disclosure order must pertinently motivate
why the legitimate interest in the disclosure clear-
25 Article 7 and 8 of the Luxembourg Law of 8 June 2004 on the Freedom of Expression in the Media (Loi sur la liberté
d’expression dans les medias, Memorial A- nr. 85, 1201.See also Chambre des Députes 2001-2002, n° 4910, Projet de loi
sur la liberté d’expression dans les médias.
26 P. WACHSMANN, "Analyse écrite du project de loi Luxembourgeois sur la liberté d’expression dans les médias", Council of
Europe, Strasbourg, ATCM (2002)8, 16 p. Also available at www.humanrights.coe.int/media.
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ly outweighs the public interest in the non-dis-
closure. Only by formulating it that way the pub-
lic authorities are invited and obliged to motivate
consistently why an overriding requirement of
the need for disclosure is proved, that the circum-
stances are of a sufficiently vital and serious na-
ture and that the necessity of the disclosure is
identified as responding to a pressing social need.
To some degree however Article 2 of the Media
Law can help to reinstall the balance, as this Arti-
cle provides that any restriction or interference in
the freedom of expression as protected by Article
10 of the European Convention must be propor-
tionate to the legitimate aim pursued ("toute re-
striction ou ingérence (..) doit répondre à un be-
sion social impérieux et être proportionnée au
but poursuivi").
A last remark with regard to the Luxembourg Me-
dia Law refers to the unclear situation whether a
journalist can lose the protection of his sources
as guaranteed by the law, if he has obtained infor-
mation from a source that breached his or her ob-
ligation of secrecy of confidentiality27. In the Ex-
planatory Memorandum of the draft media law it
is said: "Protection of sources is therefore required in
the name of freedom of expression. It is important to
stress that its purpose is not to guarantee the impunity of
the journalist or the source. (..) Only a journalist who
lawfully and legally has information may invoke it. The
judicial authorities maintain the power to avail them-
selves of every means at their disposal to reveal the iden-
tity of a source". The Explanatory Memorandum
underlines also that "it should be noted that if a jour-
nalist lawfully possesses information, he or she must be
able to use it lawfully, even where the information is the
product of an offence committed by the source. The jour-
nalist may not in this case be found guilty since he or she
has not him- or her self-committed the offence". It is
mentioned in the Explanatory Memorandum
that the journalist "may not use this privilege where
he or she is implicated as the author, co-author or accom-
plice of an offence". The consequences of these dif-
ferent circumstances are not very clearly elaborat-
ed in the Luxembourg Media Law. The law left
open some possibilities to circumvent the protec-
tion of journalistic sources. This holds the risks
that journalistic sources in the future will not be
protected on a sufficient level.
6. Belgium: law on the protection of journal-
ists’ sources (7 April 2005)
In Belgium the discussion about the (lack of) pro-
tection of journalists’ sources has often been on,
– and mostly after short time again off –, the
political agenda28. Several law proposals have
been introduced in Belgian Parliament since
198429, but never a political majority was found
to support one of these law proposals. New initi-
atives to elaborate a legal framework for the pro-
tection of journalistic sources were taken in
200230. 
Since the judgment in the case of Ernst and others
v. Belgium (15 July 2003), in which the European
Court of Human Rights condemned Belgium for
unnecessary and disproportionate interferences
by the judicial authorities which failed to respect
the confidentiality of journalistic sources, jour-
nalists and their professional organisations have
called for a legal framework to protect journalis-
tic sources. The request for such a legal frame-
work was put on the agenda again after the
27 See the references to the recent case law in Belgium, the United Kingdom and France.
28 For an overiew see D. VOORHOOF, Recht op informatie, garingsvrijheid en een zwijgrecht voor de journalistiek,
Gent, Liga voor Mensenrechten, 1985; B. DEJEMEPPE, "Protection des sources ou secret professionel. D'un faux pro-
blème à une vraie responsabilité", Journ. Proc, 1991/196, 33-35; M. BUYDENS, "Droits et obligations du professionel
de l'information à l'égard de ses ‘sources’", Journ. Proc. 1993/247, 10; J. VELU, Beschouwingen over de europese regel-
geving inzake betrekkingen tussen gerecht en pers, R.W. 1995-1996, 273-308 (300-301); H. BOSLY, D. D'HOOGHE en
D. VOORHOOF, Justitie & Media, Drie pre-adviezen op vraag van de Minister van Justitie, Brussel, 1995, C/45-47; J.
CEULEERS, "Een zwijgrecht voor journalisten? bis", R.W. 1996-1997, 975-977; P. TOUSSAINT, "Le secret des sources
du journaliste", Rev.Trim.Dr.Homme 1996, 452-457; A. BORMS, "Het arrest Goodwin: een mijlpaal in de mediajuris-
prudentie omtrent het bronnengeheim", ICM Jaarboek Mensenrechten 1995-1996, 292-299 en D. VOORHOOF, "Het
journalistiek bronnengeheim voortaan niet enkel een deontologisch principe, maar ook een afdwingbaar recht", AM
1996/3, 355-360 and D. VOORHOOF, "Naar een wettelijke erkenning van het journalistiek bronnengeheim?", in A.
HENDRIKS, J. HUYPENS en J. SERVAES (eds.), Media en Politiek. Liber Memorialis Luk BOONE, Leuven, Acco,
1998, 105-113.
29 Parl. St. Kamer 1984-1985, nr. 1032/1; Parl. St. Kamer 1984-1985, nr. 1170/1; Parl. St. Kamer 1984-1985, nr. 1196/1;
Parl. St. Kamer 1985-1986, nr. 261/1-2; Parl. St. Kamer 1986-1987, nr. 786/1-2; Parl. St. Kamer, 1986-1987, nr. 800/1;
Parl. St. Senaat B.Z. 1998, nr. 94/1; Parl. St. Kamer B.Z. 1988, nr. 336/1; Parl. St. Kamer 1992-1993, nr. 1015/1 and Parl.
St. Kamer 1995-1996, nr. 137/1.
30 Wetsvoorstel tot bescherming van de informatiebronnen van de journalist/Proposition de loi relative à la protection
des sources d’information du journaliste, Parl. St. Kamer 2002-2003, nr. 2102/001 (G. Bourgeois, 28 October 2002)
and Parl. St. Kamer BZ 2003, nr. 24/001 (G. Bourgeois, 25 June 2003). See also the law proposal "visant à accorder aux
journalistes le droit au secret de leurs sources d’information", Parl. St. Kamer BZ 2003, nr. 111/001 (O. Maingain and
M. Payfa).
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searches at the office and in the home of Stern-
journalist Hans Martin Tillack in 2004. In a judg-
ment of 1 December 2004, the Belgian Supreme
Court (Hof van Cassatie / Court de Cassation) was of
the opinion that as part of a legitimate investiga-
tion into bribery of a civil servant of the EU, the
searches at H.M. Tillack's home and in the Brus-
sels' office of Stern were not to be considered as il-
legal, nor violated Article 10 of the European
Convention31. However, on 27 November 2007
the European Court of Human Rights found a vi-
olation of Article 10 by the Belgian authorities. A
strong call for the protection of journalistic
sources was also made on 26 January 2005 at a
press conference organised by the newspaper De
Morgen, after it was revealed that a judicial inves-
tigation had taken place with regard to the tele-
phone traffic of one of its journalists Anne de
Graaf. Also the organisation of Flemish profes-
sional journalists and Reporters sans Frontières pro-
tested sharply against the inspection of report-
ers' phone records as a manifest disrespect for
the confidentiality of journalistic sources. The
Court of First Instance of Brussels, in a judgment
of 29 June 2007, convicted the Belgian State for
infringement of the journalist’s freedom of ex-
pression as protected by Article 19 of the Belgian
Constitution and Article 10 of the European
Convention. It also recognised firmly the impor-
tance of the protection of journalistic sources.32
After long debates in Parliament, finally the law
on the protection of journalistic sources of 7
April 2005 was promulgated and came into force
on the 7th May 2005. The new law is very much in
line with the Committee of Ministers' Recom-
mendation No. R (2000)7 of 8 March 2000 to
member States on the rights of journalists not to
disclose their sources. The law not only formu-
lates a broad notion of who is a journalist and
what is protected information, it also reduces
substantially the possibility of compelling jour-
nalists to reveal their sources, as well as any kind
of investigative measures taken by the judicial au-
thorities to circumvent the right of journalists
not to reveal their sources. A disclosure order is
only in accordance with the law if there are no al-
ternative means of access and if the information
in the possession of the journalist is crucial for
the prevention of crime that constitutes a serious
threat to the physical integrity of one or more
persons. Journalists exercising their right to pro-
tection of sources cannot be prosecuted for
"fencing" (handling stolen material, heling / recel),
nor for complicity in the offence of breach of pro-
fessional secrecy. In a judgment of 7 June 2006
the Court of Arbitrage (Arbitragehof/Court d'Arbi-
trage), the Belgian Constitutional Court, con-
firmed the constitutionality of the law on protec-
tion of journalistic sources, broadening for that
purpose however the application of the law "ra-
tione personae33".
The protection of sources as referred to in Article
3 is (now) guaranteed in respect of the following
persons (Article 2):
- 1° Anyone directly contributing to the gather-
ing, editing, production or distribution of infor-
mation for the public by way of a medium
- 2° Editorial staff, which means anyone who in
the exercise of his functions may be in a position
to have knowledge on information that can lead
to the revelation of a source, regardless whether
this is through the gathering, the editorial treat-
ment, the production or the distribution of this
information.
According to the new law, journalists and mem-
bers of the editorial staff have a right to refuse the
disclosure of information upon request of the judi-
cial authorities, in four different situations (Arti-
cle 3):
-1° if the information may reveal the identity of
a source;
-2° if the information may reveal the nature or
the origin of that information;
-3° if the information may reveal the identity of
the author of a text or an audiovisual 
 production;
-4° if the disclosure may reveal the content of the
information and of the documents 
 themselves, if that may lead to the informant
being identified.
Journalists or editorial staff can however excep-
tionally be compelled by a judge to disclose informa-
tion revealing a source under the circumstances
31 Supreme Court 1 December 2004, www.juridat.be. See also European Court of First Instance (President) 15 October
2004, Case T-193/04 R, Hans-Martin Tillack v. Commission of the European Communities, available at http://
curia.eu.int
32 ECtHR 27 November 2007, Tillack v. Belgium and Court of First Instance Brussels 29 June 2007, A&M 2007, 500. For
more updated information, see D. VOORHOOF (ed.), Het journalistiek bronnengeheim onthuld, Brugge, Die Keure, 2008.
33 Arbitragehof 7 June 2006, nr. 91/2006. See also D. VOORHOOF, "Arbitragehof verruimt toepassing journalistiek
bronnengeheim", De Juristenkrant 2006/132, 17.
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of Article 4 in a far as three cumulative condi-
tions are fulfilled:
-1° the information relates to crimes that consti-
tute a serious threat to the physical integrity of one
or more persons;
-2° the requested information is of crucial
importance for the prevention of these 
crimes;
-3° and the requested information cannot be
obtained in another way.
According to Article 5 detection measures and in-
vestigative measures shall not apply to data relat-
ing to information sources of journalists and ed-
itorial staff, unless the data may prevent the
crimes referred to in Article 4 and subject to the
conditions set out under that Article.
Article 6 stipulates that journalists and editorial
staff (the persons referred to in Article 2) cannot
be prosecuted under Article 505 of the Belgian
Criminal Code when they are exercising their
right to keep silent about their sources. Article
505 of the Criminal Code punishes inter alia those
who receive or use documents which have been
stolen or have been obtained by crime (e.g. after
breach of the duty of professional secrecy by oth-
ers). Also in case of a breach of professional secre-
cy in the terms of Article 458 of the Criminal
Code, the persons referred to in Article 2 cannot
be prosecuted under Article 67, par. 4 of the Crim-
inal Code when they are exercising their right to
keep silent about their sources, which means that
journalists and editorial staff in these circum-
stances cannot be prosecuted for complicity in
the offence of breach of confidence. 
Since May 2005 the Belgian law is protecting
journalistic sources in accordance with Article 10
of the European Convention34. The Belgian law
of 7 April 2005 can undoubtedly inspire other
countries to develop new standards of protection
of journalistic, "having regard to the importance
of the protection of journalistic sources for press
freedom in a democratic society and the poten-
tially chilling effect an order of source disclosure
has on the exercise of that freedom"35.
34 Notice however that the law of 4 February 2010 on Special Investigative Measures by State Security and Intelligence
Services reduces to some extent the protection guaranteed by the Law of 7 April 2005: Wet van 30 november 1998 hou-
dende regeling  van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, gew. Wet van 4 februari 2010 betreffende de methoden
voor het verzamelen van gegevens door de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, BS 10 maart 2010. The law of 4 Febru-
ary 2010 makes, under strict conditions and with extra procedural guarantees towards only professional journalists
(in the sence of the law of 30 december 1963), investigative measures and searches possible when journalists them-
selves are under a serious suspicion of being personally and actively involved in activities with a ‘potential threat’ to
security, such as state security, international relations, military security, economic and scientific potential, espionage,
terrorism… For such specific or exceptional investigative measures no court order is required: the authorization is only
needed by the director of the state security services, after having obtained a positive advice by a special commission or
the competent Minister. The president of the association of professional journalists is informed in advance in case
such specific or exceptional investigative measures or searches against professional journalists will be undertaken
35 ECtHR 27 March 1996, Goodwin v. United Kingdom, § 39. See also David BANISAR, Silencing Sources: An International
Survey of Protections and Threats to Journalists’ Sources, 2007, at www.privacyinternational.org. See also 
www.press-list.com/English/Release/OSCE2.php; http://immi.is/FAQ; http://europe.ifj.org/assets/docs/108/130/
d6b586c-bfdac82.pdf;  http://europe.ifj.org/assets/docs/056/152/eaea138-f017a98.pdf and www.snj.cgt.fr/deontolo-
gie/sources.html
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Access to state-held information essential in a democrat-
ic society – traditional reluctance of the European Court
of Human Rights to apply article 10 European Conven-
tion on Human Rights in access to information cases –
positive obligations and new perspectives: initiatives
within the Council of Europe – parallel with the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights – Sdruženi Jihočeské
Matky decision of the European Court: the beginning of
a new era?
Background
The transparency of public administration is es-
sential in a democratic society. A wide access to
information on issues of general interest allows
the public to have an adequate view of, and to
form a critical opinion on, the state of the society
in which they live. Access to information is, there-
fore, closely related to the freedom to hold opin-
ions and to receive and impart information and
ideas, guaranteed by Article 10 European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR). One could ar-
gue that a positive obligation for the State to sup-
ply relevant information and to give access to
official documents regarding matters of public
interest is inherent in this article. For many years
the Strasbourg Court was reluctant to recognize
this. However, there are indications that the
Court's position is changing. A European right
of access to information, connected with Article
10 ECHR, is drawing near.
A large majority of the 46 Council of Europe
member states recognize a statutory right of ac-
cess to state-held information.1 Many of these
states have incorporated freedom of information
in their constitutions. For example, Article 110 of
the Netherlands Constitution stipulates that an
act of parliament must regulate the principle of
open government. Article 32 of the Belgian Con-
stitution takes a step further by creating a right
of access to any administrative document for eve-
ryone, subject only to restrictions prescribed by
law.2 In France, the Conseil d'État considered
that the right of access to administrative docu-
ments is a 'fundamental guarantee, accorded to
the citizens for the exercise of public freedoms in
the sense of Article 34 of the Constitution'.3
Many other examples could be added.
In the context of European Union law, access to
information has the status of a common consti-
tutional tradition. The right of access to EU-doc-
uments is also guaranteed by Article 255 EC4 and
is confirmed by the Charter of Fundamental
Rights (Nice, 7 December 2000), which is inte-
grated in the Treaty establishing a Constitution
for Europe (29 October 2004).5 The main goal of
the Charter is to reaffirm the fundamental rights
as they result, in particular, from the constitu-
tional traditions and international obligations
common to the member states. Apart from a
right of freedom of expression and information,
including freedom to hold opinions and to re-
ceive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers, laid down in Article 11 of the Charter
(Article II-71 of the Treaty), Article 42 of the
Charter (Article II-102 of the Treaty) provides
that 'any citizen of the Union, and any natural or
legal person residing or having its registered of-
fice in a Member State, has a right of access to
documents of the institutions, bodies, offices
and agencies of the Union, whatever their medi-
um'. This general right of access to documents of
EU-institutions, bodies, offices and agencies dif-
fers from the specific right of every person to
have access to his or her file, enshrined in Article
41 of the Charter (Article II-101 of the Treaty) as
part of the right to good administration.
On 21 February 2002, the Committee of Minis-
ters of the Council of Europe adopted a Recom-
mendation on access to official documents.6 The
Recommendation contains a set of principles, to
be used by member states in their law and prac-
tice. The key principle is formulated in Article
1 David Banisar, ‘Freedom of Information Around the World 2006: A Global Survey of Access to Government Records
Laws’, at <www.freedominfo.org>. 
2 See also Arbitragehof [Court of Arbitration] 25 March 1997, no. 17/97, A.A. 1997, 203 and J.T. 1997, 476.
3 Conseil d’État 29 April 2002, no. 228830 (Ullmann) and 13 December 2002, no. 237203 (Gabriel X).
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III. Member states should guarantee the right of
everyone to have access, on request, to official
documents held by public authorities. An appli-
cant for an official document should not be
obliged to give reasons for his request (Article V).
Limitations of the right of access are possible,
but they should be set down precisely in law, be
necessary in a democratic society and be propor-
tionate to the aim of protecting a legitimate
interest (Article IV). Article II deals with the
scope of the recommendation, stating: 'This
recom-mendation concerns only official docu-
ments held by public authorities. However,
member states should examine, in the light of
their domestic law and practice, to what extent
the principles of this recommendation could be
applied to information held by legislative bodies
and judicial authorities'. Finally, Article XI of
the Recommendation considers it a duty of a
public authority 'at its own initiative and where
appropriate, to take the necessary measures to
make public information which it holds when
the provision of such information is in the inter-
est of promoting the transparency of public
administration and efficiency within adminis-
trations or will encourage informed participa-
tion by the public in matters of public interest'.7
Hence, the Recommendation recognizes both an
enforceable subjective right of the citizen to have
access, on request, to official documents and a
positive obligation, a duty of the authorities to
provide, on their own initiative, the public with rel-
evant information in matters of public interest.
Recommendations are often the prelude to a
treaty. Indeed, at their meeting on 3-4 May 2005
the Council of Europe Ministers' Deputies
instructed the Steering Committee for Human
Rights (CDDH) to prepare a legally binding
instrument on access to official documents. The
Steering Committee in their turn tasked the
Group of Specialists on Access to Official Docu-
ments (DH-S-AC) with this activity. One of the
first questions to be resolved concerned the legal
form of the instrument. Should it be a self-
standing convention or an additional protocol
to an existing treaty? Should it be a traditional
convention, fixing precise obligations for the
parties, or a so-called 'framework convention'
with programme-type provisions, setting out
objectives which the parties undertake to pur-
sue? And finally, should the new treaty provide
for the possibility that member states accept (á la
carte) some provisions and not others? In 2006,
the Group of Specialists discussed a provisional
text, with the advice of three civil society organi-
sations: 'Access Info Europe', 'Article 19' and
the 'Open Society Justice Initiative'.8 The plan-
ning is that a traditional, self-standing, conven-
tion will be opened for signature in the second
half of 2007.
4 See also Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 May 2001 regarding public
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145/43, 31.5.2001. See furthermore Direc-
tive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental
information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC, OJ L 41/26, 14.02.2003; Directive 2003/35/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of
certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and
access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC, OJ L 156/17, 25.06.2003 and Regulation (EC) 1367/
2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Envi-
ronmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies, OJ L 264/13, 25.9.2006. Both the Court of First Instance
and the Court of Justice have elaborated a substantial case law on the matter of access to EU-documents, as e.g. CFI,
Carvel v. Council, Case T-194/94 [1995] ECR II-2765; CFI, World Wildlife Fund v. Commission, Case T-105/95 [1997] ECR
II-313; CFI, Van der Wal v. Commission, Case T-83/96 [1998] ECR II-545; CFI, Svenska Journalistförbundet v. Council, Case
T-174/95 [1998] ECR II-2289; CFI, Rothmans v. Commission, Case T-188/97 [1999] ECR II-2463; CFI, Hautala v. Council,
Case T-14/98 [1999] ECR II-2489; CFI, Kuijer (I) v. Council, Case T-188/98 [2000] ECR II-1959; CFI, BAT v. Commission,
Case T-111/00 [2001] ECR II-2997; CFI, Kuijer (II) v. Council, Case T-211/00 [2002] ECR II-7 Feb.; CFI, Turco v. Council,
Case T-84/03 [2003] ECR II-24 Nov.; CFI, IFAW v. Commission, Case T-168/02 [2004] ECR II-30 Nov.; CFI, Verein für
Konsumenteninformation v. Commission, Case T-2/03 [2005] ECR II-13 April and CFI, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH
v. Commission, Case T-237-02, 14 December 2006; 
ECJ, Van der Wal and Netherlands v. Commission, Joined Cases C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P [2000] ECR I-1; ECJ, Hautala v.
Council, Case C-353/99 P [2001] ECR I-9565 and ECJ, Mattila v. Council and Commission, Case C-353/01 P, 22 January 2004.
5 Article I-9 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe states that the Union shall recognise the rights,
freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which constitutes part II of the Treaty. The
Treaty itself shall only enter into force after it has been adopted by each of the signatory countries.
6 Rec (2002) 2. The text of the Recommendation, including the Explanatory Memorandum, at<www.coe.int/t/e/
human_rights/media/4_documentary_resources>.
7 The Explanatory Memorandum of the Recommendation also contains the provision that ‘in order to allow easy access
to official documents, the public authorities should provide the necessary consultation facilities, such as appropriate
technical equipment, including that making use of new information and communication technology’ (Art. X, Com-
plementary measures).
8 See <www.access-info.org>, <www.article19.org> and <www.justiceinitiative.org>.
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RELUCTANCE OF THE COURT
The right to freedom of expression in Article 10
ECHR not only protects the communicator – the
person that expresses his opinion or imparts
information – but explicitly refers to the right to
'receive' information and ideas.9 The general
public as potential receivers is also protected.
The Strasbourg Court has repeatedly recognized
'the right of the public to be properly
informed'10 and 'the public's right to be
informed of a different perspective'.11 A system-
atic censorship for school books implies, in the
Court's view, a 'denial of the right to freedom of
information'.12 The Court considered 'that the
public has a right to receive information as a cor-
ollary of the specific function of journalists,
which is to impart information and ideas on
matters of public interest'. Nevertheless, the
Court stopped short of accepting a duty of pub-
lic authorities to actively provide information to
the public. In the cases Leander v. Sweden, Gaskin
v. United Kingdom and Guerra and others v. Italy the
Court pointed out 
'that freedom to receive information (..) basicly
prohibits a government from restricting a per-
son from receiving information that others wish
or may be willing to impart to him. That free-
dom cannot be construed as imposing on a
State, in circumstances such as those of the
present case, positive obligations to collect and
disseminate information of its own motion'.13
The words 'in circumstances such as those of the
present case' suggest that there might be situa-
tions in which a positive obligation for the State
does exist. In its case law, however, the Court
never established such a situation.14 In its judg-
ment of 15 June 2004 (Sîrbu and others v. Moldova)
the Court made a sharp distinction between a
right to receive information without interference
from independent media on the one hand, and a
right of access to state-held documents on the
other. The Court considered that there had been
no restriction of press freedom, 'since the appli-
cants complained of a failure of the State to
make public a Governmental decision concern-
ing the military, the intelligence service and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs'. Referring to its ear-
lier case law, the Court reiterated that 'freedom
to receive information (..) cannot be construed as
imposing on a State, in circumstances such as
those of the present case, positive obligations to
disclose to the public any secret documents or
information concerning its military, intelligence
service or police'.15 Again, the door was kept ajar
to decide otherwise in future cases with different
circumstances.
Thanks to the right to privacy, not all applicants
were sent home empty-handed. As a matter of
fact, Gaskin and Guerra did win their cases. The
refusal by British childcare authorities to give
Gaskin the information he had requested about
his own childhood, without an adequate proce-
dure, was considered to be a violation of Article 8
ECHR. Enabling people to understand their own
childhood is closely connected with the right to
respect for private life. It is easy to understand
why the Court preferred to use Article 8 and not
Article 10 in this case. Giving Gaskin the infor-
mation he wanted, has little to do with 'open
government' and providing the public an 'ade-
quate view of the state of society in which they
live'. Moreover, access to official documents as a
guarantee for democracy cannot be restricted to
9 Preventing a (legal) person from lawfully receiving transmissions of broadcasting programs is considered as an interfe-
rence with the exercise of freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR: ECtHR 22 May 1990, Autronic AG
v. Switzerland, § 47.
10 ECtHR 26 April 1979, Sunday Times (n° 1) v. United Kingdom, §§ 64-66 and ECtHR 29 October 1992, Open Door and
Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, § 55. See also ECtHR 8 July 1986, Lingens v. Austria, § 41; ECtHR 25 June 1992, Thorgeir
Thorgeirson v. Iceland, § 63; ECtHR 23 September 1994, Jersild v. Denmark, § 31; ECtHR 25 August 1998, Hertel v. Swit-
zerland, §§ 47-49; ECtHR 25 June 2002, Colombani v. France, §§ 55 and 64; ECtHR 13 February 2003, Çetin and others v.
Turkey, § 64 and ECtHR 29 March 2005, Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, § 38.
11 ECtHR 18 July 2000, Sener v. Turkey, § 46.
12 ECtHR 10 May 2001, Cyprus v. Turkey, § 252.
13 ECtHR 9 February 1998, Guerra and others v. Italy, § 53. Cf. ECtHR 26 March 1987, Leander v. Sweden, § 74; ECtHR 7
July 1989, Gaskin v. United Kingdom, § 52.
14 In a decision of 7 April 1997 (Grupo Interpres v. Spain) the European Commission of Human Rights applied Article 10
in a case concerning a refusal to allow a company free access to court archives for the purpose of obtaining informa-
tion about potential borrowers. According to the Commission, Spain had not violated Article 10 ECHR, because
‘l’étendue du droit à l’accès aux informations en cause est limité par le libellé du paragraphe 2 de l’article 10 de la
Convention’. In other words, Article 10 was considered applicable, but the interference with the right to receive infor-
mation was justified in the circumstances of the present case. This finding of an interference is obviously at variance
with the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights, considering Article 10 not to be applicable in such cases:
Decision European Commission of Human Rights 7 April 1997, 32849/96, Grupo Interpres S.A. v. Spain, D.R. 89, p. 150.
15 ECtHR 16 June 2004, Sîrbu and others v. Moldova, § 18. See also, the decision ECtHR 18 May 2004, 42841/02, Stephen
Eccleston v. United Kingdom.
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a specific group of persons. The right to be prop-
erly informed about matters of public interest is
a right of 'everyone'. Mr. Gaskin, however, would
certainly object if the British authorities had
opened his personal files for every citizen. Infor-
mation about one's childhood is a purely private
matter. Gaskin had the right to know, but 'out-
siders' did not.
Like Gaskin, Mrs Guerra also successfully
invoked Article 8 ECHR. The Italian government
had failed in giving sufficient information about
certain health risks, caused by a chemical factory
in the area where she lived, and about evacuation
plans in the event of an accident. Again, the
Court decided that the State had violated a posi-
tive obligation inherent in Article 8.16 Of course,
health protection is an element of a person's pri-
vate life, but one could argue that information
about environmental risks is a matter of public
interest as well and, therefore, relevant for a pub-
lic debate. Indeed, the former European Com-
mission of Human Right was of the opinion that
the passive attitude of the Italian authorities in
this case was a violation of Article 10 ECHR.17
However, as we have seen, the Court finally
decided that Article 10 was not applicable. Scep-
tics concluded that only in theory a positive obli-
gation to provide information could be deduced
from this article. They remarked that the text of
Article 10 reflects the character of a negative
right, as appears from the words 'without inter-
ference by public authority'. 
The sceptic view was corroborated by the Roche
judgment in 2005, when the Court decided once
more that a refusal to give information was a vio-
lation of Article 8, but not of Article 10 ECHR.18
In Roche, the Grand Chamber of the Court
referred to the Leander, Gaskin and Guerra judg-
ments and saw no reason 'not to apply this
established jurisprudence'.
There are however a few developments and per-
spectives why the 'established jurisprudence' of
the European Court of Human Rights might in
the future find a new approach regarding the
application of Article 10 of the Convention and
the right of access to public documents.
POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES
Since 2000, there can be no doubt that at least
some positive obligations are inherent in Article
10 ECHR. In Özgür Gündem v. Turkey police
authorities had remained passive when a contro-
versial newspaper suffered from physical attacks,
including killings, assaults and arson, by private
persons. The Court concluded 'that the Govern-
ment have failed, in the circumstances, to com-
ply with their positive obligation to protect
Özgür Gündem in the exercise of its freedom of
expression.19 In other judgments the Court con-
sidered that Article 10 required positive meas-
ures of protection in contractual relations
between individuals.20 More generally, Alastair
Mowbray, referring to writings of Shue, states
that all basic rights in the European Convention
involve both negative and positive duties,
although the specific balance between both cate-
gories will vary according to the particular right
at issue. Even apparently 'negative rights', such
as the prohibition of torture contained in Article
3, can embody significant positive obligations
(e.g. to take vulnerable children into public care
to protect them from abuse by their parents).21
Legislative initiatives within the Council of
Europe, directed at strengthening the right of
access to official documents, will stimulate the
Court to accept that a positive obligation exists
to provide relevant information to the general
public. In its jurisprudence the Court acknowl-
edges that Recommendations by the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe can be rel-
evant for the interpretation of the Convention.22
True, the Recommendation on access to official
documents of 21 February 2002 did not have any
influence on the Roche judgment of 19 October
2005, in which the Court denied applicability of
Article 10 to a refusal to give access to informa-
16 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that Article 8 is not the only article to impose positive obligations on
the State to give access to state-held information to specific persons. The same is true for Article 6 ECHR. Refusal by
national tribunals to give access to certain legal documents can jeopardize the right to a fair hearing in a civil or crimi-
nal procedure: ECtHR 9 June 1998, Mc Ginley and Egan v. United Kingdom, §§ 84-90. Cf. ECtHR 2 February 1984, Sutter
v. Switzerland; ECtHR 28 June 1984, Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom; ECtHR 24 November 1997, Werner v. Austria;
ECtHR 24 April 2001, B. and P. v. United Kingdom; ECtHR 28 September 2004, Loiseau v. France and ECtHR 7 February
2006, Donnadieu (no. 2) v. France.
17 European Commission of Human Rights 29 June 1996, Guerra v. Italy, § 49.
18 ECtHR 19 October 2005, Roche v. United Kingdom, §§ 172-173.
19 ECtHR 16 March 2000, Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, § 46.
20 ECtHR 29 February 2000, Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, § 38. Cf. ECtHR 28 June 2001, Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland,
§ 45 and ECtHR 6 May 2003, Appleby v. United Kingdom, § 39.
21 A. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of
Human Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2004) p. 108-109.
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tion.23 However, an explanation could be that
the information requested by Mr Roche was
directly relevant for his personal health, which
brings the matter essentially into the ambit of
Article 8. Indeed, the Court decided that Article
8 had been violated. If the Recommendation on
access to official documents is to be followed by
a binding Treaty in 2007 or in 2008, the argu-
ments for changing the Guerra approach would
gain strength. After all, the Convention is a liv-
ing instrument that has to be interpreted in the
light of present day conditions. As the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights has stated in 2002:
'While the Court is not formally bound to follow
its previous judgments, it is in the interest of
legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before
the law that it should not depart, without good
reason, from precedents laid down in previous
cases (..). However, since the Convention is first
and foremost a system for the protection of
human rights, the Court must have regard to the
changing conditions within the respondent
State and within Contracting States generally
and respond, for example, to any evolving con-
vergence as to the standards to be achieved (..). It
is of crucial importance that the Convention is
interpreted and applied in a manner which
renders its rights practical and effective, not the-
oretical and illusory. A failure by the Court to
maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach
would indeed risk rendering it a bar to reform or
improvement'.24
The European Court of Human Rights could
also draw inspiration from its American counter-
part, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. On 19 September 2006, the Inter-Ameri-
can Court issued judgment in the case Claude
Reyes and others v. Chile, concerning a refusal to
give access to information.25 Three environmen-
tal activists had requested information relating
to the approval of a major logging project. At the
time, Chile had no statute guaranteeing access to
information and the authorities simply ignored
the request. Before the Inter-American Court,
the applicants relied on Article 13 of the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights, pro-
tecting – among other things – the freedom to
seek and receive information.26 The Inter-Ameri-
can Court unanimously found a violation of this
article, stating 'that Article 13 protects the rights
of all persons to request access to information
held by the State, with the exceptions permitted
by the restrictions regime of the Convention.27
The restrictions regime of Article 13 closely
resembles that of 'our' Article 10 ECHR: a
restriction must be prescribed by law and be nec-
essary for a legitimate aim. Interestingly, the
Inter-American Court stressed the connection
between the right of access to information held
by the State and democracy.28
The Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky decision
On 10 July 2006 the European Court of Human
Rights gave an admissibility decision in the case
Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic.29 The
case concerned a refusal to give an ecologist Non
Governmental Organisation access to docu-
ments and plans regarding a nuclear power sta-
tion. Although the Court decided that there had
not been a breach of Article 10, it explicitly rec-
ognised that the refusal by the Czech authorities
was an interference with the right to receive
information. Hence, the refusal had to meet the
conditions set forth in Article 10 § 2. The Court
declared the application manifestly ill-founded,
because the criteria in § 2 had been met. It con-
sidered that the Czech authorities had motivated
their refusal in a pertinent and sufficient way.
Next, the refusal was justified for the protection
of the rights of others (industrial secrets), in the
interest of national security (risk of terrorist
attacks) and for the protection of health. The
Court also emphasized that the request to have
22 See, e.g., ECtHR 9 May 2003, Tepe v. Turkey, § 181, referring to Recommendation No. R (99) 3 on the Harmonization
of Medico-Legal Autopsy Rules (2 February 1999) and ECtHR 10 November 2005, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, § 136, refer-
ring to Recommendation No. R (98) 3 on Access to Higher Education (17 March 1998). The latter judgment also refer-
red to a recommendation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Rec. no. 1353 (1998) on the Access
of Minorities to Higher Education (27 January 1998). See also ECtHR 9 November 2006, Leempoel & SA Cine Revue v.
Belgium, § 78, referring to a resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: Resolution 1165
(1998) on the right of privacy (24 June 1998). In its case law, the Court also regularly referred to other international
instruments, treaties or EU-directives, as e.g. in ECtHR Müller and Others v. Switzerland, 24 May1988, § 27; ECtHR Grop-
pera Radio v. Switzerland, 28 March1990, § 61; ECtHR Autronic v. Switzerland, 22 May1990, §§ 62-63; ECtHR Jersild v.
Denmark, 23 September 1994, §§ 27 and 30-31; ECtHR Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway, 20 May 1999, § 65; ECtHR
Nikula v. Finland, 21 March 2002, §§ 27-28; ECtHR A. v. UK, 17 December 2002, §§ 33-36 and 81; ECtHR Müslüm Gün-
düz v. Turkey, 4 December 2003, §§ 22-24 and 40 and ECtHR Murphy v. Ireland, 10 July 2003, §§ 32 en 81. 
23 ECtHR 19 October 2005, Roche v. United Kingdom, §§ 172-173.
24 ECtHR 11 June 2002, Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, § 74.
25 Inter-American Court of Human Rights19 September 2006, Claude Reyes and others v. Chile, at <www.corteidh.or.cr>.
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access to essentially technical information about
the nuclear power station did not reflect a mat-
ter of public interest. For us, the crucial point
however is the fact that Article 10 was considered
to be applicable in the first place.
The relevant passage in the decision reads as fol-
lows:
In its judgments Guerra and others vs. Italy (judgment
of 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Deci-
sions 1998-I, § 53), concerning the absence of informa-
tion for the population on the health risks they might
run and on the measures to be taken in the event of an
accident in an adjacent chemical factory, and Roche vs.
United Kingdom ([GC], no. 32555/96, § 172, ECHR
2005-...), referring to the absence of any procedure of
access to information that might enable the applicant to
evaluate the health risks resulting from his participation
in military tests, the Court concluded that the afore-said
freedom 'cannot be construed as imposing on a State, in
circumstances such as those of the present case, positive
obligations to collect and disseminate information of its
own motion'. The Court equally observes that it is diffi-
cult to derive from the Convention a general right of
access to administrative data and documents (see,
mutatis mutandis, Loiseau vs. France (decision),
no. 46809/00, ECHR 2003-XII (extracts)).
In the present case, the applicant requested permission
to consult administrative documents which were at the
disposal of the authorities and to which citizens could
have access under the conditions prescribed by Article
133 of the Construction Act, contested by the applicant.
Under these circumstances, the Court recognizes that
the rejection of the afore-said request constituted an
interference with the right of the applicant to receive
information (see, mutatis mutandis, Grupo Inter-
pres S.A. vs. Spain, no. 32849/96, decision of the
Commission of 7 April 1997, Decisions and
Reports 89, p. 150).30
LOOKING AHEAD
Is Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky the beginning of a
new era? The Court does not pay much attention
to the difference with its earlier case-law. There
could be a simple explanation for the fact that
Article 10 was applicable this time, in contrast
with the Guerra and Roche judgments. Maybe
'the circumstances of the present case' were deci-
sive. In the passage, quoted above, the Courts
mentions three characteristics of the Sdruženi
Jihočeské Matky case.
– The applicant organisation had filed a request.
The refusal of a request for information is indeed
26 It is to be noticed that, in contrast with Article 10 ECHR and similar to Article 19 ICCPR, the right guaranteed by Arti-
cle 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) also includes the freedom ‘to seek’ information and
ideas, apart from the right to impart and receive information and ideas. Art. 13.1 ACHR states: ‘Everyone has the right
to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium
of one's choice’. Art. 13.3. ACHR guarantees that ‘the right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or
means (..) or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions’, see
<www.oas.org>. This difference in wording between Article 13 ACHR and Article 10 ECHR however is not substantial.
In recent case law the ECtHR has recognized that Article 10 ECHR also includes the right to seek information. The
Court e.g. considered an interference with the right of a journalist to gather and to investigate information under the
scope of Article 10 ECtHR. The Court noted that the case did not concern the restraining of a publication as such or a
conviction following a publication, but a preparatory step towards publication, namely a journalist’s research and
investigative activities. The Court emphasized that this phase also fell within its scrutiny and even called for the most
scrupulous examination on account of the great danger represented by that sort of restriction on the freedom of
expression. In the original wording of the Court, the protection of Arcticle 10 implies ‘les activités de recherche et
d’enquête d’un journaliste. A ce titre, il y a lieu de rappeler que non seulement les restrictions à la liberté de la presse
visant la phase préalable à la publication tombent dans le champ du contrôle par la Cour, mais qu’elles présentent
même des grands dangers et, dès lors, appellent de la part de la Cour l’examen le plus scrupuleux’, ECtHR 25 April
2006, Dammann v. Switzerland, § 52, see <www.echr.coe.int>. A right to seek information is also recognised in the Dec-
laration on the freedom of expression of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 29 April 1982, in
which reference is made to the right of everyone ‘regardless of frontiers, to express himself, to seek and receive infor-
mation and ideas, whatever their source, as well as to impart them under the conditions set out in Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights’, <www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/media>
27 In § 77 the Court considered: ‘la Corte estima que el artículo 13 de la Convención (..) protege el derecho que tiene toda
persona a solicitar el acceso a la información bajo el control del Estado, con las salvedades permitidas bajo el régimen
de restricciones de la Convención’.
28 § 84-87. In § 86 the Court considered: ‘El acceso a la información bajo el control del Estado, que sea de interés público,
puede permitir la participación en la gestión pública, a través del control social que se puede ejercer con dicho acceso’.
29 Decision ECtHR 10 July 2006, 19101/03, Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic. The name of the applicant can be
translated as ‘South Bohemian Mother Association’. Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky is established in České Budjovice. It is a non-
political civil association whose mission it is to protect nature and the countryside. The association supports the
enforcement of alternative methods of acquiring energy that are less of a burden to the environment and, above all, to
limit the excessive consumption of energy by looking at ways of saving it. The association also attempts to act as a
counter-balance to what it considers ‘the one-sided nuclear lobby campaign enforcing the completion of the Temelín
Nuclear Power Plant’: www.jihoceskematky.cz/en/index.php
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not the same as the failure by the authorities to
spread information motu proprio. In the Guerra
judgment and in the Roche judgment the Court
explicitly stated that the freedom guaranteed by
Article 10 cannot be construed as imposing on a
State positive obligations to collect and dissemi-
nate information of 'its own motion'.31 The
Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky decision explicitly re-
fers to this established jurisprudence of the
Court not willing to derive from Article 10 an ob-
ligation of the State to provide information to
the public motu proprio. It is to be underlined
however that in other judgments and decisions of
the Court Article 10 has been declared inapplica-
ble also in cases where the applicant had request-
ed to provide him with information or had
sought access to personal records.32 In the
Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky decision the Court by
clearly emphasizing the circumstance that the
applicant had filed a request to have access to ad-
ministrative documents, upgrades this circum-
stance to a relevant if not decisive element in or-
der to make Article 10 applicable.
– The information was contained in administra-
tive documents held by the public authorities.
Therefore, the authorities did not need to col-
lect, even less create, the information requested
by the applicant.
– Unlike the applicant, other citizens had or
could have access to the information, under the
conditions prescribed by the Czech legislation. 33 
In the Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky decision the
Court firmly puts forward that under such cir-
cumstances a refusal to provide a citizen or a legal
person with the requested administrative docu-
ments must be in accordance with Article 10 of
the Convention.
The Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky decision also
makes clear that the right to have access to pub-
lic documents cannot be an absolute one: 'as the
exercising of the right to receive information can
damage the right of others, the security of the
state or the public health, the scope of the right
to have access to the relevant information is lim-
ited by the wording of the second paragraph of
Article 10 of the Convention'.34 This approach
brings the evaluation of a refusal of the right of
access to public documents within the scope of
the conditions set forth in Article 10 § 2 of the
Convention, which implies that such a refusal
must be prescribed by law, be based on a legiti-
mate aim and especially must be necessary in a
democratic society. Referring to the case law of
the Strasbourg Court, this means that when the
requested documents are related to a matter of
public interest, a matter of serious public con-
cern or an ongoing political debate, the states
will be under a strict scrutiny whether the rea-
sons invoked to refuse a request for access to
such documents, were relevant and sufficient.35
It is important that for the first time the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights actually applied
Article 10 ECHR in an access to information
case. Hopefully, further steps will follow. The
material provisions of the future treaty on access
to information, currently under discussion in
30 Our translation. The original French version reads:
‘Dans ses arrêts Guerra et autres c. Italie (arrêt du 19 février 1998, Recueil des arrêts et décisions 1998I, § 53), concernant
l’absence d’informations de la population sur les risques encourus et sur les mesures à prendre en cas d’accident dans
une usine chimique du voisinage, et Roche c. Royaume-Uni ([GC], no 32555/96, § 172, CEDH 2005...), portant sur
l’absence de toute procédure d’accès à des informations qui auraient permis au requérant d’évaluer les risques pour sa
santé pouvant résulter de sa participation à des tests militaires, la Cour a conclu que ladite liberté « ne saurait se com-
prendre comme imposant à un Etat, dans des circonstances telles que celles de l’espèce, des obligations positives de
collecte et de diffusion, motu proprio, des informations ». La Cour observe également qu’il est difficile de déduire de
la Convention un droit général d’accès aux données et documents de caractère administratif (voir, mutatis mutandis,
Loiseau c. France (déc.), no 46809/99, CEDH 2003XII (extraits)).
En l’occurence, la requérante a demandé de consulter des documents administratifs qui étaient à la disposition des
autorités et auxquels on pouvait accéder dans les conditions prévues par l’article 133 de la loi sur les constructions,
contesté par la requérante. Dans ces conditions. la Cour admet que le rejet de ladite demande a constitué une ingéren-
ce au droit de la requérante de recevoir des informations (voir, mutatis mutandis, Grupo Interpres S.A. c. Espagne, no.
32849/96, décision de la Commission du 7 avril 1997, Décisions et rapports 89, p. 150).
31 ECtHR 9 February 1998, Guerra and others v. Italy, § 53 and ECtHR 19 October 2005, Roche v. United Kingdom, §§ 172-
173. See also ECtHR 16 June 2004, Sîrbu and others v. Moldova.
32 Decision ECtHR 18 May 2004, 42841/02, Stephen Eccleston v. United Kingdom. See also ECtHR 26 March 1987, Leander v.
Sweden and ECtHR 7 July 1989, Gaskin v. United Kingdom, § 52.
33 Notice that the request by Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky did not concern personal data or personal records regarding the
applicants themselves, like in some other cases where the Court considered, ‘under such circumstances’ Article 10 not
applicable: ECtHR 26 March 1987, Leander v. Sweden; ECtHR 7 July 1989, Gaskin v. United Kingdom; Decision ECtHR 18
May 2004, 42841/02, Stephen Eccleston v. United Kingdom and ECtHR 19 October 2005, Roche v. United Kingdom.
34 Our translation. The original French version reads:‘En effet, lorsque l’exercice du droit à recevoir des informations
peut porter atteinte aux droits d’autrui, à la sûrété publique ou à la santé, l’étendue du droit à l’accès aux informations
en cause est limitée par le libellé du paragraphe 2 de l’article 10 de la Convention’.
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the Council of Europe, can therefore be an
important guideline. Probably, this treaty will
establish a monitoring system of its own. A tra-
ditional mechanism of follow-up is to confer the
monitoring task to a committee of experts repre-
senting the States. Typically, these experts only
have the power to make recommendations. For a
human right essential in a democratic society
that is not sufficient. The national authorities
and domestic courts directly applying the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and if need
be the European Court of Human Rights should
fill the gap by judging individual complaints
under Article 10 ECHR.36 The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in 2006 has set a good
example.
P.S. For the most recent developments in the
European Case Law regarding access to official
documents, see ECtHR, Társaság a Szabadság-
jogokért (TASZ) v. Hungary, 14 April 2009 and
ECtHR, Kenedi v. Hungary, 26 May 2009. See also
the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official
Documents, Adopted by the Committee of Minis-
ters on 27 November 2008, www.coe.int and
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/-
Cher-
cheSig.asp?NT=205&CM=&&DF=&CL=ENG.
See also www.access-info.org.
35 ECtHR16 November 2004, Selistö v. Finland; ECtHR16 November 2004, Karhuvaara en Iltalehti v. Finland; ECtHR 29
March 2005, Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine; ECtHR 27 Juli 2005, Grinberg v. Russia; ECtHR 6 September 2005, Salov
v. Ukraine; ECtHR 31 January 2006, Giniewski v. France; ECtHR 25 April 2006, Stoll v. Switzerland; ECtHR 25 April 2006,
Dammann v. Switzerland; ECtHR 2 May 2006, Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey; ECtHR 4 May 2006, Alinak v. Turkey; ECtHR 6 June
2006, Erbakan t. Turkey; ECtHR 10 August 2006, Lyaskho v. Ukraine; ECtHR 21 September 2006, Monnat v. Switzerland;
ECtHR 5 October 2006, Zakharov v. Russia; ECtHR 7 November 2006, Mamère v. France; ECtHR 14 December 2006,
Karman v. Russia; ECtHR 19 December 2006, Radio Twist, SA v. Slovakia and ECtHR 19 December 2006, Dabrowski t.
Poland.
36 Actually pending before the ECtHR is application no. 11721/04, in Geraguyn Khorhurd Patgamavorakan Akumb v. Arme-
nia. This case involves the alleged failure of an Armenian election authority to provide to the applicant organisation
information related to its decision making processes, as well as data regarding the campaign contributions and expen-
ses of certain political parties. The basic legal issue raised by the case is whether Article 10 of the Convention grants
individuals and other persons a general right of access to information held by public authorities.
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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM.
FROM SUNDAY TIMES (NO. 1) V. U.K. (1979) 
TO HACHETTE FILIPACCHI ASSOCIES (‘ICI PARIS’) V. FRANCE (2009)
IN: INTER-AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL, 2010/1-2, 3-49
Dirk VOORHOOF
1. INTRODUCTION
Europe has a long tradition in guaranteeing free-
dom of speech and press freedom. The Royal De-
cree on the Freedom of the Press in Sweden
(1766, Tryckfrihetsförordning) is generally recog-
nised as the first example in Europe of legal pro-
tection with constitutional status guaranteeing
press freedom and prohibiting censorship. In
1789 Article 11 of the Déclaration des Droits de
l'Homme et du Citoyen (Declaration of the Rights
of Men and Citizens in France provided that “free
communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most
precious of the rights of man. Consequently, every citi-
zen may speak, write and publish freely, although he
may have to answer for the abuse of that liberty in the
cases determined by law”.1 Gradually, all parliamen-
tary democracies in Europe have guaranteed free-
dom of expression and media freedom in their
constitutions. The practice and application of
freedom of speech and of the press however has
often been, and to some extent still is, problemat-
ic. In some periods of time and specifically in the
areas of state security, public order, morals and
religion, the right to freedom of expression has
not always been respected by governments, exec-
utive bodies or judicial authorities. Still the gen-
eral tendency is that the scope and level of protec-
tion of freedom of expression and information
has been extended and upgraded over the years in
Europe and that public authorities have been less
involved in prior restraint, censorship and op-
pression.2 
The right to freedom of expression and informa-
tion is actually guaranteed by Article 10 of the
European Convention for the protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereaf-
ter: the European Convention, or: the Conven-
tion) in all 47 member states of the Council of
Europe, from Norway to Cyprus, from Iceland to
Azerbaijan and from Portugal to Russia.3 The de-
velopment towards more freedom of speech and
media freedom has undoubtedly been influenced
by the expanding impact of Article 10 of the Con-
vention which guarantees freedom of expression
“without interference by public authority” and “regard-
less of frontiers”.4 Article 10 of the Convention, and
the way this article has been interpreted and ap-
plied by the European Court of Human Rights5
and promoted by the Council of Europe6, has
manifestly helped to upgrade the level of freedom
of speech and media freedom in countries that
became member states of the European Conven-
tion after the fall of the Berlin Wall (9 November
1989), such as the Baltic states (Estonia, Lithua-
nia and Latvia), the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary and Slovenia.7 But also in countries
that already had a longstanding constitutional
and democratic tradition, the right to freedom of
expression and information has been broadened,
strengthened and upgraded under the influence
1 In the same period, “freedom of speech, and of the press”, was also guaranteed by the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution (1791), prohibiting Congress from abridging these freedoms.
2 Internet regulation, filtering and surveillance related to the war on terror shows a tendency however to reduce some
areas of freedom of expression and media freedom in Europe since 9/11. See D. Banisar, Speaking of Terror. A survey of
the effects of counter-terrorism legislation on freedom of the media in Europe (Strasbourg, Media and Information Society Divi-
sion, Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Council of Europe, 2008) and Ministers responsible for
Media and New Communication Services, Resolution: Developments in anti-terrorism legislation in Council of Europe member
states and their impact on freedom of expression and information, MCM(2009)011, Reykjavik, 29 May 2009, at <www.coe.int/
t/dghl/standardsetting/media/MCM(2009)011_en_final_web.pdf >.  See also for a comparative analysis, S. Sottiaux,
Terrorism and the Limitation of Rights. The ECHR and the US Constitution (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing,
2008), p. 67-152.
3 For more information about the Council of Europe, see <www.coe.int>.
4 For more information about the European Convention (signed  on 4 November 1950), see <http://conven-
tions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG>.
5 For more information about the European Court of Human Rights (established in 1959), see <www.echr.coe.int>. Ref-
erences in this article to the European Court (ECtHR) all imply judgments, unless indicated that it concerns a decision
(on the admissibility, with additional reference to the case number).
6 For more information, see <www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/ >.
7 See the positive developments in these countries reflected in the press freedom indexes of Reporters without Borders
and Freedom House, cfr. infra footnote 30.
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of Article 10 of the European Convention. In
countries in which press freedom and freedom of
(political) expression is still (very) problematic,
such as e.g. in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Russia, Geor-
gia, Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine, Article 10 of
the Convention has become a crucial instrument
to motivate or even compel national authorities
to abstain from interferences in freedom of
speech and press freedom and to respect freedom
of public debate, political expression and critical
journalism to a higher degree. From this perspec-
tive, Article 10 of the European Convention is
perceived as “Europe’s First Amendment”.8
Article 10 of the European Convention reads as
follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with
it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disor-
der or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
for the protection of the reputation or rights of others,
for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary”.
Article 10 (1) stipulates the principle of the right
to freedom of expression, while Article 10 (2), by
referring to “duties and responsibilities” that go to-
gether with the exercise of this freedom, opens
the possibility for public authorities to interfere
in this freedom by way of formalities, conditions,
restrictions and even penalties. Yet, the main
characteristic of Article 10 (2) is precisely that, by
imposing the so-called ‘triple test’, it reduces sub-
stantially the possibility of interference in the
right to receive and impart information and ide-
as. Interferences by public authorities are only al-
lowed under the strict conditions that any restric-
tion or sanction must be ‘prescribed by law’9, must
have a ‘legitimate aim’, and finally and most deci-
sively, must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’.
This analysis will focus on some of the character-
istics of the case law developed by the European
Court of Human Rights applying Article 10 of
the Convention.10 The European Court’s practice
over a period of more than 30 years11 illustrates
how the Court’s case law has manifestly helped to
create an added value for the protection of free-
dom of expression, journalistic freedom, freedom
of the media and public debate in the member
states of the Convention.12 Article 10 of the Con-
vention as interpreted by the European Court has
contributed manifestly to guarantee a higher lev-
el of protection of freedom of expression in addi-
tion to the constitutional protection in the mem-
ber states and complementary to other
8 D. Voorhoof, “Guaranteeing the freedom and independence of the media”, in X., Media and democracy (Strasbourg,
Council of Europe Publishing, 1998), p. 35-57. See also D. Voorhoof in Mediaforum, Tijdschrift voor Media en Communica-
tierecht, 1994/11, 116-124, 1995/11-12, 128-137, 1999/10, 264-271, 1999/11, 304-313, 2004/4, 106-116 en 2004/6,
198-211.
9 Only in a few cases the Court came to the conclusion that the condition  “prescribed by law”, which includes foreseea-
bility, precision and publicity or accessibility and which implies a minimum degree of protection against arbitrariness,
was not fulfilled: ECtHR, Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992; ECtHR, Steel and Others v. U.K., 23 September
1998; ECtHR, Hashman and Harrup v. U.K., 25 November 1999; ECtHR, Gaweda v. Poland, 14 March 2002; ECtHR, Kara-
demirci a.o. v. Turkey, 25 January 2005; ECtHR, Goussev and Marenk v. Finland, 17 January 2006; ECtHR, Soini a.o. v. Fin-
land, 17 January 2006; ECtHR,  Štefanec v. Czech Republic, 18  July 2006; ECtHR, Dzhavadov v. Russia, 27 September 2007
and ECtHR, Meltex Ltd. and Mesrop Movsesyan v. Armenia, 17 June 2008. See also ECtHR, Sunday Times (n° 1) v. U.K., 26
April 1979; ECtHR, Association Ekin v. France, 17 July 2001; ECtHR, Çetin v. Turkey, 13 February 2003 and ECtHR, Peev v.
Bulgaria, 26 July 2007.
10 The 47 member states that at present have ratified the Convention are Albania, Andorra, Austria,  Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San
Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. Some 800
million of people are actually living under the protection of the European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, as a “minimum rule” of human rights protection (art. 53 Convention).
11 The jurisprudence analysed in this article focuses on the case law since April 1979, (ECtHR, Sunday Times (n° 1) v. U.K.,
26 April 1979, the first judgment in which the Court found a violation of Article 10) until July 2009 (ECtHR, Wojtas-
Kaleta v. Poland, 16 July 2009; ECtHR, Willem v. France, 16 July 2009; ECtHR, Féret v. Belgium, 16 July 2009 and ECtHR,
Hachette Filipacchi Associés (“Ici Paris”) v. France, 23 July 2009), all together more than 600 judgments related to Article 10
of the Convention, freedom of expression, media and journalism.
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International Treaties protecting freedom of ex-
pression and information.13 
An important aspect that has helped to develop
and enforce this right is the strict scrutiny by the
European Court of interferences by national au-
thorities in freedom of expression on matters of
public interest, and especially regarding the free-
dom of political expression and the role of the
press as “public watchdog”. The recognition by
the European Court of a horizontal effect of Arti-
cle 10 and of the positive obligations for member
States to protect the right to freedom of expres-
sion, has further extended the scope of the right
to freedom of expression in Europe. Another im-
portant factor that is contributing to a substan-
tial and sustainable impact of Article 10 is the
high level of protection the Court has recognized
vis à vis journalistic sources, whistleblowers, the
gathering of news and information, and more re-
cently, the right of access to information held by
public authorities. The Court has manifestly up-
graded freedom of expression of individuals,
journalists, artists, academics, opinion leaders,
NGOs and activists regarding their rights to re-
ceive, gather and impart information contribut-
ing to public debate in society. However, some re-
strictive trends in the approach of the Strasbourg
Court have recently been identified, especially in
a number of Grand Chamber judgments. The
outcome and rationale of some judgments in
which the Court has found no violation of the
right to freedom of expression have raised some
concerns regarding the (future) level of protec-
tion of press freedom in Europe compared to the
‘traditional’ high standards of the Strasbourg
case law in this matter14, a concern that is also re-
flected in dissenting opinions in annex to some
judgments finding no violation of Article 10 of
the Convention.15
2. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
“Abusing” freedom of expression in all European
States can be sanctioned in one or another way.16
Various laws and regulations are indeed restrict-
12 Also other institutions and instruments of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the Council of Europe
play an important role in monitoring and enforcing freedom of expression as guaranteed under Article 10 of the Con-
vention, such as the Committee of Ministers supervising the execution of the Court’s judgments and the Parliamen-
tary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers promulgating resolutions, declarations and recommendations in
order to promote the awareness for and develop guarantees in favour of freedom of expression, in relation e.g. with
court reporting, protection of journalistic sources, access to official documents, the right to reply, public service
media, coverage of election campaigns, the media in the context of the fight against terrorism, Internet filters, blas-
phemy, religious insults and hate speech. Aspects of freedom of expression are also reflected in and guaranteed by
some Council of Europe Conventions, such as the Revised European Convention on Transfrontier Television
(ECTTV) and the European Convention on Access to Official Documents (27 November 2008). The Council of
Europe also promotes professional standards in the media and self-regulatory formats stimulating journalistic ethics
or respecting ethical and basic democratic values on the Internet. For more information, see the website of the Council
of Europe on Media and Information Society, <www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/>.
13 Exceptionally Constitutional law or International Treaties guarantee freedom of expression to a higher level. See e.g.
Article 19 and 25 of the Belgian Constitution prohibiting prior restraint. See also the application of Article 5 of the
German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) by the German Constitutional Court and the ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany, 26
April 2004. See also Article 19 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR - 1966, in force since 1976),
guaranteeing freedom of expression, including the freedom “to seek” information and ideas. Article 19 ICCPR also
guarantees the freedom of expression “in the form of art”. Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union guarantees the respect for “the freedom and pluralism of the media”.
14 See the proceedings and conclusions of the Seminar on the European Protection of Freedom of Expression:Reflec-
tions on Some Recent Restrictive Trends, Strasbourg 10 October 2008, <www-ircm.u-strasbg.fr/seminaire_oct2008/
index.htm>.
15 See e.g. ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, 22 October 2007, in which the dissent-
ing judges express the opinion that the Court’s judging no violation of Article 10 of the Convention is “a significant
departure from the Court’s case-law in matters of criticism of politicians”. In Stoll v. Switzerland (ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 10
December 2007) the dissenting opinions consider the Court’s judgment by finding no violation of Article 10 “a danger-
ous and unjustified departure from the Court’s well established case-law concerning the nature and vital importance of freedom of
expression in democratic societies”. See also the dissenting opinion in the case of Féret v. Belgium (ECtHR, 16 July 2009) in
which the dissenting judges argue why they disagree with the majority of the Court finding no violation of Article 10
regarding the conviction for ‘hate speech’ of the leader of a political party. The dissenting judges express the opinion
that by confirming the criminal repression of political debate in this case, the Court neglects the essence of freedom of
expression: “confirmer la répression pénale du discours politique en l'espèce va à l'encontre de la liberté d'expression”. See also the
dissenting opinions in ECtHR, Flux (n° 6) v. Moldova, 29 July 2009; ECtHR, Saygili and Falakaoğlu (n° 2) v. Turkey, 17
February 2009; ECtHR, G.C.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy, 24 February 2009; ECtHR, Sanoma Uitgevers BV v. The Netherlands, 31
March 2009; ECtHR, Standard Verlags GmbH (n° 2) v. Austria, 4 June 2009; ECtHR, Willem v. France, 16 July 2008 and
ECtHR, 16 July 2006, Féret v. Belgium. See also the dissenting opinions in ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Pedersen and Baads-
gaard v. Denmark, 17 December 2004; ECtHR, I.A. v. Turkey, 13 September 2005; ECtHR, Tourancheau and July v. France,
24 November 2005 and ECtHR, Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, 14 June 2007.
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ing freedom of expression and media content, de-
termining the responsibility of every person un-
der the law. The aim of such restrictions is to
protect the national states’ interests (protection
of state security and public order), the protection
of morals, the protection of reputation or privacy
or more generally “the rights of others”, the pro-
tection of confidentiality of information, or the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Other
legal provisions are prohibiting and punishing
“hate speech” that incites to violence, racism,
xenophobia or discrimination. Also broadcasting
law, audiovisual media services regulations and
legal provisions on advertising or other forms of
‘commercial speech’ contain restrictions on free-
dom of expression or on media content.17
Until a few decades ago, the limits and restric-
tions of freedom of expression were determined
by national states, ultimately scrutinised by their
own domestic judicial authorities, without any
further external control. This situation, this ‘par-
adigm’ has significantly changed in Europe, due
to the achievement of the European Convention
of Human Rights and the enforcement machin-
ery in which the European Court of Human
Rights plays a crucial role.
With the judgment in the case of Sunday Times
(n° 1) v. U.K. (26 April 1979)18 it has become clear
that Article 10 of the European Convention is ef-
fectively reducing the national sovereignty and
the scope of national limitations restricting the
right to freedom of expression and information.
In the Sunday Times case the European Court of
Human Rights for the first time19 reached the
conclusion that the right to freedom of expres-
sion had been violated by national authorities, in
a case of prior restraint of judicial reporting.20
This judgment has effectively added an extra lay-
er of protection on freedom of expression and
made clear that Article 10 of the Convention is
not only to be respected by government and par-
liament, but also by the judicial authorities in the
member states.21 The judgment in the Sunday
Times case most importantly emphasized that
freedom of expression “constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a democratic society. Subject to para-
graph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to informa-
tion or ideas that are favourably received or regarded as
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to
those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector
of the population”. It also stated that this freedom
“is subject to the exceptions set out in Article 10 § 2,
which must, however, be interpreted narrowly”. The
Court held that there had been a violation of Ar-
ticle 10 by reason of an injunction restraining the
publication in the Sunday Times of an article con-
cerning a drug and the litigation linked to its use
(thalidomide case). The injunction, based on the
common law concept of contempt of court, was
not found to be “necessary in a democratic society” in
the eyes of the Court. With the judgment in the
Sunday Times case the European Court estab-
lished, hesitantly although at the time22, a higher
level of protection for journalistic reporting on
matters of public interest, also recognising “the
16 For an interesting analysis of the notion of “abuse” of human rights, see A. Sajó (ed.), Abuse: the dark side of fundamental
rights (Utrecht, Eleven International Publishing, 2006).
17 For a an overview and analysis, see A. Nicol, G. Millar and A. Sharland, Media Law & Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2009).
18 A few years before, in its first judgment on freedom of expression (ECtHR, Handyside v. U.K., 7 December 1976), the
Court firmly emphasized the importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society, but in casu found no breach
of Article 10 of the Convention, as the protection of minors was considered to justify the interference by public
authorities against the “Little Red Schoolbook” and its publisher, Mr. Handyside.
19 See however also ECtHR 27 March 1962, De Becker v. Belgium. After the Commission’s finding of a double infringe-
ment (in time and extent) of Article 10 by a Belgian law restricting a journalist’s rights, the Belgian Parliament modi-
fied the law before the case was brought before the Court. The European Court struck the case off the list, satisfied
with the modifications in the Belgian law and referring to the fact that the applicant regarded it as unnecessary to pro-
ceed with his application. The Court was of the opinion that there was no need to proceed ex officio with the case.
20 Compared to the 1976 judgment in the Handyside case, the Court in 1979 in the Sunday Times case went a step further
by not only referring in general terms to the importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society, but also by
applying in concreto a high standard of protection of freedom of expression and press freedom. By awarding journalis-
tic reporting on matters of public interest such a high level of protection, the Court obviously reduced the margin of
the member states to interfere in their citizens’ freedom of expression and especially the freedom of the press to report
critically on matters of public interest.
21 Regardless of how precisely the European Convention is internally applied or guaranteed in the member states (mon-
istic or dualistic approach). In some countries the European Convention is given precedence over national law and the
provisions of the Convention have direct effect; in other countries the Convention has been incorporated into domes-
tic law introduced by a statute (e.g. the U.K. Human Rights Act 1998) or by an approval in the Constitution (e.g. the Zus-
timmungsgesetz under Art. 59 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz)). 
22 Indeed, the European Court only with a small majority (11/9) came to the conclusion that there was a violation of
Article 10 of the Convention, overruling the House of Lords regarding its interpretation of a specific common law
application.
mwb-3164-european.media.law.book  Page 314  Wednesday, August 17, 2011  2:33 PM
European Media Law
315
right of the public to be properly informed” about mat-
ters of interest for society.
Since the Sunday Times judgment an abundant
case law of the European Court of Human Rights
has made clear that national law prohibiting, re-
stricting or sanctioning expressions or informa-
tion as forms of public communication may only
be applied if the interference by the authorities
based on this law and justified by a legitimate
aim, is to be considered as “necessary in a democrat-
ic society”. It is the European Court itself that has
determined and elaborated the characteristics of
this vague and open notion of what is to be con-
sidered necessary in a democratic society in terms
of limiting freedom of expression and informa-
tion. The Court on many occasions has reiterated
that freedom of expression is applicable not only
to information or ideas that are favourably re-
ceived or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of
indifference, but also to those that “offend, shock or
disturb”. According to the European Court, such
are “the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broad-
mindedness” without which there is no democratic
society. In its case law the European Court of Hu-
man Rights has permanently emphasized the im-
portance of press freedom and debate on matters
of public interest as inherent characteristics and
necessary conditions for a democratic society. Ac-
cording to the Court’s case law, an open, pluralis-
tic and democratic society by it self is the most ef-
fective, if not the only, guarantor for respect for
human, civil, political, cultural and social rights
and freedoms. This means that Article 10 has to
be interpreted from a perspective of a high level
of protection of freedom of expression and infor-
mation, even if expressed opinions or informa-
tion are harmful to the State or some groups, en-
terprises, organisations or public figures. As set
forth in Article 10, freedom of expression is sub-
ject to exceptions, which must, however, be con-
strued strictly. The need for any restrictions must
be established convincingly, precisely because
freedom of expression is considered essential for
the functioning of a democratic society.23
If there are no sufficient and pertinent reasons
for an interference in one’s freedom of expression
or if an interference by the authorities is dispro-
portionate to the legitimate aim pursued, the
sanctioning of individuals, journalists, editors,
publishers, or broadcasters on the basis of even
legitimate, sufficiently precise, transparent and
non-discriminatory national law restricting free-
dom of expression, is considered by the Stras-
bourg Court as violating Article 10 of the Con-
vention.24 The dynamic interpretation by the
Court of what is to be considered “necessary in a
democratic society” together with the limitation of
the “margin of appreciation” by the member states
has been crucial for the impact of Article 10 of the
Convention on the protection of freedom of ex-
pression in Europe. From this perspective, the
Court, as a kind of a European Constitutional
Court of Human Rights, be it a “quasi-Constitution-
al Court sui generis”,25 played an important role in
interpreting and applying the open texture of Ar-
ticle 10 and in determining and developing the
actual scope and level of freedom of expression
and information in Europe.
With the Sunday Times (n°1) case as a take-off, fol-
lowed years later by the judgments in Barthold v.
Germany (25 March 1985) and Lingens v. Austria (8
July 1986), many European countries ever since
have been found in violation with Article 10 after
journalists, publishers, broadcasting organisa-
tions, individual citizens, civil servants, academ-
ics, politicians, artists or non-governmental or-
ganisations applied to the European Court for
being a victim of an illegitimate, unjustifiable or
disproportionate interference in their freedom of
expression. As a consequence of this case law by
the Strasbourg Court and due to the binding
character of the Convention, the member states
are under a duty to modify and upgrade their
standards of protection of freedom of expression
in order to comply with their obligations under
the European Convention (Article 1). This ap-
proach affects particularly the level of protection
of journalistic reporting, political debate and dis-
cussion on matters of public interest, pushing
23 See ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, 17 December 2004 and ECtHR, Raichinov v. Bulgaria,
20 April 2006. For a solid introduction, see E. Dommering, “Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR): Freedom of Expression”, in O. Castendyk, E. Dommering and A. Scheuer
(eds.), European Media Law (Austin, Boston, Chicago, New York and The Netherlands, Wolters Kluwer, 2008), p. 35-80
and E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005).
24 See e.g. ECtHR, Fressoz and Roire v. France, 21 January 1999; ECtHR, Du Roy and Malaurie v. France, 3 October 2000;
ECtHR, Thoma v. Luxembourg, 29 March 2001; ECtHR, VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 28 June 2001;
ECtHR, Colombani a.o. v. France, 25 June 2002 and ECtHR, Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, 29 March 2005.
25 L. Wildhaber, “A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights?’, 23 Human Rights Law Review
(2002), p. 161.
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back some traditional limits of freedom of ex-
pression in many countries. 
The most recent judgment of the European
Court illustrating the far reaching and some-
times unexpected impact on freedom of expres-
sion and press reporting is the judgment in the
case of Hachette Filipacchi Associés (“Ici Paris”) v.
France (23 July 2009). In this case the Court was
called upon to settle a conflict of fundamental
rights between the right of privacy, including the
right of one’s reputation and image (Article 8 of
the Convention) and a publishing company’s
right to freedom of expression, following the
publication of an article in the magazine “Ici Par-
is” about the French (ex-) rock star Johnny Hally-
day. The article had focussed on the financial dif-
ficulties and the extravagant tastes of Mr.
Hallyday. The French courts considered the arti-
cle, which was also illustrated with some photo-
graphs, as breaching the right to respect of the
private life of Mr. Hallyday and disrespecting the
right of his image (“droit à l’image”). The publish-
ing company was ordered by the Court of Appeal
to pay EUR 20,000 in damages to Mr. Hallyday,
together with costs and expenses. Referring to
several characteristics of the article, its content
and its context, the European Court came to the
conclusion that the limits attached to the exer-
cise of journalistic freedom in a democratic soci-
ety had not been overstepped by the article in “Ici
Paris”, although the Court recognised that the ar-
ticle did not contribute to any debate of public
interest for society. The European Court was of
the opinion that the French courts, although
having a broader margin of appreciation under
these conditions, in their assessment of the pub-
lishing company’s liability had not struck a fair
balance between the conflicting interests at
stake. The Court concluded that there had been a
violation of Article 10 of the Convention.26
In between Sunday Times (n°1) v. U.K. in 1979 and
Hachette Filipacchi Associés (“Ici Paris”) v. France in
2009 the European Court in about 600 judg-
ments has determined and clarified the scope
and the limits of the right to freedom of expres-
sion in Europe.
The European Court of Human Rights on freedom
of expression and rights of journalists/media: 
number of cases and violations 1960-2008.
As the figures above show, especially the last 10
years the European Court frequently came to the
conclusion that the right to freedom of expres-
sion has been violated by a member state.27 In
many other cases the Court agreed however with
the defending State and declared the application
inadmissible or, in a later stage, came to the con-
clusion that an interference was in accordance
with the “triple test” of Article 10 of the Conven-
tion, finding no violation of freedom of expres-
sion.
The practical, effective or real impact of Article 10
still differs from one member state to another,
26 ECtHR, Hachette Filipacchi Associés (“Ici Paris”) v. France, 23 July 2009. The Court attached particular importance to the
fact that the photographs published had been derived from advertising material, which set this case apart from cases
in which the photographs in issue had been obtained through contentious or undercover methods or had interfered
with the privacy of the persons concerned. The previous disclosure by Johnny Hallyday himself (in his autobiography)
of the relevant information about the lavish way in which he managed and spent his money was also an essential ele-
ment of the Court’s analysis. The singer’s disclosures weakened the degree of protection to which he was entitled as
regards his private life. That decisive factor should have been taken into account by the French courts in their assess-
ment of the publishing company’s liability, but this had not been the case. Lastly, although the article might have
appeared negative towards Johnny Hallyday, it did not contain any offensive expressions or harmful intent towards
him.
1960 - 1969 1 De Becker v. Belgium, 
struck off the list
1970 - 1979 3 1 violation: 
Sunday Times n° 1 v. U.K.
1980 - 1989 12 2 violations: 
Barthold v. Germany and 
Lingens v. Austria
1990 - 1999 75 38 violations
2000 - 2008 460 315 violations
2000 14 10 violations
2001  13 8 violations
2002 26 13 violations
9 friendly settlements
2003 30 16 violations
7 friendly settlements
2004 45 30 violations
1 friendly settlement
2005 65 45 violations
3 friendly settlements
2006 85 60 violations
2007 100 85 violations
2008 82 47 violations
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which by itself is an indication of the somewhat
weak enforcement instruments of the Conven-
tion and of the very different levels of develop-
ment of democracy and respect for human rights
in the Convention’s member states. During the
last ten years, Turkey, one of the 13 founding
States of the Convention in 195028, has been
found over and over again in breach with the
right to freedom of (political) expression29. The
situation in terms of freedom of expression and
information is also very problematic in some of
the “new” member states, especially in Russia,
Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and
Ukraine. Disrespect for freedom of expression
and information and press freedom in these
countries goes hand in hand with violations of
other fundamental human rights and freedoms.
On the other hand, the countries with a high level
of press freedom, as shown in the international
ratings of Reporters without Borders (RSF) or Free-
dom House30, are countries in which democracy,
transparency, respect for human rights and the
rule of law is strongly rooted, institutionalised
and integrated in society. In the top 20 of the
2008 press freedom ranking by RSF are only Eu-
ropean states, apart from New Zealand and Can-
ada. On top of the list are traditionally all Nordic
countries (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark
and Finland) and some West-European countries
(the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Portugal, Switzerland, Germany). Since a few
years also all the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania), together with the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, have succeeded to take their place in the
top 20. All member states of the European Con-
vention are in the top 40 of the RSF-ranking, ex-
cept Italy (on 44) and Turkey (on 102) and states
formerly belonging or connected to the Soviet-
Union or the former Republic of Yugoslavia, such
as Macedonia (42), Poland (45), Croatia (47), Ro-
mania (47), Montenegro (53), Bulgaria (59), Ser-
bia (64), Albania (79), Ukraine (87), Moldova
(98), and Armenia (102). The most negative rank-
ings of European Convention member states are
for Georgia (120), Russia (141), and Azerbaijan
(150).31
3. SOME GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE EUROPE-
AN COURT’S CASE LAW
3.1. The Court’s supervisory role
The European Court of Human Rights has devel-
oped over the years a substantial case law in
which it has expressed and clarified some basic
principles which inherently influence the impact
of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court has
also elaborated a framework of guiding princi-
ples in order to apply its supervisory role essen-
tially regarding the necessity of an interference in
the right to freedom of expression: “The test of “ne-
cessity in a democratic society” requires the Court to de-
termine whether the interference complained of corre-
sponded to a “pressing social need”. The Contracting
States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing
whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with
European supervision, embracing both the legislation
and the decisions applying it, even those delivered by an
27 In about 350 cases the Court found a violation of Article 10. It is to be underlined however that only a minority of the
applications introduced in Strasbourg lead to a final judgment by the European Court, as most applications were con-
sidered, by a Committee of three judges or by the Court, not admissible for diverse reasons, e.g. for not fulfilling the
condition of exhaustion of all (relevant) domestic remedies, for the lack of status as a ‘victim’, for not applying within
a period of six months or because the application is considered manifestly ill-founded (Art. 35 Convention). For an
interesting example, see ECtHR (Decision), 23 June 2003, Case No. 65831/01, R. Garaudy v. France (denial of holocaust
excluded from protection of Article 10, in application of Article 17 of the Convention - Prohibition of abuse of rights) and
ECtHR (Decision), 8 December 2005, Case No. 40485/02, Nordisk Film & TV A/S v. Denmark (compelling order to hand
over unedited footages, interference is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and the reasons given by the Dan-
ish Supreme Court in justification of those measures were relevant and sufficient, application manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention).
28 The 13 European States undersigning in 1950 the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
29 In more than 120 cases the Court has found a violation of freedom of expression by the Turkish authorities. In a few
cases the Turkish government negotiated a friendly settlement, recognising however that Turkish law and practice
urgently needed to be brought into line with the Convention’s requirements under Article 10 of the Convention. The
procedure for EU-membership of Turkey meanwhile has proved to have (some) positive influences and to increase the
respect for human rights in general and specifically freedom of political expression in Turkey.
30 See <www.rsf.org> and <www.freedomhouse.org>.
31 At the very bottom of the ranking, from position 150 onwards, are countries with no or no sufficient institutionalised
democratic systems, showing a general lack of respect for human rights, with gross violations of freedom of (political/
artistic) expression and massive disrespect for journalistic rights, media freedom and citizens’ right to freedom of
expression and access to information. The situation from this perspective is highly problematic in Zimbabwe, Belarus,
Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Saudi-Arabia, Iran, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Burma, North-Korea, and finally Eritrea at place
173.
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independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to
give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is recon-
cilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article
10”. The Court has also made clear that its “task in
exercising its supervisory function is not to take the place
of the competent domestic courts but rather to review un-
der Article 10 the decisions they have taken pursuant to
their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the
supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the re-
spondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, care-
fully or in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look
at the interference complained of in the light of the case
as a whole”. The Court essentially must determine
whether the reasons adduced by the national au-
thorities to justify the interference were “relevant
and sufficient” and whether the measure taken was
“proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued”.32 
The Court’s task in exercising its supervisory
function is to review under Article 10, “in the light
of the case as a whole”, the decisions the domestic
authorities have taken pursuant to their power of
appreciation. In its essence, the Court has to sat-
isfy itself that the national authorities applied
standards which are in conformity with the prin-
ciples embodied in Article 10 of the Convention,
and moreover, that they have based their deci-
sions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant
facts. The Court also controls whether it has been
demonstrated that effective and adequate safe-
guards and procedural guarantees, such as a judi-
cial review, were available in order to enhance the
right to freedom of expression.33
The Court looks at a set of different aspects of a
case before deciding whether or not an interfer-
ence in the right to freedom of expression of the
applicant(s) is necessary in a democratic society.
This “contextualisation” of its law-finding implies
that the Court focuses on the case in its different
aspects, “in the light of the case as a whole”. To this
end the Court will take into account who is invok-
ing the right to freedom of expression, what was
published, broadcasted or imparted, who was
eventually criticised or insulted, how the opinions
or statements were formulated or what medium
was used, to whom the message was directed or
who could receive the information, when some-
thing was published, broadcasted or imparted,
where and under which circumstances something
was made public, with what intention informa-
tion was made public or allegations or opinions
were formulated,  and what the possible effect or
impact of the message was. The Court finally will
also take into account the character of the inter-
ference or the severity or proportionality of the
sanctions, before finally deciding whether or not
an interference with the right to freedom of ex-
pression amounted to a violation of Article 10 of
the Convention.
Freedom of expression and information and in-
terferences by public authorities  “in the light of
the case as whole”: relevant aspects of the contex-
tual setting
1.- who
2.- what 
3.- about whom
4.- how
5.- to whom
6.-  when
7.-  where
8.- under which circumstances
9.-  with what intention
10.- with what (possible) effect
11.- and what are the characteristics of the inter-
ference in terms of proportionality
Of crucial importance while evaluating a case in
its context is the approach by the Court applying
a very broad interpretation of the scope of freedom of ex-
pression and information, together with a large ac-
ceptance of what can be considered an “interfer-
ence” in this right, from prior restraint and
custodial sentences to a suspended sanction, a
mild award of damages, an order to publish a rec-
tification or an admonishment. Even a lack of in-
tervention by public authorities can be consid-
ered a breach of Article 10 of the Convention.
This approach has established that the right to
freedom of expression enshrined in Article 10 § 1
32 These general principles are reiterated or reformulated in many judgments of the European Court. For some recent
examples, seECIt e e.g. ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, 22 October 2007;
ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Stoll v. Switzerland, 10 December 2007; ECtHR, Sanoma Uitgevers BV v. the Netherlands, 31
March 2009; ECtHR, Bodrozic and Vuijn v. Serbia, 23 June 2009 and ECtHR, Féret v. Belgium, 16 July 2009.
33 ECtHR, Çetin a.o. v. Turkey, 13 February 2003; ECtHR, Steel and Morris v. U.K., 15 February 2005; ECtHR, Ukrainian
Media Group v. Ukraine, 29 March 2005; ECtHR, Independent News and Media and Independent Newspapers Limited v. Ireland,
16 June 2005; ECtHR, Mehmet Emin Yildiz a.o. v. Turkey, 11 April 2006; ECtHR, Raichinov v. Bulgaria, 20 April 2006 and
ECtHR, Saygili and Seyman v. Turkey, 14 June 2006. See also ECtHR, Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. U.K., 13 July 1995; ECtHR,
Association Ekin v. France, 17 July 2001; ECtHR, Gaweda v. Poland, 14 March 2002; ECtHR, Peev v. Bulgaria, 26 July 2007;
ECtHR, Glas Nadezhda Eood & Elenkov v. Bulgaria, 11 October 2007; ECtHR, Meltex Ltd. and Mesrop Movsesyan v. Armenia,
17 June 2008; ECtHR, Társaság A Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 14 April 2009 and ECtHR, Kenedi v. Hungary, 26 May
2009.
mwb-3164-european.media.law.book  Page 318  Wednesday, August 17, 2011  2:33 PM
European Media Law
319
is protected under a very large umbrella, includ-
ing all kinds of expressions, information and
opinions, regardless the source or medium, re-
gardless the aim, regardless the persons involved,
and covering all aspects of the communication
process, in terms of expressing, imparting and re-
ceiving34 information and opinions. On the other
hand the Court has made clear that the possibili-
ty of restrictions or other interferences in the
right to freedom of expression and information
must be narrowly interpreted and the need of any
restriction or sanction must be convincingly, per-
tinently justified as a “pressing social need” in a
democratic society. It is this combination of
broadening the scope of application of the right
to freedom of expression and information and
narrowing down the possible restrictions and interfer-
ences by public authorities and private organisa-
tions that characterises the approach and the
commitment of the European Court of Human
Rights in guaranteeing and upgrading freedom
of expression in Europe’s democracies.
It is important to notice that, according to the
Strasbourg Court’s case law, national authorities
should not only abstain from interferences in
freedom of expression and press freedom that are
not necessary in a democratic society.  The state
has also positive obligations to protect the right of
freedom of expression against interferences by pri-
vate persons or corporate organisations. The
Court has emphasized that “in addition to the pri-
mary negative undertaking of a State to abstain from
interferences in Convention guarantees, there may be
positive obligations inherent in such guarantees. The re-
sponsibility of a State may then be engaged as a result of
not observing its obligations (..)”.35 In the case of
Özgür Gündem v. Turkey the Court developed this
approach by claiming that “genuine, effective exer-
cise of freedom of expression does not depend merely on
the State’s duty not to interfere, but may require positive
measures of protection, even in the sphere of relations be-
tween individuals”. After a campaign that involved
killings, disappearances, injuries, prosecutions,
seizures and confiscation, the newspaper Özgür
Gündem had ceased publication. According to the
European Court, the Turkish authorities had
failed to comply with their positive obligation to
protect the newspaper and its journalists in the
exercise of their freedom of expression.36 In a case
against Sweden the Court made clear that al-
though its task is not to settle disputes of a purely
private nature, “it cannot remain passive where a na-
tional court’s interpretation of a legal act, be it a testa-
mentary disposition, a private contract, a public docu-
ment, a statutory provision or an administrative
practice appears unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminato-
ry or, more broadly, inconsistent with the principles un-
derlying the Convention”.37
In some areas the Court accepts although a broad
margin of appreciation by the member states, such
as in matters of positive obligations by member
states38, in cases where interferences are based on
the protection of morals39, regarding restrictions
on commercial speech40 and regarding the assess-
ment of damages in libel or defamation cases41,
although in each of these areas the Court has also
found violations of Article 10.42 The margin of
appreciation for the member states is definitely
more narrow and there is little scope under Arti-
cle 10 of the Convention for restrictions on free-
dom of expression in the area of political speech
or debate on matters of public interest. In the
34 On the right to receive information, see ECtHR, Autronic v. Switzerland, 22 May 1990; ECtHR, Open Door and Dublin Well
Women v. Ireland, 29 October 1992; ECtHR, Khursid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, 16 December 2008; ECtHR, Társas-
ág A Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 14 April 2009 and ECtHR, Kenedi v. Hungary, 26 May 2009.
35 ECtHR, Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 29 February 2000; ECtHR, Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, 16 March 2000; ECtHR, VGT Verein
gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, 28 June 2001; ECtHR, VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken (n° 2) v. Switzerland, 4 October 2007;
ECtHR (Grand Chamber), VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken (n° 2) v. Switzerland, 30 June 2009 and ECtHR, Wojtas-Kaleta v.
Poland, 16 July 2009. See also ECtHR, Appleby a.o. v. U.K., 6 May 2003.
36 ECtHR, Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, 16 March 2000.
37 ECtHR, Khursid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, 16 December 2008.
38 ECtHR, Appleby a.o. v. U.K., 6 May 2003.
39 ECtHR, Handyside v. U.K., 7 December 1976; ECtHR, Müller a.o. v. Switzerland, 24 May 1988; ECtHR, Otto-Preminger-
Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994; ECtHR, Wingrove v. U.K., 25 November 1996 and ECtHR, I.A. v. Turkey, 13 Sep-
tember 2005. See also ECtHR, Murphy v. Ireland, 10 July 2003.
40 ECtHR, Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, 20 November 1989; ECtHR, Casado Coca v. Spain, 24
February 1994; ECtHR, Demuth v. Switzerland, 5 November 2002; ECtHR, Société de Conception de Presse et d’Edition and
Ponson v. France, 5 March 2009 and ECtHR, Hachette Filipacchi Presse Automobile and Dupuy v. France, 5 March 2009. See
also ECtHR, Murphy v. Ireland, 10 July 2003.
41 ECtHR, Independent News and Media and Independent Newspapers Limited v. Ireland, 16 June 2005.
42 ECtHR,  Gündüz v. Turkey, 4  December 2003; ECtHR, Giniewski v. France, 31 January 2006; ECtHR, Aydin Tatlav v. Tur-
key, 2 May 2006; ECtHR, Stambuk v. Germany, 17 October 2002; ECtHR, VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken (n° 1) v. Switzer-
land, 28 June 2001; ECtHR, Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 29 February 2000; ECtHR, Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, 16 March 2000;
ECtHR, VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken (n° 2) v. Switzerland, 4 October 2007. See also ECtHR, Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. U.K., 13
July 1995.
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terms of the Court itself “the most careful scrutiny
on the part of the Court is called for when, (..), the meas-
ures taken or sanctions imposed by the national author-
ity are capable of discouraging the participation of the
press in debates over matters of legitimate public con-
cern”.43 
A striking example of the impact of the Court’s
case law is the  case of TV Vest and Rogaland Pens-
jonistparti v. Norway in which the Court was not
persuaded that the application of a ban on paid
political advertising had the desired effect. In a
remarkable judgment the Court explicitly reject-
ed the view expounded by the Norwegian Gov-
ernment that there was no viable alternative to a
blanket ban.44 The European Court said to accept
that the lack of consensus in Europe regarding
the necessity to ban political advertisements on
TV spoke in favour of granting States greater dis-
cretion than would normally be allowed in deci-
sions with regard to restrictions on political de-
bate. The Court however came to the conclusion
that the arguments in support of the prohibition
of paid political advertising on television in Nor-
way, such as the safeguarding of the quality of po-
litical debate, guaranteeing pluralism, maintain-
ing the independence of broadcasters from
political parties and preventing powerful finan-
cial groups from taking advantage having access
to commercial political advertisements on TV,
were relevant but not sufficient reasons to justify,
in the specific circumstances of the case, the total
prohibition of this form of political advertising.
Accordingly, in the Court’s view, there had been a
violation of Article 10 of the Convention.45 It is
obvious that the Court’s judgment has initiated
or renewed the debate in many countries in Eu-
rope whether or not a ban on political advertising
on television is still a legitimate restriction on
freedom of political speech and access to paid po-
litical advertising. Due to the judgment in the
case against Norway, some countries have already
modified or are reviewing their legislation on this
topic.46
3.2. Freedom of expression, public debate and defama-
tion of politicians or public figures
One of the main characteristics of the Court’s
case law over the years is the emphasis on the free-
dom of political debate and critical information
regarding politics and politicians. The Court has
recognised that there are wider limits of acceptable
criticism as regards a politician or a public figure as
such, than as regards a private individual. In sev-
eral judgments, the Court has reiterated that a
politician “inevitably and knowingly lays himself open
to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both jour-
nalists and the public at large, and he must consequently
display a greater degree of tolerance”.47  The Court
went a step further regarding public debate and
criticism about governments and executive bodies, as
“the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard
to a government than in relation to a private citizen, or
even a politician. In a democratic system the actions or
omissions of the government must be subject to the close
scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authori-
ties but also of the press and public opinion. Further-
more, the dominant position which the government oc-
cupies makes it necessary for it to display restraint in
resorting to libel proceedings, particularly where other
means are available for replying to the unjustified at-
tacks and criticisms of its adversaries or the media”.48
Members of parliament, local politicians, govern-
ments, public authorities or public figures in
general have to accept even sharp criticism, some-
times expressed in a harsh or hostile tone.49 Jour-
nalists themselves however must also accept to be
criticised in a polemical tone, e.g. by other jour-
nalists or by politicians50. Also police officers,
members of the military, public prosecutors and
even judges can be sharply criticised under the
43 See e.g. ECtHR, Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994; ECtHR, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway,  20 May 1999;
ECtHR, Colombani a.o. v. France, 25 June 2002; ECtHR, TV Vest and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway, 11 December 2008
and ECtHR, Kudeshkina v. Russia, 26 February 2009. The protection of political speech in parliament is considered to be
absolute: ECtHR, A. v. U.K., 17 December 2002, while the politician’s freedom of expression outside parliament is to be
balanced with Article 6 and/or Article 8 of the Convention: ECtHR, Cordova (n° 1 and 2) v. Italy, 30 January 2003 and
ECtHR, G.C.I.L. and Cofferati v. Italy, 24 February 2009. See also ECtHR, Jerusalem v. Austria, 27 February 2001.
44 ECtHR, TV Vest and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway, 11 December 2008.
45 Compare with ECtHR, Murphy v. Ireland, 10 July 2003, where the Court found a ban on religious advertising on televi-
sion in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention. The Court considered that religious advertising on television
would lean in favour of unbalanced usage by religious groups with larger resources. It accepted a total ban on religious
advertising on television in Ireland, referring to the country-specific religious sensitivities. For the Court it is impor-
tant that the applicant, a pastor attached to the Irish Faith Centre, a bible based Christian ministry in Dublin, kept to
be free to advertise in any of the print media or to participate as any other citizen in programmes on religious matters
and to have services of his church broadcast in the audiovisual media.
46 See also T. Lewis, “Reasserting the Primacy of Broadcast Political Speech after Animal Defenders International? -
Rogaland Pensioners Party v. Norway”, 1 Journal of Media Law (2009), p. 37-48.
47 ECtHR, Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, 29 March 2005.
48 See e.g.  ECtHR, Dyuldin and Kislov v. Russia, 26 July 2007.
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protection of Article 10 of the Convention.51 On
many occasions the Court emphasized the essen-
tial function the press fulfils in a democratic society, and
it even mentioned “the duty” of the press to im-
part, in a manner consistent with its obligations
and responsibilities, information and ideas on all
matters of public interest.52 According to the Court,
“journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse to a
degree of exaggeration, or even provocation”. The safe-
guard afforded by Article 10 to journalists in rela-
tion to reporting on issues of general interest is
however subject to the proviso that “they are acting
in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and pro-
vide “reliable and precise” information in accordance
with the ethics of journalism”.53 The satirical character
of a text or a cartoon and the irony underlying it
are also to be taken into account.54 
The European Court has also showed to stand up
for other basic democratic values in a democracy
to be reflected in freedom of expression, such as
e.g. gender equality. In one of its latest judgments
(Bodrozic and Vuijn v. Serbia) the Court made clear
to the Serbian authorities that comparing an
adult man to a blonde woman is not ipso facto de-
famatory or insulting. The Court is struck by the
argument “of the domestic courts in this connection, as
later endorsed by the Government, that comparing an
adult man to a blonde woman constituted an attack on
the integrity and dignity of men. Moreover, the domestic
authorities considered such a comparison objectively in-
sulting within their society. However, the Court finds
that argument derisory and unacceptable”. 55
3.3. The right of privacy: also for politicians?
The Court at several occasions observed that pri-
vate individuals and to some extent also public
persons have a legitimate expectation of protec-
tion of and respect for their private life and that
49 ECtHR, Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986; ECtHR, Castells v. Spain, 23 April 1992; ECtHR, Schwabe v. Austria, 28 August
1992; ECtHR, Oberschlick (n° 2) v. Austria, 1 July 1997; ECtHR, Öztürk v. Turkey, 28 September 1999; ECtHR, Dalban v.
Romania, 28 September 1999; ECtHR, Wille v. Liechtenstein, 28 October 1999; ECtHR, Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, 16 March
2000; ECtHR, Erdogdu v. Turkey, 15 June 2000; ECtHR, Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal, 3 October 2000; ECtHR, Jerusa-
lem v. Austria, 27 February 2001; ECtHR, Feldek v. Slovakia, 12 July 2001; ECtHR, E.K. v. Turkey, 7 February 2002;
ECtHR, Dichand a.o. v. Austria, 26 February 2002; ECtHR, Colombani a.o. v. France, 25 June 2002; ECtHR, Çetin v. Turkey,
13 February 2003; ECtHR, C.S.Y. v. Turkey, 4 March 2004; ECtHR, Vides Aizsardzības Klubs v. Latvia, 27 May 2004;
ECtHR, Karhuvaara and Iltalethi v. Finland, 16 November 2004; ECtHR, Sokolowski v. Poland, 29 March 2005; ECtHR,
Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, 29 March 2005; ECtHR, Grinberg v. Russia, 27 July 2005; ECtHR, Wirtschafts-Trend
Zeitschriften-Verlags Gmbh v. Austria, 27 October 2005; ECtHR, Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H. (n° 3)
v. Austria, 13 December 2005; ECtHR, Malisiewicz-Gąsior v. Poland, 6 April 2006; ECtHR, Brasilier v. France, 11 April 2006;
ECtHR, Rosiero Bento v. Portugal, 18 April 2006; ECtHR, Lyashko v. Ukraine, 10 August 2006; ECtHR, Monnat v. Switzer-
land, 21 September 2006; ECtHR, Mamère v. France, 7 November 2006; ECtHR, Radio Twist v. Slovakia, 19 December
2006; ECtHR, Tønsbergs Blad AS and Haukom v. Norway, 1 March 2007; ECtHR, Lombardo v. Malta, 24 April 2007;
ECtHR, Colaço Mestre and Sociedado Independente de Communicacão (SIC) v. Portugal, 26 April 2007; ECtHR, Goreleshvili v.
Georgia, 5 June 2007; ECtHR, Flux (n° 3) v. Moldova, 12 June 2007; ECtHR, Artun and Güvener v. Turkey, 26 June 2007;
ECtHR, Lionarakis v. Greece, 5 July 2007; ECtHR, A.S. Diena and Ozoliņš v. Latvia, 12 July 2007; ECtHR, Dyuldin and Kislov
v. Russia, 26 July 2007; ECtHR, Kita v. Poland, 8 July 2008; ECtHR, Riolo v. Italy, 17 July 2008; ECtHR, Dlugolęcki v. Poland,
24 February 2009 and ECtHR, Kydonis v. Greece, 2 April 2009.
50 ECtHR, Urbino Rodrigues v. Portugal, 29 November 2005 and ECtHR, Sanocki v. Poland, 17 July 2007. See however also
ECtHR, Andreas Wabl v. Austria, 21 March 2000.
51 ECtHR, Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992; ECtHR, De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 24 February 1997; ECtHR,
Hrico v. Slovakia, 20 July 2004; ECtHR, Sabou and Pîrcălab v. Romania, 28 September 2004; ECtHR, Amihalachioaie v.
Moldova, 20 April 2004; ECtHR, Saviţchi v. Moldova, 11 October 2005; ECtHR (Grote Kamer), Kyprianou v. Cyprus, 15
December 2005; ECtHR, Raichinov v. Bulgaria, 20 April 2006; ECtHR, Peev v. Bulgaria, 26 June 2007; ECtHR, Ormanni v.
Italy, 17 July 2007; ECtHR, Saygılı, Bilgiç and Kurtay v. Turkey, 8 January 2008; ECtHR, July and SARL Libération v. France,
14 February 2008; ECtHR, Flux (n° 5) v. Moldova, 1 July 2008 and ECtHR, Obukhova v. Russia, 8 January 2009. Compare
with ECtHR, Barfod v. Denmark, 22 February 1989; ECtHR, Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 26 April 1995; ECtHR
(Grand Chamber), Perna v. Italy, 6 May 2003; ECtHR, 30 March 2006, Saday v. Turkey; ECtHR, Kobenter and Standard Ver-
lags GmbH v. Austria, 2 November 2006; ECtHR, Leempoel and S.A. Ciné Revue v. Belgium, 9 November 2006; ECtHR
(Grand Chamber), Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania, 17 December 2004 and ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Pedersen and
Baadsgaard v. Denmark, 17 December 2004.
52 Although it is not obvious how this “duty” can be legally enforced.
53 ECtHR, Fressoz and Roire v. France, 21 January 1999; ECtHR, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway, 20 May 1999; ECtHR,
Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, 29 March 2005; ECtHR, Monnat v. Switzerland, 21 September 2006. See also ECtHR
(Grand Chamber), Stoll v. Switzerland, 10 December 2007.
54 ECtHR, Sokolowski v. Poland, 29 March 2005; ECtHR, Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, 29 March 2005; ECtHR,
Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H. (n° 3) v. Austria, 13 December 2005; ECtHR, Alinak v. Turkey, 4 May
2006; ECtHR, Klein v. Slovakije, 31 October 2006; ECtHR, Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria, 22 February
2007; ECtHR, A.S. Diena and Ozoliņš v. Latvia, 12 July 2007 and ECtHR, Cihan Öztürk v. Turkey, 9 June 2009. See also
ECtHR, Freiheitliche Landesgruppe Burgenland v. Austria, 18 July 2002 and ECtHR, Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria,
25 January 2007.
55 ECtHR, Bodrozic and Vuijn v. Serbia, 23 June 2009. 
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they may legitimately expect to be protected
against intrusion of their privacy or against the
propagation of unfounded rumours relating to
intimate aspects of their private life.56 Freedom
of the press does not extend to idle gossip about
intimate or extra-marital relations merely serving
to satisfy the curiosity of a certain readership and
not contributing to any public debate in which
the press has to fulfil its role of “public watch-
dog”.57 As the Court has accepted that also the
personal reputation and the name, image or picture
of individuals, including public figures, are part
of private life as protected under Article 8 of the
Convention58, the balancing between the right of
privacy (Article 8) and the right to freedom of ex-
pression (Article 10) became a difficult exercise,
highly debated, also within the European
Court.59 The Court has more recently clarified
that the inherent logic of Article 10 precludes the
possibility of conflict with Article 8.60 In the
Court’s view, the expression “the rights of others”
mentioned in Article 10 (2) encompasses the
right to personal integrity and serves as a ground
for limitation of freedom of expression in so far
as the interference designed to protect private life
is proportionate. A critical statement or a nega-
tive opinion about a politician, regarding facts
and behaviour in relation to his public activities,
made during an election campaign in which he
was a candidate, is not considered to have an im-
pact on the private life of the person concerned.
In such circumstances the Court is of the opinion
that the alleged harm of the reputation as a poli-
tician is not a sustainable claim regarding the
protection of the right to respect for personal in-
tegrity under Article 8 of the Convention. A limi-
tation on freedom of expression for the sake of a
politician would in such a context be dispropor-
tionate under Article 10 of the Convention.61 The
Court has accepted that it can reasonably be re-
garded as justified under the Convention to give
more weight to the freedom of the press to im-
part information of public concern than a politi-
cian’s of public figure’s interest in protecting his
or her private life and correspondence. 62 The
Court has also clarified that liability for insult or
defamation of governments, institutions or other
state bodies is difficult to reconcile with the right
to freedom of expression: “a fundamental require-
ment of the law of defamation is that in order to give rise
to a cause of action the defamatory statement must refer
to a particular person. If all State officials were allowed
to sue in defamation in connection with any statement
critical of administration of State affairs, even in situa-
tions where the official was not referred to by name or in
an otherwise identifiable manner, journalists would be
inundated with lawsuits. Not only would that result in
an excessive and disproportionate burden being placed
on the media, straining their resources and involving
them in endless litigation, it would also inevitably have a
chilling effect on the press in the performance of its task
of purveyor of information and public watchdog”.63
56 ECtHR, Tammer v. Estonia, 6 February 2001; ECtHR, Peck v. U.K., 28 January 2003; ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany, 26
April 2004; ECtHR, Gourguénidzé v. Georgia, 17 October 2006; ECtHR, Leempoel and S.A. Ciné Revue v. Belgium, 9 Novem-
ber 2006; ECtHR, A. v. Norway, 9 April 2009; ECtHR, Egeland and Hanseid v. Norway, 16 April 2009 and ECtHR, Standard
Verlags GmbH (n° 2) v. Austria, 4 June 2009. Compare with ECtHR, White v. Sweden, 19 September 2006; ECtHR,
Eerikäinen a.o. v. Finland, 10 February 2009 and ECtHR, Karakó v. Hungary, 28 April 2009. See also ECtHR, Peck v. U.K.,
28 January 2003; ECtHR, Armonas v. Lithuania, 25 November 2008 and ECtHR, Biriuk v. Lithuania, 25 November 2008.
57 ECtHR, Standard Verlags GmbH (n° 2) v. Austria, 4 June 2009. See however the dissenting opinion in this case arguing
that the state of marriage of a head of state can be regarded as a topic of public interest, that the rumours concerning
the presidential couple’s marriage that were circulated were of some relevance and that all by all the impugned text
remained within the limits of acceptable comment in a democratic society.
58 According to the Court, “private life” extends to aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person’s name or pic-
ture, and furthermore includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity. The guarantee afforded by Article 8 of
the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of
each individual in his relations with other human beings. There is therefore a zone of interaction of a person with oth-
ers, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of “private life”: ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany, 26
April 2004 and ECtHR, Pfeifer v. Austria, 15 November 2007.
59 ECtHR, Radio France v. France, 30 March 2004; ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany, 26 April 2004; ECtHR, White v. Sweden,
19 September 2006; ECtHR, Gourgénidzé v. Georgia, 17 October 2006; ECtHR, Krone Verlags GMBH & CO KG. (n° 4) v.
Austria, 9 November 2006; ECtHR, Shabanov and Tren v. Russia, 14 December 2006; ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Lindon,
Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, 22 October 2007; ECtHR, Pfeifer v. Austria, 15 November 2007; ECtHR, Petrina v.
Romania, 14 October 2008; ECtHR, Armonas v. Lithuania, 25 November 2008; ECtHR, Biriuk v. Lithunia, 25 November
2008; ECtHR, A. v. Norway, 9 April 2009; ECtHR, Egeland and Hanseid v. Norway, 16 April 2009 and ECtHR, Standard
Verlags GmbH (n° 2) v. Austria, 4 June 2009. Compare with ECtHR, Eerikäinen a.o. v. Finland, 10 February 2009 and
ECtHR, Karakó v. Hungary, 28 April 2009.
60 For a thorough analysis on conflicts between human rights, including freedom of expression and the right of privacy,
see E. Brems (ed.), Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights (Antwerp, Oxford, Portland, Intersentia, 2008).
61 ECtHR, Karakó v. Hungary, 28 April 2009.
62 ECtHR (Decision), 16 June 2009, Case No. 38079/06, Jonina Benediktsdóttir v. Iceland. See also ECtHR Fressoz and Roire v.
France, 21 January 1999 and ECtHR, Radio Twist S.A. v. Slovakia, 19 December 2006.
63 ECtHR, Dyuldin and Kislov v. Russia, 31 July 2007.
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3.4. Media, NGOs and civil society as ‘public watchdog’
The European Court has made clear that in a
democratic society, apart from the press, also
NGOs,  campaign groups or organisations with a mes-
sage outside the mainstream must be able to carry on
their activities effectively and be able to rely on a
high level of freedom of expression, as there is “a
strong public interest in enabling such groups and indi-
viduals outside the mainstream to contribute to the pub-
lic debate by disseminating information and ideas on
matters of general public interest such as health and the
environment”.64 In a democratic society public au-
thorities are to be exposed to permanent scrutiny by
citizens and everyone has to be able to draw the
public’s attention to situations that they consid-
er unlawful.65 The Court has also argued that
freedom of expression is or particular impor-
tance for persons belonging to minorities.66 
A particular attention is paid to the public inter-
est involved in the disclosure of information, con-
tributing to debate on matters of public interest:
“In a democratic system the acts or omissions of govern-
ment must be subject to the close scrutiny not only of the
legislative and judicial authorities but also of the media
and public opinion. The interest which the public may
have in particular information can sometimes be so
strong as to override even a legally imposed duty of con-
fidence”.67 In such circumstances a journalist, a
civil servant, an activist or a staff member of an
NGO should not be prosecuted or sanctioned be-
cause of breach of confidentiality or the use of il-
legally obtained documents.68 The Court has ac-
cepted that the interest in protecting the
publication of information originating from a
source who had obtained and retransmitted the
information unlawfully may in certain circum-
stances outweigh those of an individual or an en-
tity, private or public, in maintaining their confi-
dentiality. A newspaper that has published
illegally gathered emails between two public fig-
ures, directly related to a public discussion on a
matter of serious public concern, can be shielded
by Article 10 of the Convention against claims
based on the right of privacy as protected under
Article 8 of the Convention.69
In its Grand Chamber judgment in Stoll v. Switzer-
land, the Court confirms that “press freedom as-
sumes even greater importance in circumstances in
which State activities and decisions escape democratic or
judicial scrutiny on account of their confidential or se-
cret nature. The conviction of a journalist for disclosing
information considered to be confidential or secret may
discourage those working in the media from informing
the public on matters of public interest. As a result the
press may no longer be able to play its vital role as “pub-
lic watchdog” and the ability of the press to provide accu-
rate and reliable information may be adversely affect-
ed.70 In cases in which journalists reported about
confidential information in a sensationalist
way71 or in which the revealed documents did not
concretely or effectively contribute to public de-
bate or only concerned information about the
private life of the persons concerned72, the Court
accepted the (proportionate) interferences in
their freedom of expression. 
In the Grand Chamber judgment in Guja v. Moldo-
va, the Court recognised the need of protection of
whistleblowers by Article 10 of the Convention.
The Court noted “that a civil servant, in the course of
his work, may become aware of in-house information,
including secret information, whose divulgation or pub-
lication corresponds to a strong public interest. The
Court thus considers that the signalling by a civil servant
or an employee in the public sector of illegal conduct or
64 ECtHR, Steel and Morris v. U.K., 15 February 2005. See also ECtHR, Hertel v. Switzerland, 25 Augustus 1998; ECtHR, VGT
Verein gegen Tierfabriken (n° 1) v. Switzerland, 28 June 2001; ECtHR, VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken (n° 2) v. Switzerland, 4
October 2007; ECtHR, Vides Aizsardzības Klubs (VAK) v. Latvia, 27 May 2004 and ECtHR, Mamère v. France, 7 November
2006. See also ECtHR, Open Door and Dublin Well Women v. Ireland, 29 October 1992; ECtHR, Hashman and Harrup v.
U.K. 25 November 1999; ECtHR, Çetin and Şakar v. Turkey,  20 September 2007 and ECtHR, Women on Waves v. Portugal,
3 February 2009.
65 ECtHR, Vides Aizsardzības Klubs (VAK) v. Latvia, 27 May 2004.
66 ECtHR, Gorzelik v. Poland, 17 February 2004.
67 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Guja v. Moldova, 12 February 2008.
68 ECtHR, Fressoz and Roire v. France, 21 January 1999; ECtHR, Dammann v. Switzerland, 25 April 2006; ECtHR, Dupuis a.o.
v. France, 7 June 2007; ECtHR, Peev v. Bulgaria, 26 July 2007 and ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Guja v. Moldova, 12 February
2008. See also ECtHR, Radio Twist S.A. v. Slovakia, 19 December 2006.
69 ECtHR (Decision), 16 June 2009, Case No. 38079/06, Jonina Benediktsdóttir v. Iceland. See also ECtHR Fressoz and Roire v.
France, 21 January 1999 and ECtHR, Radio Twist S.A. v. Slovakia, 19 December 2006.
70 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Stoll v. Switzerland, 10  December 2007. See also ECtHR, Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 27 March
1996 and ECtHR, Fressoz and Roire v. France, 21 January 1999.
71 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Stoll v. Switzerland, 10 December 2007.
72 ECtHR, Leempoel and SA Ciné Revue v. Belgium, 9 November 2006 and ECtHR, Marin v. Romania, 3 February 2009. See
also ECtHR, De Diego Nafria v. Spain, 14 March 2002 and ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Cumpǎn? and Mazǎre v. Romania, 17
December 2004.
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wrongdoing in the workplace should, in certain circum-
stances, enjoy protection. This may be called for where
the employee or civil servant concerned is the only per-
son, or part of a small category of persons, aware of what
is happening at work and is thus best placed to act in the
public interest by alerting the employer or the public at
large”. Although disclosure should be made in the
first place to the person’s superior or other com-
petent authority or body, the Court accepted that
when such a practice is clearly impracticable, the
information could, as a last resort, be disclosed to
the public. The Court held that the dismissal of a
civil servant for leaking two confidential letters
from the public prosecutor’s office to the press
was in breach of Article 10 of the Convention,
also referring to the serious chilling effect of the
applicant’s dismissal for other civil servants or
employees, discouraging them from reporting
any misconduct.73
Especially in cases where information is published
on alleged corruption, fraud or illegal activities in
which politicians, civil servants or public institu-
tions are involved, journalists, publishers, media
or NGOs can count on the highest standards of
protection of freedom of expression.74 The Court
has emphasized that “in a democratic state governed
by the rule of law the use of improper methods by public
authority is precisely the kind of issue about which the
public has the right to be informed”.75 The Court ex-
pressed the opinion that “the press is one of the
means by which politicians and public opinion can veri-
fy that public money is spent according to the principles
of accounting and not used to enrich certain individu-
als”.76 Defamation laws and proceedings cannot
be justified if their purpose or effect is to prevent
legitimate criticism of public officials or the ex-
posure of official wrongdoing or corruption.
A right to sue in defamation for the reputation of
officials could easily be abused and might pre-
vent free and open debate on matters of public in-
terest or scrutiny of the spending of public mon-
ey.77
The Court’s case law has also clarified that news
reporting based on interviews, whether edited or
not, constitutes one of the most important
means by which the press is able to play its vital
role of “public watchdog”. Punishing a journalist
for assisting in the dissemination of statements
made by another person would seriously hamper
the contribution of the press to discussion of
matters of public interest and should not be en-
visaged unless there are particularly strong rea-
sons for doing so.78 The fact that interviews or
statements are given by a member of a proscribed
or illegal (terrorist) organisation cannot in itself
justify a blanket ban on the exercise of freedom of
expression by the media and journalists. Al-
though a prohibition to publish or broadcast an
interview with spokesmen of a terrorist organisa-
tion can be justified79, the Court has clarified that
“regard must be had to the words used and the context in
which they were published, with a view to determining
73 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Guja v. Moldova, 12 February 2008. See also ECtHR, Zakharov v. Russia, 5 October 2006;
ECtHR, Peev v. Bulgaria, 26 July 2007; ECtHR, Kasayu v. Turkey, 13 November 2008; ECtHR, Ayhan Erdoğan v. Turkey, 13
January 2009; ECtHR, Marchenko v. Ukraine, 19 February 2009 and ECtHR, Kudeshkina v. Russia, 26 February 2009.
74 See ECtHR, Dalban v. Romania, 28 September 1999; ECtHR, Thoma v. Luxembourg, 29 March 2001; ECtHR, Feldek v. Slo-
vakia, 12 July 2001; ECtHR, Colombani a.o. v. France, 25 June 2002; ECtHR, Vides Aizsardzības Klubs (VAK) v. Latvia, 27
May 2004; ECtHR, Sabou and Pîrcălab v. Romania, 28 September 2004; ECtHR, Karhuvaara and Iltalethi v. Finland, 16
November 2004; ECtHR, Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, 29 March 2005; ECtHR, Sokolowksi v. Poland, 29 March 2005;
ECtHR, Barb v. Romania, 7 October 2008; ECtHR, Folea v. Romania, 14 October 2008; ECtHR, Kayasu v. Turkey, 13
November 2008 and ECtHR, Băcanu and SC ‘R’ SA v. Romania, 3 March 2009. See also most Russian cases related to
criticizing politicians or other public figures: ECtHR, Grinberg v. Russia, 27 July 2005; ECtHR, Karman v. Russia, 14
December 2006; ECtHR, Krasulya v. Russia, 22 February 2007; ECtHR, Dyuldin and Kislov v. Russia, 31 July 2007; ECtHR,
Chemodurov v. Russia, 31 July 2007; ECtHR, Dyundin v. Russia, 14 October 2008; ECtHR, Godlevskiy v. Russia, 23 October
2008; ECtHR, Kazakov v. Russia, 18 December 2008; ECtHR, Obukhova v. Russia, 8 January 2009 and ECtHR, Kudeshkina
v. Russia, 26 February 2009. For Moldova and Bulgaria, see e.g. ECtHR, Busuioc v. Moldova, 21 December 2004; ECtHR,
Flux (n° 3) v. Moldova, 12 June 2007; ECtHR, Flux (n° 2) v. Moldova, 3 July 2007; ECtHR, Ţara and Poiată v. Moldova, 16
October 2007; ECtHR, Flux and Samson v. Moldova, 23 October 2007; ECtHR, Flux (n° 4) v. Moldova, 12 February 2008;
ECtHR, Flux (n° 5) v. Moldova, 1 July 2008; ECtHR, Raichinov v. Bulgaria, 20 April 2006 and ECtHR, Kandzhov v. Bulgaria,
6 November 2008
75 ECtHR, Voskuil v. the Netherlands, 22 November 2007
76 ECtHR, Krone Verlag GmbH & Co (nr. 5) v. Austria, 14 November 2008.
77 EctHR, Cihan Öztürk v. Turkey, 9 June 2009.
78 ECtHR, Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994; ECtHR, Thoma v. Luxembourg, 29 March 2001; ECtHR, Saviţchi v.
Moldova, 11 October 2005 and ECtHR, Flux and Samson v. Moldova, 23 October 2007.
79 ECommHR, 16 April 1991, Case No. 15404/89, Betty Purcell and Others v. Ireland, D&R, 70, 262; ECommHR, 9 May
1994, Case No. 18714/91, D. Brind and Others v. U.K., D&R, 77-A, 42 and ECommHR, 9 May 1994, Case No. 18759/91,
J.M. McLaughlin v. U.K., not publ. See also ECommHR, 17 May 1984, Case No. 10799/84, Radio X., S., W. and A. v. Switzer-
land, D&R, 37, 236. Compare with ECtHR, Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, 16 March 2000 and ECtHR, Çetin v. Turkey, 13 Feb-
ruary 2003.
mwb-3164-european.media.law.book  Page 324  Wednesday, August 17, 2011  2:33 PM
European Media Law
325
whether the impugned text, taken as a whole, can be con-
sidered an incitement to violence (..). When a publica-
tion cannot be categorised as such, Contracting States
cannot with reference to national security or territorial
integrity restrict the right of the public to be informed by
bringing the weight of the criminal law to bear on the
media”.80 A requirement for journalists to dis-
tance themselves systematically and formally
from the content of a quotation (from e.g. anoth-
er newspaper or magazine) is not reconcilable
with the press’s role of providing information on
current events, opinions and ideas. 81 Methods of
balanced reporting may vary considerably and “it
is not for the Court, nor for the national courts for that
matter, to substitute their own views for those of the press
as to what techniques of reporting should be adopted by
journalists”. 82 Article 10 not only protects the sub-
stance, but also the form in which information or
ideas are conveyed or expressed.
An interference by public authorities by means of
prosecution or other judicial measures with re-
gard to the journalist’s research and investigative
activities calls for the most scrupulous examina-
tion from the perspective of Article 10 of the
Convention.83 From this perspective also journal-
istic sources can count on a very high level of pro-
tection in terms of Article 10 of the Convention.
According to the Court, “protection of journalistic
sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom, as
is recognised and reflected in various international in-
struments including the Committee of Ministers Recom-
mendation (..). Without such protection, sources may be
deterred from assisting the press in informing the public
on matters of public interest. As a result the vital public-
watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the
ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable infor-
mation may be adversely affected. Having regard to the
importance of the protection of journalistic sources for
press freedom in a democratic society and the potentially
chilling effect an order of source disclosure has on the ex-
ercise of that freedom, such a measure cannot be compat-
ible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified
by an overriding requirement in the public interest”.84
Searches and confiscations of journalistic material
in order to reveal the identity of an informant can
hardly be justified from this perspective. The
Court has considered that “even if unproductive, a
search conducted with a view to uncover a journalist’s
source constitutes a more serious measure than an order
to divulge a source’s identity. This is because investiga-
tors who raid a journalist’s workplace unannounced
and armed with search warrants have very wide investi-
gation powers, as, by definition, they have access to all
the documentation held by the journalist”.85 At several
occasions the European Court was of the opinion
that searches at media offices or at the home and
place of work of journalists or reporters, amount-
ed to a violation of Article 10 of the Conven-
tion.86
3.5. Opinions, value judgments and defamatory allega-
tions
An important characteristic of the Court’s case
law reflects the distinction that is to be made be-
tween (defamatory) allegations of fact and value
judgments: “the existence of facts can be demonstrated,
whereas the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of
proof. The requirement to prove the truth of a value
judgment is impossible to fulfil and infringes freedom of
opinion itself, which is a fundamental part of the right se-
cured by Article 10”.87 The European Court is of
the opinion that it is not, in principle, incompat-
80 ECtHR, Demirel and Ates (n° 3) v. Turkey, 9 December 2008. See also ECtHR, Imza v. Turkey, 20 January 2009.
81 ECtHR, Thoma v. Luxembourg, 29 March 2001 and ECtHR, Özgür Radio-Ses Radyo-Televizyon Yayin Yapim Ve Tanitim A.Ş.
(n° 3) v. Turkey, 10 March 2009.
82 See ECtHR, Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994; ECtHR, Thoma v. Luxembourg, 29 March 2001 and ECtHR, Eerikäin-
en a.o. v. Finland, 10 February 2009.
83 See ECtHR, De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 24 February 1997; ECtHR, Fressoz and Roire v. France, 21 January 1999;
ECtHR, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway, 20 May 1999; ECtHR, Du Roy and Malaurie v. France, 3 October 2000;
ECtHR, Thoma v. Luxembourg, 29 March 2001; ECtHR, Colombani a.o. v. France, 25 June 2002; ECtHR, Vides Aizsardzības
Klubs (VAK) v. Latvia, 27 May 2004; ECtHR, Radio Twist S.A. v. Slovakia, 19 December 2006; ECtHR, Ukrainian Media
Group v. Ukraine, 29 March 2005 and ECtHR, Dupuis v. France, 7 June 2007.
84 ECtHR, Goodwin v. U.K., 27 March 1996. See also ECtHR (Decision), 8 December 2005, Case No. 40485/02, Nordisk
Film & TV A/S v. Denmark and ECtHR, Šečič v. Croatia, 31 May 2007.
85 ECtHR, Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, 23 February 2003.
86 ECtHR, Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, 23 February 2003; ECtHR, Ernst a.o. v. Belgium, 15 July 2003; ECtHR, Voskuil v.
the Netherlands, 27 November 2007 and ECtHR, Tillack v. Belgium, 27 November 2007. The Court however found no vio-
lation of Article 10 in ECtHR, Sanoma Uitgevers BV v. the Netherlands, 31 March 2009 (see <http://echrblogspot.com/
2009/04/protection-of-journalists-sources.html>. In application of 43 ECHR the panel of five judges of the ECtHR on
14 September 2009 has accepted that the case will be referred to the Grand Chamber. See also Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (2000)7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information, 8
March 2000, at <www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/> ; D. Banisar, Silencing Sources. An International Survey of
Protections and Threats to Journalists’ Sources, 2007, at <www.privacyinternational.org> and D. Voorhoof, “The protection
of journalistic sources under fire?” in D. Voorhoof (ed.), European Media Law. Collection of Materials 2009-2010 (Gent,
Knops Publishing, 2009), p. 266-284.
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ible with Article 10 to place on a defendant in li-
bel proceedings, who wishes to rely on the de-
fence of justification, the onus of proving to the
civil standard the truth of defamatory state-
ments.88 Formulated in another way: “a require-
ment for defendants in defamation proceedings to prove
to a reasonable standard that the allegations made by
them were substantially true does not, as such, contra-
vene the Convention”.89 A journalist, publisher or
author needs however to be given the opportuni-
ty to prove the truth of his or her statement: de-
priving him or her of an effective opportunity to
adduce evidence to support the statements and
thereby attempt to establish their truthfulness or
to show that their content was not entirely with-
out foundation, constitutes a disproportionate
interference with the right to freedom of expres-
sion.90 In Csanics v. Hungary the Court confirmed
that domestic authorities should provide effec-
tive opportunities to substantiate one’s state-
ments, even if they are to be considered “gratui-
tously insulting, offensive and harsh”. According to
the Court “it would go against the very spirit of Article
10 to allow a restriction on the expression of substantiat-
ed statements solely on the basis of the manner in which
they are voiced. In principle, it should be possible to
make true declarations in public irrespective of their
tone or negative consequences for those who are con-
cerned by them”.91
In its recent case law, the Court has also applied
Article 10 in the digital context and regarding li-
bellous content on the internet.92 In the case of
Times Newspaper Ltd. V. U.K. the Court applied the
so-called “internet publication rule”, accepting that
the British courts’ finding of libel by the contin-
ued publication on the Internet site of two articles
had not represented a disproportionate restric-
tion on the newspaper’s freedom of expression.
The Court did not consider that the requirement
to publish an appropriate qualification to the In-
ternet version of the articles constituted a dispro-
portionate interference with the right to freedom
of expression. The Court however emphasized
“that while an aggrieved applicant must be afforded a
real opportunity to vindicate his right to reputation, libel
proceedings brought against a newspaper after a signifi-
cant lapse of time may well, in the absence of exceptional
circumstances, give rise to a disproportionate interfer-
ence with press freedom under Article 10”.93
In cases where journalists did not succeed to give
reliable or relevant evidence for their (serious) al-
legations, insinuations or accusations, the Court
accepts convictions and (proportionate) sanc-
tions imposed by the national authorities as not
being in breach with Article 10 of the Conven-
tion.94 The requirement that a journalist needs to
prove that the allegations made in an article were
“substantially true” on the balance of probabili-
ties, constitutes a justified restriction on the
right to freedom of expression under Article 10 §
2 of the Convention.95 In some cases the obvious
lack of evidence of published allegations made
87 See ECtHR, Jerusalem v. Austria, 27 February 2001; ECtHR, Busuioc v. Moldova, 21 December 2004; ECtHR (Grand
Chamber), Perna v. Italy, 6 May 2003; ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania, 17 December 2004;
ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, 17 December 2004; ECtHR, Ukrainian Media Group v.
Ukraine, 29 March 2005 and ECtHR, Zakharov v. Russia, 5 October 2006.
88 See ECtHR, Alithia Publishing Company Ltd. & Constantinides v. Cyprus, 22 May 2008. See also ECtHR (Decision), 10 Feb-
ruary 2009, Case No. 28577/05, The Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL a.o. v. U.K.
89 ECtHR, Rumyana Ivanova v. Bulgaria, 14 February 2008.
90 See ECtHR, Castells v. Spain, 23 April 1992; ECtHR, De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 24 February 1997; ECtHR, Flux (n° 3)
v. Moldova, 12 June 2007; ECtHR, Flux and Samson v. Moldova, 20 October 2007 and ECtHR, Băcanu and SC ‘R’ SA v.
Romania, 3 March 2009.
91 ECtHR, Csánics v. Hungary, 20 January 2009.
92 ECtHR, Times Newspapers Ltd (n° 1-2) v. U.K., 10  March 2009. For other internet-related cases, see ECtHR (Decision), 18
October 2005, Case No. 5446/03, Perrin v. U.K.; ECtHR, Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova, 8 April 2008; ECtHR (Decision),
16 September 2008, Case No. 32792/05, Laurence Pay v. U.K. and ECtHR, K.U. v. Finland, 2 December 2008.
93 ECtHR, Times Newspapers Ltd (n° 1-2) v. U.K., 10  March 2009.
94 See ECtHR, Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 26 April 1995; ECtHR, Constantinescu v . Romania, 27 June 2000; ECtHR, Mc
Vicar v. United Kingdom, 7 May 2002; ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Perna v. Italy, 6 May 2003; ECtHR, Radio France v. France,
30 March 2004; ECtHR, Chauvy v. France, 29 June 2004; ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania, 17
December 2004; ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, 17 December 2004; ECtHR, Busuioc v.
Moldova, 21 December 2004; ECtHR, Stângu and Scutelnicu v. Romania, 31 January 2006; ECtHR, Rumyana Ivanova v. Bul-
garia, 14 February 2008; ECtHR, Alithia Publishing Company Ltd. & Constantinides v. Cyprus, 22 May 2008; ECtHR, Backes
v. Luxembourg, 8 July 2008; ECtHR, Flux (no. 6) v. Moldova, 29 July 2008; ECtHR, Cuc Pasco v. Romania, 16 September
2008; ECtHR, Petrina v. Romania, 14 October 2008; ECtHR, Mihaiu t. Romania, 4 November 2008; ECtHR, Mahmudov
and Agazade v. Azerbaijan, 18 December 2008 and ECtHR, Brunet-Lecomte a.o. v. France, 5 February 2009. In some cases
the Court found no violation of Article 10, while it accepted that the applicant had not been guaranteed a fair trial
and that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention: see e.g. ECtHR, Constantinescu v . Romania, 27
June 2000 and ECtHR, Mihaiu t. Romania, 4 November 2008.
95 ECtHR, Mc Vicar v. U.K., 7 May 2002 and ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, 17 December
2004.
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the Court even decide to the (manifest) inadmis-
sibility of a complaint under Article 10 of the
Convention.96 On the other hand, the Court has
also considered that, as part of their role as a
“public watchdog”, the media’s reporting on
“‘stories’ or ‘rumours’ - emanating from persons other
than an applicant - or ‘public opinion’” is to be pro-
tected.97 The Court at several occasions accepted
that value judgments, allegations or statements
only had “a slim factual basis” or that it was suffi-
cient that there was “no proof the description of events
given in the articles was totally untrue”, or that the
“opinions were based on facts which have not been
shown to be untrue”..98 The Court accepts that val-
ue judgments and criticism can be based on “un-
confirmed allegations or rumours”.99 The Court does
not accept the reasoning of domestic courts that
allegations of serious misconduct levelled against
individuals or public persons should first have
been proven in criminal proceedings.100 Describ-
ing an act or behaviour of a politician as “illegal”
is to be considered as expressing a personal legal
opinion amounting to a value judgment of which
the accuracy cannot be required to be proven.101
Media applying the standards of journalistic eth-
ics or journalists acting in consonance with the
principles of “responsible journalism” are highly
protected by Article 10 of the Convention.102 This
does not imply that in all circumstances a jour-
nalist must act in compliance with norms of
good journalistic practice in order to be shielded
by Article 10 of the Convention. In a recent judg-
ment the Court was of the opinion that, al-
though it would have been “advisable” for a news-
paper and its journalists to have obtained
comments beforehand from a person that was
criticised in the newspaper for being involved in
fraud and improper use of public funding, “the
mere fact that it had not done so is not sufficient to hold
that the interference with the applicant company’s  right
to freedom of expression was justified”.103
3.6. Public speech, arts, expressive conduct and academ-
ic speech
The high level of protection of freedom of expres-
sion for media and journalists and public debate
has also been applied regarding interferences by
authorities in demonstrations, peaceful protest activi-
ties, public speeches, or other activities contributing
to debate on matters of public interest. In many
cases the Court found a violation of Article 10,
often in relation to Article 11 of the Convention
(freedom of assembly and association).104 The
Court is of the opinion “that one of the aims of free-
dom of assembly is to secure a forum for public debate
and the open expression of protest. The protection of the
expression of personal opinions, secured by Article 10, is
one of the objectives of the freedom of peaceful assembly
enshrined in Article 11”.105 Banning, hindering or
stopping a demonstration or the arrest and de-
tention of protesters, especially when violence is
used by the police, is likely to constitute a viola-
tion of Article 10 and/or Article 11 of the Con-
vention.106 The Court has emphasized that “any
measures interfering with the freedom of assembly and
96 See e.g. ECtHR (Decision), 4 April 2006, Case No. 33352/02, László Keller v. Hongary; ECtHR (Decision), 15 June 2006,
Case No. 6928/04 and 6929/04, Corneliu Vadim Tudor v. Romania; ECtHR (Decision), 8 February 2007, Case No. 3540/
04, Falter Zeitschriften GmbH v. Austria; ECtHR (Decision), 21 October 2008, Case No. 20953/06, Tomasz Wolek, Rafal
Kasprów and Jacek L?ski v. Poland and ECtHR (Decision), 21 October 2008, Case No. 37115/06, Vittorio Sgarbi v. Italy. See
also ECtHR (Decision), 16 October 2001, Case No. 45710/99, Verdens Gang and Kari Aarsted Aase v. Norway and ECtHR
(Decision), 21 February 2002, Case No. 43525/98, Gaudio v. Italy.
97 See e.g. ECtHR, Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992 and ECtHR, Cihan Özturk v. Turkey, 9 June 2009.
98 See e.g. ECtHR, Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway, 25 November 1999; ECtHR, Dalban v. Romania, 28 September 1999;
ECtHR, Dichand a.o. v. Austria, 26 February 2002 and ECtHR, Flux and Samson v. Moldova, 23 October 2007.
99 ECtHR, Timpul Info-Magazine and Anghel v. Moldova, 27 November 2007. See also ECtHR, Cihan Özturk v. Turkey, 9 June
2009. The Court in this case however also considered that “there was a sufficient factual basis for the applicant to make a criti-
cal analysis of the situation and to raise questions about the restoration project, since the authorities had already brought criminal pro-
ceedings against the applicant for breach of duty”.
100 See ECtHR, Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway, 25 November 1999; ECtHR, Flux (n° 6) v. Moldova, 29 July 2008; ECtHR, Folea
v. Romania, 14 October 2008; ECtHR, Dyundin v. Russia, 14 October 2008; ECtHR, Godlevskiy v. Russia, 23 October 2008
and ECtHR, Kydonis v. Greece, 2 April 2009. Compare with ECtHR, Constantinescu v . Romania, 27 June 2000 and ECtHR,
Petrina v. Romania, 14 October 2008.
101 ECtHR, Vides Aizsardzības Klubs v. Latvia, 27 May 2004. See also ECtHR, Selistö v. Finland, 16 November 2004 and ECtHR,
Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland, 16 November 2004.
102 ECtHR, Flux and Samson v. Moldova, 23 October 2007 and ECtHR, Timpul Info-Magazine and Anghel v. Moldova, 27
November 2007.
103 ECtHR, Krone Verlag GmbH & Co KG (n° 5) v. Austria, 14 November 2008.
104 ECtHR, Steel a.o. v. U.K., 23 September 1998; ECtHR, Hashman and Harrup v. U.K., 25 November 1999; ECtHR, Patyi a.o.
v. Hungary, 7 October 2008; ECtHR, Unay v. Turkey, 21 October 2008; ECtHR, Isak Tepe v. Turkey, 21 October 2008;
ECtHR, Açik v. Turkey, 13 January 2009; ECtHR, Samüt Karabulut v. Turkey, 27 January 2009 and ECtHR, Karapete e.a. v.
Turkey, 7 April 2009.
105 ECtHR, Éva Molnár  v. Hungary, 7 October 2008. See also ECtHR, Patyi a.o. v. Hungary, 7 October 2008.
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expression other than in cases of incitement to violence
or rejection of democratic principles - however shocking
and unacceptable certain views or words used may ap-
pear to the authorities - do a disservice to democracy and
often even endanger it”. The Court has reiterated on
several occasions that a demonstration in a pub-
lic place “inevitably causes a certain level of disruption
to ordinary life, including disruption of traffic”, and
that it is important for the public authorities to
show a certain degree of tolerance towards peace-
ful gatherings. If not freedom of assembly “inter-
preted in the light of Article 10 of the Convention”
would be deprived of all substance.107 An expul-
sion order to restrict the freedom of expression
and the right to take part in peaceful demonstra-
tions or give a public speech has been considered
a violation of Article 10.108 The Court’s case law
shows that both expressive conduct and symbolic
speech is protected. In one case the Court even
considered the refusal to allow a ship with activ-
ists to enter territorial waters a breach of Article
10.109 In another case the Court was of the opin-
ion that the decision of a leader of a political par-
ty to wear a red star in public must be regarded as
his way of expressing his political views and was
not necessarily to be interpreted as “dangerous
propaganda” for dictatorship and Communism,
taking into regard the multiple meanings of the
red star.110 
Article 10 of the Convention also includes free-
dom of artistic expression - notably within free-
dom to receive and impart information and ideas
- which affords the opportunity to take part in
the public exchange of cultural, political and so-
cial information and ideas of all kinds. Those
who create, perform, distribute or exhibit works
of art contribute to the exchange of ideas and
opinions which is essential for a democratic soci-
ety. Hence the obligation for the State not to en-
croach unduly on their freedom of expression.111
The Court also recognised a high level of protec-
tion in the domain of academic speech and scien-
tific writings or publications.112
3.7. No protection of ‘hate speech’, incitement to vio-
lence or glorification of terrorism113
An important area of speech the European Court
is not guaranteeing a high level of protection or
rather any protection at all for is ‘hate speech’, in-
cluding incitement to violence, holocaust denial,
(neo)Nazi-propaganda, incitement to discrimina-
tion or glorification of terrorism.114 The former
European Commission of Human Rights and lat-
er the Court itself have declared applications in
this regard, based on freedom of expression,
manifestly ill-founded and accordingly inadmis-
sible.115 The Court also clarified in a few recent
judgments that there can be no doubt that ex-
pressions propagating, inciting or justifying ha-
tred based on intolerance and discrimination, do
not enjoy protection of Article 10.116 The Court
has emphasised in particular “that tolerance and re-
spect for the equal dignity of all human beings constitute
the foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society. That
being so, as a matter of principle it may be considered
necessary in certain democratic societies to sanction or
even prevent all forms of expression which spread, incite,
promote or justify hatred based on intolerance (includ-
ing religious intolerance), provided that any “formali-
ties”, “conditions”, “restrictions” or “penalties” im-
106 ECtHR, Patyi a.o. v. Hungary, 7 October 2008; ECtHR, Kandzhov v. Bulgaria, 6 November 2008 and ECtHR, Açik v. Tur-
key, 13 January 2009.
107 ECtHR, Sergey Kuznetzov v. Russia, 23 October 2008.
108 ECtHR, Piermont v. France, 27 April 1995. 
109 ECtHR, Women on Waves v. Portugal, 3 February 2009. 
110 ECtHR, Vajnai v. Hungary, 8 July 2008. 
111 ECtHR, Karatas v. Turkey, 8 July 1999; ECtHR, Alinak v. Turkey, 29 March 2005 and ECtHR, Vereinigung Bildender Küns-
tler v. Austria, 25 January 2007. See also ECtHR, Müller a.o. v. Switzerland, 24 May.
112 ECtHR, Hertel v. Switzerland, 25 August 1998; ECtHR, Wille v. Liechtenstein, 28 October 1999; ECtHR, Nilsen and Johnsen
v. Norway, 25 November 1999; ECtHR, Boldea v. Romania, 15 February 2007 and ECtHR, Pakdemirli v. Turkey, 22 Febru-
ary 2005. See also ECtHR, Chauvy v. France, 29 June 2004; ECtHR, Monnat v. Switzerland, 21 September 2006 and
ECtHR, Frankovicz v. Poland, 16 December 2008.
113 See also I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.), Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009).
114 See A. Weber, Manuel sur le discours de haine (Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009).
115 See ECommHR, 11 October 1979, Appl. nrs. 8348/78 en 8406/78, Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands; ECom-
mHR, 12 May 1988, Case No. 12194/86, Kühnen v. Germany; ECommHR, 11 January 1995, Case No. 21128/92, U. Wal-
endy v. Germany; ECommHR, 6 September 1995, Case No. 25096/94, Otto E.F.A. Remer v. Germany; ECommHR, 29
November 1995, Case No. 25992/94, Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Bezirksverband München-Oberbayern v. Ger-
many; ECommHR, 24 June 1996, Case No. 31159/96, P. Marais v. France and ECtHR (Decision), 23 June 2003, Case No.
65831/01, R. Garaudy v. France; ECtHR (Decision), 18 May 2004, Case No. 57383/00, Seurot v. France; ECtHR (Deci-
sion),  16 November 2004, Case No. 23131/03, Norwood v. U.K.; ECtHR (Decision), 13 December 2005, Case No. 7485/
03, Witzsch v. Germany and ECtHR (Decision), 20 February 2007, Case No. 35222/04, Pavel Ivanov v. Russia. 
116 ECtHR, Soulas a.o. v. France, 10 July 2008; ECtHR, Balsytė-Lideikienė v. Lithuania, 4 November 2008 and ECtHR, Féret v.
Belgium, 16 July 2009. See also ECtHR, Willem v. France, 16 July 2009.
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posed are proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued”.117 
Sanctions or convictions for incitement to vio-
lence or terrorism118 or because of glorification
of terrorism119 are neither considered as violating
Article 10 of the Convention. The case of Leroy v.
France e.g. concerns the criminal conviction of a
cartoonist for condoning terrorism: ‘l’apologie du
terrorisme’. The Court underlined that the mes-
sage of the cartoon - the destruction of US impe-
rialism - did not amount to a denial of the funda-
mental values of the Convention, in contrast with
incitement to racism, anti-Semitism, Holocaust
negationism or Islamophobia. The Court howev-
er considered that the drawing was not limited to
criticism of American imperialism, but support-
ed and glorified the latter’s violent destruction. It
based its finding on the caption which accompa-
nied the drawing, and noted that the cartoonist
had expressed his moral support for those whom
he presumed to be the perpetrators of the attacks
of 11 September 2001. Through his choice of lan-
guage, the applicant commented approvingly on
the violence perpetrated against thousands of ci-
vilians and diminished the dignity of the victims.
Furthermore, the cartoon had provoked a certain
public reaction, capable of stirring up violence
and demonstrating a plausible impact on public
order, especially since the cartoon was published
only a few days after the tragic event. The Court
found that the measure imposed on the cartoon-
ist had not been disproportionate to the legiti-
mate aim pursued and that accordingly there had
not been a violation of Article 10 of the Conven-
tion.120
Incitement to racism and the denial of holocaust
in some cases have been excluded from Article 10
protection in application of Article 17 of the
Convention121, as this kind of ‘hate speech’ has
been considered aiming at the destruction of the
rights and freedoms of the Convention itself.  In
the case of Lehideux and Isorni v. France the Court
in general terms made clear that “there is no doubt,
like any other remark directed against the Convention’s
underlying values, the justification of a pro-Nazi policy
could not be allowed to enjoy the protection afforded by
Article 10”.122 
The Court also stated that a general and vehe-
ment attack on one ethnic group “is in contradic-
tion with the Convention’s underlying values, notably
tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination”. Con-
sequently, the Court found that, by reason of Ar-
ticle 17 of the Convention, an applicant being
convicted  because of incitement to hatred to-
wards the Jewish people could not benefit from
the protection afforded by Article 10 of the Con-
vention.123 The Court had a similar approach re-
garding a poster displayed at a window with a
photograph of the Twin Towers in flame and the
words “Islam out of Britain – Protect the British Peo-
ple”. The poster also contained a symbol of a cres-
cent and star in a prohibition sign. The Court was
of the opinion that  “the words and images on the
poster amounted to a public expression of attack on all
Muslims in the United Kingdom. Such a general, vehe-
ment attack against a religious group, linking the group
as a whole with a grave act of terrorism, is incompatible
with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the Con-
vention, notably tolerance, social peace and non-dis-
crimination”. Hence the applicant’s display of the
poster on his window constituted an act within
the meaning of Article 17, which did not, there-
fore, enjoy the protection of Article 10.124 
117 ECtHR, Gündüz v. Turkey, 4  December 2003. See also ECtHR, Sürek (n° 1) v. Turkey, 8 July 1999.
118 ECtHR, Zana v. Turkey, 25 November 1997; ECtHR, Sürek (n° 1) v. Turkey, 8 July 1999; ECtHR, Sürek (n° 3) v. Turkey, 8
July 1999; ECtHR, Hocaoğullari v. Turkey, 7 March 2006; ECtHR, Halis Doğan v. Turkey, 10 October 2006; ECtHR, Kara-
tepe v. Turkey, 31 July 2007 and ECtHR, Saygili and Falakaoğlu (n° 2) v. Turkey, 17 February 2009. See also ECtHR (Deci-
sion), 14 November 2006, Case No. 32842/02, Medya FM Reha Radyo ve İletişim Hizmetleri S.A. v. Turkey and ECtHR
(Decision), 22 March 2007, Case No. 6250/02, Gülcan Kaya v. Turkey.
119 ECtHR, Leroy v. France, 2 October 2008. See also ECtHR (Decision), 29 May 2007, Case No. 26870/04, Dieter Kern v.
Germany.
120 ECtHR, Leroy v. France, 2 October 2008.
121 I.e. the so-called anti-totalitarian provision or abuse clause. Art. 17 provides that “nothing in this Convention may be inter-
preted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any
of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention”. The gen-
eral purpose of Article 17 is to prevent individuals or groups with totalitarian aims from exploiting in their own inter-
ests the principles enunciated by the Convention: ECtHR (Decision), 16 November 2004, Case No. 23131/03, Norwood
v. U.K.
122 ECtHR, Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 23 September 1998. The Court in this case however made no application of Article
17 and neither found a violation of Article 10, cfr. infra.
123 ECtHR (Decision), 20 February 2007, Case No. 35222/04, Pavel Ivanov v. Russia. See also ECtHR (Decision), 23 June
2003, Case No. 65831/01, R. Garaudy v. France; ECtHR (Decision), 18 May 2004, Case No. 57383/00, Seurot  v. France
and ECtHR (Decision), 13 December 2005, Case No. 7485/03, Witzsch v. Germany.
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In other cases the Court did not explicitly or di-
rectly exclude the protection of Article 10, yet
found no violation of the right to freedom of ex-
pression as the interferences against some forms
of ‘hate speech’ were considered necessary in a
democratic society within the meaning of Article
10 § 2 of the Convention. The Court also has ex-
pressed the opinion that “Article 10 should not be in-
terpreted in such a way as to limit, derogate from or de-
stroy the right of protection against racial discrimination
under the UN Convention”.125 In some cases the
Court went a step further by stating that “in the
context of religious opinions and beliefs may legitimate-
ly be included an obligation to avoid as far as possible ex-
pressions that are gratuitously offensive to others and
thus an infringement of their rights, and which therefore
do not contribute to any form of public debate capable of
furthering progress in human affairs”.126 Although
the Court has recognised on many occasions that
freedom of expression is especially important for
elected representatives of the people, it has also
emphasised that it is crucial for politicians, when
expressing themselves in public, to avoid com-
ments that might foster intolerance. The impact
of racist and xenophobic discourse is magnified
in an electoral context and to recommend solu-
tions to immigration-related problems by advo-
cating racial discrimination is likely to cause so-
cial tension and undermine trust in democratic
institutions. In such circumstances there is a
compelling social need to protect the rights of
the immigrant community and to consider inter-
ferences in the right to freedom of (political) ex-
pression necessary in a democratic society.127 In a
judgment of 16 July 2009 in the case of Willem v.
France the Court came to the conclusion that the
conviction of a mayor for calling for a boycott of
Israeli products was not in breach with Article 10
of the Convention. During a session of the town
council and in the presence of journalists, Mr
Willem had announced that he intended to call
on his services to boycott Israeli products in the
municipality. He stated that he had taken that
decision to protest against the anti-Palestinian
policies of the Israeli Government. The mayor
was prosecuted and finally sentenced for provok-
ing discrimination on national, racial and reli-
gious grounds. Like the French courts, the Euro-
pean Court took the view that Mr Willem had not
been convicted for his political opinions but for
inciting the commission of a discriminatory, and
therefore punishable, act. The Court further not-
ed that, under French law, the applicant was not
entitled to take the place of the governmental au-
thorities by declaring an embargo on products
from a foreign country.128
In some judgments however the European Court
has provided protection for racist expression129
or statements that could be interpreted as sup-
porting the former Nazi-regime, as the speech
was related to a broader discussion on matters of
public interest.130 In the case of Gündüz v. Turkey,
the European Court of Human Rights has also
rejected the justification of a criminal conviction
because of inciting the people to hatred and hos-
tility. In this case, the applicant, in his capacity of
the leader of an Islamic sect, during a TV-debate
had demonstrated a profound dissatisfaction
with contemporary, democratic and secular insti-
tutions in Turkey by describing them as “impi-
ous”. During the programme he also openly
called for the introduction of the sharia. Due to
these statements Gündüz was found guilty by the
state security court of incitement to hatred and
hostility on the basis of a distinction founded on
religion. The European Court observed that the
applicant was invited to participate in the pro-
gramme to present the sect and its nonconform-
ist views, including the notion that democratic
values were incompatible with its conception of
Islam. This topic was the subject of widespread
debate in the Turkish media and concerned an is-
sue of general interest. The Court underlined
that merely defending the sharia, without calling
for the use of violence to establish it, cannot be
regarded as “hate speech”.131 In the case of Er-
bakan v. Turkey it had not been established ac-
cording to the European Court, that the ‘hate
speech’ for which Erbakan was convicted for had
124 ECtHR (Decision), 16 November 2004, Case No. 23131/03, Norwood v. U.K..
125 ECtHR, Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994. See also ECtHR, Gündüz v. Turkey, 4  December 2003.
126 ECtHR, Gündüz v. Turkey, 4  December 2003 and ECtHR, Kutlular v. Turkey, 29 April 2008. See also ECtHR, Otto-
Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994; ECtHR, Wingrove v. U.K., 25 November 1996 and ECtHR, I.A. v. Turkey,
13 September 2005. 
127 ECtHR, Féret v. Belgium, 16 July 2009. See also ECtHR, Soulas a.o. v. France, 10 July 2008; ECtHR, Balsytė-Lideikienė v.
Lithuania, 4 November 2008 and ECtHR, Willem v. France, 16 July 2009.
128 ECtHR, Willem v. France, 16 July 2009.
129 ECtHR, Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994.
130 ECtHR, Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 23 September 1998.
131 ECtHR, Gündüz v. Turkey, 4  December 2003. See also ECtHR, Giniewski v. France, 31 January 2006 and ECtHR, Aydin
Tatlav v. Turkey, 2 May 2006.
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given rise to, or had been likely to give rise to, a
“present risk” and an “imminent danger”. The
Court considered that the interference by the
Turkish authorities had not been reasonably pro-
portionate to the legitimate aims pursued, regard
being had to the interest of a democratic society
in ensuring and maintaining freedom of political
debate.132 In many cases against Turkey the
Court found that the convictions or sanctions for
separatist propaganda or incitement to hatred or
hostility did violate Article 10, as the impugned
statements, speeches, publications or pro-
grammes did, in the Court’s view, not incite to vi-
olence or terrorism.133 
In a recent judgment the Court was of the opin-
ion that to persuade readers of a book of the legit-
imacy and inevitability of torture and summary
executions in times of war during an important
period in history, is not a decisive factor to ex-
clude these statements from protection under
Article 10 of the Convention. In the Court’s view,
the fact that the author of the book had not tak-
en a critical stance with regard to these horrifying
practices and that, instead of expressing regret,
he had claimed to have been acting in accordance
with the mission entrusted to him, formed an in-
tegral part of a witness account that unquestion-
ably formed part of a debate on a matter of public
concern which was of singular importance for
the collective memory about an important period
in a country’s history. Accordingly, penalising a
publisher for having assisted in the dissemina-
tion of such a witness account would seriously
hamper contribution to the discussion on mat-
ters of public interest. As the Court in this case
did not consider the content of the book as a glo-
rification of war crimes, it came to the conclusion
that the French courts had violated Article 10 of
the Convention by convicting the publisher of
the book.134 
While the Court in some earlier cases accepted in-
terferences in freedom of expression as to protect
the religious feelings of others135, its more recent
case law is reflecting that defamation of a reli-
gious community or criticism of a religion is cer-
tainly not excluded from protection under Arti-
cle 10. In the case Giniewski v. France the Court was
of the opinion that the defamatory statements a
journalist was convicted for, linking a popular
doctrine developed by the Catholic Church with
the origins of the Holocaust, did contribute
though to the discussion of the various possible
reasons behind the extermination of Jews in Eu-
rope, a question of indisputable public interest in
a democratic society. The Court was of the opin-
ion that the litigious article written by the jour-
nalist did not contain attacks on religious beliefs
as such, but a view which the applicant had
wished to express as a journalist and a historian.
As the article had not been gratuitously offensive
or insulting and had not incited disrespect or ha-
tred, the Court found a violation of Article 10.136
In the case Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey, the Court found
the prosecution and conviction of a journalist for
publishing a book designed to defile and offend
a religion, a violation of freedom of expression.
The Court was of the opinion that certain passag-
es of the book contained strong criticism of reli-
gion in a social-political context. However, these
passages had no insulting tone and neither con-
tained an abusive attack against Muslims or
against sacred symbols of Muslim religion. The
Court did not exclude that Muslims could none-
theless feel offended by the caustic commentary
on their religion, but this was not considered a
sufficient reason to legitimise the criminal con-
viction of the author of the book.137
3.8. Toward a right of access to official documents
An important new characteristic is the Court’s re-
cent shift in approaching access to public documents
132 ECtHR, Erbakan v. Turkey, 6 July 2006.
133 See e.g. ECtHR, Incal v. Turkey, 9 June 1998; ECtHR, Erdogdu and Ince v. Turkey, 8 July 1999; ECtHR, Karatas v. Turkey, 8
July 1999; ECtHR, Gerger v. Turkey, 8 July 1999; ECtHR, Sürek and Ozdemir v. Turkey, 8 July 1999; ECtHR, Ceylan v. Tur-
key, 8 July 1999; ECtHR, Özturk v. Turkey, 28 September 1999; ECtHR, Erdogdu v. Turkey, 15 June 2000; ECtHR, Sener v.
Turkey, 18 July 2000; ECtHR, Ibrahim Aksoy v. Turkey, 10 October 2000; ECtHR, E.K. v. Turkey, 7 February 2000; ECtHR,
Karakoç a.o. v. Turkey, 15 October 2002; ECtHR, Kizilyaprak v. Turkey, 2 October 2003; ECtHR, Koç and Tambaş v. Tur-
key, 21 March 2006; ECtHR, Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon Yayın Yapım Ve Tanıtım A.Ş. v. Turkey, 30 March 2006;
ECtHR, Sevgi Yilmaz v. Turkey, 11 April 2006; ECtHR, Dicle v. Turkey, 11 April 2006; ECtHR, Varli e.a. v. Turkey, 27 April
2006; ECtHR, Alinak a.o. v. Turkey, 4 May 2006; ECtHR, Ergin (No. 6) v. Turkey, 4 May 2006; ECtHR, Eytisim Ltd. Şti. v.
Turkey, 22 June 2006; ECtHR, Yesilgöz en Firik v. Turkey, 27 June 2006; ECtHR, Deniz v. Turkey, 27 June 2007; ECtHR,
Çapan v. Turkey, 25 July 2006; ECtHR, Halis Doğan (No. 2) v. Turkey, 25 July 2006; ECtHR, Güzel (No. 2) v. Turkey, 27 July
2006; ECtHR, Ulusoy v. Turkey, 31 July 2007 and ECtHR, Bahçeci and Turan v. Turkey, 16 June 2009.
134 ECtHR, Orban a.o. v. France, 15 January 2009.
135 ECtHR, Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994; ECtHR, Wingrove v. U.K., 25 November 1996 and ECtHR,
I.A. v. Turkey, 13 September 2005.
136 ECtHR, Giniewski v. France, 31 January 2006.
137 ECtHR, Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey, 2 May 2006.
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from the perspective of Article 10 of the Conven-
tion. The Court for a long time has refused to ap-
ply Article 10 in cases of refusals of access to pub-
lic documents. However, in a judgment of 2007
the Court expressed the opinion that “particularly
strong reasons must be provided for any measure affect-
ing this role of the press and limiting access to informa-
tion which the public has the right to receive”138, implic-
itly recognising at least a right of access to
information. In the spring of 2009 the Court has
delivered two important judgments in which it
now has recognised the right of access to official
documents. The Court made clear that when
public bodies hold information that is needed for
public debate, the refusal to provide documents
in this matter to those who are requesting for ac-
cess, is a violation of the right to freedom of ex-
pression and information guaranteed under Arti-
cle 10 of the Convention. The case of TASZ v.
Hungary concerns a request by the Hungarian
Civil Liberties Union (Társaság a Szabadságjogokért,
TASZ) to Hungary’s Constitutional Court to dis-
close a parliamentarian’s complaint questioning
the legality of new criminal legislation concern-
ing drug-related offences. The Constitutional
Court refused to release the information. As the
Court found that the applicant was involved in
the legitimate gathering of information on a
matter of public importance and that the Consti-
tutional Court’s monopoly of information
amounted to a form of censorship, it concluded
that the interference with the applicant’s rights
was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
The European Court’s judgment mentioned in-
deed the “censorial power of an information monopo-
ly” when public bodies refuse to release informa-
tion needed by the media or civil society
organisations to perform their “watchdog” func-
tion. The Court referred to its consistent case law
in which it has recognized that the public has a
right to receive information of general interest
and that the most careful scrutiny on the part of
the Court is called for when the measures taken
by the national authority are capable of discour-
aging the participation of the press, one of socie-
ty's “watchdogs”, in the public debate on matters
of legitimate public concern, even measures
which merely make access to information more
cumbersome. It was also underlined that the law
cannot allow arbitrary restrictions which may be-
come a form of indirect censorship in case the au-
thorities would create obstacles to the gathering
of information. This latter activity is an essential
preparatory step in journalism and is an inher-
ent, protected part of press freedom. The Court
emphasized once more that the function of the
press, including the creation of forums of public
debate, is not limited to the media or profession-
al journalists. Indeed, in the present case, the
preparation of the forum of public debate was
conducted by a non-governmental organisation.
The Court recognized civil society’s important
contribution to the discussion of public affairs
and qualified the applicant association, which is
involved in human rights litigation, as a social
“watchdog”. The Court was of the opinion that in
these circumstances the applicant’s activities
warrant Convention protection similar to that af-
forded to the press. Furthermore, given that the
applicant’s intention was to impart to the public
the information gathered from the constitution-
al complaint in question, and thereby to contrib-
ute to the public debate concerning legislation
on drug-related offences, its right to impart in-
formation was clearly impaired.139
The European Court’s judgment in TASZ v. Hun-
gary is obviously a new step in the direction of the
recognition by the Court of a right of access to
public documents under Article 10 of the Con-
vention, although the Court is still reluctant to
affirm this explicitly. The Court recalls that “Arti-
cle 10 does not (..) confer on the individual a right of ac-
cess to a register containing information on his personal
position, nor does it embody an obligation on the Gov-
ernment to impart such information to the individual”
and that “it is difficult to derive from the Convention a
general right of access to administrative data and docu-
ments”. But the judgment also states that “the
Court has recently advanced towards a broader inter-
pretation of the notion of “freedom to receive informa-
tion” (..) and thereby towards the recognition of a right
of access to information”, referring to its decision in
the case of Sdruženi Jiho?eské Matky v. Czech Repub-
lic.140 The Court notes that “the right to freedom to
receive information basically prohibits a Government
from restricting a person from receiving information
that others wish or may be willing to impart to him”.
But it also considers that the State has an obliga-
138 ECtHR, Timpul Info-Magazine and Anghel v. Moldova, 27 November 2007.
139 ECtHR, Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, 14 April 2009.
140 ECtHR (Decision) 10 July 2006, Case No. 19101/03, Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic. See also W. Hins and D.
Voorhoof, “Access to State-held information as a Fundamental Right under the European Convention on Human
Rights, 3 European Constitutional Law Review (2007), p. 114-126.
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tion not to impede the flow of information
sought by a journalist or a an interested citizen.
Another judgment with Hungary as the defend-
ant state concerns the attempt of a historian, Mr
János Kenedi, to have access to certain docu-
ments deposited at the Ministry of the Interior
regarding the functioning of the State Security
Services in Hungary in the 1960s. Mr Kenedi,
who earlier published several books on the func-
tioning of secret services in totalitarian regimes,
complained to the European Court about the
Hungarian authorities’ protracted reluctance to
enforce a court order granting him unrestricted
access to these documents. For several years Ken-
edi tried to get access to relevant information
from the Ministry, but to no avail. After contin-
ued refusals, he obtained domestic court orders
to enforce access. The Ministry, however, contin-
ued to obstruct, for example by requiring that
Kenedi would sign a declaration of confidentiali-
ty. Kenedi refused, also because the Court order
had not mentioned confidentiality as a require-
ment. At the moment of the proceedings in Stras-
bourg, Kenedi still did not have access to all doc-
uments he requested for. The European Court
held unanimously that there had been a violation
of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, on account
of the excessively long proceedings - over ten
years - with which Mr Kenedi sought to gain and
enforce his access to documents concerning the
Hungarian secret services. Also Article 10 was vi-
olated in the Court’s view. It reiterated that “access
to original documentary sources for legitimate historical
research was an essential element of the exercise of the
applicant’s right to freedom of expression”. The Court
noted that Mr Kenedi had obtained a court judg-
ment granting him access to the documents in
question, following which the domestic courts
had repeatedly found in his favour in the ensuing
enforcement proceedings. The administrative au-
thorities had persistently resisted their obliga-
tion to comply with the domestic judgment, thus
hindering Mr Kenedi’s access to documents he
needed to write his study. The Court concluded
that the authorities had acted arbitrarily and in
defiance of domestic law. Their obstructive ac-
tions had also led to the finding of a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court held,
therefore that the authorities had misused their
powers by delaying Mr Kenedi’s exercise of his
right to freedom of expression, in violation of Ar-
ticle 10.141 Hence, an important new develop-
ment is that the Court recognises the applicabili-
ty of the right to freedom of expression and
information in matters of access to official docu-
ments, further expanding the scope of applica-
tion of Article 10 of the Convention.142 With this
new approach the European Court of Human
Rights is now in line with the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights that in its judgment in
the case of Claude Reyes and others v. Chile consid-
ered a refusal to give access to public documents
to be a violation of the freedom of expression as
enshrined in Article 13 of the Inter-American
Convention on Human Rights, while stressing
the connection between the right of access to of-
ficial documents and democracy.143
3.9. The proportionality test
In its assessment whether an interference com-
plained of is necessary in a democratic society,
the Court integrates the proportionality principle :
the nature and severity of the penalties imposed
are factors to be taken into account when assess-
ing the proportionality of an interference with
the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article
10.  It is e.g. considerably more difficult to justify
prior restraint (e.g. an injunction, a ban on a
newspaper or TV-programme or a suspension of
a broadcasting license)144 than a subsequent
criminal conviction or civil liability. In Cump?n?
and Maz?re v. Romania the Court considered that
by prohibiting the applicants from working as
journalists as a preventive measure of general
scope, albeit subject to a time-limit, the domestic
courts had contravened the principle that the
press must be able to perform the role of a public
watchdog in a democratic society.145 
The Court indeed exercises the utmost caution
where the measures taken or sanctions imposed
by the national authorities are such as to dis-
suade the press from taking part in the discus-
sion of matters of legitimate public concern. The
Court is of the opinion that “investigative journal-
ists are liable to be inhibited from reporting on matters
141 ECtHR, Kenedi v. Hungary, 26 May 2009. The Court came to the conclusion that in this case also Article 13 (effective
remedy) had been violated, since the Hungarian system did not provide for an effective way of remedying the violation
of the freedom of expression in this situation. The Court found that the procedure available in Hungary at the time
and designed to remedy the violation of Mr Kenedi’s Article 10 rights had been proven ineffective. There had, there-
fore, been a violation of Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 10 of the Convention.
142 See also the European Convention on Access to Official Documents, 27 November 2008.
143 IACtHR, Claude Reyes a.o. v. Chile, 19 September 2006 at <www.corteidh.or.cr>.
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of general public interest (..) if they run the risk, as one
of the standard sanctions imposable for unjustified at-
tacks on the reputation of private individuals, of being
sentenced to prison or to a prohibition on the exercise of
their profession”. 146 The Court in this regards often
refers to the risk of a “chilling effect”. This means
that also ex post sanctions must meet the propor-
tionality test. Although sentencing is in principle
a matter for the national courts, the Court con-
siders that “the imposition of a prison sentence for a
press offence will be compatible with journalists’ free-
dom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the
Convention only in exceptional circumstances, notably
where other fundamental rights have been seriously im-
paired, as, for example, in the case of hate speech or in-
citement to violence”.147 In some cases the Court
has accepted that an interference reflected a
pressing social need, but because of the severe
character of the sanction, the too high amount of
an award of damages148 or a sentence to impris-
onment149, the Court found a violation of Article
10. Hence the nature and severity of the sanctions
can be a reason for the Court as such to consider
an interference as a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention. In the case of Cump?n? and Maz?re v.
Romania the Grand Chamber was of the opinion
that a “classic case” of defamation in the context
of a debate on a matter of legitimate public inter-
est “presents no justification whatsoever for the imposi-
tion of a prison sentence. Such a sanction, by its very na-
ture, will inevitably have a chilling effect, and the fact
that the applicants did not serve their prison sentence
does not alter that conclusion”.150 In Mahmudov and
Agazade v. Azerbaijan the Court firmly stated that
“a prison sentence (..) by its very nature, has a chilling
effect on the exercise of journalistic freedom”.151 Also a
suspended sanction can be considered in breach
with Article 10. In the case of Aydin Tatlav v. Tur-
key the Court was of the opinion that a criminal
conviction involving, moreover, the risk of a cus-
todial sentence, could have the effect of discour-
aging authors and editors from publishing opin-
ions about religion that were not conformist and
could impede the protection of pluralism, which
is indispensable for the healthy development of a
democratic society.152
On the other hand,  also a light or lenient sanc-
tion, or even an order of rectification or an ad-
monishment can be a breach of Article 10.153 The
Court does not accept that the limited nature of
the fine is decisive as regards the issue of necessi-
ty.154 What is of greater importance is that the
journalist was convicted. In some cases the Court
considered that “the proceedings were civil rather
144 Although Art. 10 does not prohibit as such prior restraint. See e.g. the minority opinion of judge De Meyer in ECtHR,
Wingrove v. U.K., 25 November 1996. Prior restraints on the activities of journalists and media call however for the
most careful scrutiny by the Court and are justified only in exceptional circumstances. In the case of Incal v. Turkey the
Court referred to "the radical nature of the interference in question. Its preventive aspect by itself raises problems
under Article 10”, ECtHR, Incal v. Turkey, 9 June1998. See also ECtHR, Sunday Times (n° 1) v. U.K., 26 April 1979;
ECtHR, Müller a.o. v. Switzerland, 24 May 1988; ECtHR, Observer and Guardian v. U.K. and Sunday Times (n° 2) v. U.K., 26
November 1991; ECtHR, Plon (Société) v. France, 18 May 2004 and ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Cumpănă and Mazăre v.
Romania, 17 December 2004. See also  ECtHR, Piermont v. France, 27 April 1994; ECtHR, Vereinigung Demokratischer Sol-
daten Österreichs and Gubi v. Austria, 19 December 1994; ECtHR, News Verlags GmbK & CoKG v. Austria, 11 January 2000;
ECtHR Association Ekin v. France, 17 July 2001; ECtHR, Çetin a.o. v. Turkey, 13 February 2003; ECtHR, Özgür Radyo v. Tur-
key, 30 March 2006; ECtHR, Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon Yayın Yapım Ve Tanıtım A.Ş. t. Turkey, 30 March 2006,
ECtHR, Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria, 7 December 2006 and ECtHR, Woman on Waves v. Portugal, 3 February 2009.
145 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania, 17 December 2004.
146 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania, 17 December 2004.
147 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania, 17 December 2004; ECtHR, Mahmudov and Agazade v.
Azerbaijan, 18 December 2008 and ECtHR, Dlugolęcki v. Poland, 24 February 2009.
148 ECtHR, Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. U.K., 13 July 1995.
149 ECtHR, Skalka v. Poland, 27 May 2003; ECtHR, Saday v. Turkey, 30 March 2006; ECtHR, Lyaskho v. Ukraine,10 Augustus
2006; ECtHR, Artun and Güvener v. Turkey, 26 June 2007; ECtHR, Mahmudov and Agazade v. Azerbaijan, 18 December
2008; ECtHR, Mehmet Cevher Ilhan v. Turkey, 13 January 2009 and ECtHR, Marchenko v. Ukraine 2009, 19 February 2009.
150 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania, 17 December 2004; ECtHR, Dlugolęcki v. Poland, 24 Febru-
ary 2009 and ECtHR, Kydonis v. Greece, 2 April 2009. See also Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Reso-
lution 1577 (2007), Towards decriminalisation of defamation, PACE, 4 October 2007. See however ECtHR (Grand Chamber),
Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, 22 October 2007.
151 ECtHR, Mahmudov and Agazade v. Azerbaijan, 18 December 2008.
152 ECtHR, Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey, 2 May 2006. See also many other cases against Turkey, such as ECtHR, Özgür Gündem v.
Turkey, 16 March 2000; ECtHR, Sener v. Turkey, 8 July 1999; ECtHR, E.K. v. Turkey, 7 February 2002; ECtHR, Seher Kara-
tas v. Turkey, 9 July 2002 and Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey, 22 April 2008.
153 ECtHR, Barfod v. Danmark, 22 February 1989; ECtHR, Casado Coca v. Spain, 24 February 1994; ECtHR, De Haes and Gij-
sels v. Belgium, 24 February 1997; ECtHR, Nikula v. Finland, 21 March 2002; ECtHR, Steur v. The Netherlands, 28 oktober
2003; ECtHR, Selistö v. Finland,16 November 2004; ECtHR, Turhan v. Turkey, 19 May 2005; ECtHR, Veraart v. the Nether-
lands, 30 November 2006; ECtHR, A.S. Diena and Ozoliņš v. Latvia, 12 July 2007 and ECtHR, Csánics v. Hungary, 20 Janu-
ary 2009.
154 ECtHR, Selistö v. Finland,16 November 2004.
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than criminal in nature does not detract from the fact
that the standards applied by the (..) courts were not
compatible with the principles embodied in Article 10,
since they did not adduce “relevant” and “sufficient”
reasons justifying the interference at issue”. When a le-
gitimate interference has only a restricted and rel-
evant impact, is sufficiently fine tuned, is not cat-
egorical or leaves the applicants sufficient other
possibilities to express their opinions or impart
information, this will be an additional argument
for the Court to accept the justified character of
an interference complained of in the light of Arti-
cle 10155, at least when a milder sanction was not
possible156 or when the interference was suffi-
ciently limited in time or in space.157 In the case
of Hachette Filipacchi v. France the Court noted that
the French courts had refused an application for
an order to seize the offending copies of an issue
of Paris-Match while they had  ordered the maga-
zine to publish a statement informing its readers
that a photograph had been published without
consent while its publication was an intrusion
into the intimacy of the private life of the family
concerned. The Court considered that the word-
ing of the statement revealed the care the French
courts had taken to respect the editorial freedom
of Paris-Match. The Court considered that “of all
the sanctions which French legislation permitted, the or-
der to publish the statement was the one which, both in
principle and as regards its content, was the sanction en-
tailing the least restrictions on exercise of the applicant
company’s rights”.158 Regarding the publication of
an apology the Court has noted that “to make
someone retract his or her own opinion by acknowledg-
ing his or her own wrongness is a doubtful form of re-
dress and does not appear to be “necessary””.159
Some kinds of interferences, by their very nature,
have a disproportionate character. In the case of
Khursid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden the Court
attached particular importance to the applicants’
eviction from their flat in which they had lived
for more than six years, because they refused to
remove a satellite dish in their flat after the land-
lord had initiated proceedings against them. The
Court considered “that evicting the applicants and
their three children from their home was a measure
which cannot be considered proportionate to the aim
pursued”.160
4. Conclusions and challenges
It is striking how the cases in relation to freedom
of expression the European Court has dealt with
often reflect the historical and contemporary
“traumas” in the member states. Most cases
against Turkey are related to the Kurdish ques-
tion or discuss terrorism or freedom of expres-
sion in relation to religion. Many cases against
Austria are about journalistic reporting and po-
litical debate on the alleged neo-nazi sympathies
of politicians and racism or xenophobia in Aus-
tria. Cases against Italy are linked to the fight
against the mafia and the role of the judiciary
and politicians in this context. Cases against
France refer to aspects of collaboration and re-
sistance during the second world war, concern
public debate or reporting on terrorism in the
Basque region or Corsica, or refer to the role of
France in the civil war in Algeria or the nuclear
fall out in France due to the Chernobyl accident.
Other cases deal with the role of the Front Nation-
al and its (former) leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, while
some cases in France have a high “presidential”
character. Many cases in Russia, Moldova,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and Romania are
about corruption and fraud, sometimes in rela-
tion with mafia or (former) secret police. A major
case against Norway concerns seal hunting. The
Danish Jersild case had to do with upcoming xen-
ophobia in Copenhagen and a Swedish case was
linked to the investigation of the murder of Olof
Palme, the Swedish prime minister killed in 1986.
Some cases against Germany concerned freedom
of expression and “berufsverbote” of members of
communist or national-socialist parties, while
cases against the United Kingdom concerned
contempt of court, secret intelligence, libel or
155 ECtHR, Wabl v. Austria, 21 March 2000; ECtHR, Constantinescu v. Romania, 27 June 2000; ECtHR, Krone Verlag GmbH &
CoKG and Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & CoKG, 20 March 2003; ECtHR, Murphy v. Ireland, 10 July
2003; ECtHR, Leempoel and SA Ciné Télé Revue v. Belgium, 9 November 2006 and ECtHR, Leroy v. France, 2 October 2008.
See also Demuth v. Switzerland, 5 November 2002; ECtHR, Appleby v. U.K., 6 May 2003.
156 See ECtHR, Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995; ECtHR, Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, 29 February 2000; ECtHR, Nikula v. Fin-
land, 21 March 2002; ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Guja v. Moldova, 12 February 2008; ECtHR, Kudeshkina v. Russia, 26 Feb-
ruary 2009 and ECtHR, Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, 16 July 2009.
157 ECtHR, Observer and Guardian v. U.K., 26 November 1991; ECtHR, Sunday Times (n° 2) v. U.K., 26 November 1991;
ECtHR, Plon (Société) v. France, 18 May 2004 and ECtHR, Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria, 25 January 2007.
158 ECtHR, Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, 14 June 2007.
159 ECtHR, Kazakov v. Russia, 18 December 2008. See also ECtHR, Radio Twist v. Slovakia, 19 December 2006. In another
recent case the Court considered an apology to be an appropriate sanction: ECtHR, Cihan Özturk v. Turkey, 9 June
2009.
160 ECtHR, Khursid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, 16 December 2008.
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Close Circuit TV (CCTV). The Court’s judgments
against Belgium are related to cases of child
abuse, the case of Mark Dutroux, the murder of
the chairman of the socialist party, alleged cor-
ruption and bribery in the surroundings of the
European Commission in Brussels, and incite-
ment to racism and discrimination by a leader of
a far right political party. A major case against
Switzerland concerned a leaked confidential let-
ter of an ambassador on the issue of  financial
compensations to Jewish families for unclaimed
assets deposited at Swiss banks during the Holo-
caust. It is also striking that many cases are relat-
ed to expressions, information and opinions
coming up for respect for human rights, democ-
racy, health and environment. How in other
words in many cases citizens, journalists, media
or NGOs were victim in their own country of an
illegitimate interference in their right to freedom
of expression contributing to a more sustainable
society. It is obvious that in most of the judg-
ments the Strasbourg Court has emphasized, def-
initely more than the national authorities, that
the impugned press articles, publications or
statements needed protection as they were con-
tributing to public debate, and sometimes even
to the transition and development towards de-
mocracy. The European Court’s case law clearly
reflects the idea that freedom of critical expres-
sion, pluralist media and independent journalis-
tic reporting can help democracy to take root and
to develop in a country. 
Over the years, Article 10 of the Convention has
been more and more incorporated in the domes-
tic law and practice of (most of) the member
states. Parliaments, legislators, governments,
courts, judges, public prosecutors, police officers
and administrative bodies are taking the right to
freedom of expression and information more se-
rious in its various dimensions and consequenc-
es. NGOs advocating freedom of expression,
journalists’ associations, legal journals, law facul-
ties in their education and research programmes,
newspapers and websites are contributing to a
better understanding and to a committed aware-
ness of the Strasbourg Court’s case law in the area
of freedom of expression and media regulation.
Press freedom and freedom of expression is how-
ever never finally accomplished: the tension be-
tween the principle of freedom of expression in a
democracy and the need for public or private in-
terests to restrict this freedom urges to a perma-
nent attempt to find a fair balance between the
competing interests and values concerned, free-
dom of expression being however a precondition
in a democratic society. The inherent paradox of
Article 10 is that freedom of expression is consid-
ered as a necessity in a democratic society, while
at the same time the restrictions and limitations
on that freedom are justified as well as being nec-
essary in a democratic society. According to the
jurisprudence of the European Court in Stras-
bourg the test whether a restriction or sanction is
necessary in a democratic society however needs
to be a very strict one. 
The challenge for the future is to bring more Eu-
ropean Convention member states in line with
the European Court’s case law and to inspire, in-
fluence or persuade other states and regions in
the world to upgrade freedom of expression of its
citizens, to protect the freedom of newsgathering
and independent and critical reporting by jour-
nalists and NGOs and to create more access to in-
formation and transparency on matters of inter-
est for society. Protecting and effectively
guaranteeing these rights are crucial in order to
develop the quality of democracy, to stimulate di-
versity and tolerance, to guarantee the respect for
human rights and ultimately to help to realise a
more sustainable, and hence a better, world to
live in. The jurisprudence of the European Court
applying Article 10 of the European Convention
is to be considered as an authoritative interna-
tional standard regarding the protection of free-
dom of expression and information. Hence, it is
very important to uphold, consolidate and fur-
ther develop the high standards guaranteeing
this right. The European Court of Human Rights
itself should be very cautious not to reduce the
acquired level of protection based on Article 10 of
the Convention. The style or form of journalistic
reporting and the techniques used for newsgath-
ering should also in the future be highly protect-
ed under Article 10, in order to secure that the
media, journalists, NGOs and citizens can play
their role as social watchdogs. This indeed im-
plies sometimes a sharp, disturbing, critical or
provocative tone or approach. Two judges of the
European Court of Human Right have recently
emphasized the importance and the necessity of
such an approach: “‘Watchdogs’ are not meant to be
peaceful puppies; their function is to bark and to disturb
the appearance of peace whenever a menace threat-
ens”.161
161 ECtHR, Saygili and Falakaoğlu (n° 2) v. Turkey, 17 February 2009 (annex, dissenting opinion).
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